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1 Abstract 
 
In recent years many stock exchanges have moved away from floor-based to automated-based 
trading systems.  However, the choice between these alternative trading systems is a major 
concern for stock exchange regulators and designers, and the impact of their merits on market 
characteristics (e.g. liquidity) is controversial. This thesis is motivated by the desire to shed light 
on this controversy, and therefore aims to offer a comparative analysis of various aspects of 
liquidity under floor and automated trading systems. More specifically, within the context of 
different trading systems (i.e. floor versus electronic), this thesis examines three empirical issues: 
firstly, the determinants of market-wide liquidity and its time-series behaviour; secondly, 
whether market-wide and firm-specific liquidity are priced in assets returns; and finally, whether 
the cross-sectional variations in firm-specific liquidity could be explained by the cross-sectional 
variations in information asymmetry and divergence of opinion.  
 
The findings of this thesis can be summarized as follows. Firstly, market-wide liquidity is 
significantly influenced by market returns, market volatility, interest rate variables and the 
announcement of macroeconomic indicators. Market-wide liquidity also shows distinct day-of-
the-week regularities and a distinct pattern around holidays. The impact of some factors on 
market-wide liquidity, and the time-series behaviour of market-wide liquidity on the floor 
trading system in some markets is higher than that on the electronic trading systems. Secondly, 
market-wide liquidity has a significant impact on assets returns, and after controlling for its 
effect, firm-specific liquidity has a significant effect on risk-adjusted returns. The liquidity 
premium required on market-wide and firm-specific liquidity, for some proxies of liquidity in 
some markets, is higher on an automated trading system than on a floor trading system. Finally, 
firm-specific liquidity is negatively related to the level of information asymmetry. However, the 
evidence for the impact of divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity is inconclusive; a 
higher level of divergence of opinion results in higher liquidity, which supports the optimistic 
view; and firm-specific liquidity decreases with divergence of opinion, which is consistent with 
the view that disagreement among investors is a source of risk. Additionally, after automation, 
the impact of information asymmetry (divergence of opinion) on firm-specific liquidity is greater 
(lesser) than that before automation. 
 
Overall, this thesis demonstrates that the design and the structure of markets is closely linked to 
the latter’s performance and that the change to automated trading systems has significant 
implications for liquidity. As such, this study should be a valuable reference point for stock 
exchanges that have introduced automation, or are considering doing so.  
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7 Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
he last two decades has witnessed the emergence of market microstructure as a 
new field within finance literature. Market microstructure “is concerned with the 
process by which investor’s latent demands are ultimately translated into 
transactions” (Madhavan, 2000, p. 206).  In the words of O'Hara (1997), market 
microstructure can also be defined as “the study of the process and outcomes of exchanging 
assets under explicit trading rules” (p. 1). The central theme of this area, in contrast to the 
efficient market hypothesis, is that due to different frictions, stock prices do not need to be 
equal to the full-information expectations of value (Madhavan, 2000). Therefore, market 
microstructure focuses on studying the process of price formation under different market 
frictions such as bid-ask spread and information asymmetry between traders. 
 
This area has attracted the attention of several researchers and since its emergence it has 
grown and expanded quickly. As a result, there are already some useful studies that provide 
a valuable survey of the literature on market microstructure. For instance, Madhavan (2000) 
offers a distinctive account which categorizes issues examined in market microstructure 
into four categories: price formation and price discovery; market structure and design 
issues; information and disclosure, and the interface of market microstructure with other 
areas of finance1.  
 
This thesis takes the second and the fourth categories as its main focus. The published 
literature on market structure and design issues focuses on examining how different trading 
rules and mechanisms affect market quality and liquidity, while the literature on the 
interface of market microstructure with other areas of finance focuses on the quest for the 
link between market microstructure and other areas of finance such as asset pricing and 
corporate finance. The themes in this thesis are directly related to the on-going debates
                                                 
1
 Other surveys include O'Hara (1997) which provides a detailed survey on the theoretical literature on market 
microstructure, Keim and Madhavan (1998) who offer an overview of the literature on the trading costs for 
institutional investors, and Biais et al. (2005) who survey the literature that focuses on price formation and 
market design.  
T 
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 (Madhavan, 2000, 2001; Jain, 2005; Huang and Chou, 2007) surrounding the implications 
of market structure on market performance and dynamics, and thus concentrate on the sub-
field of market structure and design within the area of market microstructure, and in doing 
so examine and compare various issues under different market structures, especially floor 
versus electronic trading systems. Within this context, this thesis examines the determinants 
of liquidity and its implications on asset pricing. The latter issue will provide greater and 
stronger links between market microstructure and other areas of finance such as asset 
pricing areas.  
 
One main reason for the rapid growth in market microstructure literature is the significant 
changes that have been adopted by many stock exchanges in their structure and design. 
These changes have affected the way in which market participants interact. Each structure 
determines the rules and the ways that affect price formation and the trading process, as 
well as the scope of information and strategic behaviour of traders (Biais et al., 2005). This 
ultimately affects the two main functions of financial markets, namely, liquidity and price 
discovery (O'Hara, 2003). The interest of academics and market participants such as 
exchange management, regulators and investors in enhancing their understanding of the 
effect of different market structures and trading mechanisms on market performance and 
characteristics has increased remarkably in recent times. This growing interest has 
stimulated the emergence of a large bulk of empirical research that mainly deals with 
examining the impact and the implications of specific trading mechanisms on market 
characteristics (such as liquidity and price efficiency) and compares market performance 
under different structures. For example, several papers have compared the trading costs of 
the continuous auction and dealership market (see Madhavan, 1992; Christie et al., 1994; 
Christie and Schultz, 1994; Huang and Stoll, 1996; Dutta and Madhavan, 1997 among 
others). Other studies such as Amihud et al. (1997) and Muscarella and Piwowar (2001) 
investigate the value effect for stocks moved from call auction trading to continuous 
trading. Additionally, some studies compare call auction and continuous auction with a 
special focus on the issue of informational efficiency, such as Amihud et al. (1990) and 
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) among others.  
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The adoption of electronic trading is one of the major changes that has occurred in market 
design and structure in recent years. Such a change has attracted the attention of several 
academics and exchange regulators and designers, as well as being the main focus of this 
thesis. This change (moving from floor to electronic trading system) is an important issue 
in market microstructure, and deserves thorough investigation for several reasons. Firstly, 
the use of electronic trading systems has grown rapidly due to advancing technology and 
stock market deregulation, to the extent that the fully automated trading systems’ share in 
securities trading has expanded widely (Brockman and Chung, 2000; Ning and Tse, 2009). 
Many stock exchanges around the world have abandoned floor trading systems and have 
fully automated their trading systems, including the Swiss Stock Exchange, the London 
Stock Exchange, the Vienna Stock Exchange and the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Some 
stock exchanges however, such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) still maintain a 
floor trading system2. As exchanges move from floor to electronic trading systems, 
investigation of such structural changes in market structure is of particular interest to 
regulators and stock exchange designers. It is important to provide them with the required 
knowledge and understanding of how the automation of trading systems will affect market 
microstructure characteristics, especially liquidity, so they can decide whether to follow the 
same steps as other automated stock exchanges or maintain their traditional trading 
systems. Furthermore, such investigations will be also pertinent for countries which are yet 
to establish their stock exchanges and are yet to decide on which system to use.  
 
Secondly, despite the extensive move towards the automation of trading systems, the issue 
of which trading system is the most suitable is far from resolved. There is ongoing 
controversy (Madhavan, 2000, 2001; Jain, 2005) concerning the relative merits of floor 
versus electronic trading systems, and to what extent these merits affect market 
characteristics such as liquidity and price efficiency. The proponents of floor trading argue 
that these systems are better than electronic systems. For example, professional 
relationships may evolve during floor trading because of repeated trading and result in the 
sharing of information about order flows, thus reducing the level of information asymmetry 
                                                 
2
 NYSE still maintains its floor trading because its members believe that the elimination of floor trading could 
result in worse prices for the public (Freund et al., 1997; Freund and Pagano, 2000). 
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and increasing liquidity (Venkataraman, 2001; Jain, 2005)3. Also, the role of human 
intermediaries (i.e. specialists and brokers) in floor trading systems could provide certain 
benefits for the trading process, through their quick reaction to different market conditions 
and the execution of sophisticated trading strategies, and thus reduce trading costs and 
market impact (Venkataraman, 2001). On the other hand, proponents of electronic trading 
systems argue that the latter is more efficient and may reduce problems associated with 
human error. In addition, these systems are able to attract new pools of liquidity by 
providing remote access to investors (see Freund et al., 1997; Freund and Pagano, 2000; 
Venkataraman, 2001; Jain, 2005). It appears important therefore to try to resolve some of 
this controversy by empirically examining and comparing automated trading systems with 
floor trading systems, in order to gain insight on the effects of the automation process on 
liquidity, on the implications for determinants of liquidity, and on the implications for 
liquidity on assets returns.  
 
Although there is already a large number of empirical studies that examine the relative 
performance of floor trading systems versus electronic trading systems (see Shyy and Lee, 
1995; Pirrong, 1996; Freund and Pagano, 2000; Venkataraman, 2001; Theissen, 2002a; 
Maghyereh, 2005; Ning and Tse, 2009 among others), they focus on investigating whether 
floor trading systems or electronic trading systems lead to higher liquidity, volatility and 
informational efficiency4. In other words, these studies enclose themselves within the 
typical perspective of comparison between different trading systems in relation to market 
quality. They compare the level of market characteristics such as liquidity, price efficiency 
and volatility before and after automation. What is presently lacking is a deeper 
understanding of the effect of the introduction of electronic trading systems on liquidity 
related issues such as the determinants and the time-series behaviour of market-wide 
liquidity; the importance of liquidity in asset pricing; and the implications of both 
information asymmetry between company managers and outsider investors, and divergence 
of opinion on firm-specific liquidity.  
                                                 
3
 Order flow is a stream of requests to trade that other traders make of the dealers (Harris, 2003) or which are 
submitted to the limit order book. Order flow is characterized by three parameters: order type (market or limit 
order), order direction (buy or sell) and order size (small or large) (see Domowitz et al. 2005). 
4
 For a detailed review of the literature on floor and electronic trading systems, see section 2.2 in chapter two.  
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Besides the market structure issue, one of the main issues of market microstructure is 
liquidity, which represents the focal point of this thesis. Liquidity can easily be recognized 
but unfortunately is not that easy to define. Harris (2003) defines liquidity as “the ability to 
trade large size quickly, at low cost, when you want to trade” (p. 394)5. Interest in liquidity 
started with the seminal work of Demsetz (1968), who formalizes the bid-ask spread as the 
cost of immediacy (i.e. the cost of providing liquidity). His work attracted the attention of 
other researchers towards liquidity. At the beginning, the empirical research focused on 
liquidity at firm level (i.e. firm-specific liquidity) and examined its determinants (the 
factors affecting the cost of supplying liquidity) such as Tinic (1972), Benston and 
Hagerman (1974), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Easley et al. (1996) among others. These 
studies depend on two paradigms in market microstructure theory to examine the 
determinants of stocks’ liquidity and its cost components: the inventory model and the 
information asymmetry model. According to the inventory model, market makers maintain 
an optimal inventory level and they face risk when their inventory deviates from the 
optimal level as a result of accommodating order flow. Therefore, market makers post 
lower (higher) bid-ask spread when they have long (short) positions in order to maintain the 
inventory at the desired level (see Stoll, 1978b; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Ho and 
Stoll, 1981; O'Hara and Oldfield, 1986 among others). The second model assumes that 
market makers face two types of traders, uninformed (i.e. liquidity motivated) and informed 
traders and that they cannot distinguish between them.  Consequently, market makers quote 
wider bid-ask spread to maximize the profit from liquidity motivated traders and minimize 
the loss to informed traders (see Bagehot, 1971; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O'Hara, 1987 among others)6. 
 
Recently, a new strand of literature in market microstructure has emerged which focuses on 
examining the existence of a common component in liquidity (i.e. commonality in 
liquidity). This strand is motivated by the pioneering work of Chordia et al. (2000), which 
was then followed by Huberman and Halka (2001), and Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) who 
                                                 
5
 This definition reflects various dimensions of liquidity. See section 2.1 in chapter two for these dimensions 
and their definition.  
6
 For a more comprehensive review and discussion of the literature on the inventory model and the 
information asymmetry model, see O'Hara (1997).  
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provide evidence on commonality in liquidity for the US markets7. These studies find that 
liquidity has a systematic common component and that the fluctuations of alternative 
measures of individual stock liquidity are correlated to market-wide liquidity. 
Consequently, the work on commonality shifts the focus of empirical research on liquidity 
of individual stocks toward liquidity at the aggregate level (i.e. market-wide liquidity), and 
paves the way for further empirical research in the market microstructure area8. For 
instance, the existence of a common component in liquidity sheds light on the importance 
of factors that could affect market-wide liquidity and what these factors could be. In recent 
years, only a few studies have examined market-wide liquidity and the underlying forces 
that are responsible for its time-series variation, particularly with regard to the US markets 
(NYSE, National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations System 
(NASDAQ) and the American Stock Exchange (AMEX)) (see Chordia et al., 2001a; 
Fujimoto, 2003b; Van Ness et al., 2005).   
 
Furthermore, the evidence of commonality not only attracted the attention of researchers 
towards specifying the factors that affect market-wide liquidity but also highlighted the 
importance of market liquidity on asset pricing, even though previously the literature had 
examined the relation between firm-specific liquidity and stock returns (see Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986). In the last four decades, the area of asset pricing has witnessed 
remarkable developments since the emergence of Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
                                                 
7
 Further work on commonality includes, for example, Coughenour and Saad (2004) who provide evidence on 
commonality in liquidity in NYSE and find that common market makers are one reason for liquidity 
commonality. Additionally, Domowitz et al. (2005) and Galariotis and Giouvris (2007) document the 
existence of liquidity commonality in the Australian and the London Stock Exchange respectively.   
8
 Commonality in liquidity refers to the phenomenon in which time-series fluctuations (i.e. variations) in 
individual stock’s liquidity are induced by common underlying factors or determinants (see Chordia et al., 
2000). In other words, it is the proposition that the liquidity of individual stocks responds to the changes in 
market-wide liquidity or industry-wide liquidity (Brockman and Chung, 2002; Fabre and Frino, 2004). 
According to Chordia et al. (2000), its empirical manifestation is in the co-movement of the individual stock 
liquidity’s variation with market liquidity’s variation; where the latter is the cross-sectional average of all 
individual stocks’ liquidity while excluding the liquidity of dependent stock from the average when 
estimating its sensitivity to changes in market liquidity (i.e. beta). This phenomenon, commonality in 
liquidity, is also referred to as systematic liquidity. This indicates that market-wide liquidity is one of the 
determinants of individual stocks’ liquidity and any shock or variation in market-wide liquidity leads to a 
market-wide effect (i.e. liquidity co-movements or systematic variation). Consequently, market-wide liquidity 
i.e. the liquidity of the whole market can be considered as a state (i.e. systematic) variable that affects many 
stocks simultaneously (see Huberman and Halka, 2001). Throughout this thesis, the terms market-wide 
liquidity, market liquidity and aggregate liquidity are used interchangeably.   
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which was introduced by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) in an attempt to explain cross-
sectional variation in stock returns. Extensive examination of this model eventually lead to 
other models in asset pricing such as intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) (Merton, 1973), 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) (Ross, 1976) and consumption CAPM (CCAPM) 
(Breeden, 1979). These models attempted to identify the risk factors that could provide a 
better explanation for the cross-sectional variation in asset returns. In addition, some 
researchers looked at macroeconomic variables as risk factors in asset pricing models such 
as industrial production, inflation, spread in interest rates, corporate bond yields, input costs 
and money supply (see Chen et al., 1986). Others examined the implications of production 
and investment decisions of companies on asset pricing, such as Bossaerts and Green 
(1989), Cochrane (1991), and Naik (1994).  
 
Moreover, the inability of CAPM to explain the cross-section of average returns on assets 
sorted by size and book-to-market ratio led to further developments in asset pricing 
represented by the work of Fama and French (1993). They provided a three factor model 
that was able to explain the cross-section return and capture the impact of stock 
characteristics such as size and the book-to-market ratio. Then, Carhart (1997) introduced 
the fourth factor model, which is the Fama-French three factor model augmented with the 
momentum risk factor, in an attempt to explain the momentum anomaly in asset pricing.  
Finally, asset pricing has witnessed a recent surge in interest in pricing models that account 
for the impact of liquidity on asset returns. However, the interest in liquidity and its 
importance in asset pricing started with the seminal work of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
who focus on firm-specific liquidity, as a characteristic of a stock, and its relation to asset 
prices. Very recently, after the evidence on commonality in liquidity had been documented 
in the US markets, the literature on liquidity and asset pricing, including that by Amihud 
(2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) among others, 
examines whether market-wide liquidity is a risk factor that is priced in the asset pricing 
model9.   
 
                                                 
9
 Refer to section 3.2 in chapter three for a detailed review of the literature on liquidity and asset pricing.  
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Information asymmetry is another important issue of market microstructure concerns. The 
literature in market microstructure has largely focused on the information asymmetry 
between traders (i.e. informed and uninformed traders), and examined its implications on 
market microstructure related characteristics such as liquidity (see Copeland and Galai, 
1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985; Easley and O'Hara, 1987; Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1988; Glosten and Harris, 1988; Hasbrouck, 1991; Madhavan and Smidt, 1991 
among others). Although the problem of information asymmetry could exist between 
various other groups such as shareholders, debt holders and managers, in this thesis we 
focus on  the information asymmetry between company managers and the market (i.e. 
outside investors). The empirical research conducted so far on information asymmetry has 
largely focused on its relation in the process of valuing firms’ assets and on examining the 
association between the change in the organizational form and the level of information 
asymmetry. For example, Nanda and Narayanan (1999), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999), Gilson et al. (2001) among others examine the relation between spinoff and 
information asymmetry between company managers and the outside market. Draper and 
Paudyal (2008) examine the role of information asymmetry in bidders’ gains10. In addition, 
the existence of information asymmetries between company managers and outside 
investors about a firm’s value and its future prospects is expected to affect the level of 
disagreement among market investors. Investors often share the same common information 
about firms but they disagree about its meaning and in the way they interpret this 
information (i.e. divergence of opinion). However, the level of disagreement among 
investors depends on both the amount and the quality of information about the firm that is 
made available to investors (Harris and Raviv, 1993; Dische, 2002; Doukas et al., 2004; 
Moeller et al., 2006). Although there is a large bulk of empirical research on divergence of 
opinion, it focuses on examining the importance of divergence of opinion among investors 
in asset pricing such as Miller (1977), Ackert and Athanassakos (1997), Lee and 
Swaminathan (2000), Diether et al. (2002), Boehme et al. (2006), Doukas et al. (2004), 
Doukas and McKnight (2005) among others11. 
 
                                                 
10
 For more details on the literature on corporate actions and information asymmetry see section 4.2.1 in 
chapter three. 
11
 See section 4.2.2 in chapter four for the literature on divergence of opinion and asset pricing. 
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Despite the growth in market microstructure literature in general, in the area of market 
structure and design, and in the area of the interface of market microstructure with other 
areas of finance such as asset pricing in particular, the literature still contains several gaps 
that this thesis attempts to fill.  
 
First: in spite of the importance and the amount of research in the area of market structure 
and design, the ongoing developments and changes in financial markets’ structure and 
design creates room for a considerable amount of future research in this area. However, the 
growing body of literature on market structure and design can be viewed as comparing and 
analyzing the impact of alternative market structures on market qualities such as liquidity 
and price efficiency. Thus, there is limited knowledge on how alternative market structures 
and designs could affect specific economic relations such as a market microstructure-
related characteristic, liquidity, with its determinants, and the implications of liquidity on 
asset pricing. In particular, these issues to the best of our knowledge have not yet been 
examined and compared before and after the introduction of electronic trading systems.  
 
Second: the existence of commonality in liquidity has attracted the attention of market 
microstructure literature towards the importance of market-wide liquidity. Chordia et al. 
(2000) argue that the evidence documented concerning commonality provides useful 
potential perspectives for further research. Their finding sheds light on different issues 
related to market liquidity that is particularly important and paves the way for future 
research. One such issue could be the attempt to identify the possible factors and 
macroeconomic influences that cause time-series variations in market-wide liquidity. In 
spite of researchers’ interest such as Chordia et al. (2001a), Fujimoto (2003b) and Van 
Ness et al. (2005) in understanding market-wide liquidity in the US markets, our 
knowledge concerning which factors could be responsible for the time-series variation in 
market-wide liquidity and how market-wide liquidity behaves over time in other markets 
remains limited. Furthermore, the literature on this issue has not yet taken into 
consideration how different trading systems are able to affect market-wide liquidity, its 
determinants and its time-series behaviour.    
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Third: market microstructure does matter and it has important implications in other areas of 
finance. The interface of market microstructure literature with different areas of finance 
represents new opportunities for further future research and is still being written. One of the 
most interesting topics in this subfield of market microstructure is the effect of liquidity on 
asset pricing.  Once again, the earlier literature focused on examining how liquidity level 
(i.e. firm-specific liquidity) is related to cross-sectional variation in asset returns (e.g. 
Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan et al., 1998; Datar et al., 1998 among others). They 
find illiquid stocks have higher expected returns. Since then, the literature has deviated its 
attention toward the importance of market liquidity in asset pricing and now examines 
whether market-wide liquidity is priced in stock returns or whether market-wide liquidity 
could be a priced state variable in the asset pricing model (e.g. Pastor and Stambaugh, 
2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 2006 among others). These studies find that 
systematic liquidity risk (i.e. market-wide liquidity) is a priced risk factor, and stocks with 
high sensitivity with aggregate market liquidity earn higher returns. However, none of the 
previous studies on liquidity and asset pricing has addressed the impact of liquidity in asset 
pricing in the context of alternative (floor and electronic) trading systems. Furthermore, 
previous literature looked at firm-specific liquidity and market-wide liquidity separately. 
Hence, the question that remains unanswered is if stocks pay a premium (i.e. higher 
expected return) for being less liquid, do they still pay another premium for their higher co-
variation with market-wide liquidity?  In other words, after accounting for a market-wide 
liquidity risk, is firm-specific liquidity priced in the cross-section returns? Furthermore, 
regardless of the developments in the use of conditional asset pricing models in asset 
pricing (see for example, Jagannathan and Wang, 1996; Ferson and Harvey, 1999; Lettau 
and Ludvigson, 2001; Avramov and Chordia, 2006b; Gomes et al., 2006 among others), 
literature on liquidity and asset returns that use conditional asset pricing models, where 
liquidity is one of the models’ factors, in order to examine the pricing of liquidity, is very 
sparse.  
 
Finally, notwithstanding the importance of the previous literature on market microstructure, 
it mainly focuses on examining the impact of information asymmetry between informed 
traders and uninformed traders on liquidity. However, the level of information asymmetry 
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between corporate insiders (i.e. company managers) and outside investors could have very 
important implications on a microstructure characteristic of stock namely, liquidity, and 
thus provides an avenue of future research. Firms with high a level of information 
asymmetry are those where the managers have more information about a firm’s value than 
outside investors do (Dierkens, 1991). This may expose outside investors to a high level of 
uncertainty about firms’ future prospects, and thus increase the perceived risk of holding 
the stocks of such firms. In this case investors will avoid holding stocks with a high level of 
information asymmetry through reducing their trading activity and posting wider bid-ask 
spread. This ultimately will reduce stocks’ liquidity. The impact of information asymmetry 
between company managers and outside investors on liquidity has been neglected so far 
and to the best of our knowledge, there are virtually no studies that explicitly examine the 
implications of information asymmetry between company managers and outside investors 
on firm-specific liquidity.  
 
As well as information asymmetry, the issue of divergence of opinion among investors 
represents another potentially fruitful avenue of research in market microstructure. The 
disagreement in investors’ opinions is expected to have important implications for firm-
specific liquidity and thus could be recognized as one possible determinant of firm-specific 
liquidity.  As mentioned previously, the literature on divergence of opinion among 
investors has extensively examined its importance in asset pricing, and thus the impact of 
divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity has not yet been explored in market 
microstructure literature.  
 
This thesis sheds new light on some aspects in market microstructure such as market 
structure and design, and the interface of market microstructure with other areas of finance 
such as asset pricing. It investigates and compares various aspects of liquidity under 
different trading systems for a sample of European stock exchanges. Furthermore, by doing 
so, this thesis provides additional contributions to different aspects of other literature in 
market microstructure. More specifically, in relation to the issue of determinants of market-
wide liquidity, this thesis explores the factors that affect the time-series variation in market-
wide liquidity, as well as the time-series behaviour of market-wide liquidity (i.e. the 
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regularities in market-wide liquidity during the week, around holidays and around the 
announcement of major macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, CPI and unemployment 
rates), before and after the automation of trading systems in stock exchanges that are 
smaller than the US markets: the Vienna Stock Exchange, the Swiss Stock Exchange, the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. This provides the 
opportunity to assess the response of market-wide liquidity to different factors and examine 
its time-series behaviour under alternative trading mechanisms. Thus it will be possible to 
gain new insights from other non-US markets.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis contributes to our knowledge of liquidity and asset pricing in 
several ways. First, it examines the role of liquidity in assets pricing before and after the 
automation of trading systems in the UK, Swiss and German markets. This study thus 
brings the two different areas of market microstructure together: the area of market 
structure and design and the area of the interface of market microstructure with other areas 
of finance. Second, this thesis significantly contributes to the literature on liquidity and 
asset pricing by employing the conditional asset pricing model of Avramov and Chordia 
(2006a) to examine the importance of liquidity in asset pricing. In this model, factor 
loadings are allowed to vary with firm characteristics (i.e. size and book-to-market ratio) 
and with business cycle variables (i.e. short-term interest rate, term spread and default 
spread). Also, using individual stocks in this model provides the advantage of overcoming 
some of the problems that previous studies faced as a result of using portfolio construction 
techniques, such as data-snooping biases and loss of information that could result from 
sorting stocks into portfolios. Thus, this study is the first that uses individual stocks as test 
assets, within the context of a conditional asset pricing model, to examine the relation 
between liquidity and stock returns. In addition, this thesis undertakes a wider analysis by 
looking at both market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity.  
 
Finally, studies which explicitly investigate the relationship between firm-specific liquidity 
and the information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outside investors, and the 
relation of firm-specific liquidity and divergence of opinion among investors are virtually 
nonexistent. This thesis provides for the first time empirical evidence concerning the 
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relation of firm-specific liquidity with information asymmetry and divergence of opinion 
for the UK, Swiss and German markets. In other words, for the aforementioned markets, 
this thesis examines whether the cross-sectional variation in information asymmetry and 
divergence of opinion could explain the cross-sectional variation in firm-specific liquidity. 
It also examines the impact of different trading systems on the implications for information 
asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity. This will draw out some 
important implications of how different trading systems could affect the level of 
information asymmetry and the disagreement among investors and, then, result in different 
impacts on firm-specific liquidity.  
 
This thesis consists of five chapters including this one. Through chapters two, three and 
four, the thesis examines and compares three empirical issues, both before and after the 
automation of trading systems: the determinants of aggregate market liquidity (i.e. market-
wide liquidity); the importance of liquidity in asset pricing; and the relation of liquidity to 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion.  These chapters have a similar structure 
and design: each chapter starts with a comprehensive review of the literature on the issue in 
question, presents the sample and discusses the methodology to be utilized, reports and 
discusses the empirical results, and summarizes the findings and draws conclusions.  
 
Chapter two examines, before and after the automation of trading systems, the underlying 
forces and factors that are responsible for time-series variation in market-wide liquidity, 
and analyzes its time-series behaviour. To address these issues, the methodology of 
Chordia et al. (2001a) is applied before and after automation. The estimation method of 
Least Absolute Deviation is used to estimate the model, which allows us to control for the 
effect of outliers. In addition, the Least Trimmed Square method is used in the estimation 
process as a robust check. Both estimation methods provide qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar results. We utilize the Wald test to compare the impact of the factors on aggregate 
market liquidity and its time-series behaviour before and after automation. The results 
indicate that, either on both trading systems or under one trading period, market-wide 
liquidity is affected by different market variables such as concurrent market returns, recent 
market trends and market volatility. Also, it is affected by interest rate variables and the 
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release of macroeconomic factors. In addition, liquidity shows distinct patterns during the 
week and around holidays. The most important finding is that before and after automation 
the impact of factors on market liquidity as well as the regularities in market liquidity are 
different, which means that trading systems play an important role in affecting both the 
response of market liquidity to its determinants and its time-series behaviour.  
 
Chapter three investigates the relationship between liquidity, both market-wide liquidity 
and firm-specific liquidity, and assets returns under different trading systems (i.e. before 
and after the automation of trading systems). Unlike previous studies, the framework of 
Avramov and Chordia’s (2006a) two-pass regression is utilized to examine this issue. As a 
first-pass time-series regression, the Fama-French three factor model augmented with 
liquidity factors is used as an asset pricing model. Following Chen et al. (1986), market-
wide liquidity risk factors are derived as the innovations from autoregressive integrated 
moving average (ARIMA) models. Market-wide liquidity risk factors are measured by 
proportional bid-ask spread, turnover ratio and price impact. To estimate the time-series 
average of the second-pass cross-sectional regressions’ coefficients, the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) procedure is applied. The first-pass time-series regression allows us to examine the 
relationship between market-wide liquidity and individual assets returns, that is, whether 
market-wide liquidity is priced. Then, after adjusting the stocks’ returns in the first-pass to 
risk factors, the second-pass cross-sectional regression allows us to examine whether firm-
specific liquidity has any additional explanatory power to the cross-sectional variation in 
stock returns. The results show that both market liquidity and firm-specific liquidity have 
an important bearing on asset pricing under both floor and electronic trading systems, and 
their impact on asset returns before the automation of the trading system is different to their 
impact after automation.  
 
Chapter four examines the relationship between firm-specific liquidity and both 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion, and examines how moving from floor to 
electronic trading system could have impacted these relationships. To test these 
implications, this chapter uses both univariate and multivariate analysis. In univariate 
analysis we construct three equally-weighted portfolios on the basis of information 
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asymmetry and divergence of opinion. However, the univariate analysis does not allow for 
the interaction between information asymmetry and divergence of opinion measures with 
other determinants of firm-specific liquidity (e.g. size, price and volatility), therefore, we 
use a multivariate regression framework. In multivariate analysis, a series of cross-sectional 
regressions are estimated and then the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure is used to 
estimate the time-series average of cross-sectional coefficients. This chapter also uses the 
ideas of Brennan et al.’s (1998) and Avramov and Chordia’s (2006a) two-pass regressions, 
to allow for the impact of other information (i.e. market-wide and industry-wide 
information) on firm-specific liquidity in first-pass regression and then examines the 
relation of firm-specific liquidity with information asymmetry and divergence of opinion in 
the second-pass cross-sectional regressions. The purpose is to discover whether information 
asymmetry and divergence of opinion have any incremental explanatory power after 
allowing for market-wide and industry-wide information. A comparative analysis has been 
conducted for the univariate and multivariate analysis before and after automation, to find 
out how the impact of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific 
liquidity will be different between the two sub-periods. The t-test has been used to compare 
the results of univariate analysis, and the Wald test is applied to compare the coefficients of 
multivariate analysis between the two sub-sample periods. The results, in general, show 
that firms with low (high) levels of information asymmetry have high (low) liquidity. 
However, the evidence concerning the impact of divergence of opinion on liquidity is 
mixed. The results also show that the impact of information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion on firm-specific liquidity is different across trading systems. However, after 
allowing for the market-wide and industry-wide information, the results show that both 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion have no additional explanatory power. 
This implies that both market and industry factors are able to explain the cross-sectional 
variation in firm-specific liquidity, which puts into question the role of financial analysts 
and the value of the information they provide to investors in the market.  
 
Finally, chapter five summarizes the findings of all the empirical chapters and discusses the 
policy implications of their results. It also provides some suggestions for future research.   
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2 Chapter Two  
Determinants of Aggregate Market Liquidity  
2.1 Introduction 
 
Liquidity is considered one of the most important characteristics of financial markets, to 
the extent that liquid markets play an important role in reallocating investors’ assets 
holdings, by allowing investors to trade and implement their trading strategies at low 
cost. A market is considered to be liquid when it accommodates the ability to trade a 
large size quickly, at low cost, when you wish to trade. This definition shows that 
market liquidity has several dimensions, which are: Immediacy, how quickly a trade of a 
given size can be arranged at a specific cost; Width, the cost of a trade that can be 
arranged at a given size; Depth, the size of a trade that can be executed at a specific 
cost; and Resiliency, the speed with which prices revert to previous levels following the 
trading of an uninformed trader (see Harris, 2003).  
 
Despite the importance of liquidity in financial markets, it is likely to be affected by the 
markets’ structure and design. Therefore, many stock exchanges have undergone 
dramatic change and restructuring in their trading arrangements in order to improve the 
liquidity of their trading systems. One of the most prominent features of the 
restructuring of stock exchanges has been the adoption of electronic trading systems 
(i.e. the move from floor to electronic trading systems). This change in trading systems 
is expected to affect liquidity due to the differences in the characteristics of floor and 
electronic trading systems, which may affect the mechanism for providing liquidity and 
its behaviour, and then results in different levels of liquidity under each trading system 
(see, Huang and Stoll, 1996; Freund and Pagano, 2000; Venkataraman, 2001 among 
others). As a result, if liquidity is expected to be affected by different trading systems, 
then different trading systems will have different implications on liquidity related issues 
such as the determinants of market-wide liquidity and its time-series behaviour. In other 
words, the move from floor to electronic trading systems is expected to have an impact 
upon the relationship between market-wide liquidity and its various determinants as 
well as an impact upon the time-series behaviour of market-wide liquidity. The major 
theme of this chapter therefore is to examine and compare under a different context of
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 market structures (i.e. floor versus electronic trading systems) the determinants of 
market-wide liquidity and its time-series behaviour.  
 
The issue of liquidity determinants has stimulated a lot of research in market 
microstructure, with the main focus on the examination of liquidity at the individual 
assets’ level. That is, a considerable amount of studies have concentrated on examining 
the cross-sectional determinants of individual assets’ liquidity such as Tinic (1972), 
Benston and Hagerman (1974), Branch and Freed (1977), Stoll (1978a), Easley et al. 
(1996), among others. These studies find that each security has its own liquidity which 
is affected by different factors such as price, trading volume, the number of trades, risk 
(volatility), competition and the number of market makers.  
 
Recently, the emergence of the literature on commonality in liquidity such as Chordia et 
al. (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Huberman and Halka (2001), has shifted 
the attention of empirical research towards liquidity at the aggregate level (i.e. market-
wide liquidity). These studies provide evidence of commonality in liquidity and find 
that different measures of firm-specific liquidity are correlated to aggregate market 
liquidity. Hence, they pave the way for further future empirical research concerning the 
factors and the underlying forces that could affect market-wide liquidity, as well as 
being concerned with the time-series behaviour of market-wide liquidity. As a result, 
some studies such as Chordia et al. (2001a), Fujimoto (2003b), Van Ness et al. (2005), 
and Chordia et al. (2005) have examined the factors that affect aggregate market 
liquidity and studied its time-series behaviour (e.g. examined the regularities in market-
wide liquidity during the week and around holidays) for US markets (i.e. NYSE, 
NASDAQ and AMEX). They find that market-wide liquidity is affected by certain 
factors such as market return, volatility, and macroeconomic variables, and that market 
liquidity shows distinct regularities during the week, around the holidays and around the 
announcement of scheduled macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, CPI and 
unemployment.   
 
Furthermore, the dramatic change in trading systems of many stock exchanges has 
motivated a large amount of empirical research on market structure and design. 
Consequently, researchers have focused their attention on an extensive examination of 
how such changes in market structure could influence market characteristics (such as 
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liquidity and price discovery) and examine the superiority of one trading system over 
the other. For example, Shyy and Lee (1995) and Pirrong (1996) among others compare 
liquidity in a floor futures trading mechanism with an electronic futures trading 
mechanism, and show that liquidity in an electronic futures trading mechanism is higher 
than that in a floor trading mechanism. Theissen (2002a, 2002b), examines the 
transaction cost, the adverse selection costs and the issue of price discovery in the floor 
and electronic trading system on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. He concludes that there 
is a difference in transaction costs and adverse selection costs between a floor and an 
electronic trading system, and finds that both trading systems contribute equally to price 
discovery. Venkataraman (2001) compares the execution costs between NYSE (a floor 
based trading structure) and the Paris Bourse (an automated trading structure) and 
shows that spreads are wider in Paris than in New York. Jain (2005) provides evidence 
that the firms’ cost of equity has improved as a result of moving from a floor to an 
electronic trading system.  
 
Notwithstanding the importance of these studies on determinants of market-wide 
liquidity, and despite the large amount of studies on market structure and design, studies 
that examine and compare the determinants of market-wide liquidity and its time-series 
behaviour under different market structures (i.e. floor versus electronic trading system) 
are virtually nonexistent. This chapter therefore, aims to examine and compare before 
and after the automation of trading systems the variation in market-wide liquidity, the 
factors that are responsible for the time-series variation in market-wide liquidity and its 
time-series behaviour (i.e. regularities in market-wide liquidity). This chapter will thus 
extend the empirical literature by filling the following gaps:  
 
First, empirical studies on market structure and design so far have confined themselves 
to the typical perspective of comparison, between floor and electronic trading systems, 
in relation to market quality. That is, they compare different market characteristics such 
as liquidity, price discovery and volatility before and after the automation of the trading 
systems. Thus, our knowledge is limited on how the move from a floor to an electronic 
trading system could impact the relationship between market-wide liquidity and its 
determinants, and how this change affects the time-series behaviour of market-wide 
liquidity (i.e. the regularities in market-wide liquidity). This chapter therefore, 
contributes to our knowledge in this issue and extends the literature on market structure 
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and design by investigating and comparing, under floor and electronic trading systems, 
the aggregate market liquidity, its time-series determinants (i.e. examining its relation 
with various determinants such as market variables and macroeconomic factors) and its 
time-series behaviour (i.e. studying the regularities in the time-series of market-wide 
liquidity during certain days of the week, around holidays and around the announcement 
of macroeconomic indicators).  
 
Second, previous empirical work on the determinants of market-wide liquidity and its 
time-series behaviour is very sparse and is extensively focused on US markets (i.e. 
NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX). Therefore, our knowledge on what factors could be 
responsible for the time-series variation in market-wide liquidity, and our knowledge of 
the time-series behaviour of market wide-liquidity in other markets is limited. 
Consequently, this chapter aims to fill this gap by investigating four European stock 
markets: the Swiss, Amsterdam, Vienna, and Frankfurt Stock Exchanges. These 
markets, compared to the US markets, are smaller. Also, these markets have witnessed a 
change in their trading system from a floor to an electronic trading system with the 
exception of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, where both trading systems are working in 
parallel to each other. This may increase the likelihood of having different behaviour for 
market-wide liquidity and thus affect its relation to other determinants, which will 
provide us with different insights that are not possible to obtain in other markets.  
 
Thus, this chapter addresses the following questions:  
 
- Does the daily variation in market-wide liquidity remain the same in floor and 
electronic trading systems?   
 
- What are the factors that influence and determine market-wide liquidity in floor and 
electronic trading systems? How do these factors affect market-wide liquidity and to 
what extent within each trading system?  
 
- Does the time-series of daily market-wide liquidity exhibit regularities (i.e. day-of-
the-week effect, regularities around holidays and around scheduled macroeconomic 
announcements) on floor and on electronic trading systems? Do the same regularities 
exist under both trading systems? 
4 Chapter Two: Determinants of Aggregate Market Liquidity 
 20
Apart from the scientific merits of these questions and the direct goal of providing a 
better understanding of market liquidity through addressing them, the findings of this 
chapter have implications for various parties. More specifically, comparing market 
liquidity and identifying the factors that influence market liquidity before and after the 
automation of trading systems are of interest to several market participants.  For 
instance, it is important for investors to develop a better understanding of market-wide 
liquidity and its behaviour over time under different trading systems, so that they can 
gain extra insight into securities’ pricing. The relationship between liquidity and stock 
returns was first addressed by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) who find a positive 
relationship between stock returns and illiquidity. Also, Chordia et al. (2000) argue that 
market-wide liquidity may affect asset prices. Thus, when the market becomes illiquid 
as a result of a shock, the investor will ask for higher returns for stocks with low 
liquidity following the market-wide shock, because these stocks are highly sensitive to 
the changes of market-wide liquidity. Amihud (2002) argues that if investors anticipate 
a low level of market liquidity, they will price stocks in a way that will allow them to 
generate higher expected returns. In this case, it will be important for investors, mutual 
funds, and portfolio managers to increase their understanding of the determinants of 
market liquidity and its behaviour within floor and electronic trading systems, so they 
can establish their trading strategies and formulate their portfolios in a way that enables 
them to achieve their target returns.   
 
 In addition, transaction cost is another issue concerning investors in stock markets12.  In 
a liquid market the transaction costs are lower than those in illiquid markets. When 
investors buy/sell their shares at any given point in time, they will face transaction 
costs. As a result, investors prefer to trade with low transaction costs. Thus, the results 
of this chapter will be of some significance for investors, because they will provide 
investors with relevant insights that direct their trading decisions. For example, if the 
findings in this chapter show which trading system has more liquidity than the other and 
what the factors that influence the liquidity under each trading system are, investors will 
be able to estimate the transaction cost and then they will be able to trade effectively.  
 
                                                 
12
 Transaction costs include both explicit costs and implicit costs. Explicit costs are those that are easily 
identified by the accountant and include commissions, fees, and taxes. Implicit costs are the costs of 
trading that arise because traders generally have an impact upon prices and include bid-ask spread and 
market price impact (Harris, 2003). Here we refer to implicit transaction costs.  
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 Moreover, this chapter has implications that are important for corporate finance 
policies. For example, for companies that are considering issuing stocks or considering 
an initial public offering (IPO), market liquidity is a critical component and an 
important input element in corporate policies and decisions. When investors buy new 
shares, more specifically IPO shares, they will be concerned about the expected 
liquidity and the uncertainty about its level, especially when shares start trading on the 
aftermarket. If shares are expected to be less liquid and their liquidity grows less 
predictable as well, one would also expect a greater amount of underpricing (Corwin et 
al., 2004). Therefore, according to the latter, a liquid market may reduce required 
underpricing and improve the future access to capital markets for firms considering 
issuing stocks by attracting analysts and/or investors. Conversely, if the market is 
characterized by being illiquid, this will result in the cancelling or failure of IPOs. Thus, 
by knowing under which trading system the market will be more liquid, and knowing 
what are the factors that will affect the change in market liquidity, firms will be able to 
identify the amount of liquidity that will be available, assess the degree of certainty 
about its level, and then formulate their decisions accordingly. 
 
 Finally, the findings of this chapter should have an important implication for stock 
exchanges’ regulators and designers. That is, liquidity, as one of the most important 
characteristics of well-organized and functioning markets, represents a major concern of 
exchange organizations and regulators. They are interested in the optimal design of 
securities markets, which improves the quality of the market through increasing market 
liquidity and reducing the transaction costs, and thus attract more investors to trade and 
more companies to list their stocks. However, according to O'Hara (2003), some events 
(e.g. market crises such as the Asian crisis (1997), the Russian crisis (1998), and the 
bond market crisis (1998)) can cause liquidity problems in financial markets, thus 
stimulating a corresponding liquidity outflow to other markets. One example could be 
the “flight to liquidity” that is observed in the markets for emerging market debt or in 
bond markets. Such events, as Chordia et al. (2004) argue, shed light on regulatory 
concerns regarding liquidity crises. Therefore, the results of this chapter will help 
market designers and regulators to make the decisions that will improve market quality 
and liquidity. If after the automation of a trading system, market liquidity shows more 
variation in its level and becomes more sensitive to various determinants, then more 
regulations and policy procedures are required to maintain and improve liquidity on 
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electronic trading systems. For example, the regulator may improve the performance of 
the electronic trading system, so that it guarantees the highest execution speed and thus 
low implicit and explicit transaction costs, and higher liquidity. On the other hand, if 
market liquidity becomes more stable after the automation of a trading system and it is 
less affected by different factors, then no further regulations are required.   
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In the next section a review of the previous 
literature is considered. Section 2.3 discusses the research design, which covers the 
hypotheses developments, the methodology related to empirical investigation and the 
sample and data used in the empirical analysis. Section 2.4 presents the key findings 
and results, and finally in section 2.5, there are concluding remarks and a summary of 
the findings.  
 
2.2  Literature Review 
 
This section provides a review of the literature related to the determinants of liquidity 
and of the literature on market structure and design. Although there is a large bulk of 
research on market structure and design that deals with examining and comparing 
different market structures and settings, this section mainly concentrates on the portion 
of literature that examines the implications of floor and electronic trading systems.  
 
2.2.1 Determinants of liquidity 
 
A large amount of empirical work in market microstructure has been devoted to the 
examination of the determinants of the liquidity of individual assets.  Demsetz (1968), 
Tinic (1972), Benston and Hagerman (1974), Branch and Freed (1977), Stoll (1978a), 
Easley et al. (1987), among others focus on identifying the determinants of liquidity for 
individual stocks in cross-section. They find that each security has a liquidity of its own 
that is affected by different factors such as price, trading volume, number of trades, risk 
(volatility), competition, the number of market makers, etc. More specifically, these 
studies find that firm-specific liquidity is positively related to stock price, trading 
volume, the number of traders, the number of market makers and is negatively related to 
trade size (order size) and volatility (i.e. risk).   
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Furthermore, the work of this chapter is considered to be related more to the work 
previously undertaken in the context of the London Stock Exchange by Draper and 
Paudyal (1997). They focus on examining the seasonality in trading activity and the bid-
ask spread using monthly data for 345 firms. They find strong seasonality in trading 
activity. Their analysis shows that while institutional investors are active during January 
and April, individual investors are more active during March. In contrast, a bid-ask 
spread does not exhibit any seasonality except for portfolios with a large market value.   
 
Recently, the evidence that has been discovered on commonality in liquidity in US 
markets by Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Huberman and 
Halka (2001) has focused the attention of research towards the importance of market-
wide liquidity. Consequently, a few recent studies have begun to investigate the issue of 
market-wide liquidity and the sources of its variation. Chordia et al. (2001a), for 
example, examine the time-series determinants of market-wide liquidity and its time-
series behaviour in NYSE. They use high frequency data (intraday data) for a 
comprehensive sample of NYSE-listed stocks over an 11-year period, and construct 
time-series indices of market-wide liquidity measures over the sample period. The 
results of the time-series regressions show that both liquidity and trading activities are 
affected by short- and long-term interest rates, term spread, market volatility and recent 
market movements. The results also show strong day-of-the-week regularities in 
liquidity and trading activities; more specifically, trading activities and liquidity decline 
on Fridays, while Tuesdays display a different pattern. In addition, liquidity shows 
strong regularities around holidays. Finally, the results show that prior to the 
announcements related to GDP and the unemployment rate there was an increase in 
both market depth and trading activities.  
 
As a part of their analysis, Huberman and Halka (2001) examine the time-series 
behaviour of liquidity proxies for 240 stocks listed in NYSE, using daily observations 
for each stock in the sample. Their results show that market liquidity is related to daily 
returns; more specifically, they find that negative daily returns bear a negative effect 
over spread variables and a positive one over depth variables. They also find that the 
daily changes in the term spread are positively correlated to the spread measures and 
negatively correlated to the depth measures, and the quality spread is insignificantly 
related to any of liquidity proxies, except the depth measures, which is positively 
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correlated to quality spread. Their findings are consistent with the findings of Chordia et 
al. (2001a).  However, Huberman and Halka (2001) find that risk variables (i.e. daily 
volatility in returns) are positively correlated to spread variables and negatively 
correlated to depth variables, which is inconsistent with the results of Chordia et al. 
(2001a) who find that spreads decrease when the market is volatile and market depth is 
unaffected by volatility.  
 
Fujimoto (2003b) examines the time variation of market liquidity by studying the 
dynamic relation between market liquidity and various macroeconomic variables over 
the period from 1962 to 2001 for both NYSE and AMEX. In contrast to Chordia et al. 
(2001a), he uses daily data to construct monthly aggregate liquidity series using three 
proxies of liquidity (a proportional bid-ask spread, the price impact and return reversal), 
in addition to using the vector autoregression approach. Fujimoto finds that before the 
mid-1980s the influence of macroeconomic indicators on liquidity is stronger when the 
business cycle dynamics exhibit higher volatility. During the first half of the sample 
period, both monetary policy and inflation were important in explaining the variation in 
liquidity. Also, during the periods of negative shocks in supply-side inflation and the 
federal fund rate, and during the periods of positive shocks in non-borrowed reserves, 
market liquidity exhibited a significant improvement for a longer period of time. 
Furthermore, in addition to share turnover, the results show that market returns and 
volatility are the key determinants of liquidity, which are consistent with the results of 
Chordia et al. (2001a) and Huberman and Halka (2001). However, all of the 
determinants are affected by macroeconomic shocks. Therefore, he argues that the 
results of his study show that macroeconomic factors affect liquidity directly and 
indirectly through their effect on market returns, volatility, and share turnover. Finally, 
Fujimoto finds that market liquidity had become more resilient and less responsive to 
shocks at both the economic and market levels.  
 
Van Ness et al. (2005) apply Chordia’s et al. (2001a) methodology on the NASDAQ 
stock exchange. However, they examine market liquidity and its behaviour for the full 
sample period and during the bull and bear markets, taking into consideration the long-
run impact of order handling rules. They use transaction data to construct daily series 
for aggregate market liquidity over the sample period from January 1993 to December 
2002. Their results show that market liquidity and trading activity are related to 
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contemporaneous market returns and are affected by interest rate variables (i.e. fed 
funds rate, the term spread, and the quality spread), but they are unrelated to market 
volatility. The latter finding is inconsistent with the findings of Chordia et al. (2001a), 
Huberman and Halka (2001) and Fujimoto (2003b).  The results also show, consistent 
with Chordia et al. (2001a), that market liquidity exhibits a distinct day-of-the-week 
effect where liquidity declines on Fridays and increases on Thursdays. Finally, they find 
that spread measures are slightly influenced by macroeconomic announcements. Even 
though the results during the bull market are qualitatively similar to those for the whole 
period, the results of the bear market regressions show some differences i.e., the spreads 
during a bear market were affected by both interest rate changes and macroeconomic 
announcements. 
 
Furthermore, the examination of the determinants of market liquidity has been extended 
to include bond markets in addition to equity markets. Chordia et al. (2005) study the 
common determinants of stock and bond liquidity and the effect of monetary shocks and 
money flows on transactions liquidity. Their study covers the period from 1991 to 1998, 
with intraday data for NYSE stocks and tick-by-tick data on-the-run Treasury notes 
with 10 years to maturity.  They find that in both markets the weekly regularities in 
market liquidity are very similar; on Fridays the liquidity is very low compared with 
other days in the week, which is consistent with Chordia et al. (2001a) and Van Ness et 
al. (2005) who find that liquidity and trading activities decline on Fridays. Further, they 
conclude that both past liquidity and volatility are the most important variables in 
forecasting future liquidity. Also, across both stock and bond markets, they find a 
significantly positive correlation between the shocks of both liquidity and volatility 
which means that they are systemic in nature. In addition, the results show that 
unexpected relaxation in monetary policy is associated with improvements in stock 
market liquidity, which is consistent with the results of Fujimoto (2003b). Finally, they 
find that bond fund flows are capable of forecasting bond market liquidity.  
 
In summary, the review thus far shows that the literature on the determinants of market-
wide liquidity are very sparse, and have extensively focused on examining the factors 
that influence the times-series variation in market liquidity and studied its time-series 
behaviour in US markets (NYSE, NASDAQ, AMEX). The only study (Draper and 
Paudyal, 1997) that was carried out on another market (London Stock Exchange) 
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focused on examining the seasonality in liquidity in that market. Furthermore, no study, 
to the best of our knowledge, has examined the determinants of market-wide liquidity 
and its time-series behaviour under a different context of market structure (i.e. floor 
versus electronic trading system). Thus, there is limited knowledge on how alternative 
trading systems could affect the relation of market-wide liquidity with its determinants 
and affect its time-series behaviour.   
 
2.2.2 Market structure and design: floor versus electronic trading system 
 
 The heterogeneity in market structures and settings results in a huge amount of 
literature on market structure and design that make comparisons between alternative 
structures of stock markets (e.g. call versus continuous auction markets, quote-driven 
versus order-driven markets, and floor versus electronic markets). This literature mainly 
focuses on examining the impact of alternative trading mechanisms on market 
characteristics such as liquidity and price discovery. Despite the large amount of 
literature on market structure and design, this section focuses on a brief review of the 
literature on floor and electronic systems, which represents the main concern of this 
thesis13.  
 
Most of the previous empirical studies that compared floor trading systems with 
electronic trading systems examine different issues, utilizing different markets and 
different instruments. Shyy and Lee (1995), for example, compare floor trading at the 
London International Financial Future Exchange (LIFFE) and electronic trading at 
Deutsche Terminbrose (DTB) by investigating the intermarket relationship using the 
Bund futures contract14. They also compare the price-transmission and the informational 
asymmetry between these two trading systems. They use minute-by-minute transaction 
prices and bid-ask quotes for December 1993. Using Granger causality tests they find a 
unidirectional lead from DTB to LIFFE in price-transmission, and the informational 
asymmetry for Bund futures in DTB is lower than that in LIFFE.  
 
                                                 
13
 The literature on floor versus electronic trading system will be reviewed in this section and will 
represent       the reference for other chapters in this thesis.  
14
 Bund future contract is the most actively traded bond future contract which is based on the German 
government’s 10-year bond (see Käppi and Siivonen, 2000). 
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Pirrong (1996) compares the liquidity supply mechanism on automated future trading 
mechanisms (DTB) and floor future trading mechanisms (LIFFE) using the Bund 
futures contracts over the period July 1992 to June 1993. Consistent with Shyy and Lee 
(1995), he finds that LIFFE has wider spreads than DTB but during high volatile 
periods DTB is deeper than LIFFE.  Furthermore, Breedon and Holland (1998) evaluate 
the relative liquidity and the price discovery role of LIFFE and DTB. They use a full 
transaction record and minute-by-minute quotes for both the LIFFE and DTB over the 
period between 10th April and 2nd June 1995 for the June 1995 contract. They find that 
both markets are integrated and DTB has as much of a role in the underlying price 
discovery as LIFFE. Also, Breedon and Holland (1998) find that both markets are 
similar in terms of variable costs and the contribution to price formation, but they are 
different in terms of trade size (which is larger in floor trading systems) and in terms of 
the tendency of trading to move towards the floor trading systems (open outcry market) 
during volatile periods15.  
 
Moreover, some of the studies that compare the floor with the electronic trading 
systems tried to exploit the unique characteristics of some markets, which entail the co-
existence of trading systems like the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Grammig et al. (2001), 
for example, analyzed the preference of informed traders towards the two trading 
systems in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, i.e. whether informed traders have a 
preference for the electronic trading system (anonymous trading) or for the floor system 
(non-anonymous trading). They use transaction data for the 30 stocks that constitute the 
DAX index across 44 trading days during June and July 1997. They find that informed 
traders prefer trading in the electronic trading system, and the probability of their 
trading is positively related to the bid-ask spread, especially, to the adverse selection 
component of the spread.  
 
Theissen (2002a) examines the issue of transaction costs and adverse selection in non-
anonymous floor trading and anonymous electronic trading systems. He uses transaction 
data for 30 stocks traded in both systems (these stocks constitute the DAX index) for a 
                                                 
15
 Frino et al. (1998) compare the cost of trading across DTB and LIFFE; Franke and Hess (2000) analyze 
the attractiveness of both floor and electronic trading systems by examining the informational differences 
between these trading systems. Huang (2004) compares the relative performance of Taiwan Futures 
Exchange (an electronic trading system) with the Singapore Exchange Derivatives Trading Limited (a 
floor trading system) where Taiwan stock index future contract is traded in both markets.   
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period of 42 days for two months (June and July 1997). He finds that the floor trading 
system is more competitive for less liquid stocks. The results also show that the 
differences between the bid-ask spreads in the two trading systems have a significant 
impact on market shares, and the reaction of quoted spread to volatility in an electronic 
trading system is more than that of the floor trading system.  In addition, the adverse 
selection component of the spread is found to be larger on the electronic trading system, 
which supports the argument that the non-anonymous trading on the floor trading 
system is better suited to cope with adverse selection problems. Finally, his findings 
show that the realized spread, which has to cover the order processing costs, tends to be 
smaller on the electronic trading system. This is consistent with the hypothesis of higher 
operational efficiency of the electronic trading system.  Moreover, Theissen (2002b) 
examines the process of price discovery in floor and electronic trading systems, using 
the same sample in Theissen (2002a). He finds that both trading systems contribute 
equally to price discovery when the estimation is based on transaction prices. However, 
using quote midpoints in the estimation model indicates that the electronic trading 
system contributes more to the process of price discovery16.  
 
Additionally, other studies compare trading systems that operate in different stock 
markets. For instance, Venkataraman (2001) compares the execution costs between 
NYSE (a floor based trading structure) and the Paris Bourse (an automated trading 
structure). He uses intraday data for matched stocks over one year from April 1997 to 
March 1998. He finds that the effective spread in NYSE is lower, even though the 
quoted spread measures on both exchanges are similar. Even after controlling for 
differences in relative tick size, adverse selection, and economic attribute, the execution 
costs in Paris remain higher compared to that in NYSE17.  
 
Finally, other studies in market structure and design have made a comparison between 
floor and electronic trading systems in the markets that experienced a shift from floor to 
electronic trading systems. For instance, Jain (2005) examines whether the move from 
                                                 
16Kirchner and Schlag (1998) and Freihube and Theissen (2001) also compare the floor and electronic 
trading systems in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The former identify the impact of market structure on 
the behaviour of prices and volume, and the latter analyze the quality of DAX index and MDAX index 
that are constructed from floor prices and electronic prices.  
17
 Other examples include De Jong et al. (1995), who analyze the cost of trading French stocks in London 
SEAQ International and in Paris Bourse, and Frino and McCorry (1996) who compare the spreads 
between NYSE and the Australian Stock Exchange.  
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the floor trading system to the electronic trading system will lower the cost of equity for 
the listed firms as a result of improvements in liquidity and the informational 
environment. He uses monthly returns for 56 stock exchanges and annual returns for 15 
additional markets from December 1969 to August 2001. According to the dividend 
growth model and the international CAPM, Jain finds that the automation of trading 
lowers the cost of equity as a result of improvements in liquidity and informational 
efficiency, and the decrease in cost of equity is more pronounced in emerging markets. 
Moreover, he finds a positive price reaction of 8.99% in listed stocks around the date of 
the announcement of the move to an electronic trading system18.  
 
Regardless of the large amount of empirical studies on market structure and design, 
especially on floor and electronic trading systems, these studies confine themselves to 
the general perspective of comparing market quality before and after the automation of 
trading systems. To date no study, to the best of our knowledge, has examined what the 
factors and economic forces that influence the time-series variation of market-wide 
liquidity are, as well as examining the time series behaviour of market-wide liquidity 
before and after the automation of trading systems. 
 
To this end, this chapter aims to investigate and compare under a different context of 
market structure (i.e. floor versus electronic trading systems), the time-series variation 
in market-wide liquidity and indentify the underlying forces and factors (i.e. 
determinants) that are responsible for this time-series variation. Also, within this 
context, it aims to examine the time-series behaviour of market-wide liquidity (i.e. the 
regularities during the week, around holidays and around the announcement of 
macroeconomic indicators). This chapter addresses these issues for four European stock 
exchanges which are the Swiss Stock Exchange, the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, the 
Vienna Stock Exchange, and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. 
 
                                                 
18
 Other examples include Naidu and Rozeff (1994) who compare market characteristics (i.e. liquidity, 
volatility, volume and efficiency) before and after the introduction of an electronic trading system at the 
Singapore Stock Exchange and Blennerhassett and Bowman (1998) who examine whether the shift to an 
electronic trading system reduces transaction costs at the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
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2.3 Research Design 
 
To address research questions, this section discusses how different characteristics of 
floor and electronic trading systems will affect the provision of liquidity. It also presents 
the dependent and independent variables and the justification for their inclusion in the 
empirical analysis, along with the developing and indentifying of the testable 
hypotheses. In addition, it discusses the methodology that is utilized to test the 
hypotheses and answer the research questions. Finally, it presents the sample and the 
data that are used in the empirical analysis with some descriptive statistics.  
 
2.3.1 Market-wide liquidity under alternative trading systems, regression 
variables and hypotheses development 
 
2.3.1.1 Trading systems and market liquidity 
 
This section describes the different characteristics of floor and electronic trading 
systems and how they might affect the provision of liquidity and thus results in different 
levels of aggregate market liquidity. 
 
The literature on market structure and design argues that different market structures 
could affect the behaviour of liquidity as well as the mechanism for providing liquidity 
(see Huang and Stoll, 1996; Freund and Pagano, 2000; Venkataraman, 2001 among 
others). This implies that the different characteristics of the trading systems (floor and 
electronic) may have different implications on liquidity and may result in a different 
level of market liquidity under each trading system.  Therefore, it is expected that a 
market-wide liquidity may exhibit an asymmetric response to the factors that could 
affect its time-series variation and may show different regularities across a floor and an 
electronic trading system.  
 
The effect of floor and electronic trading systems on market liquidity is expected to be 
different, and the issue of how both systems could affect liquidity is controversial. For 
instance, the degree of trading system anonymity is a potential determinant of market 
quality. In the case of floor trading (non-anonymous trading system), Venkataraman 
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(2001) argues that the liquidity of traditional floor based systems will increase because 
the degree of information asymmetry is expected to decline since all traders can share 
the information about order inflow and intrinsic value of the stock. Also, through the 
interaction among traders on a floor trading system, it would be easy to distinguish 
between informed traders and liquidity motivated traders, and then reduce the level of 
information asymmetry. This will improve liquidity by motivating more traders to trade, 
especially liquidity motivated traders, who possess no information and try to avoid 
trading with well informed traders. In addition, Theissen (2002a) argues that the lower 
degree of information asymmetry in floor trading may contribute to lower bid-ask 
spreads, which means more liquidity in the market. In contrast, the anonymity in an 
electronic trading system is expected to result in lower trading activities (i.e. lower 
trading volumes), especially at times of high information asymmetry. That is, during 
times of high information asymmetry, the knowledge of the counterparty of a trade 
becomes important for traders, especially liquidity motivated traders, to avoid being 
picked up by other informed traders. Since it is difficult to know the identities of market 
participants in the electronic trading system, most of the traders will avoid trading 
during the periods of higher information asymmetry. This will result in lower trading 
activity, and thus lower liquidity (see Kempf and Korn, 1998; Käppi and Siivonen, 
2000; Theissen, 2002a). Furthermore, it is expected that floor trading systems will 
increase liquidity by attracting institutional investors who usually execute block trades. 
They prefer trading on a floor trading system because they can use a floor broker to 
execute their orders immediately thereby satisfying their liquidity needs 
(Venkataraman, 2001).  
 
On the other hand, automated trading systems are expected to attract more liquidity into 
markets through their own characteristics compared with floor trading systems. For 
instance, Venkataraman (2001) argues that an automated trading system provides a 
large number of locations (i.e. remote access) from which the traders can access the 
system. This advantage of automated trading systems, as Theissen (2002b) points out, 
will result in an increase in the number of traders participating in trading activities and 
thereby increasing the level of liquidity. Furthermore, the efficiency of electronic 
trading systems with their high speed allows orders to be placed faster and to be 
executed immediately. This results in a higher quality of execution and attracts more 
traders and trading activities which, in turn, provides more liquidity to the market 
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(Freund and Pagano, 2000). Also, the advantage of electronic trading systems in 
offering higher operational efficiency compared with floor trading systems will affect 
the bid-ask spread. That is, such an advantage will result in a lower order processing 
cost component due to lower trading costs that result from faster order execution, 
facilitating the matching of buy and sell orders and a low cost of operations19. 
Therefore, the bid-ask spread will decline and then more liquidity will be attracted to 
the market.  
 
In summary, since the two types of markets have different advantages/disadvantages, 
their superiority, in terms of liquidity, cannot be established theoretically. 
Consequently, the issue of whether floor or electronic trading system offers better 
liquidity becomes an empirical question. Therefore, it is important to examine 
empirically, on balance, whether market-wide liquidity increases or decreases after the 
introduction of electronic trading system, leading to a testable hypothesis that: 
 
- H1: There is no significant difference in the average daily change in market liquidity 
before and after the introduction of an electronic trading system.  
 
2.3.1.2   The dependent variables (measures of liquidity) 
 
Measuring liquidity is quite difficult due to its versatile nature; according to Kyle 
(1985), it is a slippery and elusive concept. It is not observed directly, but rather it has 
different aspects that cannot be reflected in one measure (Amihud, 2002). There are 
many proxies for liquidity that have been used in the market microstructure literature, 
but there exists little consensus on quantifying liquidity. 
 
The proxies of liquidity can be divided into two broad categories:  friction-measures, 
which are also known as order-based measures, and capture the price of concession of 
immediacy, such as the bid-ask spread; or activity-measures, which are also known as 
trade-based measures, and reflect the extent of trading, such as depth, trading volume, 
                                                 
19
 With regard to inventory costs, Franke and Hess (2000) argue that there is a little reason to believe that 
these costs are different among floor and electronic trading systems. In contrast, Theissen (2002a) argues 
that inventory costs should be of a greater importance on the floor trading systems, where a single person, 
the Makler (i.e. specialists), supplies liquidity to the market.  
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trading value, and turnover ratio. Moreover, liquidity proxies can be classified into ex-
ante and ex-post measures. Ex-ante measures can be computed prior to the trade (e.g. a 
bid-ask spread). Such measures indicate the opportunity cost of not trading and may 
predict the future liquidity through predicting the future order flows as the trader knows 
the trading cost before placing orders. Ex-post measures reflect liquidity information 
following the execution of the trade such as effective spread and trading activity 
measures, which include the number of transactions, the trading volume, the trading 
value, and the turnover ratio. These measures describe the characteristics of stock 
exchanges (see Kumar, 2003; Aitken and Comerton-Forde, 2003).  
 
Apart from the well known measures of liquidity such as the bid-ask spread measures 
and trading activity measures, there are other measures of liquidity that are employed in 
the market microstructure literature in order to investigate liquidity.  An example here is 
the price impact, which reflects the impact of order flows on prices and is also known as 
Kyle’s lamda.  In addition, Amihud (2002) refers to some measures of liquidity used by 
other studies, such as the amortized effective spread, which is used by Chalmers and 
Kadlec (1998) and is calculated from subsequent transactions and quotes. Another 
measure is the probability of informed trading introduced by Easley et al. (1996) as a 
measure of microstructure risk, which is calculated on the premises of intra-day 
transaction data.  
 
To address the research questions, a construction of market-wide liquidity series that are 
long enough is required to capture the properties of market liquidity.  Most liquidity 
measures require high frequency data (micro-data) on transactions and quotes for their 
calculation, which are not available in most markets around the world (e.g. effective 
bid-ask spread, market depth, amortized effective spread, etc), and even when such data 
is available the access to such data will be limited. Therefore, due to the involved nature 
of the task, we shall resort here to the employment of those liquidity measures that 
allow us a feasible examination of the issue. The next three sections delineate the 
liquidity measures that are used to create a market-wide liquidity series (i.e. the 
dependent variable). 
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2.3.1.2.1 Bid-ask spread 
 
A bid-ask spread reflects the immediacy dimension of liquidity and it is widely used as 
a measure of liquidity in market microstructure literature20. Demsetz (1968) was the 
first to relate the spread to the cost of transaction (i.e. price of immediacy). Therefore, 
liquidity could be measured through estimating the cost of an order’s immediate 
execution. The investor who wants to trade immediately will execute his order at the 
current bid or ask price when he wants to sell or buy. The bid (ask) price includes the 
concession (premium) for the immediate sale (purchase). Thus the spread (i.e. the 
difference between the bid and ask prices) is the normal measure of liquidity (Amihud 
and Mendelson, 1986). In addition, the bid-ask spread reflects three cost components: 
order processing costs, inventory costs, and information asymmetry costs. Thus, any 
liquidity shock could result in a higher inventory risk and increase the possibility of 
trading with an informed trader. This, in turn, will result in higher bid-ask spread and 
then lower liquidity (see Eckbo and Norli, 2002). Although the bid-ask spread is a 
common measure of liquidity in market microstructure literature (e.g. Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986; Chordia et al., 2000; Venkataraman, 2001 among others), it is 
considered a noisy measure of liquidity, because large trades tend to occur outside the 
spread and small trades tend to occur inside the spread (see Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1996 and references cited in).  
 
Due to the data availability we calculate this measure and construct the market-wide 
spread using daily data. We use the daily quoted spread to construct a market-wide 
quoted spread and also a proportional quoted spread, which are calculated by the cross-
sectional average of individual stocks’ quoted and proportional quoted bid-ask spreads. 
More specifically, first, we calculate a firm-specific quoted bid-ask spread and a 
proportional quoted spread, which is the quoted bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint 
of the quote, for stock i in day
 
t as follows: 
 
                                                   qsprit = itit bidask −                                                    (2.1) 
 
                                                 
20
 Bid-ask spread also reflects another dimension of liquidity which is the width (tightness) (see for 
example, Kumar, 2003).  
4 Chapter Two: Determinants of Aggregate Market Liquidity 
 35
                               pqsprit = ( ) ( )( )∑ +−
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where ask it is the ask price for stock i at day t and bid it is the bid price for stock i at day 
t. Then the cross-sectional average of individual stocks’ quoted spreads and percentage 
quoted spreads is computed each day to construct a market-wide liquidity series. The 
market-wide liquidity series of quoted spread and proportional quoted spread is 
computed as follows: 
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where Nj is the number of stocks included in the cross-sectional average in day t. 
 
2.3.1.2.2 Trading activity measures 
 
Trading activities measures include the trading volume (i.e. shares volume), the trading 
value (i.e. currency volume) and the turnover ratio. For each stock in our sample, we 
define the trading volume as the total number of the share volume traded during the day; 
the trading value as the number of shares traded during the day multiplied by the stock 
price; and the turnover ratio as the product of the division between the trading value and 
the market capitalization. Trading activity measures are considered good proxies for 
liquidity because they are highly associated with the bid-ask spread and other measures 
of liquidity. Additionally, in equilibrium, liquidity is correlated with the trading 
frequency; therefore, if liquidity cannot be observed directly while the turnover ratio 
can, then the latter can be used as a proxy for liquidity. More specifically, portfolios 
with higher expected holding periods are expected, in equilibrium, to include stocks 
with higher bid-ask spread. The fact that the market gross return must be an increasing 
function of the spread, suggests that the observed asset returns must be an increasing 
function of the expected holding period. Since the turnover ratio is the reciprocal of 
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investor’s holding period, the observed stock return must be a decreasing function of the 
turnover ratio of that stock (see Datar et al., 1998; Chen, 2005 and references cited in). 
In addition, these measures are attractive, simple to calculate using readily available 
data (e.g. daily data), and widely accepted among researchers as proxies for liquidity 
(see Brennan et al., 1998; Datar et al., 1998; Chordia et al., 2001b; Avramov and 
Chordia, 2006a among others).  
 
Utilizing daily data on these measures, we construct the aggregate market liquidity 
series by computing the cross-sectional average of individual stocks’ trading volume, 
trading value and turnover ratio each day. The market-wide series of trading volume, 
trading value and turnover ratio are computed as follows: 
 
                                            TVOLmt = ∑




 j
i
it
j
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1
                                            (2.5) 
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where VOLit is the trading volume for stock i at day t, TValueit is the trading value for 
stock i at day t, MVit is the market capitalization for stock i at day t, and Nj is the 
number of stocks included in the cross-sectional average in day t.  
 
2.3.1.2.3 Price impact 
 
The price impact is the impact of order flows on prices. That is, when buy- or sell-
orders arrive at the market with specific quantities, any imbalance in orders will move 
prices up or down because such an imbalance could be interpreted as a result of an 
information asymmetry, and the orders will be executed at a higher or a lower price. 
Kyle (1985) developed a model where market makers are unable to distinguish between 
informed and uninformed traders (i.e. liquidity traders) and therefore choose to set 
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prices that are an increasing function of the probability of trading with informed traders. 
This is expected to lead to an inverse relationship between the price impact and 
liquidity; in other words, the larger the price impact the less liquid the stock.  
 
The price impact (known as Kyle’s lambda) is used as a proxy for liquidity in order to 
capture the depth dimension of liquidity – the market’s ability to absorb and execute 
large orders with a lower price impact. Fujimoto (2003b) argues that the price impact 
accurately captures the costs associated with large trades compared to the quoted bid-
ask spread, which measures the cost of trades that are small enough to be executed in a 
single transaction. To measure the price impact, we use the Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity 
ratio, which is defined as the ratio of daily absolute stock returns over the trading value. 
It can be interpreted as the daily price response associated with one dollar of trading 
volume, which is the inverse of the Amivest ratio (liquidity ratio) that is used in the 
market microstructure literature (such as Cooper et al., 1985; Amihud et al., 1997; 
Berkman and Eleswarapu, 1998). The intuition behind the illiquidity ratio is that if a 
stock is less liquid, the value of the illiquidity ratio will be higher, which means that a 
stock’s price moves a lot in response to little volume. Therefore, illiquidity ratio follows 
Kyle’s (1985) concept of illiquidity, which is also defined as the response of price to the 
order flow (see Amihud, 2002). Furthermore, Hasbrouck (2005) finds that Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity measure is the best proxy for the price impact; he finds that Kyle’s 
lambda calculated from microstructure data is highly correlated with Amihud’s 
illiquidity ratio, as their correlation is found to be 0.47. Finally, one major advantage of 
this measure over other measures of liquidity (for example amortized spread and 
effective bid-ask spread) is that it requires only daily data to be computed and can be 
used to construct a series that could span a long time period. 
 
Therefore, following Amihud (2002) we employ the illiquidity ratio as a proxy for the 
price impact of a trade. This measure is first calculated for each stock in the sample, that 
is, the price impact for stock i at day t is given as follows: 
 
                                              pimpactit = 
it
it
TValue
R
                                                (2.8) 
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where Rit is the return for stock i at day t and TValueit is the trading value for stock i at 
day t. Then, the cross-sectional average of the individual stocks’ price impact is 
computed each day to construct a market-wide liquidity series as follows:    
 
                                    PIMPACTmt = ∑
=





 j
ijN 1
it  pimpact1                                      (2.9) 
 
Nj is the number of stocks included in the cross-sectional average in day t.  
 
2.3.1.3  Explanatory variables (determinants of market liquidity)  
 
This section aims to identify the factors that are expected to affect the time-series 
variation in market-wide liquidity, based on the main models of market microstructure. 
It also provides the theoretical explanation of the expected relations between these 
factors and market-wide liquidity through which several testable hypotheses are 
developed.  
 
Since there is no specific theory for market liquidity (Huberman and Halka, 2001), the 
selection and the justification of the variables (factors) that expect to affect and 
determine market-wide liquidity is guided by the main two models in market 
microstructure: the information asymmetry model and the inventory model. Both 
explanations begin with the market makers, or dealers, who help in solving the problem 
of matching buyers with sellers by selling/buying on their own accounts. The origin of 
the information asymmetry model is accredited to Bagehot (1971) and formalized by 
Copeland and Galai (1983), then it is emphasized by Kyle (1985), Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985), Easley and O'Hara (1987), and Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) among others. 
Based on this model, stock markets are viewed as consisting of three types of traders: 
informed traders, liquidity traders, and market makers. The latter possess no superior 
information, but perform a crucial function in providing liquidity to the market. Dealers 
or market makers, when they trade, face both the informed traders and liquidity traders 
(noise traders), but they cannot distinguish between them. However, they make a profit 
from trading with liquidity motivated traders but lose money when they trade with 
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informed traders. Therefore, dealers set spreads that maximize their profit from liquidity 
traders and minimize their losses to informed traders.  
 
The inventory-based model is introduced by Demsetz (1968), and then is emphasized by 
Stoll (1978b), Ho and Stoll (1981), and Amihud and Mendelson (1980) among others. 
Based on this model, market makers should hold a target level of inventory (i.e. optimal 
level of inventory). However, their inventories deviate from their optimal levels as a 
result of the market makers’ obligation to accommodate incoming orders. This forces 
market makers to either hold long or short positions, which will increase the risk and the 
cost of holding an undesirable level of inventory. Therefore, market makers always try 
to keep the optimal level of the inventory to maximize the expected average profit 
through adjusting the bid and ask prices after they trade. Consequently, market makers 
with long positions will set lower bid and ask prices to decrease the holding of excess 
inventory, and those with short positions will post higher bid and ask prices to cover the 
shortage in the inventory. Thus, a bid-ask spread represents a mechanism for market 
makers to manage their inventories and a compensation for any inventory holding risk.   
 
2.3.1.3.1 Market variables 
 
Market performance: Based on the inventory model, the main variables that will affect 
liquidity are expected to be those variables that affect inventory risk. Market 
performance is one of these variables. Chordia et al. (2001a) argue that changes in 
stocks prices and changes in market performance will affect market liquidity. Changes 
in stock prices could result in changes in investor expectations which stimulate them to 
change the composition of their portfolios. As a result their trading behaviour will 
change (increasing or decreasing their trading activities), which may affect the liquidity 
provided to the market. More specifically, when stock prices decline it will become 
costly to trade with these stocks, compared to the case when stock prices increase, 
therefore, the increase in trading cost will decrease the trading activities of investors, 
and hence decrease trading volume and then liquidity. On the other hand, the increase in 
stock prices will result in high stock returns, which will attract investors to participate in 
the stock market to increase their estimated profitability of stock market participation. 
Hence, the increased level of participation means a higher trading volume and thus 
higher liquidity (Griffin et al., 2004 and references cited in).  
4 Chapter Two: Determinants of Aggregate Market Liquidity 
 40
Moreover, the change in market performance is expected to influence market liquidity 
through affecting the inventory risk especially for market makers. That is, during a 
rising market, the level of the trading volume is expected to increase to the extent that 
market makers find it easier and quicker to adjust their inventory by laying off the 
imbalances. Since they can easily adjust their inventories, they will face less risk. 
Therefore, they will post tighter bid-ask spreads which lowers trading costs and thus 
increases liquidity. In contrast, in falling markets the level of the trading volume is 
expected to decline, and then it will be difficult for market makers to adjust their 
inventories which expose them to a higher inventory risk. In this case markets markers 
will post higher bid-ask spreads to avoid any additional inventory and thus reduce the 
potential inventory risk. This will reduce the liquidity provided to the market. 
Therefore, in a period of a rising market, liquidity is expected to be higher than in a 
period of a falling market. That is, market liquidity is expected to be positively related 
to concurrent market performance. Furthermore, for the reasons discussed in section 
2.3.1.1, concerning the effect of the different characteristics of floor and electronic 
trading systems on market-wide liquidity, it is expected that the degree of the response 
of market-wide liquidity to the factors that affect its time-series variation will be 
different under both trading systems. In other words, this means that the extent of the 
impact of various determinants on market-wide liquidity will be different across trading 
systems. Therefore, based on the discussion in section 2.3.1.1, as market-wide liquidity 
will be higher or lower on one trading system compared with the other, it is likely that 
market returns will have either a weaker or stronger impact on market liquidity. Thus, 
the extent to which market return has an impact on market liquidity is an empirical 
issue. This leads us to the following testable hypotheses: 
 
- H2a: Equity market return has a significant positive effect on market-wide liquidity. 
 
- H2b: There is no significant difference in the impact of equity market return on market-
wide liquidity on floor and electronic trading systems.  
 
Recent market movements: Recent market history could be another possible factor that 
affects market-wide liquidity. Chordia et al. (2001a) argue that contrarian strategies and 
the different techniques of technical analysis involve past market moves, which create a 
link between trading activities and recent price trends (i.e. recent market moves). 
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According to Glaser and Weber (2009) this link has been fully explained by 
overconfidence theories, which argue that investors increase their trading activities level 
because they become overconfident as a result of higher returns. More specifically, the 
intuition behind the link between past returns and trading volume, according to Glaser 
and Weber (2009, p. 5), is as follows, "high total market returns make (some) investors 
overconfident about the precision of their information. Investors mistakenly attribute 
gains in wealth to their ability to pick stocks. As a result they underestimate the 
variance of stock returns and trade more frequently in subsequent periods because of 
inappropriately tight error bounds around return forecasts". This suggests that the 
trading volume will be lower after market losses and higher after market gains. Gervais 
and Odean (2001), Statman et al. (2006), and Glaser and Weber (2009) among others 
find that there is a strong positive relationship between past returns and trading volume. 
Therefore, following recent market losses (gains), inventory holding risk will be higher 
(lower) due to the fact that trading activities will be low (high) to the extent that 
investors / market makers find it more difficult (easy) to adjust their inventories.  
  
In the light of this discussion, if trading volume is expected to be positively related to 
the past returns (i.e. recent market movements), then it is expected that market-wide 
liquidity will be positively related to market past returns. However, the impact of recent 
market movements upon market liquidity is likely to vary between floor and electronic 
trading systems. That is, recent market returns may have a stronger or weaker positive 
impact on market liquidity under one trading system compared with the other. This is 
due to the fact that market-wide liquidity is anticipated to be lower or higher on one 
trading system compared with the other. Thus, the extent of the impact of recent market 
returns on market liquidity across trading systems is an empirical question. This leads to 
the following testable propositions:  
 
- H3a: Recent equity market return has a significant positive effect on market-wide 
liquidity. 
 
- H3b: There is no significant difference in the impact of recent equity market return on 
market-wide liquidity on floor and electronic trading systems. 
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Market risk:  According to the inventory model and the information asymmetry model, 
market risk (i.e. market volatility) is expected to affect liquidity negatively. More 
specifically, during periods of higher volatility the dealers will be unable to diversify 
their portfolios or have a portfolio with desirable risk-return characteristics. Therefore, 
they will post higher bid and ask prices to avoid any additional inventory and to earn a 
higher risk premium as compensation for any additional risk resulting from holding an 
undesirable inventory; higher volatility implies higher inventory risk and thus a wider 
bid-ask spread (i.e. lower liquidity).  On the other hand, periods of higher volatility are 
normally characterized by a higher degree of information asymmetry (Theissen, 2002a). 
Therefore, it will be difficult for investors to value stocks accurately, because less 
information will be available during higher volatility periods (Harris, 2003). In this 
case, the level of information asymmetry will increase and thus increase the adverse 
selection cost component in the spread, which means a higher bid-ask spread and lower 
liquidity.  
 
The empirical evidence supports the expected negative relationship between volatility 
and liquidity. Tinic (1972), Stoll (1978a), Menyah and Paudyal (1996) among others 
provide evidence that support the negative relationship between volatility and firm-
specific liquidity. Also, Fujimoto (2003b) and Chordia et al. (2005) provide evidence 
that support the expected theoretical relationship between market volatility and market-
wide liquidity. However, Chordia et al. (2001a) provide a mix of evidence about the 
relationship between market volatility and liquidity; they find that recent market 
volatility is associated with a decrease in trading volume and spreads, and Van Ness et 
al. (2005) find no relation between market volatility and aggregate market liquidity. 
Regardless of the inconclusive evidence concerning the relationship between market-
wide liquidity and market volatility, it is expected that market-wide liquidity will be 
related negatively to market volatility. However, the impact of market volatility on 
market liquidity is likely to vary across trading systems. More specifically, as market-
wide liquidity is anticipated to be higher or lower on one trading system compared with 
the other, as a result of the different characteristics of both trading systems, the degree 
of response of market-wide liquidity to market volatility is expected to be either weaker 
or stronger on one trading system compared with the other. Therefore, the extent of the 
impact of market volatility upon market liquidity remains an empirical issue leading to 
the following testable hypotheses:  
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- H4a: Equity market volatility has a significant negative effect on market-wide liquidity. 
 
- H4b: There is no significant difference in the impact of market volatility on market-
wide liquidity on floor and electronic trading systems. 
 
2.3.1.3.2  Economic variables (short-term interest rate, term spread, and default 
spread) 
 
 Economic conditions are also among the variables that are expected to affect market 
liquidity to the extent that favourable economic states are likely to be related to 
increasing trading activities, reduced inventory risks, and improved liquidity (Fujimoto 
2003b).  The short-term interest rate, the default spread, and the term spread could be 
used as good indicators for the economic states. These three financial variables are 
known to be closely related to future economic growth and represent good indicators of 
the current health of the economy (see Chen, 1991; Fujimoto, 2003b). That is, as stated 
in Chen (1991), Fama and French (1989) observe that the short-term rate (Treasury bill) 
tends to be low in a business contraction. In addition, the default spread, which is 
implicitly included in the pricing of securities, is affected by the health of the economy 
and the term spread is related to the expected growth of GNP and consumption; when 
the future output is expected to increase, the consumption will decrease and borrowing 
will increase, thus the interest rate will increase (Chen, 1991).  
 
The changes in the short-term interest rate, the default spread, and the term spread are 
expected to affect market liquidity. Market liquidity is expected to decrease (increase) 
with a short-term interest rate and default spread (term spread). More specifically, 
Chordia et al. (2001a) argue that market frictions such as short selling restrictions and 
margin requirements imply that liquidity should depend on interest rates. So by 
reducing margin costs and the cost of financing inventory, a decrease in the short-term 
rate will motivate trading activity which then increases market liquidity.  Fujimoto 
(2003b) points out that a higher short-term rate means a restrictive monetary situation, 
which may lead to a change in expectations about future economic growth and thus 
affect the perceived risk of holding inventory. In addition, an increase in the quality 
spread (default spread) is expected to increase the holding inventory risk and then 
decrease liquidity. That is, an increase in quality spread means a higher company’s 
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perceived risk. Thus, the investors / dealers will avoid carrying such risky stocks to 
avoid any additional inventory risk by quoting a high bid-ask spread and reduce their 
trading activities, which then reduce liquidity. Further, the increase in the term spread 
will affect liquidity because investors will reallocate their wealth between debt and 
equity instruments which, as a result, will increase trading activities (see Chordia et al., 
2001a). 
 
 In general, a high short-term rate, a high default spread, and a low term spread usually 
synchronize with recessionary states, which may represent increased inventory risks due 
to low trading activities during the recession. This in turn will lead investors to ask for a 
higher risk premium to compensate for a higher inventory risk through quoting a higher 
bid-ask spread which will reduce liquidity (Fujimoto, 2003b). It is therefore expected 
that the short-term interest rate and the default spread (term spread) will be negatively 
(positively) related to market liquidity. However, the impact of interest rate variables on 
market-wide liquidity is expected to be different before and after the automation of 
trading systems, due to the differences in the characteristics of both trading systems, 
which results in different levels of market liquidity across trading systems. That is, 
based on the discussion in section 2.3.1.1, as market liquidity is likely to increase or 
decrease after the automation of trading systems, it is therefore expected that the impact 
of interest rate variables on market-wide liquidity will be weaker or stronger after the 
automation of trading systems. Hence, the extent of the impact of interest rate variables 
upon market-wide liquidity is an empirical issue. This suggests the following testable 
hypotheses: 
 
- H5a: Market-wide liquidity is negatively affected by the short-term interest rate and 
the default spread, and is positively affected by the term spread. 
 
- H5b: There is no significant difference in the impact of interest rate variables on 
market-wide liquidity on floor and electronic trading systems.  
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2.3.1.3.3 Regularities in aggregate market liquidity (day-of-the-week effect, 
holiday effect) 
 
The motivation for trading and the behaviour of the traders in the market plays an 
important role in determining the patterns of market-wide liquidity. It is therefore 
expected that there may be a day-of-the-week effect on market liquidity. Traders in 
financial markets are trading either to satisfy their liquidity needs (liquidity traders) or 
to act on some special information (informed traders). Both traders differ in timing their 
trade and in the amount of shares they want to trade, which may result in concentrated 
trading within a particular time. This will result in a different level of trading through 
the week, and thereby a different level of liquidity. More specifically, when informed 
traders have precise and more private information and decide to trade, the discretionary 
liquidity traders may choose to refrain from trading and decide to delay their trades. 
Since the informational advantage of informed traders is short lived, the decision of 
liquidity traders to delay their trades will leave the market with less liquidity and make 
it easier for the market makers to know the reasons behind informed traders’ trading. 
Consequently, the trading volume will decline and thereby reducing the liquidity. 
Furthermore, with the trading break over the weekend, this may produce a severe 
adverse selection problem at the beginning of the week (on Monday). Therefore, it is 
more likely for liquidity motivated traders to defer their transactions and thus the 
trading volume on Monday will be the lowest of any day of the week (see Admati and 
Pfleiderer, 1988; Foster and Viswanathan, 1990, 1993). Also, Chordia et al. (2001a) 
argue that changes in investors’ mood or sentiments over the week may cause some 
systematic seasonal pattern in trading activity. 
 
Market liquidity is also expected to show a particular pattern around holidays, since 
holidays are often considered as another form of market closing similar to weekends.  
Such patterns in liquidity are expected to result from the divergence of investors' trading 
behaviour around holidays. This could be explained by the inventory adjustment 
process; investors with a short position are expected to have more loss than those with a 
long position, therefore, they will be reluctant to take any short positions before a 
holiday. This will result in a lower selling pressure prior to a holiday, which will lead to 
a positive pre-holiday return and then a lower trading volume. As a consequence, 
market liquidity will be lower prior to holidays (see Fabozzi et al., 1994). In addition, 
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Harris (2003) argues that during holidays liquidity tends to dry up and it will be difficult 
to trade a large size near holidays when many traders are not working. This is because 
most people are paying attention to other things during holidays. Thus, market-wide 
liquidity is anticipated to show a particular pattern during the week and around 
holidays. However, this pattern is expected to vary across trading systems, due to the 
different levels of market-wide liquidity that result from the different characteristics of 
both floor and electronic trading systems. That is, since market liquidity is likely to be 
higher or lower on the electronic trading system compared with the floor trading 
system, or vice versa, market-wide liquidity is anticipated to show either weaker or 
stronger regularities on one trading system compared with the other. Therefore, the 
nature of the regularities in market-wide liquidity on the floor and electronic trading 
system is an empirical issue. This leads to the following testable propositions: 
 
- H6a: Aggregate market liquidity exhibits distinct regularities (i.e. the day-of-the-week 
effect and regularities around holidays). 
 
- H6b: The regularities in aggregate market liquidity on floor trading systems are 
expected to be the same as those on electronic trading system. 
 
2.3.1.3.4 Announcements of scheduled macroeconomic indicators (GNP, CPI and 
unemployment) 
 
Many market participants believe that the announcement of scheduled macroeconomic 
news such as a Consumer Price Index (CPI), the employment rate, and the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) have a major impact on financial markets. Ederington and Lee 
(1993) argue that the announcements of such macroeconomic indicators are viewed as 
signalling the possible change in the demand for credit and foreign exchange or because 
market participants believe that these are important variables which the Federal Reserve 
takes into consideration in setting monetary policy, and thus their news release could 
affect financial markets. Further, Parbhoo et al. (2006) argue that news announcements 
of the unemployment rate, money supply growth and the consumer price index are more 
closely watched economic indicators and are well documented, offering insights into the 
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future direction of the interest rate, the intrinsic health of the economy and the 
performance of financial markets21.  
 
It is expected that the announcement of macroeconomic news will affect market 
liquidity, and thus market liquidity is expected to show a distinct regularity around 
scheduled macroeconomic announcements. The release of macroeconomic news may 
stimulate investors to acquire private information through updating and revising their 
expectations, which in turn increases the trading activity (see Kim and Verrecchia, 
1991; Wang, 1994).  Furthermore, Fleming and Remolona (1999) argue that the impact 
of the release of a macroeconomic announcement on prices and liquidity comes in two 
stages. In the first stage, the release of a major macroeconomic announcement induces 
sharp simultaneous price changes, which causes a dramatic increase in the bid-ask 
spread. They argue that it is inventory control that drives the spread. That is, due to the 
inventory risks of sharp price changes, market makers evidently widen the bid-ask 
spread or withdraw their quotes. In the second stage, trading volume will increase and 
persist along with high price volatility and moderately wide bid-ask spreads. This is 
driven by a residual disagreement among investors about the meaning of information, 
which may arise from the differential in investors' private views including those based 
on dealers' knowledge of order flows.  
 
Despite the argument about the effect of the announcement of macroeconomic 
indicators on stock markets, it is expected that such an announcement would be 
significantly related to the time-series variation in market-wide liquidity, and thus 
market-wide liquidity is expected to exhibit a pattern around the release of 
macroeconomic indicators. However, this pattern is likely to be different across trading 
systems due to the different levels of market-wide liquidity that result from the different 
characteristics of floor and electronic trading systems. Specifically, market-wide 
liquidity is anticipated to be higher or lower on one trading system compared with the 
other. This is expected to affect the pattern of market-wide liquidity around the 
announcement of macroeconomic indicators, which is likely to be weaker or stronger on 
                                                 
21
 Chordia et al. (2001a) do not support the use of proxies for firm-specific information (e.g. dummies for 
earnings announcement dates) as determinants of market liquidity, because such dates are not well 
coordinated across companies and information about earnings is often conveyed to the market before the 
official earnings announcement date. 
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one trading system compared with the other. This leads to the following testable 
hypotheses. 
 
- H7a: Market-wide liquidity is affected by the announcement of macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP, CPI, and unemployment, and shows a particular pattern 
around these announcements. 
 
- H7b: The impact of the announcement of macroeconomic indicators is the same under 
each trading system. 
 
2.3.2 Data 
 
The sample of this chapter includes four stock exchanges, whose choice was guided by 
the objective of this research, which is comparing and examining the determinants of 
market-wide liquidity and its time-series behaviour before and after the automation of 
the trading system. Thus, the selection of the sample focuses on stock markets which 
have undertaken change in their trading systems (i.e. have adopted an electronic trading 
system rather than a floor trading system). These markets are: the Swiss Stock 
Exchange (SSE), the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (ASE), the Vienna Stock Exchange 
(VSE) and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE). These markets are characterized by 
being smaller than the US and UK markets that were the main focus of previous studies. 
Further, the trading system in these markets (the Frankfurt Stock Exchange aside) have 
moved from a floor trading system to an electronic trading system, while in the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange a new electronic trading system has been introduced to work 
in parallel to the existing floor trading system, where the same stocks are traded under 
both systems22. The composition of our sample is further expected to mitigate against 
the potential for the presence of the home bias in our analysis, since both trading 
systems included in the analysis are related to the same market23. In addition to this, our 
                                                 
22
 For the purpose of the discussion of empirical results, we sometimes refer to the floor trading system in 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange as pre-automation or before automation, and to the electronic trading 
system in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange as post-automation or after automation.  
23
 In contrast, Venkataraman (2001) compares the execution costs between the floor trading system and 
the electronic trading system using two stock exchanges (NYSE to proxy for floor trading and the Paris 
Bourse to proxy for electronic trading). The author acknowledges the difficulties in taking into account 
many factors resulting from country differences such as insider trading laws, the degree of competition 
for order flow, and the overall trading volume between both markets, NYSE and Paris Bourse.   
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analysis will bear the extra advantage through employing the German market (the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange). More specifically, testing the impact of different trading 
systems (floor versus electronic) using the Frankfurt Stock Exchange will have great 
advantage over the testing for the impact of the switch of trading systems in markets 
where the electronic system replaced the floor one. The issue here is that the number of 
stocks traded changes with time and this means that for those markets where the 
electronic system replaced the floor one, we will be effectively estimating the impact 
based upon two different stock-samples (pre-transition; post-transition); however, in the 
case of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the simultaneous coexistence of both systems 
allows us to investigate the impact of different trading systems on the premises of the 
same stock-pool. This will present the opportunity for a potentially controlled 
experiment of two trading systems characteristics: floor trading versus electronic 
trading. 
 
The data set under consideration ranges from September 1989 to December 2005. Since 
we were able to identify the exact date of change for all the markets, the sample period 
for each market will be different, contingent with the date of automation (see table 2.1). 
September 1989 represents the earliest start date of data for the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange, whereas December 2005 is the latest date for data collection for the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange. For each market, (Frankfurt aside), we use data for the five 
years before automation and for the five years following it. For the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange we obtained a data set for both trading systems for eight years spanning from 
January 1998 to December 2005.  
 
For each market, this research includes all stocks (dead and active) to mitigate against 
the potential estimation problems accruing from survivorship bias. Daily data for all 
stocks were obtained from Datastream. The data obtained includes the following 
variables: the closing bid prices, the ask prices, the closing prices, the trading volume, 
and the market value. These variables are processed to obtain the following proxies of 
liquidity, which were discussed in section 2.3.1.2, such as: the quoted spread, the 
percentage quoted spread, the trading volume, the trading value, the turnover ratio and 
the price impact. For some markets such as the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the 
Vienna Stock Exchange, spread measures are not included in the analysis due to data 
availability constraints.   
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In addition, we collected data on the price indices of the four exchanges included in our 
sample using Datastream market indices, which have a representative sample of stocks 
covering the majority of market capitalization in each market. These price indices have 
been used to calculate market return. Data about interest rates (short-term interest rates, 
long-term interest rates on government bonds, and long-term interest rates on corporate 
bonds) were obtained either from Datastream or from other sources such as the central 
bank of some countries such as Germany (Deutche Bundes Bank) and Austria (Austrian 
National Bank) 24. Moreover, data about holidays in each country included in our 
sample has been obtained from the following web site; www.timeanddate.com. Finally, 
in order to find how the announcement of macroeconomic indicators affect aggregate 
market liquidity, we were able to obtain the data regarding the announcement dates of 
the major macroeconomic indicators (i.e. GDP, CPI, and Unemployment) only for 
Germany for the whole sample period from the Germany Federal Statistical Office. 
 
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the basic market liquidity measures for all 
stock exchanges for the two sub-samples periods before and after the automation of 
their trading systems, except for the FSE where it reports the descriptive statistics for 
both trading systems that are working in parallel to each other.  
 
The results show that after the automation of a trading system, average trading volume 
increased in all markets except in SSE where it decreases by 0.302. Also, trading value 
increased in all markets after the automation except in SSE and VSE. Further, on 
average, the turnover ratio has been decreased in all markets after the introduction of an 
electronic trading system except in VSE where it is increased from 1.902 to 2.076. 
However, in contrast to ASE, the price impact measure experiences an increase in VSE 
and FSE after the automation of the trading system, but remains the same on both 
trading systems in SSE. In relation to spreads measures, which are only available for 
SSE and FSE, both measures (quoted spread and proportional quoted spread) increase 
after the introduction of an electronic trading system only in SSE, while in FSE only the 
quoted spread decreased by 0.117 after automation.  
                                                 
24
 See appendix 2A for the descriptive statistics of interest rate variables.  
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As indicated by the coefficient of variation, the trading volume and the trading value 
show a lower degree of variation after the automation of the trading system in SSE and 
FSE, but in ASE only the trading volume has lower variability25. While the turnover 
ratio shows high variability in SSE and VSE in an electronic trading system, the 
variability in the turnover ratio decreases in other markets. That is, the coefficient of 
variation for turnover ratio in SSE and VSE increases to 0.510 and 1.301 respectively 
during an electronic trading period compared with 0.370 and 0.514 respectively during 
a floor trading period. However, the price impact shows lower variability after the 
change only in SSE and ASE. Regarding the spread measures, both the quoted spread 
and the proportional quoted spread have a higher coefficient of variation under an 
electronic trading system in SSE, they are 0.287 and 0.265 respectively compared with 
0.173 and 0.194 under a floor trading system. In FSE only the proportional quoted 
spread shows higher variability on an electronic trading system, which is 0.651 
compared to 0.347 on a floor trading system. In sum, these results show that the move 
toward an automated trading system results in a change in the level of market liquidity 
as well as causing a change in the variability of market liquidity.  
 
Table 2.3 represents the summary statistics for the absolute values of daily percentage 
changes in all market-wide liquidity measures for all markets included in our analysis. 
The average absolute daily change of the trading volume and the trading value is lower 
after the automation of trading systems in SSE and ASE compared to other markets. 
However, the average absolute daily change of turnover ratio increases in VSE after the 
automation, that is, it increased by 0.222. The average absolute daily change of price 
impact increases on an electronic trading system in FSE and decreases in other markets. 
In relation to spread measures, the average absolute daily change for both a quoted bid-
ask spread and a proportional quoted bid-ask spread decreases in SSE after the 
automation of a trading system while they increase in FSE on the electronic trading 
system.   
 
The pair-wise correlations among changes in the liquidity proxies for all markets are 
reported in table 2.4. One might have expected a negative relation between trading 
                                                 
25
 Coefficient of variation is measured as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean, and is 
considered a useful statistic for comparing the degree of variation from one data series to another, even if 
the means are significantly different from each other (see 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/coefficientofvariation.asp). 
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activity measures and both spreads and price impact measures, and a positive relation 
among trading activity measures. In SSE, the correlation among trading activity 
measures is positive and significant at a 1% level of significance under both trading 
systems. On a floor trading system, the correlations between the quoted spread and 
trading activity measures (trading volume, trading value, and turnover ratio) are positive 
and insignificant which is unexpected. This is inconsistent with Chordia et al. (2001a) 
and Van Ness et al. (2005) who find a negative correlation between spreads and trading 
activity measures. However, the correlation between a quoted spread and trading 
activity measures after the introduction of an electronic trading system becomes 
negative and only significant with the turnover ratio at a 1% level of significance. Also, 
the results show a significant negative correlation between the price impact and the 
turnover ratio (trading volume and trading value) on a floor (electronic) trading system 
at a 10% level of significance or better. Also, price impact has a significant positive 
correlation with the quoted spread (proportional quoted spread) on a floor (electronic) 
trading system at a 1% (5%) level of significance.  
 
In ASE, on both trading systems, the correlation coefficients among trading activity 
measures is positive and significant at a 1% level of significance as expected. In 
addition, price impact has a negative and significant correlation at a 10% level of 
significance with a turnover ratio on a floor trading system, but it has a negative and 
significant correlation at a 1% level of significance with all trading activity measures on 
an electronic trading system. Also, in VSE the correlation coefficient among trading 
activity measures are positive and significant at a 1% level of significance before and 
after automation. After the automation of a trading system, price impact has a negative 
significant correlation at 10% level of significance with the trading value. Finally, in 
FSE, the results show a positive significant correlation at a 1% level of significance 
among trading activity measures under both trading systems. Although the correlation 
coefficients of the changes in market-wide quoted spread and proportional quoted 
spread with trading activity measures on a floor trading system are negatively 
significant at a 10% level of significance or better, they are quite low. This is consistent 
with the results of both Chordia et al. (2001a) and Van Ness et al. (2005). In contrast, on 
the electronic trading system, the correlation coefficients between spreads measures and 
trading activity measures are positively significant at a 5% level of significance or 
4 Chapter Two: Determinants of Aggregate Market Liquidity 
 53
better. Finally, price impact only has a significant correlation with trading activity 
measures under the floor trading system.    
 
Table 2.5 reports the autocorrelation for the percentage change in market-wide liquidity 
measures out to a lag of five trading days for the two sub-samples periods, before and 
after the automation of a trading system for SSE, ASE, and VSE, and for the floor 
trading system and the electronic trading system in FSE. The results show that on both 
trading systems in SSE, all the liquidity series show a significant negative first-order 
autocorrelation. There is even evidence of a negative high-order autocorrelation (up to a 
third and fourth lag) in some liquidity series.  Although trading volume and trading 
value series on an electronic trading system in ASE show significantly negative fourth-
order autocorrelation at a 1% level of significance, their fifth-order coefficients are 
positively significant at a 10% level of significance or better. This indicates the 
presence of a weekly seasonality. However, both the turnover ratio and the price impact 
series on both trading systems in ASE show significant negative autocorrelation up to 
the first lag and the second lag respectively. Regarding VSE, the trading volume, the 
trading value, and the turnover ratio series show negatively significant second-order 
autocorrelation at a 5% level of significance or better on a floor trading system, while 
they show negatively significant first-order autocorrelation on an electronic trading 
system. Furthermore, the price impact series exhibits significantly negative second-
order autocorrelation at a 1% level of significance only on an electronic trading system. 
Finally, in FSE the results show that all liquidity series show a pattern. More 
specifically, the trading volume series shows a higher order autocorrelation on a floor 
trading system than on an electronic trading system while the turnover ratio series 
shows a higher order autocorrelation on an electronic trading system. However, the 
trading value, the quoted bid-ask spread and the proportional quoted spread series show 
the same pattern on both trading systems, with the spreads series showing a higher order 
autocorrelation than a trading value. In sum, the results suggest that the pattern of 
autocorrelation in liquidity series in all markets indicates that there is a potential 
presence of a weekly seasonal effect (i.e. day-of-the-week effect).    
 
Comparing our results of autocorrelation with those for Chordia et al. (2001a) and Van 
Ness et al. (2005) for NYSE and NASDAQ respectively, we find that our results show 
that there is a statistically significant negative first-order autocorrelation for all the 
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series in all markets, which is consistent with the results of those two studies. Negative 
autocorrelation might be expected, because most of these series are likely to be 
stationary. Also, consistent with Chordia et al. (2001a) and Van Ness et al. (2005), we 
find evidence of negative second-order autocorrelation but ours is stronger especially in 
the case of spreads measure. However, in contrast to Chordia et al. (2001a) and Van 
Ness et al. (2005), we find that the markets included in our sample appear to have 
autocorrelation with longer lags for some of the liquidity series. For example, Chordia 
et al. (2001a) report significant autocorrelation with lags of two days for change in 
quoted spreads in NYSE, and Van Ness et al. (2005) report significant autocorrelation 
with lags of four days for the same measure in Nasdaq. On the other hand, we find that 
in both SSE and FSE, autocorrelations exhibit lags of four and five days respectively. 
This indicates that market-wide liquidity in our sample is highly persistent. Moreover, 
the negative autocorrelation in some of the trading activity measures in some markets, 
either before or after the automation, exhibit longer lags (i.e. for two, three or four days) 
compared with those in NYSE which is for two days as in Chordia et al. (2001a).   
 
2.3.4 Methodology 
 
This section provides a discussion of the methods applied in this chapter to answer our 
research questions. It explains the parametric and non-parametric tests used to compare 
the daily changes in aggregate market liquidity before and after the automation of a 
trading system. It also discusses the estimation methods used to estimate the parameters 
of the regression model to examine the determinants of aggregate market liquidity. 
Finally, it presents the test of equality of the regressions’ parameters between floor and 
electronic trading systems in order to find out whether the impact of various factors on 
market-wide liquidity has changed as a result of the introduction of electronic trading 
systems.  
 
2.3.4.1 Comparative analysis 
 
We compare the daily changes in aggregate market liquidity between the floor and 
electronic trading system using univariate analysis. In this approach we use both the 
parametric test (t-test) and nonparametric test (Mann-Whitney test), which are used to 
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compare the mean (median in case of the nonparametric test) of daily changes in 
market-wide liquidity between floor and electronic trading systems. The t-test statistic 
for the difference in the means of daily changes in market liquidity is calculated as 
follows:  
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where 21, xx , are the samples means; 1x is the average of a liquidity measure on a floor 
trading system and 2x  is the average of the same liquidity measure on an electronic 
trading system. 2,121,12 , −− nn ss  are the variance for the liquidity measure on a floor and an 
electronic trading system respectively. N is the number of observations. This formula is 
applied when there are equal observations under each trading system.  
 
In calculating the standard t-test statistic, the assumption of normality distribution is 
assumed to hold. However, when the assumption of normality of t-test (parametric test) 
is violated, one can think of employing the analogous nonparametric test26. This kind of 
test has fewer or less rigorous assumptions than its parametric analogue. In other words, 
if the distribution of changes in market liquidity violates the assumption of normality, 
we will employ a nonparametric test of statistical significance for the changes in 
liquidity measures between floor and electronic trading systems. The Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney rank sum test will be used in this case, which is the most commonly employed 
analogous nonparametric test for a t-test. It is slightly less powerful than the t-test when 
the assumptions for the t-test are met, but much more powerful when the assumptions of 
the t-test are seriously violated. In other words, this test makes no assumption about the 
distribution of the underlying series. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is employed 
with ordinal (rank-order) data, by transforming the original interval/ratio observations 
into a rank-order format. By doing so the information is scarified, in other words, the 
rank-order provides no information about the amount of the difference between adjacent 
ranks (Sheskin, 2003). This test works as follows: it examines the equality of the centres 
of location of two samples to infer whether they are from the same population. The first 
                                                 
26
 When one or more of the assumptions of the t-test are violated, most researchers still prefer to use the t-
test instead of its nonparametric analog. The justification for that is that many results of empirical studies 
have demonstrated that under most conditions a parametric test is reasonably robust (Sheskin, 2003). 
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step involves ordering all the observations of liquidity measures on floor and electronic 
systems in a combined series and assigning ranks to each regime (Jain, 2005). These 
ranks are then summed separately for floor and electronic samples. The test statistic U is 
the one of the sample with the higher sum of ranks. 
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where U is the Mann-Whitney statistic, n1 and n2 is the number of observations under 
the floor and electronic trading system respectively, and ∑R is the sum of ranks. 
However, in the case of a large sample (i.e. large number of observations) the above 
equation will give a very large value of a Mann-Whitney statistic (U statistic). In this 
case it will be difficult to compare the calculated U statistics with the critical U obtained 
from the tables, since the tables of U distribution is limited to a certain sample size. 
Consequently, the normal distribution can be employed to approximate the Mann-
Whitney U statistics using the following equation: 
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The second term in the numerator of equation (2.12) represents the expected value of U, 
while the denominator represents the expected standard deviation. Under the null 
hypothesis of no change, the expected value E(U) and its standard deviation σu are 
approximately normally distributed N(0,1). Although there is no agreement on the size 
of the sample that justifies the use of normal approximation of the Mann-Whitney 
distribution, it is generally stated that the normal approximation could be used when the 
sample size is larger than the sample size documented in the tables of U distribution 
(see Sheskin, 2003). 
 
In summary, the univariate analysis using the t-test (Mann-Whitney test) provides 
evidence whether the difference in the mean (median) of daily changes in aggregate 
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market liquidity, the difference before and after the introduction of an electronic trading 
system, is significant or not.  
 
2.3.4.2  Multivariate analysis – regression framework  
 
To examine the determinants of market-wide liquidity, we follow the method of 
Chordia et al. (2001a). The main approach is based on the idea of estimating several 
time-series regression of market-wide liquidity measures on various potential 
determinants. This model addresses the relationship between market-wide liquidity and 
its possible time-series determinants, which is discussed in section 2.3.1.3, and captures 
any potential behavioural aspects of market-wide liquidity. This model is estimated 
during the two sub-sample periods, before and after the automation of a trading system. 
The empirical model is as follows: 
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The dependent variable Yit is the daily changes in aggregate market liquidity which is 
measured by the trading volume, the trading value, the turnover ratio, the price impact, 
the quoted spread, and the proportional quoted spread. α, β1 … β19 are unknown 
parameters to estimate, εit is the time varying disturbance term. The explanatory 
variables included in equation (2.13), which are discussed in section 2.3.1.3, are defined 
according to Chordia et al. (2001a), as follows: 
 
- MKT+ (MKT-): the daily market return if it is positive (negative) and zero otherwise; 
it is the signed concurrent daily return of the market which is a proxy for market 
performance (i.e. rising market and falling market).  
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- MA5MKT+ (MA5MKT-): the past five trading-day daily market return if it is positive 
(negative) and zero otherwise; it is the signed five-day moving average of past returns 
which is a proxy for recent market returns (i.e. recent market movements). 
 
- MA5 MKT: the past five trading-day moving average of a daily absolute market 
return, which is a proxy for recent market volatility. 
 
- Dit (Monday-Thursday): indicator variables for days of the week; 1 if the trading day 
is Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday, and zero otherwise. 
 
- HOL: indicator variables for holidays; 1 if a trading day satisfies the following 
conditions (1) if any holiday falls on a Friday then the preceding Thursday, (2) if it 
falls on a weekend or on a Monday, then the following Tuesday, (3) if it falls on 
another weekday then the preceding and following days, and 0 otherwise.   
 
- SHRATE: the first difference in short-term rate (1-month or 3-month Treasury Bills). 
 
- TERSPREAD: the daily change in the difference between the yield on a constant 
maturity 10-year Treasury bond and short rate.  
 
- QULSPREAD: the daily change in the difference between the yield on highly rating 
bond or better corporate bond yield index and the yield on 10-year Treasury bond. 
 
- GDP (0): indicator variables for the day of the announcement of GDP; 1 on the day of 
a GDP announcement and zero otherwise.  
 
- GDP (1-2): indicator variables for the two days preceding the announcement of GDP; 
1 on the two trading days prior to a GDP announcement and zero otherwise.  
 
- UNP (0), UNP (1-2), CPI (0), and CPI (1-2) are defined as for GDP but for 
unemployment and Consumer Price Index announcements respectively. 
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2.3.4.2.1 The methods of estimation 
 
Ordinary Least Square method (OLS) is the most widely used technique to find the best 
estimate of the coefficients in the regression model (equation (2.13)). This estimation 
method consists of minimizing the sum of squared residuals. According to the Gauss-
Markov theorem, OLS is always the best linear unbiased estimator and if the residuals 
are normally distributed, then this procedure is the uniformly minimum variance 
unbiased estimator. In addition, under the normality assumption of the residuals, the 
inference procedures such as hypothesis test, confidence intervals and prediction 
intervals are powerful. However, when this assumption is violated the fit of the 
regression model, the parameter estimates, and inferences can be flawed. The violation 
of a normality assumption can occur as a result of the presence of outliers in a data set 
(Adnan et al., 2001). When the data are contaminated with outliers, the OLS will 
provide in-resistant (unstable) results. That is, the presence of the outliers will inflate 
the error variance and stretch the confidence interval, consequently the estimation 
cannot be asymptotically consistent which causes a bias in the parameter estimate. 
These consequences of outliers when applying OLS are due to the fact that OLS does 
not always find the outliers, because it is based on the sample mean and covariance 
matrix which are themselves affected by outliers. This is known as masking outliers. 
Also, OLS has 0% breakdown value, which means that even when there is an arbitrarily 
small percentage of outliers (bad observations) the coefficients of OLS may change to 
any value at all from -∞ to +∞ (see Rousseeuw and Zomeren, 1990; Zaman et al., 2001; 
Yaffee, 2002) 27. 
 
As a result of these weaknesses with the OLS estimation method, a robust regression 
has been used to estimate the equation (2.13). Many authors have developed several 
robust regressions, which replace the criterion in OLS (minimizing the sum of squared 
errors) with one that is less sensitive to outliers such as least absolute deviations or least 
median of squares. Such robust regression is used to detect outliers and provide stable 
results in the presence of outliers through limiting the influence of outliers (Yaffee, 
2002; Chen, 2002). 
 
                                                 
27
 Breakdown value could be defined as “a measure of the proportion of contamination that a procedure 
can withstand and still maintain its robustness” (Chen, 2002, p. 1).  
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In this research the Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) method is applied to estimate 
equation (2.13). This estimation method replaces the least sum of square criterion in 
OLS with least absolute deviation. That is, it aims to minimize the sum of absolute 
values of errors (Mutan, 2004). The robust regression LAD is able to detect outliers in 
the data set more efficiently than OLS. More specifically, LAD has a higher breakdown 
value compared with OLS; its breakdown point of the sample median is 50%. This 
means that LAD will provide estimators that can resist the effect of nearly 50% of 
contamination in the data (Rousseeuw, 1984). In addition to using LAD, as a robust 
check, the Least Trimmed Square (LTS) method is also used. This estimation method 
minimizes the least sum of squares as with OLS, but the only difference is that the 
largest squared residuals are not used in the summation (Mutan, 2004). It also has the 
same breakdown value as LAD, but its objective function is smoother, which makes 
LTS less sensitive to local effects. Furthermore, its statistical efficiency is better 
because its estimator is asymptotically normal (Rousseeuw and Van Driessen, 2006).  
 
2.3.4.2.2 Comparing the estimated regression’s coefficients before and after the 
automation  
 
To investigate how the change from a floor trading system to an electronic trading 
system could affect the impact of various determinants on market liquidity and affect 
the time-series behaviour of market liquidity, the Wald-test is used. That is, the Wald 
test is used to test the coefficients equality restriction for the regressions estimated on a 
floor trading system and on an electronic trading system. In other words, we test 
whether the coefficient of the regression model estimated on a floor trading system is 
equal to the same coefficient of the regression model estimated on an electronic trading 
system (i.e. β1F = β1E). The formula for Wald test statistic is as follows: 
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where m is the covariance matrix of the difference vector, and [ ]{ }xmVar  is the 
covariance matrix (see Green, 2003). 
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2.4  Empirical Results 
 
This section presents and discusses the findings that are related to the comparison of the 
variation in market-wide liquidity, the determinants of aggregate market liquidity and 
its time-series regularities (i.e. time-series behaviour of market-wide liquidity) before 
and after the automation of a trading system. The results are reported first for the 
comparative analysis and then for the time-series regressions of market-wide liquidity 
on various potential determinants28. 
 
2.4.1 The daily changes in market-wide liquidity before and after the 
automation of the trading system  
 
In order to examine whether the average daily changes in market liquidity will be the 
same on floor and electronic trading systems, we use both a parametric (t-test) and a 
nonparametric (Mann-Whitney) test. The nonparametric test has been applied because 
of the violation of normality assumption in market-wide liquidity series. The Jarque-
Bera statistic for a normality test, as reported in appendix 2C, shows that all liquidity 
series are not normally distributed. Furthermore, as mentioned previously in section 
2.3.4.1, in the case of a large sample the calculated Mann-Whitney statistic will be very 
large and difficult to compare with its critical value, therefore the normal approximation 
of the Mann-Whitney test is used29. The results of parametric and non parametric tests 
(normal approximation of Mann-Whitney) for the daily changes in market-wide 
liquidity are shown in table 2.6 in panel A and B respectively for all markets using 
equally weight liquidity measures. A significantly positive (negative) difference in 
average daily changes in market-wide liquidity indicates that the variation in market-
wide liquidity is higher (lower) on a floor trading system and vice versa.  
 
The empirical results of a t-test show that, in SSE, the average daily changes in all 
liquidity measures, except for price impact, show a significant decline at 1% and within 
a 10% level of significance. This implies that variation in market-wide liquidity is less 
                                                 
28
 See appendix 2B, which provides a summary of  the testable hypotheses and whether they are 
supported or rejected, along with the reasons based on the empirical results of this section.  
29
 In the interest of space the values of Mann-Whitney statistics (U statistics) are not reported here. 
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on an electronic trading system compared with that on a floor trading system. In the 
case of ASE and VSE, only the daily change in the turnover ratio shows respectively a 
significant decline and a significant increase in market-wide liquidity variation at a 1% 
level of significance. Furthermore, in contrast to SSE, the difference in the average 
daily change in spread measures in FSE is negatively significant at a 5% level of 
significance. This indicates that the variation in market-wide liquidity is higher in FSE’s 
electronic system compared with the electronic trading system in SSE. This implies that 
the introduction of an electronic trading system in SSE provides more stability in 
market-liquidity compared with a floor trading system in FSE. These results reject the 
first hypothesis and indicate that the variation in market-wide liquidity on a floor 
trading system is different from that on an electronic trading system. However, the 
majority of t-test statistics, which are statistically insignificant, are in support of the first 
proposition. This implies that the introduction of an electronic trading system does not 
cause any change in the variation in market-wide liquidity, that is, market-wide liquidity 
remains stable across different trading systems.  
 
Further, the results of a nonparametric test (the normal approximation of Mann-Whitney 
rank sum tests) that are reported in panel B for all markets show that the obtained z-
values are statistically insignificant30. This means that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the daily changes of market-wide liquidity. Consequently, the results of 
nonparametric tests are consistent with the insignificant results of the t-test and thus 
accept the first hypothesis that the daily change in aggregate market liquidity is not 
different across trading systems. Once again, this means that moving to the electronic 
trading system away from the floor trading system does not affect the variability in 
aggregate market liquidity, and thus it is the same before and after automation. 
 
2.4.2  Determinants of aggregate market liquidity 
 
To find out what are the factors and the underlying forces that are responsible for the 
time-series variation in market-wide liquidity and to examine the time-series behaviour 
of market-wide liquidity, the time-series regression (equation (2.13)) has been estimated 
                                                 
30
 As a robust check we used another nonparametric test (Kruskal-Wallis). Its results were qualitatively 
and quantitatively similar to those provided by Mann-Whitney and its normal approximation. See 
appendix 2D. 
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before and after automation. Because of data availability constraint for the 
announcement of the scheduled macroeconomic indicators, equation (2.13) has been 
estimated without the indicator variables for these announcements31. Prior to the 
estimation of the regression model, all the time-series included in the regression model 
(including all aggregate market liquidity proxies, market return, volatility, and interest 
rate variables) have been tested for stationarity by performing an Augmented Dickey-
Fuller and Phillips-Perron test. We allow for an intercept and use Akaike information 
criterion to guide selection of the lags. The unit root hypothesis (non-stationary) has 
been rejected for all of these series. The probability value (p-value) is less than 1% (see 
the results in appendix 2E). Then, the Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) is used as the 
estimation method to control for the impact of outliers, which could affect the precision 
of the estimation in case Ordinary Least Squares has been used. Further, as a robust 
check, the equation (2.13) has been re-estimated using another robust estimation 
method: Least Trimmed Squares (LTS). The results of both estimation methods (i.e. 
LAD and LTS) are qualitatively and quantitatively similar; therefore, in the discussion 
we focus on the results obtained by LAD32. Finally, a comparison of the estimated 
coefficients has been conducted to compare the impact of the various determinants on 
market-wide liquidity before and after the automation of trading systems. The empirical 
results of time-series regressions and the results of the Wald test that compare the 
estimated coefficients between pre- and post-automation periods for SSE, ASE, VSE, 
and FSE are reported in table 2.7 and in table 2.8 panel A, B, C, and D respectively. The 
next sub-sections provide a detail discussion of the empirical results concerning the 
relationship of market-wide liquidity with its possible determinants and on the time-
series behaviour of market-wide liquidity.  
 
2.4.2.1 Market performance 
 
The results show that for all markets, in most cases, there is a distinctly symmetric 
response of trading activities measures to an up and down market (MKT+, MKT -) 
before and after automation. The coefficient of an up market (down market) is 
positively (negatively) related to trading activity measures and it is significant at a 1% 
                                                 
31
 The data on the announcement of macroeconomic indicators (i.e. GDP, CPI, and Unemployment) are 
only available for the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, therefore the estimation of equation (2.13) with these 
variables will be discussed later in this section.  
32In the interest of space the results obtained by LTS are not reported here.  
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level of significance in the majority of cases. This means that aggregate market liquidity 
increases in both up and down market conditions. However, the increase in market 
liquidity when a market declines is an unexpected result, because the inventory holding 
risk is expected to be high during this period, which may result in lower trading 
activities. This indicates that any uncertainty in the market is followed by higher trading 
activity. These results are consistent with the results of Chordia et al. (2001a) and Van 
Ness et al. (2005), who find that market liquidity also shows symmetric response to up 
and down market in NYSE and NASDAQ respectively. But they are inconsistent with 
Fujimoto (2003b) who finds that liquidity is positively related to market performance 
(i.e. it increases (decreases) when market return increases (decreases)). While the 
significant positive coefficient of an up market provides support to the hypothesis H2a, 
the significant negative coefficient of a down market does not.  
 
The estimated coefficient of down market in both price impact and spared regressions 
provide further support to the hypothesis H2a. Either on both trading systems or on one 
trading system, the coefficient of down market is negatively significant at a 1% and 5% 
level in most of the price impact (spreads) regressions for SSE, ASE and VSE (SSE and 
FSE). This means that market liquidity declines in a down market, which is consistent 
with the results of Chordia et al. (2001a) and Van Ness et al. (2005) who find a 
significant negative relation between a down market and spread measures. The decline 
of market liquidity in a down market, as shown by price impact and spreads regressions, 
is an expected one. This implies that dealers/investors become more concerned about 
inventory accumulation during the period of a declining market; therefore, they try to 
avoid trading with other parties by posting a wider bid-ask spread. In addition, as many 
traders try to avoid trading in falling markets, there are other traders who try to sell their 
holding. This will result in a large amount of orders flowing to the market without being 
filled. Consequently, the market’s ability to absorb and accommodate incoming orders 
will decline and thus lower liquidity.   
 
The results thus far show that market liquidity is affected by market conditions (i.e. up 
market and down market) either on both trading systems or on one trading system. This 
emphasizes the importance of investigating how the automation of trading systems 
could affect the impact of market performance on market-wide liquidity. In general, 
whenever the coefficient of any of the determinates of market liquidity are significant 
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both before and after automation, the coefficient, while having the same sign,  has an 
impact on market-wide liquidity that is significantly different in two sub-sample periods 
as indicated by the significant Wald test statistic. More specifically, the significant 
Wald statistics, reported in table 2.8, show that the size of the coefficients of an up 
market and a down market, in the absolute value, decreased significantly after the 
introduction of an electronic trading system in the majority of regression in SSE, ASE 
and VSE. By contrast, the size of the coefficients increased on the electronic trading 
system in FSE compared with the floor trading system. This implies that in SSE, ASE, 
and VSE, market liquidity shows less response to the change in market conditions 
during the electronic trading period. This rejects the hypothesis H2b that the impact of 
market returns on market-wide liquidity is not different between floor and electronic 
trading systems.  
 
2.4.2.2 Recent market movements 
 
With regard to market trends variables, it is expected that aggregate market liquidity 
will be positively related to recent market moves. That is, market liquidity is expected 
to increase (decrease) following a recent increase (decrease) in market returns. In 
contrast, the results show that on either both or one trading system, most of the 
coefficients of a recently rising market (MA5MKT+) (a recently falling market 
(MA5MKT-)) are statistically negative (positive) at a 1% and 5% level of significance, 
and some others are within a 10% level of significance in trading activity regressions 
for all markets (SSE, VSE and FSE). This means that market liquidity shows a 
symmetric response to the recent market trends, that is, market liquidity decreases in 
both a recently rising market and a recently falling market. This provides partial support 
to the hypothesis H3a in terms of a positive relation between market liquidity and a 
recently falling market. This implies that investors are less confident about the precise 
nature of their information and overestimate the variance of stock returns, and thus trade 
less frequently in the periods following a recently rising market which reduces market 
liquidity. Our results are consistent with the results of Chordia et al. (2001a) who find 
that a recently falling market causes a decrease in trading activity in NYSE, but 
inconsistent with Van Ness et al. (2005) who find no relation between the market trends 
and any liquidity measures.  
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In addition, the results also show that the coefficients of recently raising and falling 
markets are insignificant in spreads and price impact regressions in all markets, and do 
not support our hypothesis H3a, however, they are consistent with the results of Van 
Ness et al. (2005). Furthermore, the significant results of the Wald test show that the 
size of recently rising and recently falling market coefficients, in trading value (trading 
volume) regression in SSE (VSE), decreased significantly after automation.  This 
implies that recent market trends have more impact on market liquidity on a floor 
trading system compared with that on an electronic trading system. In contrast, in ASE 
the impact of a recently rising market becomes significant after automation in trading 
activity regressions. This does not provide support to our hypothesis H3b that the impact 
of recent market trends on market-wide liquidity is not different across different trading 
systems.  
 
2.4.2.3 Market volatility 
 
It is expected that market liquidity will decline during periods of higher volatility, and 
thus it is expected that market volatility will be negatively (positively) related with 
trading activity (price impact and spreads) measures. Consistently, the estimated 
coefficients of recent market volatility (MA5 |MKT|) in trading activity regressions 
have the expected sign and are statistically significant at a 1% level of significance or 
lower in all markets either on both or just one trading system. This means that high 
levels of market volatility is associated with low trading activity due to a higher 
expected inventory risk during this time. This implies that most of the investors/dealers, 
who try to keep their portfolios at an optimal level, prefer to avoid trading during a high 
volatility period to avoid any additional inventory risk, which will be added to their 
portfolios if they trade. This will result in reducing the level of trading activity and thus 
reducing market liquidity. Our results are consistent with those of Chordia et al. 
(2001a), Fujimoto (2003b) and Chordia et al. (2005) who find a negative relationship 
between volatility and liquidity, but inconsistent with Van Ness et al. (2005) who find 
that recent market volatility is unrelated to any liquidity proxies in NASDAQ stock 
exchange. Our results also provide support to the hypothesis H4a that market volatility is 
negatively related to market liquidity.    
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In contrast, the relationships between market volatility and both price impact and spread 
measures are unexpected and thus do not provide support to the hypothesis H4a. More 
specifically, market volatility is negatively significant at a 5% level of significance in 
spreads regression on electronic trading systems for SSE, but it is weakly significant (at 
a 10% level of significance) in the price impact regression on floor trading systems for 
ASE. This means that market liquidity increases during high volatility periods. This is 
inconsistent with the findings of Huberman and Halka (2001) and Chordia et al. (2005), 
but it is consistent with the finding of Chordia et al. (2001a) who find a negative 
relation between volatility and spread. This implies that investors/dealers, who have 
inventory imbalance in their portfolio, will be unable to adjust their inventory during a 
high volatility period, because of the low level of trading activity following recent 
market volatility. Consequently, investors/dealers are forced to quote a lower bid-ask 
spread in order to attract more investors to trade and thus adjust their inventory 
imbalance.  
 
Additionally, in SSE, ASE and VSE, the overwhelming results of the Wald test show 
that the impact of recent market volatility on aggregate market liquidity is more on a 
floor trading system compared with that on an electronic trading system. That is, in 
trading activity and price impact regressions, the size of a recent market volatility 
coefficient is significantly larger on a floor trading system compared with that on an 
electronic trading system. In contrast, the impact of market volatility on aggregate 
market liquidity is more on the electronic trading system in FSE.  This implies that the 
introduction of an electronic trading system has affected the degree of a market-wide 
liquidity response to market volatility, to the extent that market liquidity shows less 
variability during the periods of higher volatility on an electronic trading system for 
SSE, ASE and VSE compared with FSE. Thus, these results reject our hypothesis H4b 
that the impact of market volatility on market liquidity is not different on alternative 
trading systems.   
 
2.4.2.4 Interest rate variables  
 
The empirical results show that interest rate variables have a significant effect upon 
market-wide liquidity. More specifically, in FSE the short-term interest rate has a 
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significant negative influence on trading volume and turnover ratio (trading value) on 
an electronic trading system (on both trading systems) at a 1% level of significance or 
lower. This indicates that market-wide liquidity decreases with a short-term interest 
rate, which implies that an increase in short-term rates could reduce trading activity 
because of an increase in the cost of margin trading and the cost of financing inventory. 
Our results are consistent with the findings of Chordia et al. (2001a, 2005), but 
inconsistent with the results of Fujimoto (2003b) who finds that average market 
liquidity is significantly higher when a short-term rate is high. This provides support to 
our hypothesis H5a that market-wide liquidity will be negatively affected by a short-term 
interest rate.  In addition, the impact of the short-term interest rate on market-wide 
liquidity in FSE on an electronic trading system is different than that on a floor trading 
system. That is, after automation the coefficient of the short-term interest rate becomes 
significant in both trading volume and turnover ratio regressions, and its size increases 
in trading value regression. This may indicate that after automation the investors 
become more concerned about the cost of financing inventory. Thus, the significant 
results of the Wald test reject the hypothesis H5b, that the impact of the short-term 
interest rate on market liquidity is not different before and after automation.  
 
On both trading systems or on one trading system, the results also show that an increase 
in treasury bonds relative to the short rate (term spread) is accompanied by decreased 
(increased) market liquidity in FSE and ASE (SSE). More specifically, the coefficients 
of term spread has a significant negative (positive) effect on trading activity (price 
impact) in FSE and ASE (ASE), and has a significant negative effect on a proportional 
quoted spread in SSE. The latter finding provides support to the hypothesis H5a, which 
expects a positive relation between market liquidity and term spread, while the former 
findings are against expectations and does not support the hypothesis. The negative 
relation between proportional spread and term spread in SSE indicates that investors 
post a lower bid-ask spread to liquidate their equity holdings and move their 
investments to debt instruments in order to invest in higher yield long-term Treasury 
Bonds. In contrast, the negative (positive) relationship between trading activity (price 
impact) and term spread implies that investors, during the period of a higher term 
spread, trade more in debt instruments rather than pay attention to reallocate their 
wealth between debt instruments and an equity market, which leaves the latter with less 
trading activity. This will result in lower liquidity in an equity market. Also, leaving the 
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equity market with less trading activity may reduce the market’s ability to absorb orders 
and thus results in a higher impact of order flow. However, the positive relation 
between market liquidity and term spread in SSE, compared with that in FSE and ASE, 
is inconsistent with the findings of Chordia et al. (2001a) and Fujimoto (2003b) who 
find that liquidity declines with term spread. Furthermore, the impact of the term spread 
on market-wide liquidity is different between floor and electronic trading systems. After 
the automation of the trading system, the coefficient of term spread in proportional bid-
ask spread (price impact) regression in SSE (ASE) becomes insignificant.  This does not 
provide support to hypothesis H5b that the impact of the term spread on market liquidity 
is not different between floor and electronic trading systems.  
 
With regard to quality spread (i.e. default spread), the results show that market-wide 
liquidity decreases with the quality spread in VSE and FSE either on both trading 
systems or on one trading system. The coefficient of quality spread is negatively related 
to the turnover ratio in VSE, and negatively (positively) related to trading activity 
measures (proportional bid-ask spread) in FSE. This implies that an increase in the 
long-term interest rate on corporate bonds relative to long-term Treasury Bond yields 
could increase the perceived risk of holding inventory, and thereby decrease liquidity. 
In other words, when the interest rate on corporate bonds increases this might increase 
the risk related to stocks, and then investors try to avoid trading in such stocks by 
lowering trading activity and by increasing a bid-ask spread. In fact, the results show 
that liquidity increases with the quality spread in SSE. The coefficient of the quality 
spread is significantly negative (positive) at a 5% level of significance or better in 
proportional bid-ask spread (trading value) regression in a pre- (post-) automation 
period. This implies that the increase in the long term interest rate on corporate bonds 
will increase the perceived risk of holding inventory, and thus force the 
investors/dealers to remove risky assets from their portfolios by quoting a lower bid-ask 
spread to attract trading. These results are inconsistent with the results of Chordia et al. 
(2001a) and Van Ness et al. (2005) who find that default spread unrelated to market 
liquidity. However, the positive relation between market liquidity and the quality spread 
in SSE is consistent with the results of Fujimoto (2003b). Overall, our results provide 
partial support to our proposition H5a in terms of the negative relation between liquidity 
and quality spread in ASE and FSE.  
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Finally, the results show that the impact of quality spread on market liquidity is 
different between floor and electronic trading systems. More specifically, the impact of 
quality spread on a floor trading system is more than that on an electronic trading 
system for SSE and FSE. In most cases, the coefficient of quality spread is significant in 
trading activity and proportional bid-ask spread (proportional bid-ask spread) 
regressions before the automation of a trading system in FSE (SSE). In contrast, the 
coefficient of quality spread becomes significant in turnover ratio regression after the 
automation of the trading system in VSE. These results reject the hypothesis H5b that 
there is no difference in the impact of quality spread on market liquidity between a floor 
and an electronic trading system. In sum, the results generally show that all interest rate 
variables have a significant impact on market-wide liquidity and their impact on market 
liquidity is different under the different context of trading systems.  
 
2.4.2.5 Day-of-the-week effect 
 
Turning our attention to the daily behaviour of market-wide liquidity during the week, 
the results show that, in all markets, market liquidity exhibits distinct day-of-week 
regularities. More specifically, the day-of-week dummies for Monday are negative and 
significant in trading activity regressions at a 5% level of significance or better in all 
markets. Also, the coefficient of Monday is positively (negatively) significant in price 
impact (spread) regressions in all markets (FSE) at a 1% and 5% level of significance in 
most cases, and within 10% level of significance in a few cases. Apart from the negative 
coefficients of Monday in spared regression in FSE, other results indicate that market 
liquidity declines on Mondays either on both or one trading system. This result is 
consistent with the results of Van Ness et al. (2005) in NASDAQ, but inconsistent with 
the findings of Chordia et al. (2001a) and Chordia et al. (2005) who find that liquidity 
increases on Mondays in NYSE. The decline of liquidity on Mondays is expected and 
implies that the degree of information asymmetry among investors is high after the 
weekend, which encourages some traders (i.e. liquidity traders) to defer their trading to 
another day during the week.  These results provide support to our postulated 
hypothesis H6a that market liquidity shows a day-of-the-week effect.  
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In most cases market-wide liquidity increases on Tuesday in all markets on either both 
or one trading system. The majority of the results show that the coefficient of Tuesday 
is positively (negatively) significant in trading activity (price impact and spread) 
regressions at a 5% level of significance or better in most cases, which provides further 
support to the hypothesis H6a. This implies that the level of information asymmetry 
declines in the second day of trading in the week, and thus increases trading activities in 
all markets in our sample. These results are consistent with the findings of Chordia et al. 
(2001a), Chordia et al. (2005) and Van Ness et al. (2005) with regard to NYSE and 
NASDAQ.  
 
In contrast to VSE, market-wide liquidity keeps increasing on Wednesdays in SSE, 
ASE and FSE as shown by a significantly positive (negative) coefficient of Wednesday 
in trading activity (price impact and spread) regressions. This implies that the level of 
information asymmetry in SSE, ASE and FSE continues to decline and thus attracts 
more trading. These results provide further support to our hypothesis H6a and are 
consistent with the results of Chordia et al. (2001a), Chordia et al. (2005) and Van Ness 
et al. (2005).  
 
Furthermore, the results regarding the day-of-the-week dummy for Thursday also 
provide further support for hypothesis H6a. That is, on Thursdays market liquidity 
continues to increase in SSE on an electronic trading system and in FSE on a floor 
trading system, as shown by the negatively (positively) significant coefficient of a 
Thursday in spread (trading value) regressions in both markets (FSE). This is consistent 
with the results of Chordia et al. (2001a) and Van Ness et al. (2005).  In contrast, 
market-wide liquidity declines on a Thursday in ASE and VSE on either one or both 
trading systems. The coefficient of Thursday is significantly negative at a 1% and 5% 
and within a 10% level of significance in trading activity regressions. This may imply 
that the information asymmetry in ASE and VSE is higher on a Thursday and thus 
attracts less trading.  
 
The regression intercepts are most likely to reflect the impact of Fridays (when the four 
days-of-the-week dummies are zero). The results provide a mix of evidence on the 
behaviour of liquidity on Fridays in each market as well as cross markets. More 
specifically, in contrast to FSE, market-wide liquidity increases on Fridays in SSE, ASE 
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and VSE either on both or on one trading system. The constant is positively significant 
in trading activity regressions at a 1% and 5% level of significance in most cases and 
within a 10% level of significance in other cases. In contrast, market liquidity in all 
markets declines on Fridays as shown by the constant, which is positively significant at 
a 5% level of significance or better in spread and price impact regressions. This may 
imply that some investors are keen to trade to lay off the imbalance in their inventories, 
in order to avoid the expected higher inventory costs that they could face by holding 
inventory over the weekend. At the same time, other investors may post wider bid-ask 
spreads because they are reluctant to trade to avoid any additional inventory risk. Our 
results, that market liquidity declines on Fridays, are consistent with the results of 
Chordia et al. (2001a), Van Ness et al. (2005) and Chordia et al. (2005).  Overall, the 
results of the indicators variables for the day of the week show that market-wide 
liquidity exhibits a strong day-of-the-week effect on both trading systems.  
 
The evidence of the day-of-the-week effect in market-wide liquidity highlights the 
importance of looking at how different the regularities are before and after automation. 
The majority of the results show that the pattern of market-wide liquidity is different 
before and after automation. More specifically, the results show that some coefficients 
of day-of-the-week dummies either become insignificant or significant after automation, 
such as the coefficient of Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday in price impact (spreads) 
regressions in ASE (FSE). Furthermore, the significant results of the Wald test in table 
2.8 indicate that some of the coefficients of day-of-the-week dummies have 
significantly increased or decreased in size after automation. For example, the 
coefficient of Monday in trading activity (spreads) regressions in SSE (FSE) has 
decreased (increased) after the introduction of the electronic trading system. This 
strongly rejects the hypothesis H6b, which states that the regularities in market liquidity 
on a floor trading system are not different from that on an electronic trading system. 
 
2.4.2.6 The effect of holidays 
 
The results show that market-wide liquidity exhibits a distinct pattern around holidays 
either on both or on one trading system. More specifically, with the exception of VSE, 
market-wide liquidity either decreases or increases in the other markets around 
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holidays. For example, the results show that market-wide liquidity declines around the 
holidays in SSE and ASE. The coefficient of holidays’ dummies is significantly 
negative (positive) at least at a 5% level of significance in trading activity (spreads and 
price impact) regressions in SSE and ASE (SSE). In contrast, the period around 
holidays in FSE is one of increasing liquidity. The coefficient of holidays’ dummies is 
positive and weakly significant (at a 10% level of significance) in trading activity 
regressions, but it is significantly negative at a 5% level of significance in spread 
regression. This means that investors in SSE and ASE, in contrast to FSE, avoid trading 
before the holiday in order not to hold any positions, especially short positions. It might 
also mean that investors pay attention to other things around a holiday and thus it makes 
trading difficult as many investors are not working, which may result in reducing 
liquidity in these markets. Also, the higher bid-ask spreads in SSE around a holiday 
indicate the reluctance of investors to hold additional inventory prior to a holiday by 
quoting a higher bid and ask prices, which means lower liquidity. Our evidence that 
market liquidity declines around holidays in SSE and ASE is consistent with the 
findings of Chordia et al. (2001a), Van Ness et al. (2005), Chordia et al. (2005). Thus, 
our results provide further support to our proposition H6a that aggregate market liquidity 
exhibits a distinct pattern around holidays. 
 
Furthermore, the pattern of market liquidity around holidays is different before and after 
automation. After automation, the coefficient of holiday’s dummy becomes 
insignificant as in the price impact and trading activity regressions in SSE and FSE 
respectively. However, the coefficient of a holiday’s dummy become significant after 
the automation in spreads (turnover ratio) regressions in SSE and FSE (ASE). This 
implies that investors, after automation, become more able to trade and manage their 
holdings before the holidays. This could be due to the remote access advantage of the 
electronic trading system that does not require any physical attendance of investors to 
carry out their trades. These results reject the hypothesis H6b which states that the 
patterns of market liquidity around holidays are not different before and after 
automation.  
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2.4.2.7 Announcement effect of macroeconomic indicators 
 
This section discusses the results of estimating an equation (2.13) with the indicator 
variables of the announcement of macroeconomic indicators. This equation is estimated 
only for the Frankfurt Stock Exchange on the floor and electronic trading system, 
because the information on the announcement of macroeconomic indicators (i.e. GDP, 
CPI, and unemployment) is only available for that market. The estimated results are 
reported in table 2.9, and the results of the Wald test that compare the estimated 
coefficients between pre- and post- periods are reported in table 2.10. 
 
The results obtained after including the indicator variables in equation (2.13) are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those obtained by estimating the same 
equation without the indicator variables, except with some differences in terms of 
significance or sign. For example, in the new results, the short-term rate becomes 
insignificant on the floor trading system in trading value regression; the term spread 
becomes significant at a 5% on floor trading system in turnover ratio regression after it 
was significant at a 10% level; and day-of-the-week dummies either become significant 
at a 10% or a 5% level of significance after they were significant at either a 5% or a 
10% level of significance in price impact and spread regressions. 
 
The results, generally, show that there is a significant relation between the 
announcement of macroeconomic indicators and aggregate market liquidity. In other 
words, market-wide liquidity shows regularities around and on the day of the 
announcement of macroeconomic indicators. For example, the results show that 
aggregate market liquidity decreases prior to a GDP announcement on an electronic 
trading system. The coefficient of the dummy for the two days prior to the 
announcement of GDP is positively significant at a 5% level of significance in price 
impact regression. These results are inconsistent with those of Chordia et al. (2001a) 
who find that trading activities increase prior to the announcement of GDP. This may 
imply that uncertainty is high before the announcement and investors are not confident 
about their information, therefore, they tend to reduce their trading activity. This then 
reduces the market’s ability to absorb and accommodate the submitted orders, which 
increases the price impact of orders. Also, on the day of the announcement of GDP 
market-wide liquidity declines on the floor trading system. The coefficient of the day of 
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the announcement of GDP is significantly positive at a 1% and a 10% level of 
significance in quoted bid-ask spread and proportional quoted bid-ask spread 
regressions respectively. The decline of liquidity on the day of an announcement is an 
unexpected result, because on that day the investors are expected to be fully informed 
and they have updated their expectations accordingly, which will affect their trading 
behaviour. However, what could be happening is that a disagreement concerning the 
information still exists among investors, which might affect the degree of uncertainty to 
the extent that they post higher bid-ask spreads. Alternatively, on the day of the 
announcement the inventory risk is expected to be higher because of the sharper price 
changes which force investors to quote a wider bid-ask spread.  Our results are 
inconsistent with the results of Van Ness et al. (2005) and Chordia et al. (2005) who 
find no relation between liquidity measures and a macroeconomic announcement. Even 
so, our results provide support to our testable hypothesis H7a that market-wide liquidity 
is affected by the announcement of macroeconomic variables. 
 
The results concerning the effect of the announcement of CPI also provide partial 
support to the hypothesis H7a. That is, aggregate market liquidity is not affected before 
the announcement of CPI by two days, however, on the day of the announcement of 
CPI, the results show that liquidity increases as indicated by a positively (negatively) 
significant coefficient in trading value (price impact) regression on an electronic (floor) 
trading system. Our result is inconsistent with the result of Chordia et al. (2001a) and 
Van Ness et al. (2005) who find that the announcement of CPI does not seem to 
influence market liquidity. This implies that inflation has not been particularly easy to 
predict in Germany compared to the USA.  
 
Finally, market-wide liquidity increases prior to the announcement of unemployment as 
well as on the day of the announcement of unemployment, which provides further 
support to the proposition H7a. The results show that the coefficient of two days prior to 
the announcement (day of the announcement) is negatively (positively) significant at a 
1% and 5%, and within a 10% level of significance in proportional quoted spread 
(trading activity) regressions on floor (both) trading system. An increase of liquidity 
prior to the announcement of an unemployment rate as indicated by a lower bid-ask 
spread on a floor trading system may imply that the inventory risks are lower prior to 
the announcement because of the absence of sharp price changes. However, the increase 
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in liquidity on the day of the announcement indicates that there is disagreement among 
investors on the meaning of the information which drives their trading activity up.  Our 
results are consistent with those of Chordia et al. (2001a) who find that market liquidity 
increases prior to the announcement of unemployment in NYSE.  
 
After the automation of the trading system, the results also show that the influence of 
macroeconomic announcements on market liquidity has changed, which rejects the 
hypothesis H7a that the impact of the announcement of macroeconomic indicators on 
market liquidity is the same before and after automation. For example, the impact of the 
day of the announcement of CPI and unemployment, in trading value and turnover ratio 
regressions, becomes significant on an electronic trading system. This implies that the 
knowledge about macroeconomic indicators becomes important during the electronic 
trading period. This may be due to the absence of the advantage of sharing information 
in an electronic trading system, which may affect the trading behaviour of investors. In 
contrast, after the automation, the impact of the day of the announcement (two days of 
the announcement) of GDP and CPI (unemployment), in spreads and price impacts 
(proportional bid-ask spread) regressions, becomes insignificant on an electronic trading 
system. This indicates that, even though the announcement of macroeconomic 
indicators has impacted the trading behaviour of investors, it does not affect the cost of 
transactions and the cost of providing liquidity on electronic trading systems.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Although there are a large number of studies that have examined the cross-sectional 
determinants of liquidity of an individual stock, studies that have examined the factors 
that affect time-series variation in aggregate market liquidity are very sparse, and in 
particular, no study, to the best of our knowledge, has examined the determinants of 
market-wide liquidity and its times-series behaviour before and after the automation of 
trading systems. Therefore, this chapter extends the literature on market structure and 
design by examining and comparing before and after the introduction of an electronic 
trading system, the variation (i.e. change) in aggregate market liquidity, the factors that 
affect the time-series variation in market-wide liquidity and its time-series behaviour. A 
comparative analysis of market-wide liquidity has been undertaken before and after 
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automation. Then, the methodology of Chordia et al. (2001a) has been applied to 
examine the determinants of market-wide liquidity and its time-series behaviour for four 
European stock markets, namely; the Swiss Stock Exchange (SSE), the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange (ASE), the Vienna Stock Exchange (VSE), and the Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange (FSE).  We use daily data for all stocks traded in these markets including 
dead stocks to avoid any survival bias in our results. The sample period for all markets 
(FSE aside) spans a period of ten years, five years before and five years after 
automation. In the case of FSE, where both a floor trading system and electronic trading 
system are working in parallel to each other, the sample period is extended for eight 
years.   
 
By examining whether the variation in market-wide liquidity is different before and 
after automation, the results overwhelmingly provide evidence that the average daily 
changes in market-wide liquidity is not significantly after automation. The majority of 
the results of the t-test are statistically insignificant. Also, the results of non-parametric 
tests provide evidence that strongly support the findings of the t-test, which means that 
the daily changes in market-wide liquidity is the same before and after automation.  
 
With regard to determinants of aggregate market liquidity, the results show that market 
liquidity is strongly related to concurrent markets either on both or on one trading 
system for all markets. That is, market liquidity increases in both an up and down 
market on floor and electronic trading systems. However, the influence of market 
returns (concurrent market return) on market-wide liquidity is greater on a floor trading 
system in all markets, except for FSE, where the impact of a concurrent market return 
over market liquidity is more on an electronic trading system. Recent market trends are 
related to aggregate market liquidity in all markets, but are strongly associated with 
market-wide liquidity in FSE on both trading systems. In addition, the results show that 
in all markets, recent market volatility negatively affects market-wide liquidity. This is 
demonstrated particularly by the negative coefficients of recent market volatility in all 
trading activity regressions. In contrast, the relation between recent market volatility 
and price impact in ASE and spread measures in SSE is unexpected. That is, both price 
impact and spread decrease with market volatility, which is consistent with the findings 
of Chordia et al. (2001a) in NYSE. However, the impact of recent market volatility on 
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market liquidity is more on a floor trading system in all markets, except in the FSE, 
where its impact over liquidity is more on an electronic trading system.  
 
The results also show that the changes in key interest rate variables (i.e. short-term rate, 
the term spread, and the quality spread) significantly influence market liquidity. Short-
term rate and quality spread negatively affect market liquidity. However, term spread 
has a significantly positive (negative) effect on market liquidity in SSE (FSE and ASE). 
Also, the impact of interest rate variables on market liquidity on a floor trading system 
is different than that on an electronic trading system. For example, in FSE, a short term 
interest rate has a greater influence on market liquidity on an electronic trading system 
compared with that on a floor trading system, and the impact of both term spread and 
quality spread is more on a floor trading system in SSE, ASE and FSE.   
 
In addition, there is a persistent day-of-the-week effect in all markets. That is, liquidity 
shows a strong day-of-the-week effect, which is different on both trading systems. More 
specifically, liquidity declines on Mondays in SSE, ASE, and VSE. In FSE, the results 
provide mixed evidence. That is, most of the trading activity and price impact measures 
show that market-wide liquidity declines on Mondays while spread measures show the 
opposite. Market-wide liquidity increases on Tuesdays and on Wednesdays in SSE, 
ASE and in FSE, while it increases only on Tuesdays in VSE. Moreover, on Thursdays 
the results are mixed: the liquidity either increases on that day in some markets (such as 
SSE and FSE) or decreases in other markets (such as ASE and VSE). Finally, on 
Fridays the liquidity in both ASE and VSE increase as shown by the positively 
significant constant in trading activity regressions, while in SSE and FSE it decreases as 
shown by the positively significant constant in spread regressions. Furthermore, market-
wide liquidity shows a distinct pattern around holidays. In contrast to FSE, market-wide 
liquidity decreases around holidays in both SSE and ASE, but it does not show any 
particular pattern around holidays in VSE. The results also show that the regularities of 
market-wide liquidity during the week and around holidays are different before and 
after automation.   
 
Consistent with Chordia et al. (2001a), but inconsistent with Van Ness et al. (2005) and 
Chordia et al. (2005), we find that macroeconomic announcements have some impact 
on market liquidity. That is, by examining the influence of the announcement of 
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macroeconomic indicators on liquidity in FSE, the results show that prior to the 
announcement (on the day of announcement) of GDP, market-wide liquidity declines on 
an electronic (floor) trading system. In contrast, prior to and on the day of the 
announcement of unemployment, market liquidity increases on a floor trading system 
and on both trading systems respectively. Finally, on the day of announcement of CPI, 
market liquidity increases on the electronic (floor) trading system as shown by the 
significantly positive (negative) coefficient of the indicator variable in trading value 
(price impact) regression. Despite the significant impact of the announcement of 
macroeconomic indicators on market-wide liquidity, their impact on market-wide 
liquidity on a floor trading system is different than that on an electronic trading system. 
 
To conclude, this chapter finds that aggregate market liquidity is affected by different 
factors such as concurrent market returns, recent market trends, and market volatility on 
both floor trading systems and electronic trading systems. Also, it shows that in some 
markets there is a significant influence of interest rate variables on market liquidity. 
Liquidity, in all markets, shows distinct patterns during the week (i.e. day-of-the-week 
effect) as well as around holidays. In addition, in the case of FSE, the results show that 
market-wide liquidity is affected by the release of information about major 
macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, CPI and unemployment, and thus shows a 
pattern around the announcement of macroeconomic indicators. Finally, the results 
provide evidence that the impact of the determinants of market-wide liquidity and its 
time-series behaviour is different across trading systems. That is, some factors have 
strong influence on market liquidity on a floor trading system and others have strong 
influence during an electronic trading period. This means that trading systems play a 
major role in affecting market liquidity and its relation with the factors that are 
responsible for its time-series variation.  
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Table 2.1 
Dates of introduction of the electronic trading system and the sample period before and after automation 
This table shows the stock exchanges that comprise our sample, the date of the introduction of the electronic trading system, the source 
of information about the date of the automation for each stock exchange and the sample period breakdown for each exchange before and 
after the automation of the trading system.  
The 
Exchange Date of Automation Source of information 
Sample period 
Before 
Automation 
After 
Automation 
Swiss 2-August-1996 http://www.swx.com/swx/review_en.html 2-8-1991 to 1-8-1996 
3-8-1996 to 
2-8-2001 
Amsterdam 30- September-1994 Lexis Nexis News retrieval services 30-9-1989 to 29-9-1994 
1-10-1994 to 
30-9-1999 
Vienna 28-June-1996 Lexis Nexis News retrieval services 28-6-1991 to 27-6-1996 
29-6-1996 to           
28-6-2001 
Frankfurt 28-November- 1997 info@deutsche-boerse.com 1/1/1998 to 30/12/2005 for both systems 
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Table 2.2 
Descriptive statistics of market-wide liquidity  
These are descriptive statistics for time series of market-wide liquidity measures. The series are constructed by the cross-sectional average of individual stocks’ liquidity 
measures for each market for the two sub-samples periods, during a floor trading system (before automation), and during an electronic trading system (after automation), 
with the exception of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange where the series are constructed for the floor trading system and the electronic trading system that are operating 
parallel to each other. The variables are defined as follows: Quoted bid-ask spread (QSPR): is the ask price minus the bid price, proportional quoted spread (PQSPR): 
the quoted bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint of the quote (in percent), trading volume (TVOL): the total share volume during the day, trading value (TVALUE): 
the total currency volume which is calculated by multiplying the trading volume by the daily closing price, turnover ratio (TOV): turnover measure of trading activities 
which is calculated by dividing trading value over the market capitalization, price impact (PIMPACT): the ratio of absolute return to trading value. All the variables are 
equally-weighted. 
Panel A: Swiss stock exchange (SSE) 
  
TVOL (000) TVALUE TOV PIMPACT QSPR PQSPR 
  
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Mean 8.993 8.691 1781.803 1376.657 2.293 1.806 1.820E-04 1.820E-04 11.855 16.400 0.037 0.040 
Median 8.258 8.294 1647.574 1203.834 2.201 1.576 1.530E-04 1.580E-04 11.754 14.918 0.037 0.038 
Std. Dev. a 7.057 2.786 852.569 653.941 0.849 0.920 1.630E-04 1.020E-04 2.053 4.699 0.007 0.011 
C of Vb 0.785 0.321 0.478 0.475 0.370 0.510 0.896 0.560 0.173 0.287 0.194 0.265 
Minimum 0.350 2.586 33.227 244.203 0.164 0.229 0.000 0.000 3.000 9.439 0.012 0.021 
Maximum 208.600 20.420 8347.650 4648.634 15.242 13.383 0.003 0.002 34.037 37.082 0.064 0.095 
Panel B: Amsterdam stock exchange (ASE) 
 TVOL (000) TVALUE TOV PIMPACT QSPR PQSPR 
 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Mean 166.007 371.074 1514.724 6406.675 21.939 3.985 6.210E-04 3.130E-04 -----------c ----------- ----------d ----------- 
Median 154.839 363.431 1339.892 5937.982 9.329 3.557 4.730E-04 2.540E-04 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Std. Dev.  67.813 117.426 638.236 3308.872 75.823 4.100 6.240E-04 2.380E-04 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
C of V 0.408 0.316 0.421 0.516 3.456 1.029 1.005 0.760 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Minimum 7.372 66.683 146.285 685.715 1.094 0.931 0.000E+00 5.250E-05 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Maximum 618.373 1315.311 5604.162 23214.620 2235.382 132.764 0.014 0.003 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
    
a
 Standard deviation. 
    
b
 Coefficient of variation, which is the standard deviation divided by the mean.  
        
c, d
 Spreads measures are not available for ASE. 
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    Table 2.2 (Continued) 
Panel C: Vienna stock exchange (VSE) 
  
TVOL (000) TVALUE TOV PIMPACT QSPR PQSPR 
  
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Mean 15.058 28.749 960.475 803.840 1.902 2.076 3.400E-04 1.327E-03 -----------c ----------- ----------d ----------- 
Median 13.288 26.086 786.321 666.206 1.641 1.677 3.060E-04 8.420E-04 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Std. Dev. a 8.090 29.207 608.902 542.250 0.976 2.701 1.840E-04 1.535E-03 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
C of Vb 0.537 1.016 0.634 0.675 0.514 1.301 0.541 1.157 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Minimum 1.138 3.013 114.281 55.209 0.627 0.346 1.560E-06 0.000E+00 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Maximum 65.977 950.800 3975.726 8652.280 7.203 47.979 0.002 0.021 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Panel D: Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE) 
 TVOL (000) TVALUE TOV PIMPACT QSPR PQSPR 
 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Mean 86.357 151.466 2611.054 5613.472 1.841 1.487 0.006 0.017 0.561 0.444 0.034 0.043 
Median 15.277 141.215 184.539 4626.939 0.918 1.407 0.003 0.005 0.519 0.350 0.032 0.033 
Std. Dev.  239.082 80.805 8746.311 3456.830 2.943 0.523 0.009 0.031 0.298 0.224 0.012 0.028 
C of V 2.769 0.533 3.350 0.616 1.598 0.351 1.335 1.778 0.531 0.504 0.347 0.651 
Minimum 2.855 14.865 27.664 747.079 0.171 0.355 1.350E-05 1.360E-06 0.164 0.147 0.014 0.008 
Maximum 3917.667 811.517 203757.100 37558.870 52.720 4.051 0.058 0.547 1.420 1.407 0.080 0.147 
    
a
 Standard deviation. 
    
b
 Coefficient of variation, which is the standard deviation divided by the mean.  
        
c, d
 Spreads measures are not available for VSE. 
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Table 2.3 
Absolute percentage daily changes in market-wide liquidity measures  
These are descriptive statistics for absolute values of daily percentage changes in the variables described in table 2.2. The summary statistics presented here for each 
market for the two sub-sample periods, during a floor trading system (before automation), and during an electronic trading system (after automation), with the 
exception of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange where the averages are constructed for the floor trading system and for an electronic trading system that are operating 
parallel to each others. A preceding ∆ denotes the daily percentage change in the variable.  
Panel A: Swiss stock exchange (SSE) 
  
∆ TVOL ∆ TVALUE  ∆ TOV ∆ PIMPACT  ∆ QSPR ∆ PQSPR 
  
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Mean 0.306 0.180 0.301 0.179 0.237 0.196 0.663 0.367 0.088 0.061 0.072 0.048 
Median 0.187 0.145 0.195 0.146 0.163 0.149 0.299 0.266 0.061 0.050 0.050 0.038 
Std. Dev. a 0.906 0.161 1.419 0.169 0.476 0.227 5.835 0.470 0.153 0.052 0.161 0.045 
Minimum 4.160E-04 5.280E-04 8.060E-05 8.230E-05 5.760E-05 4.230E-06 1.990E-04 4.530E-04 2.310E-05 5.570E-06 1.550E-04 1.740E-05 
Maximum 20.482 1.535 47.447 2.503 10.396 4.159 197.555 8.741 3.190 0.494 4.367 0.520 
Panel B: Amsterdam stock exchange (ASE) 
 ∆ TVOL ∆ TVALUE  ∆ TOV ∆ PIMPACT  ∆ QSPR ∆ PQSPR 
 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Mean 0.285 0.228 0.274 0.228 1.205 0.279 0.586 0.554 -----------b ----------- ----------c ----------- 
Median 0.199 0.169 0.196 0.172 0.516 0.170 0.359 0.359 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Std. Dev.  0.766 0.248 0.710 0.253 3.689 1.144 1.190 0.802 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Minimum 1.600E-04 3.400E-04 2.320E-04 3.920E-05 1.060E-03 2.770E-04 3.620E-04 2.160E-06 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Maximum 18.578 4.413 22.381 4.922 83.164 38.600 20.572 10.677 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
     a
 Standard deviation. 
   
b, c
 Spreads measures are not available for ASE. 
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                  Table 2.3 (Continued) 
Panel C: Vienna stock exchange (VSE) 
  
∆ TVOL ∆ TVALUE  ∆ TOV ∆ PIMPACT  ∆ QSPR ∆ PQSPR 
  
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Mean 0.373 0.411 0.356 0.395 0.240 0.462 0.746 0.707 -----------b ----------- ----------c ----------- 
Median 0.254 0.228 0.232 0.246 0.169 0.248 0.323 0.439 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Std. Dev. a 0.485 2.888 0.486 1.532 0.291 1.640 8.086 0.953 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Minimum 0.000E+00 2.490E-04 7.010E-05 5.890E-04 5.300E-06 6.630E-04 7.360E-04 6.720E-04 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Maximum 7.538 99.986 5.718 49.928 3.596 42.314 274.666 9.120 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Panel D: Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE) 
 ∆ TVOL ∆ TVALUE  ∆ TOV ∆ PIMPACT  ∆ QSPR ∆ PQSPR 
 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Mean 0.164 0.217 0.185 0.233 0.163 0.160 0.610 0.636 0.065 0.111 0.042 0.086 
Median 0.105 0.148 0.118 0.161 0.105 0.112 0.232 0.322 0.051 0.075 0.034 0.058 
Std. Dev.  0.280 0.380 0.359 0.404 0.302 0.200 4.534 1.460 0.053 0.143 0.036 0.099 
Minimum 1.040E-04 6.450E-05 7.630E-05 2.200E-04 1.120E-04 1.440E-04 3.890E-04 7.130E-04 7.840E-06 0.000E+00 8.280E-06 2.730E-06 
Maximum 5.980 9.256 8.360 10.046 6.904 3.049 128.761 37.998 0.511 3.455 0.493 2.113 
     a
 Standard deviation. 
   
b, c
 Spreads measures are not available for VSE. 
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Table 2.4 
Correlations of simultaneous daily percentage changes in market-wide liquidity 
measures  
These are correlations among daily percentage changes in the variables described in table 2.2. The 
correlations between variables are reported for each market for the two sub-sample periods, during a floor 
trading system (before automation), and during an electronic trading system (after automation), with the 
exception of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange where the correlation coefficients between variables are 
reported for the floor trading system and for an electronic trading system that are operating parallel to 
each other. A preceding ∆ denotes the daily percentage change in the variable.  
Panel A: Swiss stock exchange (SSE)  
 
Liquidity 
measures 
∆TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR 
Fl
o
o
r 
tr
ad
in
g ∆TVALUE 0.753***     
∆TOV 0.565*** 0.282***    
∆PIMPACT -0.029 0.006 -0.094***   
∆QSPR 0.042 0.038 0.020 0.115***  
∆PQSPR 0.008 -0.005 0.004 0.012 0.585*** 
El
ec
tr
o
n
ic
 
tr
ad
in
g 
∆TVALUE 0.829***     
∆TOV 0.562*** 0.555***    
∆PIMPACT -0.055* -0.069** -0.022   
∆QSPR -0.017 -0.027 -0.062** 0.031  
∆PQSPR 0.005 -0.010 -0.012 0.057** 0.608*** 
Panel B: Amsterdam stock exchange (ASE) 
 Liquidity 
measures 
∆TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV 
 
Fl
o
o
r 
tr
ad
in
g ∆TVALUE 0.925***   
∆TOV 0.131*** 0.177***  
∆PIMPACT -0.032 -0.035 -0.054* 
El
ec
tr
o
n
ic
 
tr
ad
in
g ∆TVALUE 0.977***   
∆TOV 0.207*** 0.143***  
∆PIMPACT -0.078*** -0.081*** -0.078*** 
***, **, * Correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively.  
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Table 2.4 (Continued) 
Panel C: Vienna stock exchange (VSE) 
 Liquidity 
measures 
∆TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV 
 
Fl
o
o
r 
tr
ad
in
g ∆TVALUE 0.817***   
∆TOV 0.660*** 0.742***  
∆PIMPACT 0.000 0.013 0.011 
El
ec
tr
o
n
ic
 
tr
ad
in
g ∆TVALUE 0.965***   
∆TOV 0.068** 0.115***  
∆PIMPACT -0.042 -0.047* 0.028 
Panel D: Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE) 
 Liquidity 
measures 
∆TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR 
Fl
o
o
r 
tr
ad
in
g ∆TVALUE 0.946***     
∆TOV 0.695*** 0.558***    
∆PIMPACT 0.063*** 0.053** 0.048**   
∆QSPR -0.070*** -0.062*** -0.042* -0.024  
∆PQSPR -0.058*** -0.054** -0.079*** -0.001 0.424*** 
El
ec
tr
o
n
ic
 
tr
ad
in
g 
∆TVALUE 0.989***     
∆TOV 0.801*** 0.779***    
∆PIMPACT -0.031 -0.033 -0.031   
∆QSPR 0.114*** 0.110*** 0.071*** -0.033  
∆PQSPR 0.072*** 0.064*** 0.047** -0.117*** 0.436*** 
***, **, * Correlation is significant at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level respectively. 
 
4 Chapter Two: Determinants of Aggregate Market Liquidity 
 87
 
Table 2.5 
Autocorrelations of market-wide liquidity measures. 
This table presents the autocorrelation coefficients in the daily percentage changes in the variables described in 
table 2.2. The autocorrelation coefficients are reported for each market for the two-samples periods, during a 
floor trading system (before automation), and during an electronic trading system (after automation), with the 
exception of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange where the autocorrelation coefficients are reported for the floor 
trading system and for an electronic trading system that are operating parallel to each other. Note that all 
variables in this table are measured as daily percentage changes – signified by the prefix ∆. Numbers with 
boldface type indicate that the coefficient is marginally statistical significant. 
Panel A: Swiss stock exchange (SSE) 
 
 Constant AR-1 AR-2 AR-3 AR-4 AR-5 
∆ TVOL Floor trading 0.110*** -0.113*** -0.026 -0.019 -0.002 0.012 Electronic trading 0.021*** -0.471*** -0.385*** -0.259*** -0.193*** -0.002 
∆TVALUE Floor trading 0.111** -0.050* -0.010 -0.001 -0.007 0.001 Electronic trading 0.019*** -0.522*** -0.390*** -0.286*** -0.247*** -0.003 
∆TOV Floor trading 0.063*** -0.216*** -0.073** -0.014 -0.034 0.032 Electronic trading 0.029*** -0.423*** -0.163*** -0.126*** -0.042 0.084** 
∆PIMPACT Floor trading 0.392** -0.014 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 
Electronic trading 0.110*** -0.336*** -0.130*** -0.077** -0.025 -0.031 
∆QSPR Floor trading 0.010*** -0.375*** -0.175*** -0.058* -0.027 0.016 
Electronic trading 0.003*** -0.403*** -0.195*** -0.125*** -0.138*** -0.037 
∆ PQSPR Floor trading 0.007*** -0.845*** -0.222*** -0.200*** -0.185*** -0.070 
Electronic trading 0.002 -0.299*** -0.159*** -0.070** -0.095*** -0.027 
Panel B: Amsterdam stock exchange (ASE) 
  
Constant AR-1 AR-2 AR-3 AR-4 AR-5 
∆TVOL Floor trading 0.066*** -0.151*** -0.049* -0.025 -0.024 0.020 
Electronic trading 0.041*** -0.410*** -0.230*** -0.107*** -0.134*** 0.054* 
∆TVALUE Floor trading 0.067*** -0.121*** -0.034 -0.015 -0.021 0.032 Electronic trading 0.042*** -0.404*** -0.217*** -0.089*** -0.109*** 0.073** 
∆TOV Floor trading 0.787*** -0.137*** -0.049 0.024 -0.011 0.155*** Electronic trading 0.088** -0.067** -0.002 0.010 -0.004 -0.004 
∆PIMPACT Floor trading 0.236*** -0.229*** -0.066** -0.009 0.004 0.004 Electronic trading 0.208*** -0.298*** -0.071** -0.013 0.012 0.001 
      *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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        Table 2.5 (Continued) 
Panel C: Vienna stock exchange (VSE) 
 
 Constant AR-1 AR-2 AR-3 AR-4 AR-5 
∆ TVOL Floor trading 0.110*** -0.303*** -0.093*** -0.049 -0.058* -0.017 Electronic trading 0.148*** -0.436*** -0.122 -0.113 -0.091 -0.126 
∆TVALUE Floor trading 0.100*** -0.325*** -0.061** -0.014 -0.027 -0.037 Electronic trading 0.139*** -0.321*** -0.063 -0.048 -0.060 -0.066 
∆TOV Floor trading 0.050*** -0.349*** -0.155*** -0.044 -0.026 -0.035 Electronic trading 0.215*** -0.074** -0.020 -0.001 0.002 0.134*** 
∆PIMPACT Floor trading 0.197*** -0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 Electronic trading 0.324*** -0.316*** -0.086*** -0.003 0.027 -0.045 
Panel D: Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE) 
  
Constant AR-1 AR-2 AR-3 AR-4 AR-5 
∆ TVOL Floor trading 0.032*** -0.262*** -0.084*** -0.060*** -0.030 -0.012 Electronic trading 0.049*** -0.254*** -0.086*** 0.012 -0.044* 0.037 
 
∆TVALUE 
Floor trading 0.040*** -0.230*** -0.079*** -0.038 -0.015 0.017 
Electronic trading 0.055*** -0.255*** -0.089*** 0.001 -0.045* 0.034 
∆TOV Floor trading 0.033*** -0.216*** 0.071*** -0.026 -0.012 0.002 Electronic trading 0.026*** -0.440*** -0.218*** -0.102*** -0.069*** 0.043* 
∆PIMPACT Floor trading 0.431** -0.026 0.033 0.002 0.402*** 0.022 Electronic trading 0.303*** -0.161*** 0.001 0.042* 0.016 0.042* 
∆QSPR Floor trading 0.003*** -0.547*** -0.354*** -0.211*** -0.165*** -0.086*** Electronic trading 0.012*** -0.443*** -0.201*** -0.112*** -0.074*** -0.024 
∆PQSPR Floor trading 0.002*** -0.396*** -0.235*** -0.166*** -0.126*** -0.023 Electronic trading 0.009*** -0.403*** -0.252*** -0.155*** -0.070*** -0.023 
     *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.6 
Parametric and nonparametric tests for the daily change in market-wide liquidity  
This table represents the results of the analysis of the difference between the daily change in aggregate market liquidity 
of the floor trading system and the daily change in aggregate market liquidity of the electronic trading system using the 
parametric test (t-test) in Panel A and nonparametric test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank sum test) in Panel B for all 
markets included in our sample. The analysis uses market-wide liquidity variables described in Table 2.2. All the 
variables are equally-weighted and they are measured as daily percentage changes – signified by the prefix ∆. 
Swiss stock exchange (SSE) 
Panel A:  Parametric test (statistical t-test) 
Liquidity measures  ∆ TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
M
ea
n
 
Floor 
trading  0.103 0.103 0.061 0.366 0.013 0.011 
Electronic 
trading  0.024 0.024 0.033 0.103 0.002 0.001 
Difference 0.078 0.079 0.028 0.263 0.011 0.010 
t-statistic  2.822*** 1.914* 1.615* 1.582 1.920* 1.869* 
Panel B: Nonparametric test (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Tests) 
Z-statistic 
-0.235 -0.096 -0.253 -0.102 -0.487 -0.600 
     Amsterdam stock exchange (ASE) 
Panel A:  Parametric test (statistical t-test) 
Liquidity measures  ∆ TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
M
ea
n
 
Floor 
trading  0.082 0.073 0.756 0.251 -----------
a
 -----------
b
 
Electronic 
trading  0.045 0.046 0.090 0.221 ----------- ----------- 
Difference 0.037 0.027 0.666 0.030 ----------- ----------- 
t-statistic 1.496 1.173 5.926*** 0.670 ----------- ----------- 
Panel B: Nonparametric test (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Tests) 
Z-statistic 
-0.612 -0.371 -0.709 -0.102 ----------- ----------- 
     Vienna stock exchange (VSE) 
Panel A:  Parametric test (statistical t-test) 
Liquidity measures  ∆ TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
M
ea
n
 
Floor 
trading  0.116 0.108 0.054 0.438 ----------- ----------- 
Electronic 
trading  0.173 0.145 0.204 0.318 ----------- ----------- 
Difference -0.057 -0.037 -0.150 0.120 ----------- ----------- 
t-statistic -0.670 -0.756 -3.006*** 0.515 ----------- ----------- 
Panel B: Nonparametric test (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Tests) 
Z-statistic 
-0.057 -0.006 -0.175 -0.049 ----------- ----------- 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
a, b
 Spreads measures are not available for ASE and VSE. 
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Table 2.6 (Continued) 
Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE)  
Panel A:  Parametric test (statistical t-test) 
Liquidity measures  ∆ TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
M
ea
n
 
Floor 
trading  0.030 0.038 0.031 0.360 0.003 0.002 
Electronic 
trading  0.048 0.053 0.026 0.312 0.014 0.009 
Difference -0.018 -0.016 0.005 0.048 -0.011 -0.008 
t-statistic -1.495 -1.155 0.555 0.447 -2.476** -2.423** 
Panel B: Nonparametric test (Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Tests) 
Z-statistic 
-0.736 -0.649 -0.288 -0.370 -0.184 -0.961 
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.7 
 Determinants of aggregate market liquidity, equally weighted time series regressions estimated by LAD 
This table represents the regressions of changes in market-wide liquidity measures on market movements, interest rate variables, day of the week, and holidays for each 
country included in our sample. These regressions are estimated under both floor and electronic trading systems, using equally weighted market-wide liquidity measures. The 
results are estimated by Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) method. All dependent variables are measured as daily percentage change in market-wide daily average liquidity 
proxies that are described in table 2.2 (∆ denote the daily percentage change in the variables). The independent variables are MKT+ (MKT-):  the daily market return if it is 
positive (negative) and zero otherwise; MA5MKT+ (MA5MKT-): the past five trading-day daily market return if it is positive (negative) and zero otherwise; MA5 MKT: 
the past five trading-day average of daily absolute market return (all the return variables are expressed as percentages); SHORTRATE: the first difference in short-term rate; 
TERSPREAD: the daily change in the difference between the yield on 10-year government treasury bond and short rate; QULSPREAD: the daily change in the difference 
between the yield on highly rating bond or better corporate bond yield index and the yield on 10-year government Treasury bond; (Monday-Thursday): 1 if the trading day is 
Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday, respectively, and zero otherwise. Holidays: 1 if a trading day satisfies the following conditions (1) if any holiday falls on Friday 
then the preceding Thursday, (2) if it falls on weekend or on a Monday, then the following Tuesday, (3) if it falls on another weekday then the preceding and following days, 
and 0 otherwise.  The t-statistic values (not reported here) are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.  
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        Table 2.7 (Continued) 
Panel A: Swiss stock exchange (SSE) 
Dependent Variables ∆ TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV 
Trading system  Floor  Electronic Floor Electronic Floor Electronic 
Explanatory variables Coefficient 
Std. 
error Coefficient 
Std. 
error Coefficient 
Std. 
error Coefficient 
Std. 
error Coefficient 
Std. 
error Coefficient 
Std. 
error 
Constant 0.041* 0.025 -0.004 0.017 0.021 0.023 -0.005 0.016 0.026 0.021 0.004 0.017 
MKT+ 23.808*** 2.940 10.145*** 1.334 24.835*** 2.506 10.342*** 1.370 14.279*** 2.314 8.126*** 1.409 
MKT- -10.705*** 2.572 -3.962*** 1.344 -14.524*** 1.758 -3.824*** 1.224 -4.147* 2.204 -2.171 1.342 
MA5MKT+ -7.470 4.678 -5.157** 2.436 -9.538** 4.476 -4.875** 2.308 -5.277 4.185 -4.416* 2.553 
MA5MKT- 8.096 5.618 4.811 3.154 10.320** 5.215 5.059 3.225 5.659 4.606 5.710* 3.027 
MA5MKT -13.579*** 3.758 -4.607** 1.949 -15.223*** 3.278 -5.127** 2.017 -7.259** 3.250 -3.190* 1.872 
SHORTRATE -0.080 0.211 -0.099 0.222 -0.233 0.234 -0.082 0.194 -0.063 0.177 -0.272 0.243 
TERMSPREAD 0.053 0.160 -0.041 0.177 -0.150 0.192 0.002 0.155 0.104 0.132 -0.179 0.195 
QUALITYSPREAD 0.201 0.166 0.042 0.077 -0.075 0.219 0.125** 0.050 -0.064 0.152 -0.036 0.098 
MONDAY -0.212*** 0.024 -0.117*** 0.018 -0.204*** 0.022 -0.116*** 0.017 -0.197*** 0.020 -0.113*** 0.018 
TUESDAY 0.121*** 0.027 0.131*** 0.019 0.147*** 0.025 0.155*** 0.019 0.127*** 0.024 0.111*** 0.020 
WEDNESDAY 0.006 0.025 0.056*** 0.019 0.034 0.024 0.052*** 0.016 0.020 0.021 0.050** 0.020 
THURSDAY -0.011 0.023 -0.011 0.018 0.017 0.022 -0.006 0.017 0.019 0.020 -0.001 0.020 
HOLIDAYS -0.141*** 0.049 -0.104** 0.044 -0.113** 0.054 -0.123*** 0.040 -0.122*** 0.037 -0.134*** 0.051 
 
      
R-squared 0.006 0.142 0.002 0.155 0.063 0.069 
Adjusted R-squared -0.004 0.133 -0.009 0.146 0.053 0.059 
S.E. of regression 0.953 0.223 1.453 0.227 0.514 0.289 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.192 2.606 2.084 2.650 2.318 2.699 
          ***, **, * Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
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         Table 2.7 (Continued) 
Panel A: Swiss stock exchange (SSE) (continued) 
Dependent Variables ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
Trading system  Floor Electronic Floor Electronic Floor Electronic 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Constant 0.041 0.044 0.028 0.037 0.007 0.010 0.014** 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.010** 0.004 
MKT+ 2.152 4.721 -0.128 2.548 0.072 0.967 0.192 0.456 -1.048 0.766 -0.071 0.338 
MKT- -17.563*** 6.857 -5.175* 2.779 -1.678* 0.955 -1.984*** 0.464 -1.711** 0.811 -2.447*** 0.321 
MA5MKT+ 8.225 8.365 -4.009 4.680 1.573 1.842 0.455 0.858 0.265 1.396 -0.290 0.615 
MA5MKT- 1.773 10.283 0.746 5.694 -0.498 2.104 -0.443 0.873 0.071 1.537 -0.099 0.763 
MA5MKT -6.502 6.492 -1.012 4.401 -1.374 1.676 -1.395** 0.656 -0.352 1.047 -1.076** 0.488 
SHORTRATE -0.037 0.322 -0.375 0.441 0.034 0.086 0.039 0.079 -0.092 0.058 -0.038 0.068 
TERMSPREAD 0.203 0.236 -0.080 0.358 -0.004 0.073 0.076 0.065 -0.077* 0.045 0.029 0.058 
QUALITYSPREAD -0.359 0.356 0.107 0.173 0.003 0.087 0.000 0.040 -0.147*** 0.049 0.020 0.029 
MONDAY 0.097** 0.049 0.141*** 0.041 0.016* 0.009 -0.010 0.007 0.016** 0.007 -0.005 0.005 
TUESDAY -0.091** 0.043 -0.067* 0.037 -0.030*** 0.009 -0.028*** 0.006 -0.017** 0.007 -0.027*** 0.005 
WEDNESDAY -0.022 0.042 -0.028 0.038 -0.012 0.009 -0.020*** 0.007 -0.007 0.007 -0.015*** 0.005 
THURSDAY -0.026 0.041 -0.022 0.038 -0.004 0.008 -0.016** 0.007 -0.006 0.007 -0.017*** 0.005 
HOLIDAYS 0.215** 0.084 -0.004 0.058 0.018 0.014 0.023** 0.011 0.001 0.012 0.024** 0.011 
 
      
R-squared -0.004 0.002 -0.001 0.046 0.001 0.092 
Adjusted R-squared -0.014 -0.008 -0.012 0.036 -0.010 0.082 
S.E. of regression 5.902 0.590 0.177 0.079 0.177 0.063 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.027 2.582 2.121 2.683 1.818 2.544 
            ***, **, * Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
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Table 2.7 (Continued) 
Panel B: Amsterdam stock exchange (ASE) 
Dependent Variables ∆ TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT 
Trading system  Floor Electronic Floor Electronic Floor Electronic Floor Electronic 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Constant 0.041* 0.024 0.061*** 0.020 0.038* 0.024 0.059*** 0.020 0.316*** 0.092 0.040* 0.022 0.144*** 0.055 0.045 0.048 
MKT+ 24.989*** 2.969 12.788*** 1.464 25.585*** 2.698 13.678*** 1.536 -8.124 8.469 11.346*** 1.540 6.786 5.731 -2.979 3.106 
MKT- -16.358*** 3.297 -10.159*** 1.306 -16.241*** 3.110 -8.932*** 1.351 -2.816 7.564 -2.822** 1.364 -21.058*** 7.218 -8.090** 3.716 
MA5MKT+ -6.800 4.572 -6.626*** 2.588 -4.949 4.601 -5.896** 2.535 -2.939 16.002 -6.365** 2.686 12.899 10.759 0.435 7.485 
MA5MKT- 7.874 6.201 4.483 3.094 6.417 6.122 3.823 3.007 2.424 20.780 3.622 3.170 -9.703 11.912 0.069 6.846 
MA5MKT -16.117*** 3.824 -10.215*** 1.890 -17.428*** 3.642 -10.619*** 1.860 1.228 17.176 -6.515*** 2.123 -17.388* 9.129 -1.527 4.613 
SHORTRATE 0.069 0.287 -0.167 0.253 -0.093 0.281 -0.266 0.261 -0.066 0.909 -0.329 0.345 0.708 0.626 -0.014 0.938 
TERMSPREAD 0.035 0.252 -0.179 0.173 -0.158 0.265 -0.239 0.170 -0.475 0.920 -0.544** 0.222 1.194* 0.632 -0.007 0.465 
QUALITYSPREAD 0.347 0.237 0.254 0.191 0.190 0.237 0.113 0.191 -0.481 0.847 0.116 0.236 0.174 0.580 -0.414 0.488 
MONDAY -0.288*** 0.022 -0.293*** 0.022 -0.290*** 0.021 -0.288*** 0.022 -0.321*** 0.086 -0.150*** 0.023 0.053 0.064 0.114** 0.057 
TUESDAY 0.170*** 0.025 0.139*** 0.024 0.181*** 0.024 0.146*** 0.024 0.042 0.102 0.094*** 0.024 -0.166*** 0.052 -0.030 0.053 
WEDNESDAY 0.040* 0.022 0.028 0.020 0.048** 0.022 0.035* 0.020 0.001 0.092 0.035 0.022 -0.133*** 0.051 0.013 0.056 
THURSDAY -0.008 0.023 -0.038* 0.021 -0.008 0.022 -0.036* 0.021 -0.182** 0.089 -0.011 0.023 -0.152*** 0.052 -0.018 0.054 
HOLIDAYS -0.144*** 0.056 -0.134*** 0.038 -0.175*** 0.063 -0.115*** 0.040 -0.233 0.173 -0.153*** 0.045 0.132 0.177 0.140 0.128 
 
        
R-squared 0.041 0.228 0.050 0.222 -0.015 0.003 0.013 -0.013 
Adjusted R-squared 0.031 0.220 0.040 0.213 -0.025 -0.008 0.002 -0.024 
S.E. of regression 0.800 0.295 0.742 0.300 3.855 1.179 1.301 0.960 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.212 2.510 2.229 2.512 2.136 2.113 2.346 2.482 
***, **, * Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.  
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Table 2.7 (Continued) 
Panel C: Vienna stock exchange (VSE) 
Dependent Variables ∆ TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT 
Trading system  Floor Electronic Floor Electronic Floor Electronic Floor Electronic 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Constant 0.172*** 0.062 0.119*** 0.032 0.125** 0.053 0.093*** 0.032 0.077** 0.034 0.124*** 0.035 0.112 0.071 0.209*** 0.060 
MKT+ 35.814*** 4.776 16.684*** 2.682 37.584*** 5.363 18.152*** 2.952 23.969*** 3.354 9.030*** 3.452 2.631 5.276 1.707 4.572 
MKT- -28.241*** 5.181 -13.193*** 2.291 -22.200*** 4.637 -11.092*** 2.573 -15.988*** 3.163 -5.241 3.294 -9.333* 5.744 -5.557 4.206 
MA5MKT+ -17.847** 6.986 -8.175* 4.709 -11.189 6.795 -11.293** 5.072 -5.621 4.859 -3.226 6.235 -3.903 10.866 -8.920 10.100 
MA5MKT- 14.554* 8.761 7.046 5.173 6.437 8.003 9.828* 5.864 7.971 5.339 4.524 6.473 -1.333 13.904 -2.291 8.728 
MA5MKT -24.038** 9.640 -11.050*** 3.273 -27.628*** 8.708 -9.422** 4.122 -18.396*** 5.706 -4.760 4.498 -10.296 12.718 -6.736 7.359 
SHORTRATE -0.012 0.943 -0.526 0.748 -0.855 0.986 -0.420 0.755 -0.487 0.717 -0.898 0.885 0.560 1.512 -1.187 1.695 
TERMSPREAD -0.350 0.891 -0.452 0.587 -1.113 0.920 -0.489 0.593 -0.541 0.701 -1.003 0.786 0.664 1.477 -1.855 1.607 
QUALITYSPREAD 0.278 0.938 -0.067 0.641 -1.006 0.967 -0.298 0.638 -0.186 0.759 -1.319* 0.806 0.929 1.467 -2.560 1.708 
MONDAY -0.403*** 0.056 -0.299*** 0.033 -0.317*** 0.049 -0.264*** 0.033 -0.200*** 0.031 -0.188*** 0.039 0.080 0.068 -0.098 0.072 
TUESDAY 0.034 0.055 0.016 0.037 0.062 0.050 0.050 0.037 0.018 0.031 -0.025 0.042 0.004 0.065 -0.159** 0.070 
WEDNESDAY -0.119** 0.053 -0.101*** 0.033 -0.097** 0.046 -0.084** 0.034 -0.059* 0.031 -0.127*** 0.037 -0.016 0.061 -0.023 0.071 
THURSDAY -0.129** 0.053 -0.086** 0.035 -0.048 0.045 -0.050 0.036 -0.031 0.029 -0.085** 0.037 -0.003 0.062 -0.088 0.068 
HOLIDAYS 0.073 0.066 0.059 0.070 0.017 0.067 0.077 0.063 0.096 0.060 0.000 0.065 -0.034 0.098 0.208 0.134 
 
        
R-squared 0.132 0.051 0.103 0.035 0.104 -0.009 -0.002 -0.026 
Adjusted R-squared 0.118 0.040 0.089 0.024 0.090 -0.021 -0.018 -0.037 
S.E. of regression 0.599 0.609 0.603 0.679 0.352 1.717 9.892 1.171 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.491 2.439 2.523 2.422 2.614 2.133 2.016 2.481 
***, **, * Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.  
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          Table 2.7 (Continued) 
Panel D: Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE) 
Dependent Variables ∆ TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV 
Trading system  Floor Electronic Floor Electronic Floor Electronic 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Constant -0.011 0.011 -0.018 0.013 -0.020* 0.012 -0.019 0.014 -0.002 0.010 -0.016 0.011 
MKT+ 5.097*** 0.694 7.856*** 0.726 6.945*** 0.806 8.932*** 0.796 3.997*** 0.664 7.399*** 0.732 
MKT- -4.268*** 0.666 -6.851*** 0.644 -5.108*** 0.715 -6.351*** 0.717 -2.570*** 0.596 -4.733*** 0.590 
MA5MKT+ -2.354* 1.316 -3.504** 1.498 -3.264** 1.457 -4.052** 1.664 -1.029 1.299 -2.349* 1.315 
MA5MKT- 4.348*** 1.335 3.852*** 1.467 4.418*** 1.559 3.822** 1.577 2.380* 1.268 3.009** 1.425 
MA5MKT -2.814*** 0.940 -5.369*** 0.950 -4.111*** 1.078 -5.592*** 1.029 -1.982** 0.887 -4.238*** 0.845 
SHORTRATE -0.136 0.103 -0.407*** 0.133 -0.195* 0.119 -0.440*** 0.144 -0.102 0.099 -0.306*** 0.106 
TERMSPREAD -0.197** 0.097 -0.368*** 0.125 -0.272** 0.112 -0.404*** 0.134 -0.178* 0.093 -0.328*** 0.099 
QUALITYSPREAD -0.163** 0.074 -0.145 0.101 -0.205*** 0.073 -0.141 0.104 -0.132* 0.073 -0.167*** 0.064 
MONDAY 0.005 0.013 -0.179*** 0.014 0.002 0.014 -0.192*** 0.015 0.028** 0.012 -0.097*** 0.012 
TUESDAY -0.003 0.012 0.176*** 0.015 0.025* 0.013 0.192*** 0.017 -0.042*** 0.012 0.090*** 0.012 
WEDNESDAY 0.022* 0.012 0.097*** 0.013 0.038*** 0.013 0.101*** 0.015 0.008 0.011 0.058*** 0.011 
THURSDAY 0.019 0.012 0.019 0.014 0.036*** 0.013 0.020 0.015 0.001 0.012 0.016 0.012 
HOLIDAYS 0.048 0.030 0.012 0.043 0.054* 0.033 0.008 0.046 0.058* 0.034 0.017 0.040 
 
      
R-squared 0.016 0.010 0.017 0.100 0.016 0.119 
Adjusted R-squared 0.010 0.093 0.010 0.094 0.010 0.113 
S.E. of regression 0.322 0.414 0.400 0.441 0.340 0.240 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.465 2.372 2.406 2.364 2.459 2.646 
             ***, **, * Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively.  
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             Table 2.7 (Continued) 
Panel D: Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE) (continued) 
Dependent Variables ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
Trading system  Floor Electronic Floor Electronic Floor Electronic 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Constant  0.002 0.026 0.065 0.041 0.005 0.005 0.019** 0.008 0.007** 0.003 0.010 0.006 
MKT+ 2.527* 1.502 0.194 2.008 -0.035 0.280 -0.346 0.413 -0.300 0.192 -0.238 0.351 
MKT- -1.864 1.352 -2.448 2.054 -0.428 0.276 -0.948** 0.440 -0.906*** 0.202 -1.623*** 0.358 
MA5MKT+ -1.706 2.943 4.953 4.496 0.434 0.655 0.893 0.879 -0.296 0.430 0.088 0.688 
MA5MKT- 0.082 2.779 -1.708 4.500 -0.203 0.594 0.330 0.967 -0.284 0.391 -0.213 0.811 
MA5MKT -1.169 2.262 -0.961 3.364 -0.240 0.401 -0.515 0.654 -0.461 0.290 -0.798 0.516 
SHORTRATE 0.124 0.268 0.156 0.358 0.001 0.055 0.016 0.078 -0.020 0.036 0.005 0.068 
TERMSPREAD 0.194 0.256 0.074 0.353 -0.001 0.055 -0.028 0.076 -0.018 0.035 -0.039 0.067 
QUALITYSPREAD 0.102 0.170 -0.111 0.206 0.014 0.045 0.003 0.064 0.050* 0.026 -0.064 0.053 
MONDAY 0.087*** 0.030 0.149*** 0.046 -0.010* 0.006 -0.041*** 0.009 -0.009** 0.004 -0.031*** 0.007 
TUESDAY 0.013 0.027 -0.102*** 0.040 -0.017*** 0.006 -0.017* 0.009 -0.016*** 0.004 -0.005 0.007 
WEDNESDAY 0.027 0.028 0.008 0.041 0.010** 0.006 -0.005 0.009 -0.002 0.004 0.004 0.007 
THURSDAY 0.078*** 0.030 -0.088** 0.041 -0.010* 0.006 -0.007 0.009 0.000 0.004 0.005 0.007 
HOLIDAYS -0.020 0.045 0.053 0.087 -0.005 0.013 -0.037** 0.018 -0.008 0.007 -0.009 0.014 
 
      
R-squared -0.004 -0.015 0.016 0.015 0.053 0.046 
Adjusted R-squared -0.011 -0.022 0.010 0.009 0.047 0.039 
S.E. of regression 4.586 1.579 0.083 0.180 0.054 0.128 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.043 2.253 2.783 2.533 2.650 2.632 
                 ***, **, * Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
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Table 2.8 
Wald test for the coefficients of equally-weighted time series regressions estimated by 
LAD 
For the coefficients reported in table 3.7, this table represents the results of Wald test statistic that test the equality 
constraint between the variables’ coefficients, which are estimated by LAD in liquidity regression, ∆TVOL, 
∆TVALUE, ∆TOV, ∆PIMPACT, ∆QSPR and ∆PQSPR, before and after the automation of trading system for all 
stock markets included in our sample.  
Panel A: Swiss stock exchange (SSE) 
Liquidity regression model ∆TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
Constant 7.128*** 2.586* 1.543 0.123 1.361 2.256 
MKT+ 104.864*** 111.875*** 19.081*** 0.800 0.068 8.341*** 
MKT- 25.169*** 76.446*** 2.168 19.868*** 0.434 5.242** 
MA5MKT+ 0.902 4.084** 0.114 6.835*** 1.699 0.812 
MA5MKT- 1.084 2.661* 0.000 0.033 0.004 0.049 
MA5MKT 21.178*** 25.050*** 4.723** 1.556 0.001 2.200 
SHORTRATE 0.007 0.604 0.740 0.586 0.004 0.624 
TERMSPREAD 0.281 0.964 2.107 0.622 1.525 3.343* 
QUALITYSPREAD 4.265** 16.163*** 0.082 7.246*** 0.008 31.973*** 
MONDAY 28.089*** 25.645*** 22.057*** 1.164 14.815*** 19.285*** 
TUESDAY 0.266 0.149 0.715 0.396 0.066 4.823** 
WEDNESDAY 7.395*** 1.165 2.207 0.018 1.333 2.696* 
THURSDAY 0.002 1.931 0.993 0.008 3.298* 6.067** 
HOLIDAYS 0.715 0.068 0.057 14.080*** 0.253 4.624** 
Panel B: Amsterdam stock exchange (ASE) 
Liquidity regression model ∆TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
Constant 1.036 1.102 157.364*** 4.150** 
----------
a
 ----------
b
 
MKT+ 69.416*** 60.073*** 159.930*** 9.885*** 
----------- ----------- 
MKT- 22.516*** 29.285*** 0.000 12.179*** 
----------- ----------- 
MA5MKT+ 0.005 0.140 1.628 2.773* 
----------- ----------- 
MA5MKT- 1.201 0.745 0.143 2.037 
----------- ----------- 
MA5MKT 9.752*** 13.405*** 13.302*** 11.821*** 
----------- ----------- 
SHORTRATE 0.874 0.440 0.579 0.592 
----------- ----------- 
TERMSPREAD 1.526 0.224 0.097 6.682*** 
----------- ----------- 
QUALITYSPREAD 0.233 0.163 6.398** 1.451 
----------- ----------- 
MONDAY 0.054 0.009 54.856*** 1.153 
----------- ----------- 
TUESDAY 1.680 2.213 4.765** 6.638*** 
----------- ----------- 
WEDNESDAY 0.368 0.431 2.250 6.925*** 
----------- ----------- 
THURSDAY 1.916 1.745 55.645*** 6.041** 
----------- ----------- 
HOLIDAYS 0.064 2.209 3.177* 0.004 
----------- ----------- 
       ***, **, * Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
           
a, b
 Spreads measures are not available for ASE. 
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 Table 2.8 (continued) 
Panel C: Vienna stock exchange (VSE) 
Liquidity regression model ∆TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
Constant 2.693* 0.972 1.781 2.626* 
----------
a
 ----------
b
 
MKT+ 50.895*** 43.320*** 18.728*** 0.041 
----------- ----------- 
MKT- 43.130*** 18.632*** 10.646*** 0.806 
----------- ----------- 
MA5MKT+ 4.219** 0.000 0.148 0.247 
----------- ----------- 
MA5MKT- 2.107 0.334 0.284 0.012 
----------- ----------- 
MA5MKT 15.744*** 19.509*** 9.189*** 0.234 
----------- ----------- 
SHORTRATE 0.471 0.332 0.215 1.061 
----------- ----------- 
TERMSPREAD 0.030 1.108 0.346 2.456 
----------- ----------- 
QUALITYSPREAD 0.289 1.230 1.973 4.174** 
----------- ----------- 
MONDAY 10.034*** 2.515 0.090 6.165** 
----------- ----------- 
TUESDAY 0.214 0.090 1.066 5.481** 
----------- ----------- 
WEDNESDAY 0.269 0.139 3.271* 0.010 
----------- ----------- 
THURSDAY 1.467 0.002 2.025 1.562 
----------- ----------- 
HOLIDAYS 0.043 0.895 2.174 3.236* 
----------- ----------- 
Panel D: Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE) 
Liquidity regression model ∆TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
Constant 0.336 0.005 1.624 2.346 2.918* 0.151 
MKT+ 14.455*** 6.242** 21.597*** 1.349 0.568 0.032 
MKT- 16.083*** 3.004* 13.462*** 0.081 1.401 4.011** 
MA5MKT+ 0.589 0.224 1.006 2.194 0.272 0.313 
MA5MKT- 0.115 0.143 0.195 0.158 0.305 0.008 
MA5MKT 7.223*** 2.068 7.128*** 0.004 0.177 0.429 
SHORTRATE 4.111** 2.913* 3.683* 0.008 0.037 0.132 
TERMSPREAD 1.869 0.965 2.274 0.116 0.117 0.096 
QUALITYSPREAD 0.032 0.381 0.302 1.077 0.031 4.588** 
MONDAY 170.484*** 156.315*** 110.553*** 1.853 11.816*** 10.166*** 
TUESDAY 136.610*** 97.356*** 116.035*** 8.408*** 0.005 2.657* 
WEDNESDAY 30.919*** 17.806*** 19.435*** 0.229 2.665* 0.822 
THURSDAY 0.000 1.108 1.655 16.303*** 0.131 0.446 
HOLIDAYS 0.685 0.982 1.047 0.688 3.292* 0.002 
    ***, **, * Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
   
a, b
 Spreads measures are not available for VSE. 
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Table 2.9 
Determinants of aggregate market liquidity, equally-weighted time series regressions with the announcement of macroeconomic indicators, 
estimated by LAD 
This table represents the regressions of changes in market-wide liquidity measures on market movements, interest rate variables, day of the week, holidays, and the indictors 
variable for the day of announcement and for the two days preceding the announcement about GDP, CPI, and unemployment for the Frankfurt Stock Exchange only. These 
regressions are estimated under both floor and electronic trading systems, using equally weighted market-wide liquidity measures. The results in this table are estimated by 
Least Absolute Deviation (LAD) method. All dependent variables are measured as daily percentage change in market-wide daily average liquidity proxies that are described 
in table 2.2 (∆ denote the daily percentage change in the variables). The independent variables are MKT+ (MKT-):  the daily market return if it is positive (negative) and zero 
otherwise; MA5MKT+ (MA5MKT-): the past five trading-day daily market return if it is positive (negative) and zero otherwise; MA5 MKT: the past five trading-day 
average of daily absolute market return; SHORTRATE: the first difference in short-term rate; TERSPREAD: the daily change in the difference between the yield on 10-year 
government treasury bond and short rate; QULSPREAD: the daily change in the difference between the yield on highly rating bond or better corporate bond yield index and 
the yield on 10-year government Treasury bond; (Monday-Thursday): 1 if the trading day is Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday, respectively, and zero otherwise. 
Holidays: 1 if a trading day satisfies the following conditions (1) if any holiday falls on Friday then the preceding Thursday, (2) if it falls on weekend or on a Monday, then 
the following Tuesday, (3) if it falls on another weekday then the preceding and following days, and 0 otherwise. The t-statistic values (not reported here) are corrected for 
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. 
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          Table 2.9 (Continued) 
Dependent Variables ∆ TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV 
Trading system  Floor Electronic Floor Electronic Floor Electronic 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Constant -0.011 0.011 -0.021 0.013 -0.022* 0.012 -0.023 0.015 0.000 0.010 -0.016 0.011 
MKT+ 5.132*** 0.696 7.851*** 0.730 6.959*** 0.808 8.892*** 0.794 4.013*** 0.667 7.407*** 0.731 
MKT- -4.308*** 0.668 -6.839*** 0.643 -5.111*** 0.715 -6.294*** 0.717 -2.587*** 0.601 -4.760*** 0.593 
MA5MKT+ -2.338* 1.331 -3.562** 1.514 -3.272** 1.468 -4.182** 1.670 -0.960 1.305 -2.396* 1.323 
MA5MKT- 4.363*** 1.334 3.849*** 1.469 4.367*** 1.563 3.856** 1.578 2.413* 1.273 3.011** 1.434 
MA5MKT -2.807*** 0.938 -5.357*** 0.950 -4.121*** 1.078 -5.524*** 1.024 -1.968** 0.887 -4.230*** 0.845 
SHORTRATE -0.141 0.104 -0.395*** 0.134 -0.190 0.119 -0.427*** 0.143 -0.108 0.099 -0.311*** 0.106 
TERMSPREAD -0.200** 0.097 -0.357*** 0.126 -0.265** 0.112 -0.392*** 0.134 -0.184** 0.093 -0.333*** 0.099 
QUALITYSPREAD -0.162** 0.074 -0.138 0.102 -0.199*** 0.073 -0.132 0.105 -0.136* 0.074 -0.169*** 0.064 
MONDAY 0.005 0.013 -0.181*** 0.014 0.001 0.014 -0.193*** 0.015 0.030** 0.012 -0.098*** 0.012 
TUESDAY -0.004 0.012 0.171*** 0.016 0.022* 0.014 0.186*** 0.017 -0.042*** 0.012 0.087*** 0.013 
WEDNESDAY 0.021* 0.012 0.093*** 0.014 0.036*** 0.013 0.098*** 0.015 0.008 0.011 0.056*** 0.011 
THURSDAY 0.017 0.012 0.017 0.014 0.035*** 0.013 0.017 0.015 -0.002 0.012 0.013 0.012 
HOLIDAYS 0.048 0.030 0.013 0.043 0.055* 0.033 0.010 0.046 0.059* 0.034 0.018 0.040 
GDP (0) -0.009 0.031 -0.017 0.032 -0.026 0.032 -0.007 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.030 0.030 
GDP (1-2) 0.019 0.021 0.032 0.024 0.029 0.026 0.023 0.025 0.002 0.020 0.022 0.019 
CPI(0) 0.000 0.017 0.028 0.020 0.006 0.018 0.039* 0.021 0.004 0.015 0.002 0.015 
CPI(1-2) -0.012 0.012 0.000 0.014 0.006 0.013 0.004 0.016 -0.012 0.012 -0.008 0.012 
UNP(0) 0.033* 0.018 0.046** 0.019 0.034* 0.018 0.054** 0.021 0.010 0.017 0.028* 0.015 
UNP(1-2) -0.006 0.013 0.007 0.015 0.004 0.014 0.010 0.017 -0.013 0.013 -0.003 0.013 
 
      
R-squared 0.017 0.100 0.018 0.100 0.017 0.120 
Adjusted R-squared 0.007 0.091 0.008 0.091 0.008 0.112 
S.E. of regression 0.322 0.415 0.401 0.442 0.341 0.240 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.464 2.369 2.405 2.360 2.459 2.643 
             ***, **, * Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
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          Table 2.9 (continued) 
Dependent Variables ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
Trading system  Floor Electronic Floor Electronic Floor Electronic 
Explanatory variables Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Coefficient Std. 
error 
Constant -0.002 0.026 0.066 0.042 0.006 0.005 0.020** 0.009 0.008** 0.003 0.011* 0.007 
MKT+ 2.671* 1.487 0.410 2.013 -0.055 0.278 -0.344 0.415 -0.297 0.191 -0.254 0.351 
MKT- -2.110 1.345 -2.750 2.061 -0.438 0.276 -0.948** 0.440 -0.907*** 0.204 -1.609*** 0.361 
MA5MKT+ -1.480 2.925 5.802 4.485 0.361 0.652 0.861 0.883 -0.258 0.426 0.089 0.698 
MA5MKT- -0.183 2.769 -2.090 4.480 -0.195 0.598 0.395 0.967 -0.258 0.389 -0.181 0.811 
MA5MKT -1.456 2.245 -1.374 3.364 -0.243 0.401 -0.478 0.657 -0.460 0.288 -0.782 0.518 
SHORTRATE 0.113 0.266 0.134 0.358 -0.006 0.054 0.006 0.079 -0.023 0.037 0.001 0.069 
TERMSPREAD 0.184 0.254 0.061 0.353 -0.007 0.054 -0.036 0.077 -0.020 0.035 -0.042 0.068 
QUALITYSPREAD 0.098 0.169 -0.115 0.203 0.013 0.043 0.000 0.065 0.051* 0.027 -0.067 0.053 
MONDAY 0.081*** 0.029 0.148*** 0.046 -0.010* 0.006 -0.041*** 0.009 -0.008* 0.004 -0.031*** 0.007 
TUESDAY 0.015 0.028 -0.099** 0.040 -0.017*** 0.006 -0.019** 0.009 -0.015*** 0.004 -0.005 0.007 
WEDNESDAY 0.030 0.028 0.007 0.041 0.010* 0.006 -0.006 0.009 -0.002 0.004 0.004 0.007 
THURSDAY 0.089*** 0.031 -0.079* 0.042 -0.012** 0.006 -0.010 0.009 -0.001 0.004 0.003 0.007 
HOLIDAYS -0.024 0.046 0.049 0.088 -0.005 0.014 -0.037** 0.017 -0.008 0.007 -0.009 0.014 
GDP (0) -0.051 0.068 -0.134 0.088 0.053*** 0.014 0.047 0.030 0.016* 0.009 0.007 0.018 
GDP (1-2) 0.071 0.056 0.205** 0.088 -0.012 0.011 0.001 0.015 -0.005 0.006 0.000 0.013 
CPI(0) -0.100** 0.045 -0.033 0.063 -0.007 0.010 -0.011 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.009 
CPI(1-2) 0.040 0.033 -0.003 0.045 0.007 0.006 -0.007 0.009 -0.004 0.004 -0.009 0.008 
UNP(0) -0.029 0.039 -0.020 0.056 -0.010 0.009 0.021 0.013 -0.004 0.006 0.008 0.011 
UNP(1-2) 0.018 0.033 -0.047 0.042 -0.004 0.007 -0.006 0.010 -0.011*** 0.004 -0.006 0.008 
 
      
R-squared -0.004 -0.015 0.024 0.017 0.057 0.046 
Adjusted R-squared -0.014 -0.025 0.015 0.008 0.048 0.037 
S.E. of regression 4.593 1.581 0.083 0.180 0.054 0.128 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.043 2.253 2.786 2.533 2.653 2.631 
             ***, **, * Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
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Table 2.10 
Wald test for the coefficients of equally-weighted time series regressions with the 
announcement of macroeconomic indicators estimated by LAD 
For the coefficients reported in table 3.9, this table reports the results of Wald test statistic that test the equality 
constraint between the variables’ coefficients, which are estimated by LAD in liquidity regression, ∆TVOL, 
∆TVALUE, ∆TOV, ∆PIMPACT, ∆QSPR and ∆PQSPR, on floor and electronic trading system for Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange only.  
Liquidity regression model ∆TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
Constant 0.588 0.001 1.945 2.609* 2.963* 0.141 
MKT+ 13.891*** 5.919** 21.567*** 1.262 0.487 0.015 
MKT- 15.519*** 2.719* 13.434*** 0.096 1.341 3.788* 
MA5MKT+ 0.654 0.297 1.179 2.636* 0.320 0.247 
MA5MKT- 0.122 0.105 0.174 0.181 0.372 0.009 
MA5MKT 7.199*** 1.876 7.176*** 0.001 0.128 0.387 
SHORTRATE 3.628* 2.755* 3.635* 0.003 0.022 0.122 
TERMSPREAD 1.544 0.893 2.235 0.122 0.142 0.099 
QUALITYSPREAD 0.052 0.401 0.264 1.103 0.044 4.839** 
MONDAY 174.220*** 157.877*** 111.853*** 2.082 11.633*** 10.495*** 
TUESDAY 126.424*** 91.214*** 106.046*** 7.982*** 0.032 2.115 
WEDNESDAY 28.635*** 16.815*** 18.142*** 0.319 3.029* 0.659 
THURSDAY 0.001 1.393 1.667 16.158*** 0.051 0.409 
HOLIDAYS 0.631 0.934 1.065 0.688 3.479* 0.001 
GDP (0) 0.062 0.346 0.003 0.887 0.044 0.274 
GDP (1-2) 0.291 0.048 1.063 2.321 0.825 0.124 
CPI(0) 2.057 2.291 0.008 1.132 0.128 0.008 
CPI(1-2) 0.753 0.013 0.118 0.913 2.230 0.400 
UNP(0) 0.427 0.907 1.460 0.025 5.509** 1.358 
UNP(1-2) 0.679 0.139 0.577 2.415 0.045 0.319 
  ***, **, * Coefficients significantly different from zero at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
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Appendix  
 
Supplementary Empirical Information 
 
 
Appendix 2A 
Debt explanatory variables  
This table represents the descriptive statistics for the interest rate variables, 
Short term rate: the interest rate on 1-month or 3-month Treasury bills, Term 
spread: the yield spread between the yield on a constant maturity 10-years 
Treasury bond and short term interest rate, Quality spread: the yield spread 
between the yield on highly rating bond or better corporate bond yield index 
and the yield on 10-years Treasury bond. The descriptive statistics are 
provided for each market during a floor trading system (before automation), 
and during an electronic trading system (after automation), with the exception 
of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange where the descriptive statistics are provided 
for floor trading system and electronic trading system which are operating 
parallel to each other. For each market, panel A represents the descriptive 
statistics for the level in interest rate variables; panel B represents the 
descriptive statistics for the absolute value of daily first difference.  
Swiss stock exchange (SSE) 
 
Short Rate Term Spread Quality Spread 
 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Panel A: Interest rates levels  
 Mean 4.938 2.102 0.197 1.241 0.258 0.428 
 Std. Dev. 2.190 0.825 1.410 0.659 0.210 0.295 
 Median 4.310 1.880 0.030 1.370 0.220 0.460 
Maximum 9.470 3.590 2.740 2.480 0.820 1.050 
Minimum 1.630 0.940 -2.590 -0.180 -0.410 -0.160 
Panel B:Absolute Values of Daily First Differences 
 Mean 0.042 0.029 0.053 0.036 0.016 0.016 
 Std. Dev. 0.049 0.039 0.067 0.047 0.053 0.055 
 Median 0.030 0.020 0.040 0.020 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 0.470 0.660 0.720 0.680 0.670 0.700 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Amsterdam stock exchange (ASE) 
 
Short Rate Term Spread Quality Spread 
 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Panel A: Interest rates levels 
 Mean 8.027 3.515 -0.193 1.902 -0.033 0.270 
 Std. Dev. 1.574 0.719 0.894 0.660 0.110 0.142 
 Median 8.570 3.340 -0.395 2.040 -0.060 0.274 
Maximum 9.920 5.600 2.410 3.240 0.304 0.562 
Minimum 4.820 2.570 -1.450 0.490 -0.257 -0.092 
Panel B:Absolute Values of Daily First Differences 
 Mean 0.025 0.010 0.030 0.031 0.023 0.028 
 Std. Dev. 0.034 0.021 0.032 0.031 0.023 0.026 
 Median 0.010 0.003 0.020 0.020 0.017 0.021 
Maximum 0.380 0.386 0.280 0.346 0.198 0.214 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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                     Appendix 2A(Continued) 
Vienna stock exchange (VSE) 
 
Short Rate Term Spread Quality Spread 
 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Panel A: Interest rates levels 
 Mean 6.537 3.695 0.773 1.566 -0.502 -0.371 
 Std. Dev. 2.246 0.649 1.740 0.796 0.412 0.455 
 Median 5.608 3.547 0.379 1.526 -0.537 -0.289 
Maximum 9.867 5.140 3.431 3.208 0.339 0.523 
Minimum 3.100 2.570 -1.553 0.194 -1.287 -1.189 
Panel B:Absolute Values of Daily First Differences 
 Mean 0.011 0.008 0.028 0.031 0.029 0.029 
 Std. Dev. 0.030 0.021 0.038 0.032 0.033 0.027 
 Median 0.000 0.002 0.015 0.021 0.019 0.021 
Maximum 0.517 0.386 0.351 0.357 0.323 0.297 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE) 
 Short Rate Term Spread Quality Spread 
Panel A: Interest rates levels 
Mean 3.057 1.373 0.661 
Std. Dev. 0.918 0.687 0.560 
Median 3.069 1.428 0.587 
Maximum 5.750 3.623 2.804 
Minimum 1.340 -0.911 -0.451 
Panel B:Absolute Values of Daily First Differences 
Mean 0.056 0.074 0.036 
Std. Dev. 0.133 0.130 0.048 
Median 0.010 0.034 0.025 
Maximum 1.160 1.175 0.887 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Appendix 2B 
The testable hypotheses, their acceptance or rejection, and the justification 
Hypothesis Status (accepted/ rejected) The reason 
H1: There is no significant difference in the average daily change in 
market liquidity before and after the introduction of an electronic 
trading system.  
Accepted 
The difference in the average daily change in market liquidity 
between floor and electronic trading system is insignificant. 
H2a: Equity market return has a significant positive effect on 
market-wide liquidity. Accepted 
The up market (down market) is significantly and positively 
(negatively) related to trading activity (bid-ask spread and price 
impact) measures.  
H2b: There is no significant difference in the impact of equity 
market return on market-wide liquidity on floor and electronic 
trading system. 
Rejected 
 
The size of the coefficients of up market and down market is 
significantly different across trading systems.  
H3a: Recent equity market return has a significant positive effect on 
market-wide liquidity. Accepted 
The recently falling market is significantly and positively related to 
trading activity measures. 
H3b: There is no significant difference in the impact of recent equity 
market return on market-wide liquidity on floor and electronic 
trading systems. 
Rejected 
 
The size of the coefficients of recently raising market is 
significantly different across trading systems. 
H4a: Equity market volatility has a significant negative effect on 
market-wide liquidity. Accepted 
Market volatility is significantly and negatively related to trading 
activity measures. 
H4b: There is no significant difference in the impact of market 
volatility on market-wide liquidity on floor and electronic trading 
systems. 
Rejected 
 
The size of the coefficients of market volatility is significantly 
different across trading system. 
H5a: Market-wide liquidity is negatively affected by the short-term 
interest rate and the default spread, and is positively affected by the 
term spread. Accepted 
Short-term interest rate and quality spread have significant negative 
(positive) effect on trading activity (bid-ask spread) measures, and 
term-spread has significant negative effect on bid-ask spread 
measures.  
H5b: There is no significant difference in the impact of interest rate 
variables on market-wide liquidity on floor and electronic trading 
systems. 
Rejected 
 
The size of the interest rate variables’ coefficients is significantly 
different across trading system / some of the coefficients become 
significant or insignificant after automation. 
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Appendix 2B (Continued) 
H6a: Aggregate market liquidity exhibits distinct regularities (i.e. 
the day-of-the-week effect and regularities around holidays). 
Accepted 
Mondays accompany a significant decrease in market liquidity, on 
Friday market liquidity shows mix pattern, and other days of the 
week tend to be accompanied by increased market liquidity.  Also, 
market liquidity either significantly increases or decreases around 
holidays.  
H6b: The regularities in aggregate market liquidity on floor trading 
systems are expected to be the same as those on electronic trading 
system. 
Rejected 
 
The size of the coefficients of some of the day-of-the-week 
dummies and holiday’s dummy is significantly different across 
trading system / some of the day-of-the-week and holiday dummies’ 
coefficients become significant or insignificant after automation. 
H7a: Market-wide liquidity is affected by the announcement of 
macroeconomic variables such as GDP, CPI, and unemployment, 
and shows a particular pattern around these announcements. 
Accepted 
Market liquidity either significantly increases or decreases around 
the announcement of macroeconomic indicators.  
H7b: The impact of the announcement of macroeconomic indicators 
is the same under each trading system. 
Rejected 
 
Some of the coefficients of the announcement dummies become 
significant or insignificant after automation. 
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Appendix 2C 
Normality test  
This table reports the results of the normality test for all market liquidity series for all markets during a floor trading system and during an electronic trading system, using Jarque-
Bera test for normality. All the Jarque-Bera statistic values are statistically significant at 1% level of significance; the null hypothesis of normal distribution has been rejected.   
 ∆ TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Floor 
trading 
Electronic 
trading 
Panel A: Swiss stock exchange (SSE) 
Jarque-Bera 5110784 823 44125437 7476 1407559 66158 55434763 119152 755790 283 6061165 1849 
Panel B: Amsterdam stock exchange (ASE) 
Jarque-Bera 6974365 39742 19322452 76009 2501943 44598162 920566 41293 -----------a ----------- ----------b ----------- 
Panel C: Vienna stock exchange (VSE)  
Jarque-Bera 34040 64562951 24459 34204869 12272 6877169 59139459 7439 ----------- ----------- ----------- ----------- 
Panel D: Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE)   
Jarque-Bera 870334 1705840 2458947 1707755 2061417 58378 24826060 3637748 232 445847 1334 112255 
         
a, b
 Spreads measures are not available for ASE and VSE. 
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Appendix 2D 
Nonparametric tests Kruskal-Wallis 
This table represents the results of the analysis of the difference between the daily change in aggregate market 
liquidity of the floor trading system and the daily change in aggregate market liquidity of the electronic trading 
system, using other nonparametric tests (Kruskal-Wallis) as a robust check to the results of Mann-Whitney test. 
The analysis uses market-wide liquidity variables as described in Table 2.2. All the variables are equally-
weighted and they are measured as daily percentage changes – signified by the prefix ∆. All the results of 
Kruskal-Wallis statistic are insignificant which support the acceptance of the first hypothesis of no change.  
 
∆ TVOL ∆TVALUE ∆TOV ∆PIMPACT ∆QSPR ∆PQSPR 
Panel A: Swiss stock exchange (SSE) 
Kruskal-Wallis 0.055 0.009 0.064 0.010 0.237 0.360 
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 0.055 0.009 0.064 0.010 0.237 0.360 
Panel B: Amsterdam stock exchange (ASE) 
Kruskal-Wallis 0.375 0.138 0.502 0.010 -----------a ----------b 
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 0.375 0.138 0.502 0.010 ----------- ----------- 
Panel C: Vienna stock exchange (VSE) 
Kruskal-Wallis 0.003 0.000 0.031 0.002 ----------- ---------- 
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 0.003 0.000 0.031 0.002 ----------- ----------- 
Panel D: Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE) 
Kruskal-Wallis 0.541 0.421 0.083 0.137 0.034 0.924 
Kruskal-Wallis (tie-adj.) 0.541 0.421 0.083 0.137 0.034 0.924 
        
a, b
 Spreads measures are not available for ASE and VSE. 
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Appendix 2E 
Unit root test for dependent and explanatory variables 
This table represents the results of the unit root test to test for stationarity using 
both Augmented Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. These tests 
allow for intercept and the selection of the lags is guided by Akaike Information 
criterion. For each market, the test has been done to all liquidity variables (i.e. 
dependent variables) in panel A and for the explanatory variables in Panel B, for 
the two sub-samples periods, during a floor trading system and electronic trading 
system, with exception of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange where the test has been 
done for independent variables under the floor trading system and electronic 
trading system, and for explanatory variables for the period where both systems 
working parallel to each other.The t-statistics for both tests are statistically 
significant at 1% level of significance.  
 Floor trading  Electronic trading  
 DF PP DF PP 
 t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat 
Swiss stock exchange (SSE) 
Panel A: Unit root test for dependent variables 
∆ TVOL -38.367 -38.474 -7.434 -87.095 
∆TVALUE -36.060 -36.067 -5.201 -85.999 
∆TOV 
-28.329 -43.289 -3.930 -56.587 
∆PIMPACT -35.203 -35.203 -23.993 -50.344 
∆QSPR -18.713 -40.032 -15.911 -64.247 
∆PQSPR -13.788 -37.993 -16.631 -51.896 
Panel B: Unit root test for independent variables 
MKT+ -12.622 -33.455 -4.516 -34.849 
MKT- -15.221 -33.472 -5.296 -34.449 
MA5MKT+ 
-9.188 -11.705 -10.993 -13.275 
MA5MKT- -11.624 -11.166 -7.345 -13.394 
MA5MKT -4.273 -8.433 -3.309** -7.181 
SHORTRATE -26.959 -32.780 -31.263 -31.159 
TERMSPREAD -9.580 -36.719 -7.393 -33.438 
QUALITYSPREAD -13.916 -63.312 -12.351 -57.161 
Amsterdam stock exchange (ASE) 
Panel A: Unit root test for dependent variables 
∆ TVOL -12.863 -49.294 -4.982 -58.632 
∆TVALUE -13.073 -41.395 -4.917 -57.389 
∆TOV -4.296 -33.934 -5.471 -37.566 
∆PIMPACT -29.782 -47.067 -23.356 -49.522 
Panel B: Unit root test for independent variables 
MKT+ 
-34.353 -34.358 -3.675 -33.911 
MKT- -15.564 -35.376 -5.612 -35.237 
MA5MKT+ -10.655 -11.348 -6.828 -14.846 
MA5MKT- -10.101 -12.554 -7.827 -14.427 
MA5MKT -4.312 -9.757 -2.588* -6.467 
SHORTRATE 
-17.907 -29.297 -13.309 -30.557 
TERMSPREAD -14.792 -33.352 -24.638 -38.111 
QUALITYSPREAD 
-13.851 -80.268 -12.522 -101.767 
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                 Appendix 2E (Continued) 
 Floor trading Electronic trading  
 DF PP DF PP 
 t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat t-Stat 
Vienna stock exchange (VSE) 
Panel A: Unit root test for dependent variables 
∆ TVOL -45.803 -48.593 -10.056 -9.917 
∆TVALUE -27.947 -48.031 -19.452 -19.078 
∆TOV 
-18.542 -49.811 -12.287 -37.355 
∆PIMPACT -18.646 -34.176 -46.333 -47.016 
Panel B: Unit root test for independent variables 
MKT+ -15.568 -29.839 -5.949 -32.330 
MKT- -8.414 -30.408 -6.338 -38.093 
MA5MKT+ -7.379 -10.642 -11.687 -12.607 
MA5MKT- -7.332 -10.921 -6.477 -12.912 
MA5MKT 
-3.979 -8.512 -3.485 -7.396 
SHORTRATE -10.984 -33.307 -6.611 -32.450 
TERMSPREAD -32.683 -32.584 -24.360 -37.107 
QUALITYSPREAD -10.588 -28.537 -7.410 -39.217 
Frankfurt stock exchange (FSE) 
Panel A: Unit root test for dependent variables  
∆ TVOL 
-6.147 -58.870 -8.645 -58.260 
∆TVALUE -6.375 -56.425 -8.593 -58.528 
∆TOV -32.354 -56.037 -9.498 -72.136 
∆PIMPACT -48.247 -48.247 -8.510 -53.181 
∆QSPR -15.167 -121.084 -28.384 -79.828 
∆PQSPR -13.309 -76.310 -17.510 -74.848 
Panel B: Unit root test for independent variables  
 DF PP 
MKT+ 
-5.618 -48.769 
MKT- -4.566 -48.996 
MA5MKT+ -10.235 -17.140 
MA5MKT- -8.821 -16.815 
MA5MKT -3.342** -8.768 
SHORTRATE -12.390 -83.947 
TERMSPREAD -10.548 -72.309 
QUALITYSPREAD 
-48.055 -48.053 
5  
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3 Chapter Three 
Liquidity and Assets Pricing 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Traditional asset pricing theory is based on the assumption of frictionless financial 
markets and considers them to be perfectly liquid, which assumes that investors do not 
pay any transaction costs (Luttmer, 1996). Consequently, traditional asset pricing theory 
does not take into account the role of liquidity in asset pricing. Recently, considerable 
attention has been directed towards liquidity (i.e. either firm-specific liquidity or 
market-wide liquidity) and its importance in asset pricing, and, hence a large amount of 
theoretical and empirical literature on liquidity and asset returns has emerged linking 
the area of market microstructure and asset pricing.  
 
However, liquidity is likely to be a function of market structure and design. In the 
previous chapter it was shown that market-wide liquidity varies over time, and its 
response to its time-series determinants is different before and after the automation of a 
trading system. It was also shown that although market-wide liquidity exhibits some 
regularities (e.g. day-of-the-week effect), these regularities are different before and after 
automation. Therefore, the fact that many stock markets have adopted significant 
changes in their trading arrangements could also possibly affect liquidity and its 
relationship to asset returns. More specifically, many stock exchanges have moved 
away from a floor-based to an electronically-based trading system. This revolution in 
trading systems is expected to affect liquidity: the mechanism which provides liquidity, 
and the behaviour of liquidity will be affected by the varying characteristics of floor and 
electronic trading systems, which then may result in different levels of liquidity under 
each system (see, Huang and Stoll, 1996; Freund and Pagano, 2000; Venkataraman, 
2001 among others)33. Of course, investors looking to increase the value of their stocks 
prefer a trading system which provides the highest liquidity, otherwise they would 
discount stocks more heavily when liquidity is low to reduce their value and earn higher 
expected returns. Consequently, if liquidity is expected to be affected by different 
trading systems, then different trading systems (i.e. floor versus electronic trading
                                                 
33
 See section 3.3.2 for more details on how floor and electronic trading systems could result in different 
levels of liquidity.  
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 systems) will have different implications on the relationship between liquidity and asset 
returns (i.e. pricing of liquidity). This chapter therefore aims to investigate the pricing 
of market liquidity and firm-specific liquidity before and after the automation of trading 
systems. 
 
There is an extensive literature that examines, theoretically and empirically, the 
relationship between liquidity and asset returns. Some studies, such as Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), 
Brennan et al. (1998), Datar et al. (1998), Chordia et al. (2001b), Lo et al. (2004) among 
others, examine whether firm-specific liquidity is related to expected returns. That is, 
these studies examine whether illiquid stocks (i.e. stocks with higher bid-ask spread, 
lower turnover, higher price impact) offer investors a higher premium. Their findings 
generally show that stocks with lower liquidity earn higher expected returns. More 
recent literature has concentrated on the importance of market-wide liquidity in asset 
pricing rather than firm-specific liquidity34. This shift in attention has been driven by 
Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka (2001) 
who provide strong evidence for commonality in US markets and find that fluctuations 
in various measures of liquidity correlate significantly with market-wide liquidity. Their 
findings raise concerns about whether market-wide liquidity is a systematically-priced 
risk factor, and shed light on the possible role that market liquidity risk could play in 
explaining asset prices. Therefore, some theoretical and empirical studies (e.g. Lustig, 
2005; Holmstrom and Tirole, 2001; Huang, 2003; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; 
Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Chen, 2005 among others) have analyzed the impact of  
market-wide liquidity shocks on asset pricing and examined whether expected stock 
returns are related to their sensitivity to market-wide liquidity at the cross-sectional 
level. These studies find that market-wide liquidity is a priced risk factor and the stocks 
that show lower sensitivity to market-wide liquidity have lower expected stock returns. 
 
Despite the large number of studies on liquidity and asset pricing, no study, to the best 
of our knowledge, has examined and compared the pricing of liquidity under floor and 
                                                 
34
 Firm-specific liquidity is the level of liquidity as an attribute of individual stock. That is, the individual 
stock will either be highly liquid or less liquid. Market-wide liquidity is market systematic liquidity as a 
state variable or undiversifiable risk factor, that its innovations have effects that are pervasive across 
common stocks (see for example, Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Sadka, 2006).   
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electronic trading systems35. Further, the previously mentioned studies on liquidity and 
assets returns have examined the liquidity-return relationship through focusing on either 
firm-specific or market-wide liquidity. Very few studies have considered a combination 
of market-wide and firm-specific liquidity in the liquidity-return relationship. The two 
notable exceptions are Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008), 
who either examine the pricing of market liquidity risk while controlling for liquidity 
level, or vice versa. Also, the literature on liquidity and asset pricing has generally been 
restricted to using unconditional asset pricing models rather than conditional ones. One 
notable exception is Martínez et al. (2005) who investigated whether aggregate liquidity 
is priced in the Spanish market using both unconditional and conditional asset pricing 
models. However, in Martínez et al. (2005) factor loadings are scaled by aggregate 
book-to-market ratio, and, thus their conditional model has been transformed into a 
scaled one, which can be interpreted as an unconditional multifactor model. 
Furthermore, in their analysis they use portfolios as tested assets rather than individual 
stocks. Finally, the literature on liquidity and asset pricing has extensively focused on 
investigating whether market-wide or firm-specific liquidity is priced on US markets 
such as the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX, with little attention directed towards other 
markets. US markets are considered the most liquid in the world and thus what has been 
found in US markets may not be pertinent to other markets (see Bekaert et al., 2007; 
Galariotis and Giouvris, 2007).  
 
Therefore, this chapter aims to extend the empirical literature on liquidity and asset 
pricing in the following ways: 
 
First, while many stock markets have adopted changes in their structure, studies that 
examine whether and to what extent liquidity is priced before and after the automation 
of the trading system are virtually nonexistent. Thus, we know very little about how 
moving from traditional floor trading to electronic trading can impact upon liquidity and 
how this in turn could result in different pricings of liquidity. Market microstructure 
literature has documented strong evidence regarding the impact of different market 
structures on the quality of financial markets in terms of liquidity, and has shown that 
                                                 
35
 Also, to the best of our knowledge, none of the studies that compare floor and electronic trading 
systems, which have been reviewed in section 2.2.2, have examined the pricing of liquidity under both 
trading systems.  
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different market structures imply different liquidity behaviour. For example, 
Venkataraman (2001) finds that liquidity in the floor-trading system is higher than in 
the electronic-trading system. Amihud et al. (1997) find a significant change in asset 
values as a result of improving liquidity for stocks moved from call trading to 
continuous trading on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, i.e. shifting the trading of stocks 
from one trading system to another might affect their liquidity. So, if changes in market 
structure such as moving from a floor to an electronic trading system result in 
differences to both market and stock liquidity, then it is expected that there will be a 
difference in the required return by investors before and after the introduction of 
electronic trading. Furthermore, Avramov and Chordia (2006a) argue that “liquidity 
may be more of a trading phenomenon that is unrelated to the state of the economy. 
Liquidity is likely to be a function of market design, competition amongst liquidity 
suppliers, and the degree of information asymmetry in financial markets” (p. 1005). 
This has been confirmed in the previous chapter. So this chapter contributes to our 
knowledge concerning the impact of different trading systems (floor versus electronic) 
on the importance of liquidity in asset pricing, and thus provides a further and stronger 
link between the areas of market microstructure and asset pricing.   
 
Second, literature on liquidity and asset pricing that uses conditional asset pricing 
models is very sparse. We will employ the two-stage conditional asset pricing model of 
Avramov and Chordia (2006a) to examine whether aggregate market liquidity 
constitutes a priced risk factor, and whether firm-specific liquidity generates an 
additional premium after controlling for market-wide liquidity. In this model, the factor 
loadings, in the first-pass time-series regression, are allowed to vary with a firm’s size 
and book-to-market ratio as well as with business cycle variables. Also, by using 
individual stocks, data snooping biases and any loss of information that may result 
when stocks are sorted into portfolios, can be avoided36.   
 
Finally, our knowledge about the importance of liquidity in markets other than in the 
US is very limited. This provides us with a great opportunity to provide out-of-sample 
evidence in other markets. Thus, this research will focus on three main European 
markets: the UK (London Stock Exchange; LSE), Swiss (Swiss Stock Exchange; SSE) 
                                                 
36
 For detailed discussion of the features of this conditional asset pricing model, see section 3.3.1.1. 
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and German (Frankfurt Stock Exchange; FSE). These markets have major differences in 
their structure and are considered smaller than US ones. In US markets, stocks are 
traded under one trading system (e.g. floor trading system in NYSE), but stocks on the 
London Stock Exchange and the Swiss Stock Exchange are moved from floor to 
electronic trading system. On the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, stocks may either be 
traded electronically through the electronic trading system XETRA or on a floor trading 
system. Thus, these unique features across markets imply that the nature of liquidity 
will be different in each market. Moreover, specialists in US markets (i.e. NYSE) are 
obliged to provide liquidity to smooth trading in particular securities, while dealers and 
Maklers in the UK and German markets respectively may trade for their own accounts 
but are not obliged to provide liquidity37. The heterogeneity in market structure leads to 
differences in the conditions under which liquidity is provided across stock exchanges 
included in our sample. Therefore, examining whether and to what extent market-wide 
and firm-specific liquidity are priced before and after the automation of these markets, 
will provide new insight into the importance of liquidity in asset pricing.   
 
Hence, this research addresses the following questions: 
 
• Is aggregate market liquidity a priced risk factor under the change in market 
structures (i.e. before and after the introduction of automated trading systems)? If so, 
does the pricing of aggregate market liquidity differ before and after the automation of 
trading systems? 
 
• Does firm-specific liquidity have any additional premium before and after the 
introduction of automated trading systems? If so, does this premium differ before and 
after the automation of trading systems? 
 
Investigating liquidity, both market-wide and firm-specific, in asset pricing is important 
because illiquid stocks with higher transaction costs are traded at a discount (e.g. 
Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) and tend to have a high return sensitivity to market 
liquidity and thus higher expected returns (e.g. Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). Also, the 
existence of commonality across individual stocks’ liquidity fluctuations implies that 
                                                 
37
 Makler are known as Amtlicher Kursmakler whose position resembles that of the NYSE specialist (see 
Grammig et al., 2001; Theissen, 2002a, 2002b). 
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market-wide liquidity constitutes a source of nondiversifiable systematic risk that could 
be priced. Finally, market-wide liquidity represents a major source of concern especially 
during market slumps. For example, during the 1987 stock market crash, the 1997 Asian 
crisis and the 1998 long-term capital market crisis, most financial markets suffered 
sharp declines in liquidity, which resulted in “flight-to-liquidity”, as observed in the 
markets of debt securities. Therefore, the findings of this chapter should be of interest to 
individual investors, portfolio managers, financial managers (corporate finance), and 
financial market designers and regulators. Investors need to know whether market-wide 
liquidity is priced, and whether any additional premium is likely to be required for 
carrying stocks with different levels of liquidity. Understanding the securities’ pricing 
process can lead investors to carry market-wide liquidity risk with greater efficiency. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) were the first to establish the return-liquidity 
relationship and find that they are negatively related. In addition, Chordia et al. (2000) 
point out that market liquidity could affect asset pricing, and that investors will 
therefore expect a higher return from holding stocks that are highly co-varied with 
market liquidity.  
 
In the area of portfolio management, mutual funds and portfolio managers frequently re-
balance their portfolios to meet investors’ liquidity needs. Frequent re-balancing of 
portfolios exposes managers to transaction costs, which prevents profitable 
implementation of portfolio strategies. That is, profitability of momentum strategies is 
related to transaction costs, which may raise the issue of whether the returns on these 
strategies can be related to the time-variation of market liquidity. In cases where the 
unanticipated variations of liquidity have a systematic component, then trading 
strategies’ returns (e.g. momentum returns) could be considered as a compensation for 
market-wide liquidity risk (see Sadka, 2006). Therefore, the findings of this research 
will help portfolio managers make decisions on which is more important for trading 
strategies, market-wide or firm-specific liquidity, and then help them in developing 
trading strategies and ensure their effective implementation. If liquidity is taken into 
consideration in portfolio constructions, a considerable profit could be achieved for 
momentum strategies, the reason being that momentum strategy profits are sensitive to 
market liquidity risk (see Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004; Sadka, 2006).  
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This chapter also has implications for corporate finance. It suggests new understanding 
of what may be required to improve a stock’s liquidity. If the stock is less liquid, its 
returns will be highly sensitive to market liquidity and investors will ask for higher 
returns: the company will incur a higher cost of capital. Thus, it may be that financial 
managers will be required to devise financial policies to improve stock liquidity.  
 
Finally, the findings of this chapter should benefit stock exchange regulators and may 
provide a useful reference for those that have introduced or are considering introducing 
an electronic trading system. It may also help regulators’ decision-making in improving 
market liquidity, since maintaining a well-designed and highly liquid market keeps as 
many traders in the market as possible. If, for example, after the introduction of 
electronic trading systems, the market liquidity is highly priced and investors seek 
higher premium then more regulatory provisions can be introduced to improve the 
liquidity of electronic trading systems. That is, the regulators may implement new 
policy procedures to improve the mechanism of supplying liquidity in electronic trading 
systems. For example, they may decide to introduce designated market makers to 
support the operations of the electronic trading system and thus provide additional 
liquidity, especially for small and mid cap stocks for which the electronic systems may 
not be suitable. On the other hand, if the introduction of electronic trading systems 
results in higher liquidity, and thus a lower premium is paid to investors, then the 
automation of trading systems can be considered successful. Consequently, stock 
exchanges considering introducing electronic system can be assured of the possibility of 
increased liquidity. 
 
The next section of this chapter reviews the literature concerning the relationship 
between liquidity and stock returns. Section 3.3 discusses the hypotheses development, 
methodology employed to undertake the analysis, and the data that is utilized in the 
empirical analysis. The empirical results are then discussed in section 3.4. Finally, 
section 3.5 concludes the chapter.   
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3.2 Literature Review 
 
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have been devoted to the importance of 
liquidity in assets pricing. These studies examine liquidity premia by testing whether 
firm-specific liquidity or market-wide liquidity is priced in asset pricing. Approaches 
using different liquidity measures, methodologies and asset pricing models, have been 
employed to examine these issues. The empirical issue which still needs further 
investigation, however, is whether both market-wide and firm-specific liquidity are 
priced under different market structures (i.e. before and after the automation of trading 
systems)38.  
 
3.2.1 Liquidity and assets returns – Theoretical studies 
 
A growing body of theoretical studies have developed models to explain the liquidity-
return relationship. These studies, to start with, explained the effect of firm-specific 
liquidity on asset returns by examining the impact of transaction costs on assets prices. 
However, there is controversy among these studies.  From one theoretical point of view, 
some studies argue that liquidity has a significant effect on asset returns. These studies 
are based on the argument that the liquidity premium of less liquid assets depends on 
the investors’ holding horizon. Thus, in equilibrium, investors with a longer holding 
horizon will choose to hold assets with higher transaction costs (i.e. assets with higher 
bid-ask spread) to maximize their net of transaction costs returns. When investors 
choose to hold less liquid assets with greater transaction costs they will discount them 
by a greater amount. So the size of illiquidity discount will increase and asset prices 
decrease, which in turn increases the expected returns. For instance, Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) develop an equilibrium model where investors with a longer holding 
horizon hold assets with larger spreads (clientele effect), and these assets yield higher 
expected returns39. Therefore, investors with a long holding horizon will receive higher 
expected returns from carrying illiquid assets. Heaton and Lucas (1996) introduce a 
                                                 
38
 See section 2.2.2 for the review of the studies on market structure and design, especially with regard to 
floor and electronic trading systems.  
39
 Clientele effect assumes that investors have different liquidity plans or expected holding periods. Thus, 
in equilibrium, investors with longer holding periods choose to hold illiquid stocks (i.e. stocks with higher 
bid-ask spread), while liquid stocks (i.e. stocks with low bid-ask spread) are allocated to investors with 
shorter holding periods (see Amihud and Mendelson, 1986).    
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model where investors face both systematic and unsystematic labour income shocks and 
trade frequently to reduce the unsystematic one. They find, because of frequent trading, 
that transaction costs play an important role and there are both direct and indirect effects 
of transaction costs on equity premium, where the former is dominant when transaction 
costs are large. Finally, Lo et al. (2004) find that small fixed transaction costs have a 
significant impact on asset returns by suggesting a continuous equilibrium model of 
asset prices and trading volume with fixed transaction costs and heterogeneous 
investors. 
 
In sharp contrast, Constantinides (1986) develops a general equilibrium model where 
investors trade to rebalance their portfolios. According to this model, investors can 
avoid transaction costs by reducing their trading in assets with higher transaction costs. 
Consequently, investors’ expected utility of the future consumption will be insensitive 
to deviations of the asset proportions from those proportions which are optimal in the 
absence of transactions costs. Thus, a very small liquidity premium is required as a 
compensation for these deviations. In other words, transaction costs have small effects 
on assets returns. A similar result in terms of the impact of transaction costs on asset 
returns has been found by Vayanos (1998) and Vayanos and Vila (1999) who assume an 
economy with overlapping generations, where the investors trade to accommodate 
lifetime consumption.   
 
In the last few years, a few theoretical studies have directed their attention towards 
market-wide liquidity risk and have explained its role in asset returns based on the 
solvency constraints argument. They argue that many investors will require higher 
expected returns to hold less liquid stocks in the face of market-wide liquidity shock. 
More specifically, during the recession the liquidity shocks will be strong and the 
investors’ idiosyncratic income risk will increase as well. So, investors with low-wealth 
and high income draws will face solvency constraints. As borrowing by those investors 
to facilitate consumption will be impossible, they will be forced to liquidate some of 
their assets to raise cash. If investors hold stocks that are illiquid and highly sensitive to 
market liquidity, then liquidation will take place when liquidity is low, because the 
decline in investors’ wealth is related to the decline in liquidity. Liquidation will be 
costly, especially during periods of low liquidity, and when investors’ wealth decreases 
and their margin utility is high. Therefore, stocks whose returns are highly co-varied 
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with market-wide liquidity will have a sharp decline in their prices and their current 
returns so they are expected to pay higher returns in the future. That is, investors will 
require a systematic liquidity premium for stocks that are highly positively sensitive to 
market liquidity. For instance, Holmstrom and Tirole (2001) develop a liquidity-based 
asset pricing model that assumes a risk-neutral consumer and where the variation in 
liquidity demand at the corporate level is the driving force. In their model, they find that 
stocks’ expected return is related to stocks’ sensitivity to market-wide liquidity. Huang 
(2003) develop a model in an economy, where the agents who can invest in illiquid and 
liquid assets face sudden liquidity shocks and have a random holding period. Under this 
model, liquidity has a significant effect on asset returns when the agents face a 
borrowing constraint. Finally, Lustig (2005) in his model argues that liquidity shocks 
(i.e. liquidity risk) are induced by solvency constraints during an economic recession. 
He finds a strong relationship between aggregate liquidity and risk premia where 
investors ask for higher expected returns on stocks to compensate for business cycle-
related liquidity risk.  
 
To summarize, despite the controversy about the impact of liquidity at firm-specific 
level over stock return, the theoretical literature, in general, shows that both firm-
specific and market-wide liquidity have an impact on stock returns. However, the 
majority of empirical studies, as we will see in the next section, provide evidence 
supporting the theorists.  
 
3.2.2 Liquidity and returns - Empirical evidence 
 
3.2.2.1 Firm-specific liquidity and asset returns 
 
Most of the empirical studies that examine the relationship between liquidity as a firm-
specific characteristic and stock returns, provide evidence in favour of the theory that 
stocks with low liquidity levels, represented by high bid-ask spread, high price impact, 
low turnover, and low trading volume, earn higher expected returns. These studies use a 
wide variety of liquidity measurements and base their analyses either on using the return 
on portfolios formed, based on some criteria such as size, book-to-market ratio or beta, 
or on using the return of individual stocks.  
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Amihud and Mendelson (1986), in their seminal work, test whether less liquid stocks 
with high bid-ask spread have higher expected returns. By using monthly returns and 
yearly quoted bid-ask spreads on NYSE stocks from 1961–1980 with a pooled (cross-
sectional and time-series) methodology, Amihud and Mendelson provide much support 
for their prediction. They find that the average portfolio risk-adjusted returns increase 
with bid-ask spread. This result is robust after controlling for firm size. However, 
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) question the results of Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986) and examine seasonality in the liquidity-return relationship. Their study uses the 
same proxy of liquidity as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) for NYSE stocks but for a 
longer sample period, from 1961-1990. Eleswarapu and Reinganum employ the Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) methodology rather than following Amihud and Mendelson’s 
(1986) methodology, arguing that the later methodology restrains a constant market 
premium, possibly resulting in spurious effects of spread. The authors find no evidence 
in favour of Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) propositions. They also find that liquidity 
premium exhibits strong seasonality. That is, the relationship between liquidity and 
returns is confined to the month of January. These results are robust when Eleswarapu 
and Reinganum (1993) re-examine the return-liquidity relationship after relaxing 
Amihud and Mendelson’s portfolio selection criteria40.  
 
In contrast, other studies shed light on the importance of liquidity through examining 
the impact of adverse selection on asset pricing. For example, Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996) use, instead of bid-ask spread, both variable and fixed cost 
components of transaction costs, to test whether liquidity due to information asymmetry 
affects asset returns41.  The authors argue that bid-ask spread is a noisy measure, 
because many large trades tend to occur outside the spread while small trades occur 
inside the spread. They apply the methods of Glosten and Harris (1988) and Hasbrouck 
(1991) to segregate transaction costs into both components.  Compared with others, this 
study uses both intraday data over the period 1984-1988 and monthly returns for the 
period from 1984-1991 for NYSE and AMEX stocks. However, in asset pricing, this 
                                                 
40
 Amihud and Mendelson (1986) require eleven years of complete return data for a stock to be included 
in the analysis. This requirement, according to Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), removes smaller 
stocks from the analysis and causes a bias in documenting the size effect. Thus, Eleswarapu and 
Reinganum relax this requirement by using three years of return data, so the number of stocks included in 
the portfolio increased and, as a result, the portfolios include smaller size firms with larger bid-ask spread.  
41
 A variable component depends on the amount of informed trading and noise trading, while a fixed 
component is related to inventory maintenance and order processing.   
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sample period is considered short when compared to other studies42. Similarly to 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) but unlike Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), Brennan 
and Subrahmanyam (1996) apply the generalized least squares (GLS) method on pooled 
data to avoid the errors-in-variables problem that results from applying Fama-
MacBeth’s (1973) procedure. The regression analysis indicates that cost components, 
both fixed and variable, have significant premiums. However, their findings add little 
support for Amihud and Mendelson’s model. More specifically, they find a positive and 
concave (at a decreasing rate) relationship between the variable cost component and 
stock returns, and a positive and convex (at an increasing rate) relationship between the 
fixed cost component and stock returns. The latter relationship is inconsistent with the 
proposition of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) (i.e. horizon clientele effect). This might 
be, as the authors argue, because of an incorrect estimate in fixed cost parameters, or it 
might be due to an incomplete adjustment for the risk using the Fama-French three 
factors model. The results also show, inconsistently with Eleswarapu and Reinganum 
(1993), that the liquidity-return relationship does not exhibit any seasonality. This might 
be, as Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) argue, due to different sample periods or due 
to the ability of the Fama-French model to absorb any seasonality.     
 
The studies described above run their analyses using the returns on portfolios 
constructed by sorting stocks on different criteria (e.g. size, liquidity measure, and 
firm’s beta). Such procedures (portfolio formation), according to Brennan et al. (1998), 
are used to moderate problems that could result from estimating betas as independent 
variables in a two-step estimation procedure or to enable the estimation of the 
covariance matrix of residual returns when a one-step estimation procedure is used. 
However, the portfolio formation procedure could result in two problems. First, possible 
loss of information when stocks are sorted into portfolios. Second, a data snooping bias 
that frequently exists in portfolio-based asset pricing tests (see Brennan et al. (1998) and 
references cited in). Therefore, recent empirical studies on liquidity and asset pricing 
focus on the return of individual stocks in examining the relationship between a stock’s 
liquidity and its returns. They also use trading activity measures (e.g. trading volume, 
trading value and turnover ratio) as proxy for liquidity, rather than the bid-ask spread 
measure, which is considered a noisy proxy for liquidity. These measures are an 
                                                 
42
 Amihud et al. (2005) argue that tests of assets pricing require data that extend over a long time period 
to increase the power of the tests.  
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important determinant of liquidity, and are based on daily data that could be made 
available over a longer period, therefore providing a powerful test of the liquidity 
hypothesis.  
 
Brennan et al. (1998), for example, focus on individual stocks and used dollar trading 
volume as a measure of liquidity. They examine whether expected stock returns could 
be explained by liquidity as well as by a number of firm characteristics such as size, 
book-to-market ratio, price, dividend yield, and past returns. They use monthly data for 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from 1966-1995, and estimate the risk-adjusted 
return using the Connor and Korajczyk (1988) approach and the Fama and French 
(1993) three factor model. Despite a risk-adjusted approach, Brennan et al. find that 
stock returns are strongly and negatively related to volume, consistent with the notion 
that liquidity is priced in asset pricing. This is also consistent with the findings of 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) who find a 
negative return-liquidity relationship, but is inconsistent with the results of Eleswarapu 
and Reinganum (1993).  
 
In addition, Datar et al. (1998) provide an alternative test to Amihud and Mendelson's 
(1986) model using turnover ratio as a proxy for liquidity. They use monthly data on 
returns and trading volume for NYSE stocks from 1962-1991. In contrast to Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) but similar to Brennan 
et al. (1998), Datar et al. (1998) employ Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) procedure. The 
regression results are supportive of Amihud and Mendelson’s predictions; in other 
words, the results show that the cross-section stock returns are a decreasing function 
with turnover ratio.  This confirms the notion that high liquid stocks pay lower returns, 
which is consistent with the findings of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996), and Brennan et al. (1998). Further, their results still hold after a 
number of robust checks such as controlling for other variables (i.e. size, book-to-
market ratio, and firm beta), using a trimmed dataset, and dividing the dataset into two 
halves43. Their results also show, in contrast to Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) but 
consistent with Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), that liquidity does not show any 
seasonal pattern and that its effects exist throughout the year. That is, there is no 
                                                 
43
 They trim the lowest 1% and the highest 1% observations of turnover rate because the range of the 
turnover rate is very large. The turnover rate varies from 0.0013% to 110%.  
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evidence for January seasonality. This contradiction in results could be, as the authors 
argue, a result of using a different proxy for liquidity.  
 
In contrast to other studies, Chordia et al. (2001b) not only focus on investigating the 
relationship between liquidity and returns, but also examine whether the variability in 
firm-specific liquidity is positively associated with stocks’ expected returns. They 
propose that the risk-averse investor avoids variability in liquidity and will require 
higher returns for stocks with greater variability in liquidity.  They use dollar volume 
(as in Brennan et al., 1998) and turnover rate (as in Datar et al., 1998) as liquidity 
measures. The study employs monthly data on NYSE and AMEX common stocks for 
the period from 1966-1995, and the methodology of Brennan et al. (1998), which 
focuses on individual stocks rather than portfolios. Their reported results are consistent 
with both theory and results of previous studies (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Brennan et al., 1998; Datar et al., 1998), in terms of 
the negative relationship between stock returns and liquidity. However, the results are 
unexpected with regard to the relationship between variability in liquidity and a stock’s 
returns: stocks with higher fluctuations in liquidity have lower expected returns. This 
result still holds after controlling for size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, price level 
and dividends yield, and following some checks for robustness (such as using different 
definitions of variability in liquidity (e.g. coefficient of variation and conditional 
volatility), conducting separate tests for NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, and controlling 
for returns predictive variables (e.g. term spread, default spread and short-term rate)). 
 
3.2.2.2  Market-wide liquidity and assets returns 
 
Recently, the research on liquidity and asset pricing has advanced by shifting its 
attention towards aggregate market liquidity and its importance in asset pricing. This 
focus is motivated by the evidence for the existence of commonality in liquidity (e.g. 
Chordia et al., 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Huberman and Halka, 2001). These 
studies show that if liquidity is expected to vary systematically, then it is expected that 
stocks with returns that are positively and highly correlated with market-wide liquidity 
will pay higher expected returns. Therefore, rather than investigating firm-specific 
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liquidity, studies have evolved to examine whether market-wide liquidity, as a state 
variable, is a priced risk factor.  
 
To address this issue, studies of aggregate market liquidity put forward different assets 
pricing models augmented with liquidity risk factors such as CAPM and Fama-French 
Factor models. They also use different measures of market-wide liquidity as proxies for 
the liquidity factor. These studies provide evidence in support of a systematic liquidity 
risk being a priced risk factor in either a time-series or in a cross-sectional framework.  
 
3.2.2.2.1 Time-series test of market-wide liquidity 
 
Amihud (2002) examines the time-series relationship between market expected and 
unexpected illiquidity and market excess returns. He develops a new measure of 
illiquidity, which could be defined as the ratio of a stock’s absolute daily return to its 
daily trading value, and applies it to NYSE stocks between 1964 and 1997. This 
measure is considered an approximate measure of the price impact of order flow. The 
results show that expected market illiquidity has a positive and significant effect on ex 
ante stock excess return, while unexpected illiquidity has a negative and significant 
effect on contemporaneous stock return. This effect remains significant after controlling 
for the default yield premium and the term yield premium. In addition, both expected 
and unexpected market illiquidity have strong effects on the returns of small stock 
portfolios.  
 
Along the same lines, Fujimoto (2003a) applies Amihud’s (2002) methodology and 
conducts a time-series test for the liquidity-return relationship. However, he uses four 
monthly time-series market liquidity measures constructed on stocks from NYSE and 
AMEX for the period 1962-2002. Consistent with Amihud (2002), he finds a strong 
contemporaneous relationship between market return and market liquidity, that is, a 
significant negative effect of illiquidity shocks on current excess returns.  However, he 
extends the test for the liquidity-return relationship in different economic conditions, 
and finds an asymmetric response of market return to illiquidity shocks. That is, the 
effect of illiquidity shocks on market returns is stronger during a recession period.  
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3.2.2.2.2 Cross-sectional test of market-wide liquidity 
 
Examining the empirical studies that provide evidence for whether market-wide 
liquidity is a priced systematic risk factor in the cross-section, the studies examine 
whether a stock’s expected returns are related to their sensitivity to the fluctuations in 
market-wide liquidity. For example, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), examine the 
relationship between market-wide liquidity and asset returns by focusing on the price 
impact aspect of liquidity, and provide evidence that aggregate market liquidity is a 
priced risk factor. They develop a measure of market-wide liquidity based on volume 
related return reversal, using daily data on NYSE and AMEX stocks from 1966-1999. 
While this measure could be imprecise at the individual level, its market-wide average 
is estimated more precisely44. However, the results show that expected stock returns are 
cross-sectionally related to the sensitivities of returns to fluctuations in aggregate 
liquidity. That is, liquidity betas for stocks, which are the sensitivity to innovations in 
aggregate liquidity, play an important role in asset pricing. They find that during the 
sample period the average return on stocks with high sensitivities to liquidity exceeds 
that for stocks with low sensitivities by 7.5% annually, after controlling for the exposure 
to the market return as well as size, value and momentum factors. 
 
Further, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) develop a model that counts for pricing of 
liquidity risk while controlling for liquidity level.  In contrast to Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003), they separate liquidity risk into three parts; namely, the covariance between 
stock liquidity and market liquidity, the covariance between stock return and market 
liquidity, and the covariance between stock liquidity and market return. Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) use Amihud's (2002) illiquidity ratio as a measure of illiquidity. This 
ratio is calculated from daily data on NYSE and AMEX stocks over the period 1962-
1999. They show that a stock's return decreases in the covariance between the stock's 
return and the market illiquidity, and in the covariance between a stock's illiquidity and 
market returns; but is increasing in the covariance between a stock's illiquidity and 
market illiquidity. Although their results are consistent with those of Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003), the amount of liquidity premium that Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
                                                 
44As Liu (2006) argues, one possible reason for Pastor and Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity measure being 
imprecise at the individual stock level is that the estimation of this measure is based on using at least 16 
daily observations over the month. Therefore, if a stock’s number of trading days is less than 16 through 
the month, its liquidity measure cannot be estimated.  
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find is lower than that of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003): the liquidity premium is 1.1% 
in the former compared with 7.5% in the latter. This could be due, as the authors argue, 
either to using different liquidity measures, different sorting criteria, or to not 
controlling for the level of liquidity as in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). However, 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) point out that their results are imprecisely estimated 
because of inherent collinearity between the level of liquidity and liquidity risk.  
 
In addition, evidence in favour of the notion that market-wide liquidity is a priced risk 
factor is provided from markets other than US ones. Martínez et al. (2005) analyze 
whether the expected returns on Spanish equities during the 1990s are cross-sectionally 
related with betas estimated relative to different liquidity measures. That is, in contrast 
to others, Martínez et al. use multiple measures to examine whether liquidity is priced. 
These liquidity measures are: Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio, Pastor and Stambaugh’s 
(2003) return reversal, and the difference in the returns between portfolios of stocks 
with high sensitivity to changes in the relative bid-ask spread, and portfolios with low 
sensitivity to those changes. The analysis employs daily and monthly data for the period 
from 1991-2000 which is, compared with Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005), considered a very short period for asset pricing research.  
Consistent with the evidence documented for US markets, the results show that liquidity 
is priced in the Spanish market, especially when betas are estimated relative to the 
illiquidity ratio on either unconditional or conditional versions of liquidity-based asset 
pricing models. However, the other measures of systematic liquidity carry no premium, 
which is contradicted by the results of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) who find that 
liquidity is priced using their measure.   
 
Similarly to Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) who examine liquidity at firm-specific 
level, and in contrast to Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
and Martínez et al. (2005), Sadka (2006) measures liquidity by segregating price-impact 
components into fixed and variable cost components using the Glosten and Harris 
(1988) model. He investigates which component of liquidity is priced and which is 
important in explaining assets pricing anomalies (i.e. momentum and post-earning 
announcement drift). He focuses on market-wide measures of both the variable and the 
fixed components using intraday data for a sample of NYSE stocks during the period 
from 1983-2001. He uses the Fama-French three factors model augmented with 
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liquidity factor and applies Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. The results show that 
liquidity is a priced risk factor, which is consistent with the findings of previous studies. 
However, in contrast to Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) who find that both 
components of firm-specific liquidity affect stock returns, Sadka (2006) finds that only 
the variable permanent component is priced.  
 
Previous empirical studies, whether focusing on liquidity at individual firm level or at 
market-wide level, employ different liquidity measures. Each one of these measures 
reflects one dimension of liquidity. Therefore, in contrast to previous studies, Liu 
(2006) develops a new measure that captures multiple dimensions of liquidity45. This 
measure is the standardized turnover-adjusted number of zero daily trading volumes. 
Using daily and monthly data for all stocks on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ over the 
period 1960-2003, the empirical results of CAPM, augmented with the liquidity factor, 
show a strong and significant liquidity premium over the sample period. The significant 
liquidity premium found indicates that liquidity is important for asset pricing, which is 
consistent with previous studies of US markets (such as Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; 
Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 2006) and with Martínez et al. (2005) of the 
Spanish market.  
 
Moreover, Chen (2005) and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) argue that, although previous 
studies use alternative measures of liquidity, these measures reflect different facets of 
liquidity that are expected to be correlated (i.e. to share a common source of variation). 
Therefore, they, as an alternative, use the principle component analysis method of 
Connor and Korajczyk (1986) and the expectation maximization algorithm based 
method of Stock and Watson (1998), to extract from alternative liquidity measures a 
common measure of liquidity risk. Both of these studies examine whether this common 
measure of liquidity is priced. They find a consistent result with previous studies; they 
find that the common factor is significantly priced even though both studies used 
different data sets for different sample periods. Chen (2005) uses daily data for NYSE 
and AMEX over the period 1963-2002, while Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) use data of 
different frequencies for the period 1983-2000 for NYSE46. Although both studies find 
                                                 
45
 This measure captures dimensions of liquidity such as trading speed, trading quantity, and trading cost. 
46
 Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) use intraday data for the estimation of liquidity measures and daily, 
monthly and annual data for the asset pricing analysis. 
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that the common factor (i.e. aggregate systematic liquidity) is priced, their results show 
that individual liquidity factors are not priced in the presence of the common factor. 
This means that the common factor was able to capture the priced component of other 
liquidity measures which might be priced in isolation. Furthermore, in contrast to Chen 
(2005), Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) examine the pricing of liquidity characteristics 
after controlling for liquidity risk, and they find some evidence that firm-specific 
liquidity is priced.  
 
To summarize, reviewing the literature on firm-specific liquidity and market-wide 
liquidity, shows that liquid stocks (i.e. stocks with low bid-ask spread, high turnover 
ratio, and low price impact) pay lower returns, which confirms that liquidity as a firm 
characteristic is priced in asset returns. It also shows that market-wide liquidity is a 
priced risk factor and has an important bearing on asset pricing. However, none of the 
previous studies on liquidity and asset pricing have examined and compared the 
importance of liquidity in asset pricing under different market structure contexts (i.e. 
floor versus electronic trading systems). Further, studies that undertake empirical 
analysis of the liquidity-return relationship and take into consideration both market-
wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity are very sparse. Also, these studies give very 
little attention to using conditional asset pricing models in examining the liquidity-
return relationship.     
 
Therefore, this chapter investigates and compares the importance of liquidity (i.e. 
market-wide and firm-specific liquidity) in asset pricing under floor and electronic 
trading systems using the conditional asset pricing model of Avramov and Chordia 
(2006a), with reference to UK, Swiss and German markets, the three major markets in 
Europe. In other words, this research examines and compares whether market-wide 
liquidity is a priced risk factor, and whether firm-specific liquidity carries an additional 
premium after controlling for market-wide liquidity before and after the automation of 
trading systems based on the framework of Avramov and Chordia (2006a). The features 
of this conditional asset pricing model will be addressed in the next section.   
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3.3 Research Design 
 
This section identifies the hypotheses to be tested and presents the methodology that is 
employed to address the research questions. It also presents the sample and the data 
employed in the analysis and discusses the measures of liquidity, and the construction 
of the liquidity risk factors.  
3.3.1 Hypothesis developments 
 
This section develops several testable hypotheses through providing the theoretical 
explanation for the rationale behind the relationship between liquidity and asset returns 
in the context of different market structures.  
3.3.1.1  Liquidity and assets returns 
 
The proposition is that market illiquidity is expected to have a significant negative 
effect on a current stock’s excess return especially when higher future illiquidity is 
anticipated by investors. That is, if market liquidity is persistent (lower levels of market 
liquidity predict lower levels of market liquidity in future), this will result in higher 
expected stock returns and at the same time will result in lower current excess stock 
returns (i.e. positive contemporaneous return-liquidity relationship). This is due to the 
fact that if investors expect low market liquidity in future, they will react to the current 
illiquidity shocks by reducing current stock prices in order to earn a higher expected 
rate of return, which results in lower contemporaneous stock returns (see Amihud, 
2002; Fujimoto, 2003a). Therefore, market liquidity as a risk factor is expected to be 
positively related to the current stock’s excess returns.  
 
Additionally, since illiquid stocks are expected to be traded at a discount because of 
their higher transaction costs, and tend to have a high return sensitivity to market 
liquidity (e.g. Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005), investors 
are expected to require higher expected returns on such stocks. This could be explained 
as follows: “consider, for example, any investor who employs some form of leverage 
and faces a margin or solvency constraint, in that if his overall wealth drops sufficiently, 
he must liquidate some assets to raise cash. If he holds assets with higher sensitivities to 
liquidity, then such liquidations are more likely to occur when liquidity is low, since 
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drops in his overall wealth are then more likely to accompany drops in liquidity.  
Liquidation is costlier when liquidity is lower, and those greater costs are especially 
unwelcome to an investor whose wealth has already dropped and who thus has higher 
marginal utility of wealth. Unless the investor expects higher returns from holding these 
assets, he would prefer assets less likely to require liquidation when liquidity is low, 
even if these assets are just as likely to require liquidation on average” (Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2003, p. 643).  
 
To summarize, investors are expected to require a premium that compensates them for 
the risk of common systematic shocks including market-wide liquidity shocks and for 
holding illiquid stocks. However, if the variation in stock returns is completely 
explained by all risk factors, including a market-wide liquidity factor, then it is expected 
that liquidity as a firm characteristic will not have any additional impact on stock 
returns because its predicative power is captured by risk factors in the asset pricing 
model. This means that investors receive a premium only for bearing market-wide 
liquidity risk. On the other hand, if the known risk factors including market-wide 
liquidity risk are not sufficient to explain the variation in stock returns, then firm-
specific liquidity will have a significant impact on risk-adjusted returns (i.e. explain the 
cross-sectional variation in risk adjusted returns). This means that investors will receive 
an additional premium for holding illiquid stocks.  This leads to the first and second 
hypotheses:  
 
H1: In asset pricing aggregate market liquidity is a priced risk factor (i.e. has a 
significant positive effect on current stock’s excess returns).  
 
H2: Firm specific liquidity has an additional premium (i.e. firm-specific liquidity is 
negatively and significantly related to risk-adjusted returns) after controlling for all risk 
factors including the market-wide liquidity risk factor.  
 
3.3.1.2  Liquidity and assets returns under alternative trading systems 
 
The proposition is that the introduction of an electronic trading system is expected to 
influence the relationship between market-wide liquidity and stock excess returns as 
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well as influence the premium on firm-specific liquidity. Alternative market structures 
could have different implications on liquidity, and result in different levels of market-
wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity according to the trading system.  As a result, 
the required rate of return on liquidity is expected to be different for floor and electronic 
trading systems. For example, the degree of trading system anonymity is a potential 
determinant of market quality. In the case of the floor trading system (i.e. non-
anonymous trading system), Venkataraman (2001) argues that the liquidity of 
traditional floor based systems will increase, because the degree of information 
asymmetry is expected to decline since all traders can share the information about order 
inflow and the intrinsic value of the stock. Also, through the interaction among traders 
in a floor trading system, it would be easy to distinguish between informed traders and 
liquidity-motivated traders, thus reducing the level of information asymmetry. This will 
improve liquidity through motivating more traders to trade, especially liquidity-
motivated traders who possess no information and try to avoid trading with well 
informed traders. In contrast, the high degree of information asymmetry in an 
anonymous electronic trading system will result in lower trading volume, especially 
during high volatility periods. This might be due to the fact that the knowledge of the 
identity of the other side of a trade is important during a period of high information 
asymmetry. Also during these periods the bid-ask spread will be very high, which 
means lower liquidity for an electronic trading system (see Kempf and Korn, 1998; 
Theissen, 2002a). Hence, it is expected that market-wide liquidity and firm-specific 
liquidity will be different for floor and electronic trading systems, and thus have a 
different impact on asset returns. Specifically, on the floor trading system market-wide 
and firm-specific liquidity are expected to be higher than that on the electronic trading 
system, and consequently they will have a lower impact on stock returns (i.e. have a 
lower premium) on the floor trading system.  
 
On the other hand, the characteristics of automated trading systems are expected to 
attract more liquidity into markets than floor trading systems. Venkataraman (2001) 
argues that automated trading systems provide a large number of locations from which 
traders can access the system. All transactions are executed by remote access computers 
without the existence of traders. This advantage of automated trading systems, as 
Theissen (2002b) points out, will result in an increase in the number of participants in 
trading activities, filling submitted orders and thereby increasing the level of liquidity. 
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Moreover, the efficiency and high speed of such a trading system, compared with floor-
based trading, allows fast placement and immediate execution of orders, resulting in a 
higher quality of execution that would attract more traders and trading activities. This 
also would provide more liquidity to the market (Freund and Pagano, 2000). Therefore, 
it is expected that both market-wide and firm-specific liquidity will be different for 
electronic and floor trading systems, and result in a different required rate of returns for 
each system. More specifically, it is anticipated that on the electronic trading system 
market-wide and firm-specific liquidity will be higher than that on the floor trading 
system, and thus their impact on stock returns (i.e. the required premium) will be lower 
on the electronic trading system.  
 
All in all, the level of market liquidity and firm-specific liquidity is expected to be 
different under alternative trading systems (i.e. floor and electronic trading systems), 
and thus will affect their pricing in asset returns. However, no superiority in liquidity 
between floor and electronic trading systems can be established on the basis of the 
discussion above. As a result, it is not possible to have an unambiguous conclusion as to 
whether market-wide and firm-specific liquidity are higher or lower on one trading 
system compared with the other. Hence, the extent of pricing of market-wide liquidity 
and firm-specific liquidity in asset returns (i.e. whether market-wide and firm-specific 
liquidity have a stronger or weaker impact on asset returns), on the floor trading system 
compared with the electronic trading system is an empirical question. This will lead us 
to the third and fourth testable hypotheses:  
 
H3: Pricing of aggregate market liquidity (i.e. the relationship between market liquidity 
and stock excess returns) is not different before the introduction of an electronic trading 
system than after the introduction of an electronic trading system. 
 
H4: The premium on firm-specific liquidity is not different before the introduction of an 
electronic trading system than that after the introduction of an electronic trading 
system. 
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3.3.2 Empirical Methodology 
 
This section discusses the methods applied to test the developed hypotheses and to 
answer the research questions. It explains the two-pass regression framework of 
Avramov and Chordia (2006a) that is employed in order to examine the pricing of both 
market-wide liquidity and individual stock liquidity before and after the automation of 
trading systems. It also explains the test of equality of regressions’ parameters (i.e. 
estimated liquidity premium) between floor and electronic trading systems, to find out 
whether there is a difference in the pricing of market-wide liquidity and in the 
additional premium paid on firm-specific liquidity as a result of automation.  
 
3.3.2.1  Conditional asset pricing framework 
 
To examine whether market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity are priced in asset 
returns, we used the two-pass cross-sectional regression based on the framework of 
Avramov and Chordia (2006a). The employment of this conditional model is motivated, 
in general, by the argument that conditional asset pricing models are reasonably 
successful and perform better than unconditional ones when allowance is made for 
time-varying risk premia (see Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001; Avramov and Chordia, 
2006a among others).  
 
In addition, Avramov and Chordia’s (2006a) model is characterized by several features 
that distinguish it from other asset pricing models, especially those on liquidity and 
asset pricing. First, in the first-pass time-series regression of this framework, risk and 
expected returns are allowed to vary with conditional information. Indeed, previous 
studies have not allowed factor loadings to vary with firm characteristics (such as size 
and book-to-market ratio) and with business cycle variables in individual stocks. For 
example, Martínez et al. (2005) have examined the pricing of market liquidity using a 
conditional asset pricing model and have modelled the factor loadings as a function of 
market-wide information (i.e. aggregate market book-to-market ratio). Their procedure 
could be interpreted as an unconditional multifactor model, while in the Avramov and 
Chordia (2006a) framework such interpretation does not exist because firm level 
characteristics (i.e. size and book-to-market ratio) are not common among all test assets. 
Therefore, the product of multiplying risk factors with firm characteristics does not 
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provide an additional risk factor in an unconditional representation.  Also, firm size and 
book-to-market ratio provide information about a firm’s risk and expected return (see 
Fama and French, 1992), therefore conditioning beta on these firm characteristics in this 
framework not only explain the variation in stock returns by common risk factors (i.e. 
market excess return, Fama-French factors and liquidity factor), but also by firm-level 
risk. Using size and the book-to-market ratio as conditioning variables is motivated by 
their separate role as determinants of beta. More specifically, the component of a firm’s 
systematic risk, attributable to its growth option, represents a proxy for the risk of a 
firm’s existing projects that could be captured by a firm’s size and book-to-market ratio. 
In addition, allowing beta to vary with business cycle variables is motivated by the 
ability of these variables to capture investors’ expectations about future market returns 
or business cycle conditions: they help in predicting future economic conditions and 
future market returns (see Avramov and Chordia, 2006a; and references cited in). 
 
 Secondly, another important feature of Avramov and Chordia’s (2006a) model is the 
use of individual stocks, rather than portfolios constructed by sorting stocks on some 
criteria of interest such as size, book-to-market ratio and beta. Avramov and Chordia 
(2006a) argue that this is the first asset pricing framework using single securities in 
cross-sectional regressions where risk and expected returns are allowed to vary with 
conditioning information47. The focus on single securities helps to avoid the data 
snooping biases that exist in portfolio based asset pricing tests and also helps in 
avoiding any potential loss of information when stocks are sorted into portfolios.  
 
Finally, compared with previous studies, the two-pass methodology allows us to 
examine both market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity in asset pricing. That is, 
through the first-pass time-series regression we can find out whether aggregate market 
liquidity is priced, and from the second-pass cross-sectional regression we can find out 
whether individual stock liquidity has an additional premium (i.e. has an impact on 
stock expected returns) after controlling for the known risk factors including market 
liquidity risk. Therefore, this framework allows us to examine whether it is the market 
liquidity or liquidity as a firm characteristic, or both, that could be priced in asset 
pricing. Additionally, through the two stages regressions, time-series and cross-
                                                 
47
 Both Brennan et al. (1998) and Chordia et al. (2001b) use individual stocks in their analysis, but they 
did not use conditional assets pricing models.  
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sectional regressions, this framework helps to avoid the collinearity problem that exists 
between market liquidity risk and firm-specific liquidity (i.e. level of liquidity), faced 
by previous studies such as Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Korajczyk and Sadka 
(2008).  
 
As in Avramov and Chordia (2006a), the empirical methodology of the two-pass 
conditional framework is discussed as follows. The returns are assumed to be generated 
by Y-risk factors model: 
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where Rit is the return on security i at time t, Et is the conditional expectations operator, 
fyt is the unexpected return on the y-risk factor at time t, βiy is the beta associated to the 
yth-risk factor. Under the conditional version of Y-risk factors model, equation (3.1) 
could be written as follows: 
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βiyt-1 is the conditional beta corresponding to yth-risk factor. The expected returns Et-1(
itR
~ ) under the exact or equilibrium version of APT where the market portfolio is well 
diversified with respect to the factors, can be modeled as: 
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where Rft is the return on risk-free asset and λyt-1 is the risk premium for factor y at time 
t. Substituting for )~(1 itt RE − in equation (3.2) from equation (3.3), the realized returns are 
given by: 
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where 1
~~
−
+= ytityt fF λ  is the sum of the factor innovation and its associated risk 
premium, and 1−iytβ  is the conditional beta estimated by the first-pass time-series 
regression over the entire period. Then, the estimated risk-adjusted return on each 
security, ∗itR
~
, for each month t is calculated as: 
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The risk adjustment procedure imposes the assumptions that the conditional zero-beta 
return equals the conditional risk-free rate, and that the APT factor premium is equal to 
the excess return on the factor. Next, from equation (3.5), the risk adjusted return 
represents the raw material for our estimation in the following cross-sectional 
regression:  
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where 1−mitZ  is the value of characteristic m for security i at time t-1 and M is the total 
number of characteristics. The coefficients cmt in equation (3.6) are estimated by using 
the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimator. That is, we first estimate the vector 
of characteristics rewards ct each month from Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression: 
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where Zt-1 is the vector of firm characteristics in month t and ∗tR  is the vector of risk-
adjusted returns. Then, the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimators are the time 
series averages of these coefficients tcˆ . 
 
 Note that, although the factors loading in first-pass regression are estimated with error, 
only the dependent variable (i.e. risk-adjusted return) is affected by this error. While 
there is no priori reason to believe that the errors in the estimated loadings will be 
correlated with the security characteristics Zt-1, the factor loadings themselves will be 
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correlated with the security characteristics. This implies that the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) estimate of the coefficient vector tcˆ  is unbiased. However, if the errors are 
correlated with the security characteristics, then the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
estimators will be biased by an amount that depends upon the mean factor realizations 
and, hence, a purged estimator should be obtained to correct for the bias (see Brennan et 
al., 1998; Chordia et al., 2001b)48. In contrast, Avramov and Chordia (2006a) employed 
Shanken (1992) and Jagannathan and Wang (1998) approaches to correct the Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) standard errors attributable to the error in the estimation of factor 
loadings.  In contrast to Jagannathan and Wang (1998), Shanken (1992) shows that the 
standard errors of the coefficients estimated by Fama and MacBeth (1973) are 
understated which increases the precision of the estimated coefficients. This is because 
standard errors ignore the additional variation induced by the estimation error in the 
factor loadings. However, Brennan et al. (1998) also show, by applying the correction 
of Shanken (1992), that the magnitude of the coefficient understatement in their sample 
is small and does not affect their basic conclusions. Also Chordia et al. (2001b) show 
that both the Fama and MacBeth procedure and the purged estimates give the same 
results. Therefore, in this research we use only the standard Fama and MacBeth 
estimator.  
 
To formalize Avramov and Chordia’s (2006a) conditional beta framework, equation 
number (3.6) could be written as follows: 
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where 1−itX  and 1−itZ  are vectors of firm characteristics, zt-1 denotes a vector of business 
cycle variables, and θ represents the parameters that capture the dependence of β on the 
business cycle variables and the firm characteristics. 
 
Under this conditional framework, the time variation in beta i.e. the modelling of beta 
(factor loading) as a function of firm characteristics and business cycle variables in the 
first-pass time-series regression can be described as follows. Let us assume that there is 
                                                 
48
 Brennan et al. (1998) and Chordia et al. (2001b) used a purged estimator developed by Black and 
Scholes (1974) which is the constant term from the regression of the month-by-month Fama-MacBeth 
estimates on the factor portfolio returns.  
6 Chapter Three: Liquidity and Assets Pricing 
 140
one risk factor; thus the conditional beta of security i $,	 in equation 3.4) is 
modelled as: 
 
    .	  	,  ,2	  $,,2	&324,	  $,5,,5,2	&6
,	    (3.9) 
 
where Size and BM are the natural logarithm of market capitalization and book-to-
market ratio at time t-1, and zt-1 is a macroeconomic variable (i.e. business cycle 
variable default spread, term spread, dividends yield and 3-month Treasury bill yield). 
 
Also, in this conditional framework, time-varying alpha (i.e. asset pricing 
misspecification) will be considered, in which alpha could vary with the business cycle 
variables. Thus time-varying alpha could be modelled as follows: 
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Where zt-1 is a vector of macroeconomic variables (i.e. business cycle variables) at time 
t-1. 
 
Under the Avramov and Chordia (2006a) framework, we employ the Fama-French three 
factors model augmented with liquidity risk factor as an asset pricing model: 
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Therefore, the modelling of factor loading (i.e. beta) in the first-pass time-series 
regression will be as follows: 
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where the Rit is the excess return on stock i at month t, BC is the vector of business 
cycle variables default spread, term spread, dividends yield and 3-month Treasury bill 
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yield. FF is the vector of Fama-French three factors (i.e. market excess return, SMB and 
HML), LIQ is the liquidity risk factor. We have to emphasize that when beta is allowed 
to vary with macroeconomic variables zt-1, the analysis has been conducted using default 
spread, term spread, dividends yield and 3-month Treasury bill yield separately in the 
time series regressions49. 
 
 
In the empirical examinations of the pricing of market-wide liquidity and firm-specific 
liquidity, betas in equation (3.12) are modelled under different conditional 
specifications. Although unconditional asset pricing models have been previously 
criticized in terms of their poor performance compared with their conditional 
counterparts, we include the estimation of the unconditional model to represent the 
benchmark for comparison purposes. Therefore, in addition to the unconditional asset 
pricing model, the following specifications have been estimated for the conditional 
model;  (i) α2 = β3-6 = γ3-6 = 0, (ii) α2 = β2= β4 = β6  = γ2 = γ4 = γ6  =0, (iii) α2 = 0, (iv) β3-6 
= γ3-6 = 0, (v) β2= β4 = β6  = γ2 = γ4 = γ6  =0 (vi) all coefficients depart from zero. To 
illustrate, the first-pass time-series regression for the (v) specification, for example, 
where beta is allowed to vary with firm characteristics (i.e. size and book-to-market 
ratio) and alpha is time varying, is: 
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In the second-pass cross-sectional regression, the risk-adjusted returns are regressed on 
firm specific variables (size, book-to-market ratio, liquidity and past raw returns): 
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<    ∑ =58,5,,	 

59 ∑ >5 ,5,,	 

59 .,                                            $3.14&  
 
where FC is a vector of firm characteristics j (j=3, firm size, book-to-market ratio, and 
liquidity measure (e.g. proportional bid-ask spread, turnover ratio, and price impact)). 
PCR are the past cumulative raw returns of stock i over the second through third (RET2-
3), fourth through sixth (RET4-6), and seventh through twelfth (RET7-12) months prior 
                                                 
49
 A detailed discussion of these variables is provided in the sample section 3.3.3.  
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to the current month t. R* is the risk-adjusted return which is equal to (αi,0+µi,t) from 
equation (3.12). 
 
For the purpose of testing the stated hypotheses, we estimated the model as described in 
equations (3.12) (the first-pass time-series regression) and equation (3.14) (the second-
pass cross-sectional regression) for both pre- and post-automation periods. Then we test 
whether the coefficient of liquidity risk factor γ1 in equation (3.12), and the coefficient 
of liquidity as a firm-characteristic = in equation (3.14) are equal to zero. Specifically, 
we test the null hypotheses that liquidity risk factors loading are insignificant in the 
first-pass time-series regression, and the firm liquidity characteristic is insignificant in 
the cross-sectional regression. If the known risk factors (and business cycle variables in 
case of time-varying alpha) are sufficient to explain the variation in stock returns, then 
the explanatory power of firm characteristics including liquidity, in the cross-sectional 
regression, should be insignificant. This means that the liquidity risk factor in the first-
pass is priced and no additional premium is paid for liquidity as a firm characteristic. 
On the other hand, if the cross-sectional risk-adjusted return is still affected by the 
liquidity measures in the cross-sectional regression, after adjusting for Fama-French 
three factors and liquidity risk factor (and business cycle variables in case of time-
varying alpha), then the coefficient of firm-specific liquidity should be significant. This 
means that an additional premium should be paid for carrying less liquid stocks even 
after taking into consideration the market-wide liquidity risk.  
 
3.3.2.2 Comparing the liquidity premium before and after the automation of 
trading systems 
 
To investigate the effect of the introduction of electronic trading systems on pricing of 
market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity, we conduct a comparative analysis of 
the estimated liquidity coefficients between pre- and post-automation of trading 
systems. More specifically, to examine the influence of the automation of a trading 
system on the relationship between market-wide liquidity and excess stock return, we 
use the t-test to compare the cross-sectional averages of the individual coefficients of 
market liquidity risk factor estimated by first-pass time-series regression (equation 
(3.12)) before and after automation. That is, we test whether the cross-sectional average 
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of the coefficients of market-wide liquidity risk factor on floor trading system γ1F is 
expected to be equal to that on electronic trading system γ1E. Additionally, to find out 
whether there will be a difference in the premium on firm-specific liquidity between 
pre- and post-automation, we use the Wald-test to test the coefficients equality 
restriction for the cross-sectional regressions (equation (3.14)) estimated on floor and 
electronic trading systems. In other words, we test whether the coefficient of the 
liquidity measures in the cross-sectional regression model estimated on a floor trading 
system is expected to be equal to the same coefficient of the regression model estimated 
on an electronic trading system (i.e. =@  F = =A).  
 
3.3.3 The sample 
 
The sample includes all the stocks listed and subsequently delisted in the UK (the 
London Stock Exchange; LSE), Swiss (the Swiss Stock Exchange; SSE) and German 
(the Frankfurt Stock Exchange; FSE) stock markets. Examining the pricing of aggregate 
market liquidity and firm-specific liquidity in these markets is important for a number 
of reasons. 
 
Firstly: these stock exchanges are among the most important in the world. They are 
considered among the major and biggest markets in Europe as well as in the world, they 
are respectively the second (fifth), third (ninth), and the fifth (fifteenth) in the Europe 
(World) by market capitalization50. Also, our empirical analysis employs a mixture of 
big and small markets. In other words, the Swiss market is considered smaller than the 
UK and German markets. Hence, investigating the Swiss Stock Exchange may give us 
some different results.  
 
Secondly: UK and Switzerland have moved from the floor trading system to the 
electronic trading system, while in Germany (i.e. in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange) the 
electronic trading system has been introduced in parallel with the existing floor trading 
system. These unique changes in market structure may result in a change in the nature 
and the dynamic of liquidity in these markets. Previous studies such as Huang and Stoll 
(1996) and Fabre and Frino (2004) provide evidence that a different market structure 
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 Source: World Federation of Exchanges, domestic market capitalization, December 2007. 
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results in a different liquidity behavior across markets. Furthermore, Huang and Stoll 
(2001) argue that liquidity is endogenous to the market structure. Based on this, it 
would be impossible to automatically apply the findings of the research conducted in 
US markets to other markets. Therefore, examining the role of liquidity in asset pricing 
in other markets (i.e. London Stock Exchange, Frankfurt Stock Exchange and Swiss 
Stock Exchange) is considered important to provide out-of-sample evidence51.  
 
Our empirical analysis utilizes a data set for different sample periods. Since we were 
able to identify the exact date of the introduction of an electronic trading system for 
each market, the beginning and the end date of the sample period for each market is 
contingent on the date of automation (see table 3.1). Start date of sample periods for 
each market is also guided by data availability. That is, the sample period for UK data 
spans from October 1987 to October 2007, ten years prior and ten years after the 
introduction of an electronic trading system. The sample period for the German markets 
only spans ten years from January 1998 to December 2007 for each of the parallel 
trading systems. Finally, the sample period for the Swiss market runs from April 1990 
to November 2002, which represents six years and four months before and after 
automation. This short sample period for the Swiss market is due to data availability 
restrictions, no data being available for more than 76 months before the automation 
date. In general, it may be recognized that our sample period is short compared to the 
available evidence on the pricing of liquidity. However, this does not represent a 
problem in itself. The results should be taken as valid for the period being examined, 
but be interpreted with more caution.     
 
The basic data set consists of daily and monthly data for all stocks (dead and live), 
which are obtained from Datastream. The daily data for all stocks includes closing 
prices, bid prices, ask prices, trading volume and market value, which is used to 
construct the following liquidity measures: Proportional bid-ask spread, turnover ratio, 
and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio (price impact). Monthly data include return index 
(which includes capital gains as well as dividend payment), book-to-market ratio, 
market value (size), and lagged returns, which are used for asset pricing analysis. The 
                                                 
51
 Although many stock exchanges have moved from floor to electronic trading systems, the availability 
of data confined our sample to these stock exchanges only; where the data is available over longer sample 
period.  
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time-series averages of the cross-sectional means, medians, and standard deviations of 
these variables are reported in table 3.2. The variables display considerable skewness. 
Therefore, we employ logarithmic transforms of all the variables except the lagged 
returns (proxy for momentum) because they may be zero. Also, following Avramov and 
Chordia (2006a), the firm characteristics for a given month were expressed as 
deviations from their cross-sectional means for that month and lagged by two months 
with respect to the excess returns and the risk-adjusted returns that are the dependent 
variables in regression models (equations (3.12) and (3.14)). Expressing firm 
characteristics as deviations from their cross-sectional average implies that the average 
security will have values of each non-risk characteristic that are equal to zero, so under 
both the null and the alternative hypotheses the security’s expected returns will be 
determined solely by its risk characteristics. Also, lagging firm characteristics by one 
additional month is to preclude the possibility that a linear combination of the lagged 
return variables and other variables, that involve the price level, could provide a noisy 
estimate of the return in the previous month, thus leading to biases because of bid-ask 
spread effects and thin trading (see Brennan et al., 1998; Chordia et al., 2001b). 
 
In addition, monthly data on market return indices and market dividends yields have 
been obtained from Datastream. Data on interest rate variables (i.e. business cycle 
variables) (short-term interest rate, long-term interest rate on government bond, and 
long-term interest rate on corporate bonds) were obtained from Datastream for each 
sample country, except for the data on long-term interest rates on corporate bonds for 
Germany and short-term interest rates for Switzerland which were obtained from 
Deutsche Bundes Bank and Bank of Switzerland respectively. Table 3.3 provides the 
details about definition, measurements and the source of these variables for each sample 
country.  
 
With regard to Fama-French factors that are designed to mimic risk factors regarding 
size and book-to-market, we download the data on the two factors, small minus big 
(SMB) and high minus low (HML), for UK from the Stefan Nagel website for the 
period October 1987 to December 200152. Then, we construct these factors for the rest 
of the sample period following Fama and French (1996) as follows. At the end of June 
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 We thank Stefan Nagel for providing the UK HML and SMB data, which is obtained from 
http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/nagel/Stefan%20Nagel's%20Data.htm.  
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of each year t all the stocks are sorted by their market capitalization. Then a breakpoint 
at the 70th percentile of ranked market value is used to split stocks into two groups 
(small (S) and big (B)). Then all the stocks are allocated in an independent sorting to 
three book-to-market groups (low (L), medium (M), high (H)) based on the breakpoints 
for the bottom 40%, middle 20% and top 40% of the values of book-to-market ratio. We 
apply these breakpoints in constructing SMB and HML for the rest of the period in 
order to keep the consistency with the factors data obtained from Stefan Nagel’s 
website. Dimson et al. (2003) argue that these breakpoints compared with those set by 
Fama and French (1996) (i.e. 50% market value and 30% / 70% book-to-market ratio) 
are applied to ensure the acceptable levels of diversification among portfolios. Then 
from the intersections of the two size and three book-to-market groups, six portfolios 
are formed (S/L, S/M, S/H B/L, B/M, B/H), where the value-weighted monthly returns 
are calculated from July of yeart to June of yeart+1. SMB is the difference between the 
average of the returns on the three small-stocks portfolios and the average of the returns 
on the three big-stocks portfolios. HML is the difference between the average of the 
returns on the two high book-to-market ratio portfolios and the average of the returns on 
the two low book-to-market ratio portfolios. Every year in June, portfolios are reformed 
based on the new information on market capitalization and book-to-market ratio.  
 
Also, Fama-French factors SMB and HML for Germany have been constructed 
following Fama and French (1996) as mentioned above, but by applying the same 
breakpoints set by Fama and French, which are 50% of market value (i.e. the size 
median) and the bottom 30%, middle 40% and top 30% of the values of book-to-market 
ratio. Finally, for Switzerland, data on SMB and HML factors have been obtained from 
the website of Ammann and Steiner53. Following Fama and French (1993), Ammann 
and Steiner (2007) construct these factors using a high quality dataset, taking into 
consideration the specific characteristics of the Swiss stock market such as the small 
number of stocks in the market. They find that the premiums of these factors are robust 
to the key assumptions of the construction methodology such as change in rebalancing 
horizon, the exclusion of small stocks, the use of more sub-portfolios and the 
application of an equally-weighted factor construction. They also find that these factors 
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 We thank Ammann and Steiner for providing the Switzerland HML and SMB data, which is obtained 
from their website www.ammannsteiner.ch.  
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have high explanatory power in a regression of excess portfolio returns on these factors, 
which is a confirmation of their relevance to the Swiss Stock Exchange. 
 
3.3.4 Measures of market-wide liquidity  
 
To construct market-wide liquidity proxies, we first start by defining the liquidity 
measure at the firm-specific level (i.e. measure liquidity for each individual firm). Then 
measures for aggregate market liquidity are calculated by taking the cross-sectional 
average across the sample stocks in the market. Following Amihud (2002), Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Sadka (2006) we calculate these 
aggregate measures on an equally-weighted basis. Using an equally-weighted average 
might be more appropriate than using value-weighted average. Because when value-
weighted average is used, liquid firms (i.e. large cap stocks) will be overrepresented in 
the sample and the liquidity factor will be dominated by these firms (see Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005; Liu, 2006). In constructing market-wide liquidity measures, we 
concentrated in our analysis on widely and mostly used measures of liquidity such as 
proportional bid-ask spread, turnover ratio, and price impact (Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity ratio).The next three sub-sections discuss in detail the measures of individual 
stock liquidity and the calculation of market-wide liquidity proxies.   
 
3.3.4.1 Bid-ask spread 
 
The bid-ask spread is one of the most common and frequently used measures of 
liquidity. It reflects the immediacy dimension of liquidity. That is, according to 
Demsetz (1968), spread is the cost of supplying immediacy, and thus liquidity could be 
measured by estimating the cost of an order’s immediate execution. It also results from 
inventory costs, order processing costs, and information asymmetry costs54.   
 
Since our objective is to construct liquidity factors that span a long time period this 
would be impossible with intra-day data which is unavailable for a long period in some 
markets. Therefore, we use the daily proportional quoted spread at firm-specific level to 
calculate the monthly average for each company. Then the monthly market-wide 
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 For further details on bid-ask spread, see section 2.3.1.2.1 in chapter two.  
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proportional quoted spread has been constructed by calculating the cross-sectional 
average of monthly individual stocks’ proportional quoted bid-ask spreads. More 
specifically, the firm-specific proportional quoted spread (the quoted bid-ask spread 
divided by the midpoint of the quote) for stock i on day d in month t is given by: 
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                         (3.15) 
 
where aski,d,t  and bidi,d,t  are the ask price and the bid price for stock i on day d in month 
t respectively. Then the monthly proportional quoted spread for stock i in month t is 
given by: 
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where Di,t is the number of trading days for stock i at month t. Finally, the cross-
sectional average of individual stocks’ proportional quoted spreads is computed each 
month to construct a monthly market-wide liquidity series55. The market-wide liquidity 
series of proportional quoted spread is computed as follows:  
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where Nj is the number of stocks included in the cross-sectional average in month t.  
 
3.3.4.2 Turnover ratio 
 
For each stock in our sample, the turnover ratio is given as the ratio of the trading value 
to the market capitalization. It is one of the trading activity measures that are frequently 
used as a proxy for liquidity, as it is highly associated with the bid-ask spread and other 
measures of liquidity. Also, the fact that turnover ratio is related to investors’ holding 
                                                 
55
 Consistent with Amihud (2002), Eckbo and Norli (2002), Fujimoto (2003b), and Chen (2005), we 
remove the extreme observations at both ends of the cross-section before calculating aggregate market 
liquidity.  
6 Chapter Three: Liquidity and Assets Pricing 
 149
period indicates that it is related to liquidity, and thus one can use it as a proxy for 
liquidity56.  
 
To construct a market-wide turnover ratio, we start by defining turnover ratio at firm-
specific level. More specifically, the firm-specific turnover ratio, which is the ratio of 
trading value to a firm’s market capitalization for stock i on day d in month t is given 
by: 
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where TValuei,d,t is the trading value for stock i on day d in month t, which is calculated 
as trading volume multiplied by the stock price. MVi,d,t is the market capitalization for 
stock i on day d in month t. Then the monthly turnover ratio for stock i in month t is 
given by: 
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where Di,t is the number of trading days for stock i at month t. Finally, as in the case of 
bid-ask spread, the cross-sectional average of individual stocks’ turnover ratio is 
computed each month to construct a monthly market-wide liquidity series. The market-
wide liquidity series of turnover ratio is computed as follows:   
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where Nj is the number of stocks included in the cross-sectional average in month t.  
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 See section 2.3.1.2.2 in chapter two for more details on turnover ratio measure.  
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3.3.4.3 Price impact 
 
Price impact is defined as the impact of order flows on stock prices. Compared with the 
bid-ask spread, the price impact accurately captures the costs associated with large 
trades. To measure the price impact, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio is used, which is 
the ratio of daily absolute stock returns to the trading value.  Illiquidity ratio is the 
inverse of the Amivest ratio (liquidity ratio) that is used in the market microstructure 
literature, and it follows Kyle’s (1985) concept of illiquidity, which is defined as the 
response of price to the order flow (see Amihud, 2002)57.  
 
Thus, following Amihud (2002), illiquidity ratio is calculated for stock i on day d in 
month t as follows: 
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where Ri,d,t  and TValuei,d,t  are the return and the trading value for stock i on day d at 
month t respectively. The monthly firm-specific price impact is given by:     
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 where Di,t  is the number of observations for stock i in month t. Then, the cross-
sectional average of the monthly individual stock’s price impact is computed each 
month to construct a monthly market-wide liquidity series as follows:    
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where Nj is the number of stocks included in the cross-sectional average in month t.  
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 For further details on price impact (Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio), see section 2.3.1.2.3 in chapter 
two. 
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Table 3.4 provides descriptive statistics for the time-series of the three aggregate market 
liquidity measures for all markets in our sample. As shown in panel A the average 
proportional quoted bid-ask spread in the LSE is around 7.6% on the electronic trading 
system, which is larger than the proportional quoted bid-ask spread on the floor trading 
system, which is nearly 4.4%. Similarly in other markets, the proportional quoted bid-
ask spread in the SSE is 4.2% on the electronic trading system compared with 3.4% on 
the floor trading system, and it is 6.9% on the electronic trading system compared with 
4.0% on the floor trading system in the FSE. The average monthly turnover in the LSE 
(FSE) on the electronic trading system is approximately 2.81 (1.28) compared with 2.47 
(1.06) on the floor trading system. In contrast, turnover ratio on the floor trading system 
in the SSE is higher than that on the electronic trading system, it is 1.77 compared with 
1.61. Finally, the average monthly price impact on electronic trading systems for all 
markets is higher than that on floor trading systems.  
 
Panel B in table 3.4 shows the correlation between market liquidity series. We should 
expect these empirical measures to correlate. For proportional quoted bid-ask spread 
and price impact, high values represent less liquidity and for turnover high values 
represent high liquidity. Thus, we expect a positive correlation between bid-ask spread 
and price impact and a negative correlation of turnover ratio with bid-ask spread and 
price impact. The results in panel B show that the correlation coefficients in the LSE 
and the FSE on floor trading systems confirm all the expected correlations. However, 
the correlation coefficients of the turnover ratio with proportional bid-ask spread and 
with price impact are positive for LSE and for FSE on electronic trading, which are 
unexpected. Finally, the correlation coefficients between liquidity measures for SSE 
confirm all the expectations for floor and electronic trading systems.  
 
3.3.5 Construction of liquidity risk factors 
 
Following the calculation of market-wide liquidity proxies as shown in the previous 
section, we should use shocks or innovations of changes in market-wide liquidity series 
to construct the liquidity risk factors as in Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), and Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005) among others. The importance of using shocks or innovations is 
motivated by the rationale that shocks, unexpected variations, to the macroeconomic 
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variable could be priced (see Chen et al., 1986; Sadka, 2006 and references cited in). 
Further, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) argue that the failure to use liquidity innovations 
can contaminate risk measures, especially if there is a correlation between changes in 
liquidity and time variation in expected stock returns.  
 
We could proceed by identifying and estimating the residuals of the autoregressive 
model as the unexpected innovations in the liquidity factor. However, according to 
Chen et al. (1986), if the change in a given series is not serially correlated, it can be 
used as innovation without alteration. That is, if the changes in the aggregate market 
liquidity series are not serially correlated, then they can be used as the liquidity risk 
factor: otherwise it could be necessary to estimate the innovations in aggregate changes 
in market liquidity as the residuals of a time-series model. Therefore, we estimate the 
autocorrelation in aggregate changes in market liquidity measures. The reported results 
of autocorrelation in panel C table 3.4 show that all market-wide liquidity series in the 
LSE, except the proportional bid-ask spread series on the floor trading system and the 
turnover ratio series on electronic trading system, are persistent. That is, they have 
statistically significant first-order serial correlation at 1%, and 5% level of significance. 
In the SSE only the turnover ratio series and price impact series show persistence during 
the floor trading period. The first-order serial correlation for these series is statistically 
significant at 10% and 1% level of significance respectively. Further, in the FSE, all 
market-wide liquidity series, apart from the proportional bid-ask spread series, are 
persistent. That is, they have statistically significant first-order serial correlation at a 5% 
level of significance or better in most cases. Some market-wide liquidity series in these 
markets show a significant higher order serial correlation (e.g. second-, third-, and 
fourth-order) at 1%, 5% and 10% levels of significance, for example, the turnover ratio 
on the floor trading system, and turnover ratio and price impact on the electronic trading 
system in the FSE. This means that they are highly persistent.  
 
The persistence in some aggregate market liquidity series, as shown above, means that 
we cannot use these series directly as liquidity risk factors compared with non-
persistence market-wide liquidity series, where the changes of these series could be 
used as innovations without alteration. To remove the persistence (i.e. remove the 
information which is tracked by lagged observations) and thus construct a time series of 
innovations, we model the aggregate changes in market liquidity into an autoregressive 
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integrated moving average (ARIMA) model. Before proceeding with ARIMA model 
construction, the aggregate changes in market liquidity series have been tested for 
stationarity by performing the Augmented Dicky-Fuller test. We did not allow for 
intercept or trend and use information criteria (Akaike Information Criterion) to guide 
the selection of the lags. The results of the unit root test in Panel D in table 3.4 for all 
markets show that the unit root hypothesis (non-stationary) has been rejected for all 
series. The probability value (p-value) is either less than 1% or 5%. Then Box-Jenkins 
methods are used to determine the appropriate order of the autoregressive integrated 
moving average (ARIMA) model, which will be estimated to obtain the innovations of 
persistence aggregate market liquidity series.  
 
Table 3.5 shows the order of ARIMA model for each of the persistence aggregate 
market liquidity series. The order of ARIMA model has been chosen based on the 
Bayesian Information Criterion. After estimating the ARIMA models and extracting the 
innovations of the persistence market-wide liquidity series, which represent the liquidity 
risk factor, the estimated innovations have been checked to see if they are serially 
correlated. The estimated autocorrelation results that are reported in table 3.6 panel A 
show that the estimated innovations are not serially correlated. That is, the first-order 
autocorrelation for all innovations in market liquidity is statistically insignificant. Also, 
panel B in table 3.6 shows the correlation coefficient between the innovations in market 
measures. For all markets and for both trading systems the results of correlations 
coefficients confirm the expected correlation between the innovations of market 
liquidity measures. In particular, the correlations between turnover and proportional 
bid-ask spread and price impact are negative, and they are positive between proportional 
bid-ask spread and price impact. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
 
This section presents and discusses the results of examining and comparing the pricing 
of market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity before and after the automation of 
trading systems. The results are discussed first for the estimation of the first-pass time-
series regression (equation (3.12)), which examines the pricing of market-wide 
liquidity. Then, this section reports the results of the second-pass cross-sectional 
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regression (equation (3.14)), which examines the relationship between firm-specific 
liquidity and risk-adjusted returns. Both regressions have been estimated in the two sub-
sample periods before and after automation, and then a comparative analysis has been 
conducted to compare the pricing of market-wide and firm-specific liquidity under 
different contexts of trading systems. In the first-pass time-series regression, we 
employed the Fama-French model augmented by market liquidity risk factor, which is 
measured by proportional bid-ask spread, turnover ratio, and illiquidity ratio (price 
impact). The first-pass regression is estimated using each of the liquidity factors 
separately. In the second-pass cross-sectional regression we use the same measures of 
liquidity but at individual stock level (i.e. firm-specific liquidity)58. 
 
3.4.1 Market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity in the context of a 
conditional model 
3.4.1.1 Market-wide liquidity 
 
Table 3.7 summarizes the results of the first-pass time-series regression (equation 
(3.12)). It only reports the summarized results relating to the coefficients of market-
wide liquidity risk factors59. The mean values of each of the market-wide liquidity 
coefficients in the pre- and post-automation of the trading system are presented. The 
table also gives the difference in the mean of the coefficients before and after 
automation, and the t-statistic of the null hypothesis that the mean value of the 
coefficients is equal before and after the introduction of the electronic trading system. 
Since the liquidity risk factor in the first-pass regression is represented by the 
innovations or the residuals of the proportional bid-ask spread, turnover ratio and price 
impact, higher values of proportional bid-ask spread and price impact and lower values 
of turnover ratio indicate lower liquidity. Thus, the estimated coefficients of 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact are expected to be negative and those of 
turnover ratio to be positive. If market-wide liquidity is a priced risk factor and has a 
significant effect on stock excess returns, the mean value of the coefficients of market 
liquidity risk factor estimated from first-pass regression (equation (3.12)) will be 
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 See appendix 3A, which provides a summary of the testable hypotheses and whether they are 
supported or rejected, along with the reasons based on the empirical results of this section. 
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 Because the table is already voluminous, we do not report coefficients for the other risk factors in the 
first-pass regression.  
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statistically different from zero. That is, we test the hypothesis that the mean value of γi 
is equal to zero using a cross-sectional t-test following Chordia et al. (2000). Panel A 
shows the results of fixed beta (i.e. unconditional version model that has been estimated 
to represent a benchmark for comparison), in panel B beta is scaled by size and the 
book-to-market ratio, in panel C beta is allowed to vary with default spread, and in 
panel D beta is conditioned on size and book-to-market ratio, and also allows this 
conditioning to vary over time with business cycle variables (i.e. default spread)60.  
 
The results in Panel A show that, in all markets and during both sub-periods related to 
before and after automation, all the coefficients on market-wide liquidity risk factors 
have the expected sign, and most of them are statistically significant as indicated by 
their associated t-statistic. More specifically, the mean value of proportional bid-ask 
spread coefficients in all markets under both trading systems is negative as expected, 
and statistically significant on both trading systems in all markets except for Germany. 
The coefficient of turnover ratio is positive in all markets and statistically significant in 
pre- and post-automation in Germany and in pre- (post-) automation in Switzerland 
(UK). Finally, the mean value of the price impact coefficient has the predicted sign and 
it is statistically significant in pre- and post-automation in Switzerland and in pre- (post-
) automation in Germany (UK). These results of all market-wide liquidity measures 
confirm the findings of previous studies such as Amihud (2002) and Fujimoto (2003a). 
They also support the first postulated hypothesis that market liquidity is a priced risk 
factor, that is, market-wide liquidity has a positive effect on stock excess returns. This 
means that any decrease in market-wide liquidity will result in lower current stock 
excess returns, because investors depress the current stock prices when they anticipate 
lower future market liquidity so they can earn higher expected returns.  
 
The results thus far show that market-wide liquidity is an important priced risk factor in 
asset pricing on either one or both trading systems. This, however, leads us to 
investigate how the automation of the trading system could affect the relationship 
between market-wide liquidity and stock excess returns. In general, the t-test results 
represented in the last three columns in table 3.7 panel A, show that the introduction of 
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 The results of first-pass time-series regression in panel C and D are estimated using term spread, short-
term interest rate, and dividends yield as conditional variables rather than default spread. The results 
obtained from this estimation are reported in appendix 3B and they are qualitatively similar to those 
obtained by using default spread.  
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the electronic trading system has impacted on the pricing of aggregate market liquidity. 
This implies that the change in market structure significantly results in changing market 
liquidity risk. More specifically, the t-test statistic shows that the size of the 
proportional bid-ask spread coefficients, in the absolute term, increases and decreases 
significantly after the introduction of the electronic trading system in UK and Germany 
respectively. That is, following automation, as market liquidity decreases in UK 
(Germany) stock excess returns decrease more (less). This suggests that market-wide 
liquidity became more (less) risky after the automation in UK (Germany). This implies 
that the immediacy of the market in filling investors’ orders represents less concern to 
the investors during market liquidity shocks in Germany than in UK. Furthermore, post-
automation, the influence of market-wide liquidity on stock excess-returns increases 
(decreases) in UK (Switzerland). The mean coefficient of turnover ratio increases 
(decreases) to 0.006 (0.004) post-automation. This means that the influence of market 
liquidity on stock excess returns becomes more (less) in UK (Switzerland), which may 
result in lower (higher) excess returns post-automation compared with the pre-
automation period when market liquidity is low. In relation to the price impact, the 
results show that, only in Germany and after the introduction of the electronic trading 
system, the effect of market-wide liquidity risk on excess return decreases in the 
absolute term. The t-test statistic that compares the difference in the mean between the 
two trading systems is statistically significant at 5% level of significance. This implies 
that the market ability to absorb a large trading volume without or with minimum effect 
on stock prices increased during electronic trading, and thus market liquidity became 
less risky. All in all, the results show that the automation of the trading system has 
affected the relationship between market liquidity and stock excess returns, and results 
in market liquidity being more risky in the UK market compared with other markets in 
our sample. Thus, our results reject our third hypothesis that the effect of market-wide 
liquidity on stocks’ excess returns before and after the automation of trading systems is 
not different.  
 
In relation to the results in panel B, when beta is allowed to vary with firm 
characteristics (i.e. size and BM), they show that there is weak evidence of the effect of 
market liquidity on excess stock returns. Only the mean value of turnover ratio’s 
coefficients in pre-automation UK and post-automation Germany, and the mean value 
of price impact’s coefficient post-automation Switzerland are statistically significant, as 
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indicated by their associated t-statistics. This provides very weak support to the first 
hypothesis that market-wide liquidity is a priced risk factor. In addition, the results 
reveal weak evidence that the introduction of the electronic trading system has affected 
the market liquidity-return relationship. In contrast to the UK, in post-automation 
Germany, the influence of market liquidity on excess stock returns increased as shown 
only by the increase in the mean value of the turnover ratio coefficients. Despite the 
weak evidence, it does not support the third hypothesis that the introduction of the 
electronic trading system does not affect the relationship between market liquidity and 
stock excess returns.  
 
In sharp contrast, the results in panel C show that, when beta is allowed to vary with 
business cycle variables (i.e. default spread), there is strong evidence of a significant 
relationship between market liquidity and excess stock return. More specifically, there 
is clear evidence for pricing market-wide liquidity, with the mean value of proportional 
bid-ask spread being negatively and statistically significant at 1% and at 10% level of 
significance in pre- and post-automation UK and for the floor trading system in 
Germany respectively. This also is supported with the mean value of turnover ratio 
being positively significant at 1% level of significance in post-automation UK and 
Switzerland and for both trading systems in Germany, and with price impact being 
negatively and statistically significant at 10% and 1% level of significance in post-
automation UK and Switzerland respectively. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Amihud (2002) and Fujimoto (2003a) and provide further support to the first 
postulated hypothesis that market liquidity is priced in asset returns. In addition, these 
results indicate once again that investors will react to negative liquidity shocks by 
depressing current stock prices in order to earn a higher expected return in future. These 
findings also imply that investors pay more attention to business cycle variables to 
predict market liquidity and to assess their liquidation needs, because market liquidity 
will be low and the probability of liquidation is expected to be higher when economic 
conditions deteriorate.  
 
Furthermore, t-test results reported in panel C show that the introduction of the 
electronic trading system appears to have affected the relationship between market 
liquidity and excess stock returns. This implies that structural changes in markets’ 
trading systems may significantly alter the liquidity of the markets and its risk. More 
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specifically, the automation of the trading system seems to have significantly influenced 
the impact of market turnover ratio and price impact on excess stock returns. Prior to 
automation neither of these measures were significant for either UK or Switzerland, but 
they became significant after automation. Even though the mean value of turnover ratio 
coefficients in Germany is significant for both trading systems, its size increases after 
automation. This may indicate that after the automation of the trading system, market 
liquidity becomes more important as a risk factor, and investors become more 
concerned with the level of market trading activities and its ability to absorb large 
trading quantities. Thus, our results do not support the third proposition regarding the 
impact of the automation of the trading system on the relationship between market 
liquidity and stock excess returns. 
 
Finally, when beta is allowed to vary with firm characteristics (i.e. size and BM) and 
with business cycle variables (i.e. default spread), the results in panel D do not provide 
evidence that market liquidity is a priced risk factor. Specifically, none of the 
coefficients of market liquidity measures are statistically significant either before or 
after the automation of the trading system. Also, the results show that the introduction 
of the electronic trading system has no significant impact on the liquidity-return 
relationship. Thus, the results under this specification of asset pricing model do not 
support the first hypothesis, but they provide support to the third hypothesis, that the 
pricing of market-wide liquidity is not different before and after automation.  
 
Thus far the findings of the first-pass regression reveal that market-wide liquidity is a 
priced risk factor and that it is an important state factor in an asset pricing model on 
either one or both trading systems. These results are robust using different market-wide 
liquidity measures and using the unconditional and conditional version (i.e. when beta is 
allowed to vary with business cycle variables) of an asset pricing model. 
 
3.4.1.2  Firm-specific liquidity 
 
To find out whether liquidity as a firm-specific characteristic carries an additional 
premium, we examine the results of the second-pass cross-sectional regression 
(equation (3.14)). If the risk factors in the first-pass time-series regression are 
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insufficient in explaining the variation in excess stock returns, the explanatory power of 
firm-specific liquidity should be significant. This implies that liquidity as a firm 
characteristic is related to the cross-section of individual risk-adjusted returns and it 
does carry an additional premium.   
 
The coefficients of the second-pass cross-sectional regression model (equation. (3.14)) 
estimated in pre- and post-automation periods along with the Wald test results are 
reported in table 3.8. Panel A shows the results of fixed beta (i.e. unconditional 
version); in panel B, beta is scaled by size and the book-to-market ratio; in panel C, 
betas are allowed to vary with default spread; and in panel D beta is conditioned on size 
and the book-to-market ratio and also this conditioning is allowed to vary over time 
with business cycle variables (i.e. default spread)61. Although we applied different 
specifications of beta modelling, the results under different specifications are 
qualitatively similar with very few differences in terms of significance. To put it another 
way, the different specifications of beta modelling to examine whether liquidity as a 
firm characteristic carries an additional premium make relatively little difference in the 
results. Therefore, we focus our discussion of the empirical results of the second-pass 
cross-sectional regression on those reported in panels A (unconditional model) and B 
(where beta are allowed to vary with size and book-to-market ratio). We also highlight 
the differences in the results that are reported in panels C and D compared with those 
reported in panel A, which represents the benchmark case.  
 
In both models (panels A and B), the results show that the coefficient on proportional 
bid-ask spread is significantly negative at 1% level of significance for both sub-sample 
periods related to pre- and post-automation in UK, but that this coefficient is 
statistically insignificant for other markets. Hence, under both unconditional and 
conditional asset pricing models, firm-specific liquidity on both trading systems in the 
UK carries an additional premium. However, the significantly negative relationship 
between proportional bid-ask spread and risk-adjusted return in UK is unexpected. This 
contradicts the argument that stocks with higher transactions costs (i.e. higher bid-ask 
spread) should earn a higher expected return. Instead it implies that investors will 
                                                 
61
 The results of second-pass cross-sectional regression reported in panel C and D are estimated using 
term spread, short-term interest rate, and dividends yield as condition variables in first-pass time-series 
regression rather than default spread. The results obtained from this estimation are reported in Appendix 
3C and they are qualitatively similar to these obtained by using default spread.  
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receive a premium for carrying stocks with low bid-ask spread. Therefore, the sign of 
bid-ask spread is inconsistent with its role as a measure of transaction costs. This could 
be due to the fact that bid-ask spread is a noisy measure of liquidity or it is proxying for 
risk variables relating to price or firm size that are not captured by the Fama-French 
model (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996). Further, this evidence is inconsistent with 
the positive spread-return relationship found by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and 
with negative relations between return and liquidity as found by Brennan et al. (1998), 
Datar et al. (1998), Chordia et al. (2001b) among others. But, it is consistent with the 
findings reported by Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) and Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996) using US data. The significant negative relation between 
proportional bid-ask spread and risk-adjusted returns in UK provides partial support to 
the second hypothesis in terms of the significant relationship between bid-ask spread 
and expected returns, but not in terms of coefficient sign, which is expected to be 
positive.  
 
In contrast, the insignificance of liquidity premium (i.e. coefficient of proportional 
quoted spread) for both Switzerland and Germany indicates that the risk factors in first-
pass regression capture the influence of firm-specific liquidity. This implies that 
investors only receive a premium on bearing market liquidity risk in Switzerland and 
Germany. Insignificant results in both Switzerland and Germany are inconsistent with 
the results of the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) who find positive spread-return 
relationships. Thus, the prediction of the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model does not 
hold in these markets. This could be, as Eleswarapu (1997) argues, due to the fact that 
quoted spreads are not a better proxy for the cost of transacting in these markets. These 
results are inconsistent with our prediction and thus do not provide support to the 
second hypothesis that firm-specific liquidity has an additional premium.  
 
With regard to turnover ratio, the results in panels A and B show that the impact of 
turnover ratio on risk-adjusted return in UK is captured by risk factors in the asset 
pricing model in the first-pass regression, and thus, liquidity carries no additional 
premium. In contrast, the coefficient of turnover ratio is significantly negative at a 5% 
level of significance or better in most cases in Switzerland and Germany on either both 
or one trading system. This implies that besides the premium that is required to 
compensate investors on market liquidity risk in Switzerland and Germany, investors 
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ask for an additional premium for holding less liquid stocks.  These results are 
consistent with the argument that asset returns must be a decreasing function of turnover 
ratio, and consistent with the results of Datar et al. (1998) using risk-unadjusted returns, 
and with the results of Brennan et al. (1998), Chordia et al. (2001b) and Avramov and 
Chordia (2006a) using an asset pricing model to adjust return for risk. Thus, the 
significant results of turnover ratio in the Swiss and German markets provide further 
support to the second postulated hypothesis.  
 
The insignificant impact of turnover ratio on risk-adjusted return in the UK does not 
support the second hypothesis, and implies that there is no additional premium on firm-
specific liquidity. In contrast to Avramov and Chordia (2006a), the risk factors in our 
first-pass time-series regression were able to capture the impact of turnover ratio. That 
is, the coefficient remains insignificant in all models (unconditional and conditional 
ones) in pre- and post-automation periods, except in the case when beta is allowed to 
vary with firm characteristics and with default spread during the electronic trading 
period (panel D). In comparison, Avramov and Chordia (2006a) were unable to capture 
the impact of turnover ratio on risk-adjusted returns even by using different versions of 
a conditional asset pricing model. They argue that the failure of their models in 
capturing the impact of liquidity could be “… that liquidity is more than of trading 
phenomenon, unrelated to the state of economy. Liquidity is likely to be a function of 
market design, competition amongst liquidity suppliers, and the degree of information 
asymmetry or the lack thereof” (Avramov and Chordia, 2006a, p1036). Thus, the 
inconsistency in our findings with that of Avramov and Chordia (2006a) as well as the 
difference in our results among the markets in our sample may be explained by the 
differences in market structure between UK and US markets and between UK and 
Switzerland and Germany in our sample.  
 
Finally, when firm-specific liquidity is measured by price impact (i.e. illiquidity ratio), 
the results of cross-sectional regression show that liquidity as a firm-characteristic has 
an additional premium either on a floor or electronic trading system for each of the 
markets in our sample. More specifically, under the unconditional model, the coefficient 
of price impact is negative but weakly significant (at a 10% level of significance) for the 
electronic trading system in the UK market. This result is inconsistent with the findings 
of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) who find that both variable and fixed 
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components of price impact are significantly positively related to excess returns. The 
significant negative coefficient of price impact provides partial support to the second 
hypothesis. That is, the significant relation between price impact and risk adjusted 
returns implies that firm-specific liquidity has an additional premium after controlling 
for all risk factors, but the negative sign is against expectation. This once again means 
that investors pay a premium for holding stock with a higher price impact (i.e. less 
liquidity stocks).  
 
In contrast, under both models, the estimated coefficients of price impact are positively 
significant at 5% and 10% in Switzerland (Germany) in the pre- (post-) automation 
period, which provides further support to the second postulated hypothesis. These 
results are consistent with the argument that less liquid stocks with higher price impact 
pay higher returns. This is consistent with the findings of Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1996) and other previous studies in terms of a negative liquidity-return relationship. 
This implies that the possibility that stocks’ prices will be affected by large quantity of 
trading represents a concern, and hence an additional source of risk for investors who 
trade on the electronic (floor) trading system in Germany (Switzerland). To summarize, 
the significant negative (positive) relationship between risk adjusted returns and 
turnover ratio (price impact) in the Swiss and German markets, provides evidence that 
supports the second postulated hypothesis: liquidity as a firm characteristic has an 
additional premium after controlling for all risk factors including market-wide liquidity 
risk factor for floor and electronic trading systems. 
 
The results thus far reveal that firm-specific liquidity carries an additional premium and 
plays an important role in asset pricing on either one or both trading systems. This 
highlights the importance of examining how the introduction of electronic trading 
system could affect this additional premium on liquidity. The results of the Wald test 
that compare the estimated coefficients between pre- and post-automation periods are 
reported in table 3.8. Whenever the coefficients of firm-specific liquidity, while having 
the same sign, are significant both pre- and post-automation, the coefficients have an 
impact on risk adjusted return that is significantly different in two sub-periods, as 
indicated by the significant Wald test statistic. The evidence for whether the 
introduction of an automated trading system has impacted on the premium of liquidity is 
mixed among liquidity measures. However, in general, the results for the pre- and post-
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automation periods show that the introduction of electronic trading appears to affect the 
additional premium required by investors on firm-specific liquidity. This implies that 
the introduction of the electronic trading system may significantly change the level of 
firm liquidity and thus affect its pricing in assets returns.  
 
More specifically, although the coefficient of proportional bid-ask spread is significant 
and negative during both sub-sample periods for the UK under both models, only under 
the unconditional model does the Wald test statistic show that the size of the coefficient 
decreases significantly post-automation. This indicates a decrease in the effect of 
liquidity on risk-adjusted returns. These results do not support the fourth hypothesis that 
the premium on firm-specific liquidity will not be different before and after automation. 
In contrast, the Wald test results for turnover ratio support our prediction. That is, the 
automation of the trading system does not seem to have influenced the impact of 
turnover ratio on risk-adjusted returns. Even though the coefficients of turnover ratio in 
both models (in unconditional model) under both trading systems in Switzerland 
(Germany) are negatively significant, their impact on risk-adjusted return is 
insignificantly different as indicated by the insignificant Wald test statistic. This 
indicates that after the introduction of the electronic trading system, the level of stock 
trading activity does not change, which results in the same level of liquidity as before 
automation.  Thus, firm-specific liquidity as proxied by turnover ratio is the same, and 
carries equal premiums under both trading systems. In relation to the price impact, the 
results show that its effect on risk-adjusted return is different across trading systems, 
which is against the fourth postulated hypothesis that the premium in firm-specific 
liquidity is not different across trading systems. That is, the coefficient of price impact 
becomes significant post-automation under the unconditional model (both models) for 
UK (Germany), but it becomes insignificant after the automation of the trading system 
in both models for Switzerland. The influence of price impact on risk-adjusted return is 
greater in the post- (pre-) automation period in UK and Germany (Switzerland).  
 
Panels C and D in table 3.8 report respectively the Fama-MacBeth coefficients 
estimated when beta is allowed to vary with default spread and when the relationship of 
betas with size and book-to-market is allowed to vary over the business cycle with 
default spread. Overall the results presented in these panels are qualitatively similar to 
those reported previously in panels A and B, with some difference in terms of 
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significance. More specifically, the results in panel C, when risk factors in first-pass 
regression are scaled by default spread, show that the coefficient of price impact in UK 
and Germany and the coefficient of turnover in Switzerland on an electronic trading 
system are no longer significant. This provides weak support to the second hypothesis 
that liquidity as a firm-characteristic carries an additional premium. This also suggests 
that under this conditional specification the known risk factors including market-
liquidity risk in the first-pass regression were able to capture the influence of some 
measures of firm-specific liquidity. Additionally, in panel D, when the relationship 
between betas and size as well as book-to-market is allowed to vary over the business 
cycle with default spread, the results show that the coefficient of turnover ratio during 
the electronic trading period becomes negative and weakly significant at a 10% level of 
significance in UK. Also, the effect of price impact on risk-adjusted returns becomes 
insignificant (significant) in UK and Germany (Switzerland). The significance of firm-
specific liquidity coefficients under this specification are consistent with the notion that 
all risk factors in first-pass time-series regression do not explain the variation in stock 
excess returns. This provides further support to the second hypothesis: firm-specific 
liquidity is negatively and significantly related to risk adjusted returns which thus have 
an additional premium after controlling for all risk factors.     
 
Finally, the results in panels C and D show that there is a difference in liquidity 
premium before and after automation. For example, in panel C, the Wald test statistic 
reveals that the coefficient of proportional bid-ask spread in the UK is statistically 
different in the two sub-samples periods, and the coefficient of turnover ratio and price 
impact in Switzerland become insignificant in the post-automation period.  Also, in 
panel D, the coefficient of turnover ratio in the UK and the coefficient of price impact in 
Switzerland become significant in the post-automation period. These results reject the 
fourth hypothesis, which states that the liquidity premium is not different between 
trading systems.    
 
To summarise, we find a significant relationship between risk-adjusted return and 
different measures of liquidity in cross-sectional regression, on either one or both 
trading systems using different specifications of conditional asset pricing models. 
Panels A, B and D show strong evidence compared to panel C. In spite of this, the 
findings are consistent with the notion of a liquidity premium in asset prices. In other 
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words, liquidity as a firm-specific characteristic has an additional premium after 
controlling for all risk factors including market liquidity risk. In addition, we find that 
the liquidity premium is different between the two trading systems, which implies that 
the introduction of the electronic trading system has influenced the impact of firm-
specific liquidity on risk-adjusted returns.  
 
Having examined the cross-sectional relationship between risk-adjusted return and 
liquidity after controlling for size, book-to-market ratio and momentum variables, it is 
worthwhile to highlight the role of these variables in the second-pass regression. The 
results in all panels show that the coefficients of size are positive but insignificant in 
most cases. This might be as a result of the presence of liquidity variables in the cross-
sectional regression and with firm size serving as proxy for liquidity (see Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986). This is consistent with the results of previous studies such as 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan et al. (1998), Chordia et al. (2001b) and 
Avramov and Chordia (2006a). With regard to the book-to-market ratio, our results 
show that value effect is prominent in all regressions for all markets under both floor 
and electronic trading systems. The coefficients of book-to-market ratio are positive and 
statistically significant at 1% and 5% level of significance. Our results are consistent 
with those of Brennan et al. (1998), Datar et al. (1998), Chordia et al. (2001b) and 
Avramov and Chordia (2006a) using US data. Finally, the coefficients of past returns 
(momentum variables) are positive and statistically significant at all different levels of 
significance in most cases for all markets. These findings are consistent with those of 
Brennan et al. (1998), Chordia et al. (2001b) and Avramov and Chordia (2006a).  
 
3.4.2 Market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity in the context of 
conditional model and time-varying alpha 
 
By using conditional models with time-varying risk premiums, the findings provide 
evidence that is consistent with a liquidity premium in asset prices, that is, it has been 
shown that market liquidity is priced and firm-specific liquidity has an additional 
premium. However, does a conditional model with time-varying risk premium and with 
time-varying asset pricing misspecification (time-varying alpha) lead to the same 
conclusion? That is, does the accounting for time-varying alpha affect the relationship 
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between market liquidity and excess stock returns? Does that also show that liquidity 
premiums vary with the business cycle?  To find out whether previous results hold, this 
section presents the results of estimating the conditional asset pricing model with time-
varying alpha. That is, the first-pass time-series regression (equation (3.12)) has been 
modified to account for time-varying alpha. Then we estimate the first-pass regression 
and the second-pass cross-sectional regression (equation (3.14)) where beta is allowed 
to vary with firm characteristics (i.e. size and book-to-market ratio) and with business 
cycle variables (i.e. default spread). This section presents first the results of estimation 
first-pass time-series regression that examine the pricing of market-wide liquidity. 
Following that it reports the results of second-pass regression that examine the 
relationship between firm-specific liquidity and risk-adjusted returns.  
 
3.4.2.1 Market-wide liquidity 
 
Table 3.9 presents a summary of the results of the first-pass time-series regression 
(equation (3.12)). It reports the summary results relating to the coefficients of market-
wide liquidity risk factors62. The mean values of each market-wide liquidity coefficients 
estimated by the first-pass regression (equation (3.12)) in the pre- and post-automation 
of trading systems are reported. The table also gives the difference in the mean of the 
coefficients before and after the automation of trading systems, and the t-statistic of the 
null hypothesis that the mean value of the coefficients is equal before and after 
automation. The structure of this table follows that of table 3.763. The results reported in 
this table are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those reported in table 3.7 with 
very few differences in terms of the significance and the sing of the mean value of 
individual market liquidity coefficients.  
 
Overall, the results support our previous evidence that market-wide liquidity has a 
significant effect on excess stock returns during the two sub-sample periods, and that 
the introduction of the electronic trading system has impacted on this relationship. More 
                                                 
62
 Because the table is already voluminous, we do not report coefficients for the other risk factors in the 
first-pass regression.  
63
 The results of first-pass time-series regression in panels C and D are estimated using term spread, short-
term interest rate, and dividends yield as conditional variables rather than default spread as a condition 
variables. The results obtained from this estimation are reported in appendix 3D and they are qualitatively 
similar to those obtained by using default spread.  
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specifically, the results in panel A show in most cases the coefficients of market-wide 
liquidity are significant and have the expected sign, which provides clear evidence that 
market-wide liquidity is a priced risk factor. This is supported with the mean value of 
individual coefficients of proportional bid-ask spread being negatively significant for 
UK and Switzerland during pre- and post-automation, and for Germany on its floor 
trading system. Also, it is supported with the mean value of turnover ratio’s coefficients 
being positively significant on the electronic (floor) trading system for the UK (Swiss) 
market and under both trading systems for the German market, and with the mean value 
of price impact’s coefficient being negatively significant in post- (pre-) automation UK 
(Germany) and in the two sub-periods for Switzerland. This indicates that market-wide 
liquidity has a positively significant impact on current excess stock return, and thus 
supports the first hypothesis that market-wide liquidity is a priced risk factor. Further, 
there is clear evidence that the introduction of an electronic trading system has 
influenced the relationship between market-wide liquidity and excess stock return. Most 
of the t-statistics which compare the mean value of the coefficients of market liquidity 
risk between floor and electronic trading systems, are statistically significant at 1% and 
10% level of significance, which rejects the third hypothesis.  
 
Furthermore, the results in panel B table 3.9 are consistent with those reported in panel 
B table 3.7. That is, when beta is allowed to vary with firm characteristics, the evidence 
that market liquidity is significantly affecting excess stock returns is very weak. Also, 
the results show that the introduction of an electronic trading system does not influence 
this relationship. These results do not strongly support the first hypothesis that market-
wide liquidity is a priced risk factor, but do support the third hypothesis that the 
automation of the trading system does not have a significant impact on the pricing of 
market liquidity. In contrast, the results in panel C, when beta is allowed to vary with 
business cycle variables such as default spread, provide strong support to the first 
hypothesis and reject the third hypothesis. The results provide robust evidence that 
market-wide liquidity is a priced risk factor and that the automation of the trading 
system has an influence on the relationship between market-wide liquidity and stock 
excess returns. This may imply that conditioning beta on business cycle variables has an 
influence on the relationship between market liquidity and stock returns. This means 
that market liquidity is related to macroeconomic status and investors pay attention to 
macroeconomic predictive variables in predicting market liquidity to assess their future 
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liquidation needs especially when the economy in recession. Finally, when beta is 
allowed to vary with both firm characteristics and business cycle variables, there is no 
evidence that market liquidity is a priced risk factor and there is no evidence that the 
impact of market liquidity on excess stock returns is different before and after the 
automation of the trading system. The majority of the mean values of individual market 
liquidity coefficients, and the t-statistics that compare the means between the two 
trading systems, are statistically insignificant as indicated by their associated t-value. 
These results do not support the first, however, they accept the third testable hypothesis.  
 
To summarize, the results of employing both unconditional and conditional models with 
time-varying alpha provide robust evidence that market-wide liquidity is a priced risk 
factor, especially when beta is fixed and when it is allowed to vary with business cycle 
variables.  Further, under these specifications, the results show that the pricing of 
market-wide liquidity on a floor trading system is different from that on an electronic 
trading system.  
 
3.4.2.2   Firm-specific liquidity 
 
The coefficients of the two-pass cross-sectional regression model (equation (3.14)) are 
reported in table 3.10. The structure of this table follows that of table 3.864. Overall, the 
results reported in table 3.10 provide evidence that liquidity as a firm characteristic 
carries an additional premium on both floor and electronic trading systems, after 
adjusting excess stock returns to the known risk factors including market liquidity risk. 
They also show that the introduction of the electronic trading system has an impact on 
the influence of firm-specific liquidity on risk-adjusted returns, that is, the liquidity 
premium is different between the two trading systems.  
 
More specifically, the results in panel A show that even though that there is weak 
evidence of liquidity premiums in the UK the evidence provided from other markets 
strongly indicates that there is a premium on individual firm liquidity. That is, when 
                                                 
64
 The results of second-pass cross-sectional regression reported in panels C and D are estimated using 
term spread, short-term interest rate, and dividends yield as condition variables in first-pass time- series 
regression rather than default spread.  The results obtained from this estimation are reported in Appendix 
3E and they are qualitatively similar to these obtained by using default spread.  
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alpha varies with business cycle variables, most of the liquidity coefficients in the UK 
are statistically insignificant. This may imply that capturing the impact of liquidity on 
the cross-section of expected returns unrelated to the business cycle in the UK may 
suggest an existence of business cycle pattern within liquidity. That is, liquidity is 
related to the state of the economy. This evidence is inconsistent with the findings of 
Avramov and Chordia (2006a) using US data. In contrast, liquidity variables’ 
coefficients (i.e. proportional bid-ask spread, turnover ratio and price impact) in 
Switzerland and Germany under both trading systems are statistically significant at least 
at the 5% level of significance and have the predicted sign. That is, the coefficients of 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact (turnover ratio) in both Switzerland and 
Germany are significantly positive (negative). This means that less liquid stocks with 
higher bid-ask spread, higher price impact and low turnover pay higher returns. This 
provides strong support for the second hypothesis that firm-specific liquidity has an 
additional premium, even though the results for UK provide weak support.  Our results 
are consistent with those of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Datar et al. (1998), 
Brennan et al. (1998), Chordia et al. (2001b) among others.  
 
Furthermore, the results of the Wald test statistic in panel A reject the fourth hypothesis, 
and indicate that there is a difference in liquidity premium between pre- and post-
automation periods. More specifically, the statistically significant Wald test statistics at 
1% level of significance indicate that the coefficients of firm-specific liquidity have a 
significant different impact on risk-adjusted return in the two sub-sample periods for 
Switzerland and Germany.  The estimated coefficients of liquidity variables are higher 
in absolute terms pre-automation, compared with those post-automation in Switzerland; 
but in Germany the opposite is true. This implies that the investors become less 
concerned about the liquidity level of individual firms after (before) the introduction of 
an electronic trading system in Switzerland (Germany), and thus ask for less (more) 
liquidity premiums.  
 
Moreover, panel B in table 3.10 shows the Fama-MacBeth coefficient estimates with 
time-varying alpha and when the beta is allowed to vary with firm characteristics (i.e. 
size and book-to-market ratio). The results are qualitatively similar to those in panel A 
especially for Switzerland and Germany. With regard to the UK, the results in panel B 
compared with those in panel A show strong evidence of a liquidity premium. Most of 
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the liquidity coefficients in the UK are statistically significant at the 10% level of 
significance or better either under one or both trading systems. The significance of the 
coefficients of firm-specific liquidity in this specification implies that risk factors in the 
first-pass are unable to explain the variation in stock-excess returns. This provides 
strong support to the second proposition that liquidity as firm characteristics has an 
additional premium after controlling for the known risk factors. Further, for most cases 
in all markets, the Wald statistic is statistically significant at 5% level of significance or 
better. This implies that the additional premium that the investors required for holding 
less liquid stock is different before and after the automation of the trading system. This 
also rejects the fourth postulated hypothesis that firm-specific liquidity does not have a 
different premium between the two trading systems.  
 
Additionally, the results reported in panel C are qualitatively similar to those reported in 
panel A and those in panel D are qualitatively similar to those reported in panel B with 
very few differences in terms of coefficients’ significance. But, in the case of the UK 
market compared with other markets, the results in panels A and C, in contrast with 
those in panels B and D, show that the impact of liquidity on a cross-section of expected 
returns unrelated to the business cycle in UK became insignificant in most cases. This 
may suggest that the known risk factors in the first-pass regression, in the case of the 
results in panels A and C, were able to capture the impact of liquidity as a firm 
characteristic and thus no additional premium was being paid for carrying illiquid 
stocks.  
 
With regard to the controlling variables in the second-pass cross-sectional regression, 
the results in table 3.10 in all panels show that, in the UK and Switzerland, the 
coefficient of firm size is negative and statistically significant. This is consistent with 
the findings of Avramov and Chordia (2006a). In contrast, the firm size in Germany has 
a positive impact on expected cross-sectional returns and it is significant in most cases. 
This is consistent with the findings of Brennan et al. (1998) and Chordia et al. (2001b) 
who find positive significant size effect. Furthermore, the results show that the value 
affect is strongly present in the data. In all panels of the table 3.10, the coefficient of 
book-to-market ratio is positive and significant in most cases in UK and Germany, 
which is inconsistent with the results of Avramov and Chordia (2006a). However, the 
results in the case of Switzerland show that the impact of book-to-market ratio on 
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expected returns is negative in most cases especially in panels A to C and positive in 
others. The change in sign of book-to-market ratio from positive to negative, compared 
with the results reported in table 3.8, could be due to the change of the dependent 
variable in cross-sectional regression, which is the asset mispricing purged of the 
business cycle variation in the case of time varying alpha (see Avramov and Chordia, 
2006a). Furthermore, even though the examination of the impact of momentum 
variables on expected stock returns lies outside the framework of this research, our 
results show interesting evidence. In the presence of time-varying alpha, compared with 
the results in table 3.8, the coefficients of past returns RET2-3, RET4-6 and RET7-12 
are positive and insignificant in most cases. This evidence is consistent with that of 
Avramov and Chordia (2006a) using US data and supports their argument that the 
momentum is not explained by using a rational asset pricing model, or it may not 
represent a compensation for risk: but this may suggest that the profit of momentum 
strategies could vary with the business cycle.  
 
In summary, under different specifications of conditional asset pricing models with time 
varying alpha, the results provide evidence that firm-specific liquidity has a significant 
effect on risk adjusted return, and, hence it has an additional premium before and after 
the automation of the trading systems in both Switzerland and Germany. In relation to 
the UK, even though there is evidence regarding the premium of firm-specific liquidity, 
especially when beta is allowed to vary with firm characteristics and with firm 
characteristics and business cycle variables, the evidence is very weak. Further, the 
results also show that the automation of the trading system has impacted upon liquidity 
premium, that is, the liquidity premium is significantly different between the two sub-
sample periods relating to pre- and post-automation of a trading system. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
Despite the vast literature on liquidity and asset pricing, it has generally restricted itself 
to examining whether firm-specific liquidity or market-wide liquidity is priced in assets 
returns. Literature that undertakes empirical analysis which examines and compares the 
pricing of market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity in different contexts of 
trading systems (i.e. before and after the automation of trading systems) is virtually 
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nonexistent. Therefore, this chapter extends the literature and examines whether and to 
what extent market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity are priced in asset pricing 
before and after the automation of a trading system within the context of a conditional 
asset pricing model. In addressing this issue for the three major European markets 
namely, the UK, Switzerland and Germany, it is possible to gain valuable insights about 
the pricing of both market and firm-specific liquidity that might be impossible to obtain 
by looking at other markets. We used daily and monthly data for all stocks traded in 
these markets. The sample period for the UK extended over twenty years (ten years pre-
, ten years post-automation); for twelve years and eight months for Switzerland (six 
years four months pre-, the same post-automation); and within Germany, ten years for 
each trading system. In contrast to other studies that examine liquidity in asset pricing, 
we apply the conditional model of Avramov and Chordia (2006a) to the underlying 
markets in our sample, where factor loadings in this model are allowed to vary with 
firm characteristics (i.e. size and book-to-market ratio) and with business cycle 
variables.  
 
For the definition of a particular liquidity factor, following Chen et al. (1986), we used 
the innovations from a time-series model for the factor to represent the market-wide 
liquidity risk. Market-wide liquidity measures are constructed as the cross-section 
average of firm-specific liquidity measures, which are presented by using proportional 
bid-ask spread, turnover ratio and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio (i.e. price impact). 
For each liquidity factor augmented in Fama-French’s three factor model under the 
conditional framework of Avramov and Chordia (2006a), we apply the Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) procedure to estimate the time-series average of the second-pass cross-
sectional regressions’ coefficients. To address the research issue relating to the pricing 
of market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity under different trading systems, the 
first-pass and the second-pass regressions in the framework of Avramov and Chordia 
(2006a) are estimated for the two sub-sample periods relating to before- and after-the 
automation of trading system.  
 
The results provide evidence that market-wide liquidity is priced under both trading 
systems. More specifically, the results show that there is significant negative impact of 
market-illiquidity on stock excess return on either one or both trading systems. The 
evidence appears to be strong when beta is fixed and when it is allowed to vary with 
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default spread. However, while the evidence that market liquidity is priced is weak 
when beta varies with firm characteristics, there is no significant evidence on pricing 
market liquidity when beta varies with both firm characteristics and default spread. The 
same results are obtained in the case of the asset pricing model with time-varying alpha. 
This appears to suggest that investors become more concerned about market liquidity 
when the economy is sour, and they pay much attention to macroeconomic predictive 
variables to predict market liquidity and assess their future liquidation needs, especially 
when market liquidity plunges during bad economic conditions. In addition, there is 
clear evidence that the introduction of electronic trading has impacted the relationship 
between market-wide liquidity and stock excess return. That is, the impact of market-
wide liquidity is different pre- and post-automation. Within the post-automation period, 
market liquidity exhibits a strong impact on excess return for UK in most cases 
compared with Switzerland and Germany, where market liquidity has a strong impact 
on excess return pre-automation. This implies that market-wide liquidity presents a 
greater source of risk to investors after the automation of the trading system in the UK 
compared with Switzerland and Germany. 
 
Examination of any possible additional premium on firm-specific liquidity after 
controlling for the known risk factors including market liquidity risk, suggests the 
existence of such a premium. More specifically, the results show that in most cases and 
under different specifications of the pricing model, firm-specific liquidity has a 
significant impact on risk-adjusted returns before and after the automation of the trading 
system. This implies that risk factors in the first-pass regression were unable to explain 
the variation in stock excess return, thus firm-characteristics including liquidity have 
significant explanatory power.  This appears to be dominated most of the time for 
Switzerland and Germany in the case of asset pricing model with time-vary alpha. 
Furthermore, the results also show that the automation of the trading system has an 
influence the premium on firm-specific liquidity. That is, the effect of liquidity as a firm 
characteristic on risk-adjusted returns seems to be different before and after the 
automation of the trading system. This implies that moves towards electronic trading 
results in changes in the level of liquidity for individual stocks, which then results in a 
difference in the premium on firm-specific liquidity before and after the automation of 
the trading system.  
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Overall, the findings provide useful insights and reveal that market liquidity is a priced 
risk factor in both trading systems and, in some cases, either before or after automation. 
In addition, the results show that after controlling for known risk factors include market 
liquidity risk, firm-specific liquidity has an additional premium either on both trading 
systems, before or after the automation of the trading system. This means that both 
market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity are priced and important in asset 
pricing. This result supports the evidence provided by previous studies based on US 
market data. Furthermore, the pricing of liquidity has been affected by the introduction 
of electronic trading. Both the pricing of market liquidity and the additional premium on 
firm-specific liquidity are different between floor and electronic trading.  
 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature by: first, examining the role of 
liquidity (be it market-wide or firm specific) in asset pricing under different contexts of 
market structures (i.e. floor versus electronic trading systems). That is, it investigates 
whether and to what extent liquidity is priced before and after the automation of trading 
systems, an issue that has not been explored yet. Thus, it provides a further and stronger 
link between the area of market microstructure and the asset pricing area. Second, it 
extends the existing literature on liquidity and asset pricing by examining whether 
market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity are priced using the conditional asset 
pricing model of Avramov and Chordia (2006a).  Finally, it provides out-of-sample 
evidence by exploring whether liquidity is priced in markets other than the US such as 
the UK, Switzerland and Germany. 
 
The finding that liquidity is important in asset pricing suggests that liquidity risk is a 
promising direction for future research: for example, to explore the importance of 
market liquidity in asset pricing in markets other than equity markets, such as fixed 
income markets for which there is a dearth of evidence.  
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Table 3.1 
Dates of introduction of the electronic trading system and sample period before and after automation 
This table shows the stock exchanges that comprise our sample, the date of the introduction of the electronic trading system, 
the source of information about the date of the automation for each stock exchange and the sample period breakdown for each 
exchange (before and after the automation of the trading system).  
The 
Exchange 
Date of 
Automation 
Source of information Sample period 
Before 
Automation 
After 
Automation 
London 27-Oct.-1997 http://www.londonstockexchange.com  Oct. 1987 to 
Sept. 1997 
Nov. 1997 to 
Oct. 2007 
Swiss 2-Aug. -1996 http://www.swx.com/swx/review_en.html  April 1990 to  
July 1996 
Aug. 1996 to 
Nov. 2002 
Frankfurt  28-Nov. - 1997 info@deutsche-boerse.com  Jan. 1998 to Dec. 2007 for both 
trading systems 
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Table 3.2 
Summary statistics 
This table presents the time-series average of cross-sectional means, medians, 
and standard deviations during the period, floor trading and electronic trading 
systems for UK, Switzerland and Germany. Prop. Bid-ask is the proportional 
bid-ask spread calculated by dividing the quoted bid-ask spread over the 
midpoint of quoted bid-ask spread. Turnover is the trading value divided by 
market capitalization. Price impact (illiquidity ratio) is the ratio of absolute 
return to trading value. Size represents the market capitalization expressed in 
millions. BM is the book-to-market ratio. RET2-3, RET4-6 and RET7-12 are 
the past cumulative raw returns over the second through third, fourth through 
sixth, and seventh through twelfth months before the current month, 
respectively.  
UK (London Stock Exchange) 
Floor trading system Electronic trading system 
Mean Median StdDev. Mean Median StdDev. 
Prop.Bid-Ask  0.0462 0.0283 0.0543 0.0780 0.0440 0.1041 
Turnover 2.6910 2.0592 3.3960 3.1424 1.8255 6.0591 
Price Impact 0.0006 0.0000 0.0030 0.0070 0.0002 0.0921 
Size 0.3452 0.0274 1.4364 0.8449 0.0370 5.1966 
BM 0.6704 0.5735 2.1678 0.7773 0.5541 4.3012 
Ret2-3 -0.0024 0.0004 0.1614 -0.0084 -0.0042 0.2082 
Ret4-6 0.0008 0.0058 0.1998 -0.0125 -0.0037 0.2583 
Ret7-12 0.0119 0.0267 0.2910 -0.0244 0.0021 0.3807 
Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
Floor trading system Electronic trading system 
Mean Median StdDev. Mean Median StdDev. 
Prop.Bid-Ask 0.0389 0.0224 0.0685 0.0518 0.0207 0.1209 
Turnover 1.9734 1.0527 3.6342 2.0308 0.8968 7.3491 
Price Impact 0.0006 0.0001 0.0023 0.0033 0.0001 0.0356 
Size 0.6181 0.1124 2.2271 0.6283 0.2030 2.1539 
BM 1.7913 0.8851 6.2237 1.3312 0.6904 5.0308 
Ret2-3 -0.0055 0.0003 0.1433 0.0045 0.0034 0.1621 
Ret4-6 -0.0105 -0.0014 0.1708 0.0141 0.0116 0.1961 
Ret7-12 -0.0153 -0.0019 0.2404 0.0285 0.0296 0.2811 
Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
Floor trading system Electronic trading system 
Mean Median StdDev. Mean Median StdDev. 
Prop.Bid-Ask 0.0433 0.0273 0.0526 0.0848 0.0237 0.1888 
Turnover 2.5238 0.8304 12.3342 1.6228 0.6185 4.0285 
Price Impact 0.0480 0.0018 0.3463 1.0588 0.0017 11.0442 
Size 1.3347 0.0812 6.1201 2.1907 0.3179 7.3718 
BM 2.6563 0.5591 10.4144 2.8059 0.5859 10.2337 
Ret2-3 -0.0166 -0.0097 0.2279 -0.0209 -0.0091 0.2661 
Ret4-6 -0.0223 -0.0115 0.2813 -0.0287 -0.0111 0.3170 
Ret7-12 -0.0374 -0.0099 0.4084 -0.0520 -0.0174 0.4397 
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Table 3.3 
Definition, measurement and sources of macroeconomic variables (i.e. business cycle variables) 
          This table shows the data used to calculate the macroeconomic variables; short-term yield, dividends yield, default spread and term spread as well as their    
         definitions. It also shows the source of data on interest rates and dividend yield. 
Country  Short-term Financial 
Securities 
Long-term Government 
Bonds Corporate Bonds Market Dividends Yield  
UK 3-month Treasury bills UK 20 Years Government Redemption Yield Corporate bonds rate 
Dividend yield on Financial 
Times All Share Price Index 
Switzerland  
Call Money Rate* 
Long Term Government 
Bond Yield (10 years 
maturity) 
Corporate bonds rate Dividend yield on Germany DS-market constituents 
Germany  
3-month FIBOR 
Long Term Government 
Bond Yield (9-10 years 
maturity) 
Corporate bonds rate* Dividend yield on Germany DS-market constituents 
       *the data on corporate bonds for Germany are obtained from the website of Deutche Bundes Bank, and the data on Call Money Rate for Switzerland are obtained  
        from Bank of Switzerland, otherwise all the data are obtained from Datastream.  
 
      Macroeconomic variables (short-term yield, dividends yield, default spread (quality spread), and term spread) are measured as follow: 
1- Short-term yield (YLD): is measured by the rate of return on short-term financial securities. 
2- Dividends yield (DIV): is measured by dividend on value-weighted broad based market index. 
3- Default spread (DEF): is measured as the difference between the yield on corporate bonds and the yield on long-term government bonds. 
4- Term spread (TERM): is measured as the difference between the yield on long-term bonds and the yield on short-term financial securities. 
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Table 3.4 
Aggregate market liquidity and the change in aggregate market liquidity 
For each market in our sample (London Stock Exchange, Swiss Stock Exchange, and Frankfurt Stock Exchange) and during the two sub-
periods, floor trading system and electronic trading system, this table represents descriptive statistics and correlation coefficients for the 
aggregate market liquidity measures in panel A and panel B respectively. Panel C and Panel D represent the autocorrelation and unit root 
test for the change in market liquidity respectively. The market liquidity measures are defined as follows: proportional bid-ask spread 
(PQSPR): the quoted bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint of the quote, turnover ratio (TOV): turnover measure of trading activities 
which is calculated by dividing trading value over the market capitalization, and Price impact (illiquidity ratio) (PIMPACT): the ratio of 
absolute return to trading value. The aggregate market liquidity measures are given by the cross-sectional average of the firm-specific 
liquidity measures. All market liquidity series are equally-weighted. 
 UK/ London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
 
Floor Trading Electronic Trading 
Liquidity Measures  PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics for time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
 Mean 4.4316 2.4682 0.0004 7.5530 2.8101 0.0029 
 Median 4.5501 2.4019 0.0004 7.5072 2.7891 0.0028 
 Std. Dev. 1.6732 0.5761 0.0003 1.4860 0.6300 0.0018 
 Maximum 8.1737 4.6678 0.0013 11.6236 4.3016 0.0091 
 Minimum 1.8471 1.5597 0.0000 5.1341 1.4386 0.0006 
Panel B:  Correlations for time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
PQSPR 1.0000   1.0000   
TOV -0.5888 1.0000  0.1619 1.0000  
PIMPACT 0.8196 -0.5799 1.0000 0.8949 0.0885 1.0000 
Panel C: Autocorrelations for the change in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
AR(1) 0.0761 -0.2455** -0.3898*** 0.4019*** -0.0679 -0.4619*** 
AR(2) -0.1326 -0.2705*** -0.2691*** 0.0001 -0.0809 -0.0694 
AR(3) -0.0051 -0.1447 -0.1467 -0.0504 -0.3025*** -0.0459 
AR(4) 0.0285 -0.1127 -0.2027* -0.0570 0.0992 -0.0318 
AR(5) 0.0395 -0.0070 0.1888* 0.0839 -0.2921*** -0.0564 
Panel D: Unit root test for the change in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
Test-statistic  -9.0377*** -10.1912*** -15.2150*** -7.1624*** -3.8388*** -17.3625*** 
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                                 Table 3.4 (continued) 
Switzerland /Swiss Stock Exchange (SSE) 
 
Floor Trading Electronic Trading 
Liquidity Measures  PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics for time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
 Mean 3.4045 1.7734 0.0004 4.2444 1.6065 0.0007 
 Median 3.2923 1.6900 0.0003 4.1579 1.4982 0.0005 
 Std. Dev. 0.7441 0.5385 0.0002 0.9559 0.6263 0.0006 
 Maximum 6.1954 3.0510 0.0013 7.1902 3.6374 0.0029 
 Minimum 1.9934 0.8311 0.0001 2.5082 0.6786 0.0002 
Panel B:  Correlations for time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
PQSPR 1.0000   1.0000   
TOV -0.4723 1.0000  -0.1608 1.0000  
PIMPACT 0.7280 -0.4784 1.0000 0.4086 -0.5841 1.0000 
Panel C: Autocorrelations for the change in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
AR(1) -0.1118 -0.2158* -0.5784*** 0.0008 -0.1145 -0.0707 
AR(2) -0.0335 -0.2727** -0.2482* -0.1145 -0.1734 0.1303 
AR(3) 0.0046 -0.2004 -0.1410 -0.1294 -0.1262 -0.1717 
AR(4) -0.1603 -0.0354 -0.0571 -0.1336 -0.1566 -0.4472*** 
AR(5) 0.0037 -0.1637 -0.0818 -0.0306 -0.0604 0.0573 
Panel D: Unit root test for the change in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
Test-statistic  -8.9961*** -7.9767*** -13.5859*** -10.3588*** -9.1464*** -4.5937*** 
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                                  Table 3.4 (continued) 
Germany/Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) 
 
Floor Trading Electronic Trading 
Liquidity 
Measures  
PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics for time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
 Mean 3.9657 1.0578 0.0235 6.8523 1.2808 0.2349 
 Median 3.9410 0.8812 0.0195 6.7433 1.2827 0.2093 
 Std. Dev. 1.2809 0.5020 0.0245 4.5076 0.4010 0.2649 
 Maximum 7.4260 3.9227 0.1324 20.2709 2.1914 1.2413 
 Minimum 1.6971 0.4565 0.0000 0.9895 0.5536 0.0001 
Panel B:  Correlations for time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
PQSPR 1.0000   1.0000   
TOV -0.4617 1.0000  0.2704 1.0000  
PIMPACT 0.8591 -0.3874 1.0000 0.8699 0.2536 1.0000 
Panel C: Autocorrelations for the change in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
AR(1) 0.1413 -0.3019*** 0.1811* -0.2800***   -0.2259** -0.2041** 
AR(2) -0.0680 -0.2910*** -0.0076 -0.0473 -0.3033***    -0.1575* 
AR(3) 0.1190 -0.2792*** -0.0803 -0.0708   -0.1146 -0.2410** 
AR(4) -0.1241 -0.1169 -0.0991 -0.0870 -0.1493 0.1653* 
AR(5) 0.1731* -0.0354 0.1828* 0.0466 -0.1067 0.0944 
Panel D: Unit root test for the change in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
Test-statistic  -9.6872*** -10.1527*** -9.0419*** -14.0169*** -10.4122*** -9.5623*** 
                                                     ***, **, and * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Augmented Dicky-Fuller critical values at 1%, 5% and 10% are  
                                                     respectively -2.585, -1.944, and -1.615 for unit root test during floor and electronic trading system. 
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Table 3.5 
ARIMA models order  
This table shows the order of ARIMA models for the change in aggregate market liquidity series  
that show persistence (i.e. a significant first-order autocorrelation) as shown in Panel C in table 1  
for all markets.  
Sample 
period 
Liquidity 
measure 
London Stock 
Exchange 
(LSE) 
Swiss Stock 
Exchange 
(SSE) 
Frankfurt 
Stock 
Exchange 
(FSE) 
Fl
o
o
r 
Tr
ad
in
g PQSPR -------------- -------------- -------------- 
TOV (1,0,1) (1,0,1) (1,0,1) 
PIMPACT (0,0,1) (0,0,1) (2,0,1) 
El
ec
tr
o
n
ic
 
Tr
ad
in
g PQSPR (1,0,0) -------------- (0,0,1) 
TOV -------------- -------------- (1,0,1) 
PIMPACT (2,0,1) -------------- (3,0,0) 
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Table 3.6 
Innovations of the change in aggregate market liquidity 
This table represents the autocorrelations and correlation coefficients for the innovations of aggregate market liquidity 
measures in panel A and panel B respectively. The market liquidity measures are defined as follows: proportional bid-ask 
spread (PQSPR): the quoted bid-ask spread divided by the midpoint of the quote, turnover ratio (TOV): turnover measure 
of trading activities which is calculated by dividing trading value over the market capitalization, and Price impact 
(illiquidity ratio) (PIMPACT): the ratio of absolute return to trading value. The aggregate market liquidity measures are 
given by the cross-sectional average of the firm-specific liquidity measures. All market liquidity series are equally-
weighted.  
London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
 
Floor Trading Electronic Trading 
Liquidity 
Measures  
PQSPR* TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV* PIMPACT 
Panel A:  Autocorrelations in the innovations in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
AR(1) ------ 0.0428 0.0770 0.0081 ------ -0.0513 
AR(2) ------ -0.0610 -0.0697 0.0007 ------ -0.0610 
AR(3) ------ 0.0851 -0.0159 -0.0508 ------ -0.0324 
AR(4) ------ 0.0518 -0.1276 -0.0752 ------ -0.0289 
AR(5) ------ 0.0406 0.2697*** 0.0179 ------ -0.0695 
Panel B:  Correlations for the innovations in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
PQSPR 1.0000   1.0000   
TOV -0.3637 1.0000  -0.2296 1.0000  
PIMPACT 0.4888 -0.1422 1.0000 0.6731 -0.0761 1.0000 
Swiss Stock Exchange (SSE) 
 
Floor Trading Electronic Trading 
Liquidity 
Measures  
PQSPR* TOV PIMPACT PQSPR* TOV* PIMPACT* 
Panel A:  Autocorrelations in the innovations in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
AR(1) ------ 0.0303 -0.0418 ------ ------ ------ 
AR(2) ------ -0.0805 0.0608 ------ ------ ------ 
AR(3) ------ -0.0318 -0.0148 ------ ------ ------ 
AR(4) ------ 0.0980 0.0076 ------ ------ ------ 
AR(5) ------ -0.0736 -0.0755 ------ ------ ------ 
Panel B:  Correlations for the innovations in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
PQSPR 1.0000   1.0000   
TOV -0.3947 1.0000  -0.1503 1.0000  
PIMPACT 0.1478 -0.0934 1.0000 0.5501 -0.0845 1.0000 
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Table 3.6 (Continued) 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE) 
 
Floor Trading Electronic Trading 
Liquidity 
Measures  
PQSPR* TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Panel A:  Autocorrelations in the innovations in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
AR(1) ------ 0.0323 -0.0054 0.0019 0.0380 0.0417 
AR(2) ------ -0.0274 0.0319 0.0326 -0.0891 0.0443 
AR(3) ------ -0.0713 -0.0421 -0.0570 0.0882 -0.0247 
AR(4) ------ 0.0554 -0.0877 -0.0695 -0.0181 0.0849 
AR(5) ------ 0.0673 0.2154 0.0652 -0.0032 0.0234 
Panel B:  Correlations for the innovations in the time-series of aggregate market liquidity. 
PQSPR 1.0000   1.0000   
TOV -0.2651 1.0000  -0.1078 1.0000  
PIMPACT 0.4734 -0.2638 1.0000 0.2925 -0.1058 1.0000 
*The aggregate change in the liquidity series is not serially autocorrelated, thus, this series has not been modelled into      
ARIMA model to estimate the innovations. Instead the original series of aggregate change itself is used directly as 
innovations (see section 3.3.5 and references cited in for the discussion on this issue).  
 ***, **, and * denotes significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 3.7 
Statistics of individual coefficients of market liquidity risk factors estimated by 
conditional asset pricing model  
Among the other risk factors and control factors, this table reports the cross-sectional average of the time-series slope 
coefficients of market-wide liquidity risk factors with their associated t-statistics. These coefficients are estimated by 
running the first-pass time-series regression (Eq. (3.12)) for each firm during the floor trading period and the electronic 
trading period. Liquidity risk factors include PQSPR is proportional bid-ask spread, TOV is the liquidity turnover ratio 
and PIMPACT is the price impact (Amihud’s 2002 Illiquidity ratio). The construction of liquidity risk factors is 
explained in section 3.3.4. “Pos” reports the percentage of positive slope coefficients, while “Sig” gives the percentage 
of the coefficients that are significant at 10% of significance or higher. The last three columns present the difference in 
the mean between electronic and floor trading systems with the t-value and p-value of the null hypothesis that the 
difference in the mean is equal to zero.  
 
Panel A: Unconditional asset pricing model. 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) PQSPR -0.008 (-5.04) 42 27 -0.026 (-12.13) 38 16 -0.018 (-6.46) 0.000 
TOV 0.001 (0.72) 48 12 0.006 (4.25) 50 15 0.005 (2.88) 0.004 
PIMPACT 
-0.003 (-1.04) 50 13 -0.003 (-3.78) 44 17 0.000 (-0.04) 0.968 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) PQSPR -0.014 (-5.91) 33 16 -0.011 (-6.12) 31 16 0.003 (1.09) 0.275 
TOV 0.021 (7.79) 72 21 0.004 (1.08) 54 10 -0.018 (-4.04) 0.000 
PIMPACT 
-0.043 (-5.43) 34 26 -0.035 (-5.28) 35 21 0.008 (0.73) 0.466 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) PQSPR -0.012 (-4.83) 41 15 -0.001 (-0.72) 49 14 0.012 (4.20) 0.000 
TOV 0.029 (10.15) 61 18 0.028 (6.71) 56 16 -0.001 (-0.27) 0.790 
PIMPACT 
-4.5E-04 (-2.94) 47 17 -3.2E-05 (-1.41) 44 11 4.2E-04 (2.55) 0.011 
 
Panel B: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with Size and BM. 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) PQSPR 0.161 (1.49) 48 17 0.192 (1.25) 47 15 0.031 (0.16) 0.876 
TOV 
-0.223 (-2.12) 49 14 0.053 (1.23) 52 17 0.276 (2.63) 0.009 
PIMPACT 
-0.154 (-1.11) 49 18 -0.161 (-1.25) 47 17 
-0.007 (-0.03) 0.972 
 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) PQSPR -0.140 (-1.48) 41 18 -0.031 (-0.19) 48 13 0.110 (0.60) 0.551 
TOV 0.102 (0.78) 60 21 -0.035 (-0.36) 50 14 
-0.137 (-0.84) 0.401 
PIMPACT 0.066 (0.13) 49 17 -0.491 (-1.82) 45 18 
-0.557 (-0.95) 0.342 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) PQSPR 0.179 (0.49) 48 15 -0.013 (-0.83) 53 19 -0.191 (-0.45) 0.652 
TOV 
-0.062 (-0.95) 52 17 0.163 (1.75) 54 19 0.225 (2.04) 0.042 
PIMPACT 
-0.001 (-0.26) 50 18 -0.001 (-1.13) 54 18 0.001 (0.14) 0.890 
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Panel C: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with default spread (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) PQSPR -0.045 (-3.15) 44 15 -0.021 (-3.37) 46 12 0.024 (1.60) 0.110 
TOV 
-0.004 (-0.64) 49 13 0.028 (5.79) 54 14 0.033 (4.03) 0.000 
PIMPACT 0.046 (2.60) 50 17 -0.006 (-1.76) 47 14 -0.053 (-3.00) 0.003 
 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) PQSPR -0.002 (-0.36) 51 12 -0.008 (-1.45) 38 16 -0.006 (-0.77) 0.444 
TOV 
-0.010 (-1.40) 48 16 0.023 (2.61) 63 18 0.033 (2.91) 0.004 
PIMPACT 0.029 (1.25) 55 9 -0.054 (-4.60) 22 19 -0.082 (-2.97) 0.003 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) PQSPR -0.009 (-1.92) 45 12 -0.001 (-0.37) 46 11 0.009 (1.62) 0.106 
TOV 0.044 (7.18) 55 15 0.080 (7.37) 61 17 0.035 (2.92) 0.004 
PIMPACT 
-0.001 (-1.58) 44 14 -2.77E-05 (-0.37) 42 16 0.001 (1.46) 0.145 
 
 Panel D: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with Size, BM and default spread (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) PQSPR -0.730 (-1.22) 51 16 -0.332 (-1.05) 50 14 0.398 (0.63) 0.530 
TOV 
-0.022 (-0.07) 50 15 0.068 (0.21) 51 15 0.091 (0.20) 0.843 
PIMPACT 
-0.025 (-0.03) 51 16 0.031 (0.19) 51 15 0.057 (0.08) 0.933 
 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) PQSPR -0.695 (-0.98) 54 17 0.615 (0.48) 50 15 1.310 (0.88) 0.377 
TOV 
-0.371 (-0.70) 47 14 -0.320 (-0.16) 44 13 0.051 (0.02) 0.981 
PIMPACT 0.052 (0.07) 54 17 -1.727 (-0.19) 53 15 -1.779 (-0.20) 0.844 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) PQSPR -0.400 (-0.82) 49 16 -0.003 (-0.04) 48 15 0.397 (0.69) 0.490 
TOV 
-2.494 (-1.01) 49 18 0.282 (0.91) 57 15 2.777 (0.96) 0.336 
PIMPACT 
-0.038 (-0.81) 44 16 -2.54E-04 (-0.28) 49 16 0.038 (0.69) 0.489 
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Table 3.8 
Fama-MacBeth estimates with Fama-French factors and liquidity as risk factor 
This table represents time-series averages of individual stocks’ cross-sectional OLS regression coefficient estimates (Eq. (3.14)) for all securities in the UK, Switzerland and 
Germany. Panel A presents the estimates when the dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return using the unconditional Fama-French model augmented with liquidity factor. 
In panel B the dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return when factor loadings (i.e. betas) are allowed to vary with firm characteristics (i.e. size and book-to-market ratio). 
In panel C the dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return when factor loadings (i.e. betas) are allowed to vary with business cycle variables default spread. In panel D the 
dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return when factor loadings (i.e. betas) are allowed to vary with firm characteristics (i.e. size and book-to-market ratio) and with 
business cycle variable default spread. Liq. Risk Factor is the liquidity risk factor added to Fama-French three factor model, PQSPR is proportional bid-ask spread, TOV is the 
liquidity turnover ratio and PIMPACT is the price impact (Amihud’s 2002 Illiquidity ratio). The construction of liquidity risk factors is explained in section 3.3.4. Floor and 
electronic in the third column in each panel refers to the estimation done during the floor trading system and electronic trading system respectively.  Size represents the 
logarithm of market capitalization; BM is the logarithm of book-to-market ratio; RET2-3, RET4-6, RET7-12 are the past cumulative raw returns over the second through 
third, fourth through sixth, and seventh through twelfth months before the current month;  Prop.Bid-ask is the proportional bid-ask spread calculated as the quoted bid-ask 
spread divided by the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread; Turnover is the turnover ratio measures as the trading value divided by the market capitalization; Price impact is 
the ratio of absolute return divided by the trading value.   BBBB
 
is the time-series average of the monthly adjusted R2. T-statistic (reported in parenthesis) are adjusted for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. W-stat. is the Wald test statistic. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, 1% level. 
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 Panel A:  Risk adjusted return is unconditional. 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.308 
(-2.97)*** 
-0.162 
(-3.69) *** 
0.499 
(7.83) *** 
2.160 
(4.53) *** 
1.565 
(3.54) *** 
1.169 
(4.24) *** 
-0.545 
(-5.37) *** 
  
2.32% 
Electronic -0.737 
(-5.91) *** 
-0.021 
(-0.45) 
0.909 
(10.42) *** 
2.467 
(6.25) *** 
1.757 
(5.39) *** 
1.073 
(4.97) *** 
-0.273 
(-2.64) *** 
  
2.12% 
W-stat. 
 11.82*** 8.82*** 22.05*** 0.60 0.35 0.20 6.86***    
TOV 
Floor -1.084 
(-5.46) *** 
0.143 
(3.07) *** 
0.559 
(6.09) *** 
2.770 
(4.44) *** 
2.134 
(3.06) *** 
2.061 
(4.34) ***  
0.018 
(0.19) 
 
4.22% 
Electronic -0.829 
(-5.73) *** 
0.115 
(2.16) ** 
0.921 
(10.95) *** 
2.691 
(5.98) *** 
1.769 
(5.76) *** 
0.995 
(4.33) ***  
0.001 
(0.02) 
 
2.27% 
W-stat. 
 3.10* 0.26 18.49*** 0.03 1.41 21.54***  0.08   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.233 
(-3.46) *** 
0.120 
(1.22) 
0.543 
(6.05) *** 
2.743 
(4.01) *** 
2.169 
(3.13) *** 
1.976 
(3.95) ***  
 -0.003 
(-0.04) 4.13% 
Electronic -0.806 
(-5.19) *** 
0.040 
(0.53) 
0.913 
(9.94) *** 
2.441 
(5.31) *** 
1.844 
(6.01) *** 
1.137 
(5.01) ***  
 -0.074 
(-1.81) * 2.30% 
W-stat. 
 7.55*** 1.12 16.25*** 0.43 1.12 13.63***   3.01*  
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor -0.889 
(-4.54) *** 
0.079 
(0.83) 
0.395 
(3.01) *** 
3.149 
(2.84) *** 
2.209 
(2.17) ** 
1.947 
(2.44) ** 
0.215 
(1.31) 
  
5.16% 
Electronic -0.317 
(-1.34) 
0.054 
(0.50) 
0.643 
(4.29) *** 
2.810 
(2.06) ** 
1.789 
(1.55) 
1.311 
(1.94) * 
0.136 
(0.94) 
  
7.64% 
W-stat. 
 5.88** 0.06 2.73* 0.06 0.13 0.88 0.29    
TOV 
Floor -0.856 
(-4.09) *** 
-0.046 
(-0.59) 
0.346 
(3.02) *** 
3.033 
(2.74) *** 
1.790 
(1.95) * 
1.810 
(2.29) **  
-0.178 
(-2.33) ** 
 
4.42% 
Electronic -0.406 
(-1.67) * 
0.036 
(0.36) 
0.711 
(4.56) *** 
3.756 
(3.19) *** 
2.337 
(2.17) ** 
1.465 
(2.08) **  
-0.153 
(-2.04) ** 
 
7.81% 
W-stat. 
 3.43* 0.67 5.49** 0.38 0.26 0.24  0.11   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.928 
(-4.07) *** 
0.131 
(1.42) 
0.401 
(3.40) *** 
3.051 
(2.72) *** 
2.348 
(2.44) ** 
1.947 
(2.45) **  
 0.163 
(2.20) ** 4.41% 
Electronic -0.392 
(-1.66)* 
0.082 
(0.91) 
0.640 
(4.12) *** 
4.307 
(3.63) *** 
2.251 
(2.10) ** 
1.565 
(2.54) **  
 -0.026 
(-0.37) 7.54% 
W-stat. 
 5.17** 0.29 2.36 1.12 0.01 0.39   6.99***  
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 Panel A (Continued)  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.219 
(-1.24) 
0.092 
(1.50) 
0.442 
(3.58)*** 
1.357 
(2.45) ** 
1.865 
(4.32) *** 
0.845 
(2.59) ** 
0.070 
(0.58) 
  
3.69% 
Electronic -0.468 
(-1.39) 
0.502 
(1.44) 
0.657 
(3.11) *** 
2.040 
(2.93) *** 
1.487 
(2.29) ** 
0.451 
(0.95) 
-0.021 
(-0.13) 
  
4.65% 
W-stat. 
 0.55 1.38 1.03 0.96 0.34 0.69 0.32    
TOV 
Floor -0.151 
(-0.73) 
-0.120 
(-1.83) * 
0.691 
(2.16) ** 
0.052 
(0.04) 
0.837 
(0.89) 
1.404 
(1.17)  
-0.242 
(-1.78) * 
 
3.21% 
Electronic -0.514 
(-2.10) ** 
0.104 
(1.46) 
0.652 
(3.14) *** 
1.800 
(2.27) ** 
1.632 
(2.66) *** 
0.514 
(1.09)  
-0.240 
(-3.08) *** 
 
4.96% 
W-stat. 
 2.20 9.95*** 0.04 4.88** 1.67 3.58*  0.00   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.048 
(-0.21) 
0.110 
(0.68) 
0.677 
(2.15) ** 
-0.259 
(-0.18) 
1.183 
(1.54) 
1.531 
(1.33)  
 0.119 
(0.91) 3.91% 
Electronic -0.475 
(-1.91) * 
0.228 
(1.83) * 
0.554 
(2.53) ** 
1.712 
(2.09) ** 
1.883 
(2.96) *** 
0.489 
(1.00)  
 0.125 
(1.78) * 5.11% 
W-stat. 
 2.95* 0.91 0.32 5.79** 1.21 4.59**   0.01  
  
 Panel B:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on size and BM. 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.404 
(-4.69) *** 
-0.131 
(-3.33) *** 
0.319 
(5.89) *** 
2.035 
(4.36) *** 
1.610 
(3.70) *** 
1.165 
(4.30) *** 
-0.508 
(-5.96) *** 
  
2.27% 
Electronic -0.814 
(-8.10) *** 
-0.007 
(-0.15) 
0.703 
(9.28) *** 
2.892 
(7.99) *** 
2.007 
(6.25) *** 
1.298 
(5.80) *** 
-0.373 
(-4.06) *** 
  
2.30% 
W-stat. 
 16.66*** 7.09*** 25.73*** 5.61** 1.53 0.35 2.15    
TOV 
Floor -1.091 
(-6.26) *** 
0.163 
(3.70) *** 
0.438 
(5.16) *** 
2.391 
(3.92) *** 
2.363 
(3.70) *** 
1.669 
(4.17) ***  
0.041 
(0.49) 
 
3.79% 
Electronic -0.942 
(-7.76) *** 
0.171 
(4.04) *** 
0.715 
(9.51) *** 
2.891 
(6.65) *** 
1.928 
(6.30) *** 
1.267 
(5.53) ***  
-0.048 
(-0.93) 
 
2.41% 
W-stat. 
 1.51 0.03 13.56*** 1.32 2.03 3.08*  2.95*   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.321 
(-4.22) *** 
0.158 
(1.73) * 
0.439 
(4.96) *** 
2.558 
(3.97) *** 
2.250 
(3.67) *** 
1.772 
(4.45) ***  
 -0.006 
(-0.09) 3.94% 
Electronic -0.936 
(-7.03) *** 
0.118 
(1.85) * 
0.674 
(8.44) *** 
2.698 
(6.23) *** 
2.014 
(6.65) *** 
1.252 
(5.34) ***  
 -0.039 
(-1.01) 2.40% 
W-stat. 
 8.35*** 0.38 8.69*** 0.10 0.61 4.94**   0.74  
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 Panel B (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor -0.823 
(-4.63) *** 
0.032 
(0.36) 
0.212 
(2.09) ** 
3.080 
(2.99) *** 
1.438 
(1.70) * 
1.941 
(2.67) *** 
0.083 
(0.61) 
  
4.47% 
Electronic -0.303 
(-1.55) 
0.191 
(2.09) ** 
0.483 
(3.61) *** 
3.526 
(3.36) *** 
0.988 
(1.06) 
1.469 
(2.69) *** 
0.137 
(1.06) 
  
7.72% 
W-stat. 
 7.10*** 3.02* 4.09** 0.18 0.23 0.74 0.17    
TOV 
Floor -0.755 
(-4.10) *** 
-0.071 
(-1.02) 
0.096 
(1.06) 
2.729 
(2.88) *** 
1.153 
(1.40) 
2.167 
(3.12) ***  
-0.207 
(-3.38) *** 
 
3.53% 
Electronic -0.362 
(-1.89) * 
0.189 
(2.13) ** 
0.446 
(3.28) *** 
4.041 
(4.22) *** 
1.731 
(1.91) * 
1.748 
(3.36) ***  
-0.149 
(-2.42) ** 
 
7.70% 
W-stat. 
 4.23** 8.56*** 6.65*** 1.87 0.41 0.65  0.89   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.890 
(-4.47) *** 
0.095 
(1.10) 
0.217 
(2.19) ** 
2.743 
(2.90) *** 
2.020 
(2.50) ** 
1.965 
(2.92) ***  
 0.138 
(2.15) ** 3.86% 
Electronic -0.349 
(-1.87) * 
0.169 
(1.95) * 
0.441 
(3.10) *** 
4.816 
(5.16) *** 
1.220 
(1.41) 
1.664 
(3.07) ***  
 -0.052 
(-0.73) 7.41% 
W-stat. 
 8.33*** 0.72 2.47 4.94** 0.85 0.31   7.00***  
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.292 
(-2.18) ** 
0.104 
(2.10) ** 
0.262 
(2.46) ** 
1.351 
(2.61) *** 
1.798 
(4.43) *** 
0.655 
(2.26) ** 
0.052 
(0.44) 
  
3.51% 
Electronic -0.362 
(-1.31) 
0.308 
(1.42) 
0.358 
(2.09) ** 
1.645 
(2.52) ** 
1.665 
(2.74) *** 
0.377 
(0.85) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
  
4.45% 
W-stat. 
 0.06 0.88 0.31 0.2 0.05 0.39 0.11    
TOV 
Floor -0.327 
(-1.88) * 
-0.072 
(-1.04) 
0.308 
(1.01) 
-0.417 
(-0.28) 
0.358 
(0.36) 
1.227 
(1.19)  
-0.207 
(-1.49) 
 
3.43% 
Electronic -0.656 
(-3.48) *** 
0.132 
(2.51) ** 
0.373 
(1.98) ** 
1.601 
(1.99) ** 
2.052 
(3.42) *** 
0.511 
(1.14)  
-0.233 
(-3.40) *** 
 
4.86% 
W-stat. 
 3.04* 15.12*** 0.12 6.32** 7.96*** 2.56*  0.14   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.138 
(-0.76) 
0.079 
(0.60) 
0.415 
(1.47) 
-0.921 
(-0.54) 
0.744 
(0.96) 
1.063 
(1.14)  
 0.046 
(0.37) 3.04% 
Electronic -0.526 
(-2.73) *** 
0.231 
(2.06) ** 
0.314 
(1.70) * 
1.905 
(2.40) ** 
2.099 
(3.42) *** 
0.506 
(1.09)  
 0.115 
(1.75) * 4.96% 
W-stat. 
 4.06** 1.85 0.30 12.65*** 4.88** 1.43   1.09  
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Panel C:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on default spread (business cycle variable). 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.360 
(-3.69) *** 
-0.148 
(-3.47) *** 
0.490 
(7.71) *** 
1.843 
(3.70) *** 
1.447 
(3.48) *** 
1.085 
(3.66) *** 
-0.548 
(-5.42) *** 
  
2.41% 
Electronic -0.705 
(-6.45) *** 
-0.035 
(-0.76) 
0.844 
(9.29) *** 
2.325 
(5.48) *** 
1.639 
(4.78) *** 
0.939 
(4.07) *** 
-0.273 
(-2.73) *** 
  
2.26% 
W-stat. 
 9.96*** 5.84** 15.20*** 1.29 0.31 0.40 7.61***    
TOV 
Floor -1.072 
(-5.70) *** 
0.147 
(3.25) *** 
0.556 
(6.11) *** 
2.509 
(3.69) *** 
2.282 
(3.41) *** 
1.865 
(4.00) ***  
0.019 
(0.21) 
 
4.46% 
Electronic -0.796 
(-5.93) *** 
0.108 
(2.15) ** 
0.849 
(9.92) *** 
2.530 
(5.44) *** 
1.585 
(4.98) *** 
0.896 
(3.58) ***  
-0.008 
(-0.14) 
 
2.39% 
W-stat. 
 4.22** 0.58 11.70*** 0.00 4.80 14.99***  0.23   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.196 
(-3.81) *** 
0.117 
(1.28) 
0.519 
(5.77) *** 
2.513 
(3.56) *** 
2.244 
(3.35) *** 
1.813 
(3.71) ***  
 -0.017 
(-0.23) 4.40% 
Electronic -0.774 
(-5.42) *** 
0.045 
(0.62) 
0.822 
(8.85) *** 
2.261 
(4.66) *** 
1.688 
(5.29) *** 
0.979 
(4.12) ***  
 -0.055 
(-1.40) 2.36% 
W-stat. 
 8.73*** 0.99 10.64*** 0.27 3.04* 12.35***   0.94  
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor -0.829 
(-4.39) *** 
0.067 
(0.73) 
0.354 
(2.81) *** 
3.127 
(2.85) *** 
2.211 
(2.13) ** 
1.953 
(2.52) ** 
0.243 
(1.53) 
  
5.34% 
Electronic -0.223 
(-0.98) 
0.050 
(0.47) 
0.404 
(2.85) *** 
3.165 
(2.36) ** 
1.252 
(1.06) 
1.274 
(1.94) * 
0.125 
(0.88) 
  
8.54% 
W-stat. 
 7.11*** 0.03 0.12 0.00 0.65 1.06 0.68    
TOV 
Floor -0.964 
(-4.91) *** 
-0.079 
(-1.10) 
0.313 
(2.88) *** 
2.492 
(2.28) ** 
1.866 
(2.11) ** 
1.786 
(2.31) **  
-0.233 
(-3.47) *** 
 
4.55% 
Electronic -0.217 
(-0.96) 
0.052 
(0.51) 
0.474 
(3.32) *** 
3.939 
(3.46) *** 
2.002 
(1.84) * 
1.121 
(1.46)  
-0.106 
(-1.63) 
 
9.30% 
W-stat. 
 10.93*** 1.68 1.27 1.61 0.02 0.76  3.80*   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.891 
(-3.96) *** 
0.101 
(1.10) 
0.382 
(3.38) *** 
2.761 
(2.38) ** 
2.234 
(2.49) ** 
1.819 
(2.34) **   
0.148 
(2.02) ** 4.59% 
Electronic -0.188 
(-0.86) 
0.036 
(0.40) 
0.460 
 (3.09) *** 
4.416 
 (4.03) *** 
1.732 
(1.62) 
1.616 
 (2.57) **   
-0.051 
(-0.73) 8.20% 
W-stat. 
 10.36*** 0.51 0.28 2.28 0.22 0.10   7.97***  
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 Panel C (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.193 
(-1.16) 
0.098 
(1.69) * 
0.437 
(3.53) *** 
1.265 
(2.39) ** 
1.825 
(4.16) *** 
0.747 
(2.39) ** 
0.066 
(0.56) 
  
3.73% 
Electronic -0.361 
(-1.11) 
0.445 
(1.38) 
0.639 
(3.09) *** 
2.049 
(3.06) *** 
1.374 
(2.02) ** 
0.323 
(0.68) 
-0.067 
(-0.43) 
  
4.97% 
W-stat. 
 0.27 1.15 0.96 1.37 0.44 0.80 0.74    
TOV 
Floor -0.249 
(-1.32) 
-0.070 
(-1.10) 
0.630 
(2.20) ** 
0.582 
(0.52) 
1.345 
(1.55) 
1.052 
(1.08)  
-0.241 
(-1.73) * 
 
3.34% 
Electronic -0.500 
(-2.18) ** 
0.103 
(1.45) 
0.616 
(3.06) *** 
1.876 
(2.39) ** 
1.542 
(2.39) ** 
0.365 
(0.81)  
-0.220 
(-2.91) *** 
 
4.98% 
W-stat. 
 1.19 5.95** 0.01 2.73* 0.09 2.33  0.08   
PIMPACT 
Floor 0.008 
(0.04) 
0.074 
(0.43) 
0.685 
(2.17) ** 
-0.155 
(-0.11) 
1.348 
(1.66) * 
1.411 
(1.19)  
 0.078 
(0.58) 4.04% 
Electronic -0.471 
(-1.95) * 
0.200 
(1.60) 
0.562 
(2.62) *** 
1.748 
(2.18) ** 
1.692 
(2.59) ** 
0.467 
(0.98)  
 0.095 
(1.35) 5.36% 
W-stat. 
 3.95** 1.02 0.33 5.66** 0.28 3.95**   0.05  
 
Panel D:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on size, BM and default spread (business cycle variable). 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.464 
(-6.04) *** 
-0.096 
(-2.60) *** 
0.231 
(4.56) *** 
2.008 
(4.00) *** 
1.714 
(4.05) *** 
1.220 
(4.89) *** 
-0.426 
(-4.97) *** 
  
2.63% 
Electronic -0.764 
(-9.32) *** 
-0.035 
(-0.86) 
0.552 
(8.45) *** 
2.719 
(7.16) *** 
1.935 
(6.38) *** 
1.280 
(5.46) *** 
-0.435 
(-5.70) *** 
  
2.55% 
W-stat. 
 13.40*** 2.28 24.13*** 3.51* 0.53 0.07 0.01    
TOV 
Floor -0.998 
(-6.36) *** 
0.150 
(3.61) *** 
0.318 
(4.36) *** 
1.976 
(3.33) *** 
2.547 
(4.40) *** 
1.491 
(4.05) ***  
0.028 
(0.37) 
 
4.14% 
Electronic -0.909 
(-9.23) *** 
0.211 
(5.99) *** 
0.544 
(8.60) *** 
2.604 
(6.11) *** 
1.765 
(6.24) *** 
1.266 
(5.45) ***  
-0.082 
(-1.80) * 
 
2.56% 
W-stat. 
 0.81 2.97* 12.74*** 2.17 7.66*** 0.94  5.84**   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.074 
(-4.24) *** 
0.114 
(1.49) 
0.347 
(4.34) *** 
2.107 
(3.55) *** 
2.506 
(4.56) *** 
1.580 
(4.23) ***  
 -0.010 
(-0.15) 4.17% 
Electronic -1.021 
(-9.30) *** 
0.176 
(3.24) *** 
0.577 
(8.49) *** 
2.706 
(6.02) *** 
1.989 
(7.72) *** 
1.199 
(4.95) ***  
 -0.017 
(-0.52) 2.65% 
W-stat. 
 0.23 1.27 11.46*** 1.78 4.03** 2.47   0.04  
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Panel D (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor -0.882 
 (-6.02) *** 
0.012 
(0.16) 
0.185 
 (2.31) ** 
3.074 
 (3.09) *** 
1.719 
 (2.06) ** 
2.177 
 (3.27) *** 
-0.066 
(-0.69) 
  
4.69% 
Electronic -0.263 
 (-1.69) * 
0.150 
 (1.79) * 
0.412 
 (3.61) *** 
3.881 
 (4.89) *** 
1.049 
(1.54) 
1.426 
 (2.74) *** 
0.037 
(0.37) 
  
7.71% 
W-stat. 
 15.86*** 2.71* 3.94** 1.03 0.97 2.08 1.06    
TOV 
Floor -0.868 
 (-5.76) *** 
0.033 
(0.54) 
0.129 
(1.65)* 
2.430 
 (2.62) ** 
1.152 
(1.64) 
2.438 
 (3.93) ***  
-0.166 
 (-3.71) *** 
 
4.11% 
Electronic -0.324 
 (-2.11) ** 
0.215 
 (2.68) *** 
0.367 
 (3.12) *** 
4.184 
 (4.95) *** 
1.553 
 (2.05) ** 
1.629 
 (3.54) ***  
-0.102 
 (-2.02) ** 
 
7.82% 
W-stat. 
 12.60*** 5.15** 4.09** 4.30** 0.28 3.10*  1.60   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.006 
 (-5.68) *** 
0.128 
 (1.71) * 
0.250 
 (3.24) *** 
2.613 
 (2.89) *** 
1.673 
 (2.24) ** 
2.094 
 (3.69) ***   
0.068 
(1.26) 3.99% 
Electronic -0.134 
(-0.90) 
0.097 
(1.17) 
0.335 
 (2.62) ** 
4.998 
 (6.08) *** 
0.993 
(1.48) 
1.247 
 (2.28) **   
-0.100 
 (-1.67) * 8.22% 
W-stat. 
 34.06*** 0.14 0.44 8.41*** 1.03 2.40   7.79***  
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.305 
(-2.62) *** 
0.124 
(2.98) *** 
0.217 
(2.16) ** 
1.290 
(2.64) *** 
1.379 
(3.47) *** 
0.724 
(3.00) *** 
0.032 
(0.29) 
  
3.47% 
Electronic -0.007 
(-0.02) 
-0.016 
(-0.09) 
0.417 
(2.67) *** 
2.010 
(3.29) *** 
1.805 
(3.12) *** 
0.542 
(1.36) 
0.037 
(0.28) 
  
4.37% 
W-stat. 
 0.73 0.64 1.64 1.39 0.54 0.21 0.00    
TOV 
Floor -0.453 
(-3.29) *** 
0.029 
(0.57) 
0.340 
(1.67) * 
0.533 
(0.46) 
1.029 
(1.45) 
0.685 
(1.58)  
-0.216 
(-1.97) * 
 
3.14% 
Electronic -0.606 
(-3.77) *** 
0.115 
(2.39) ** 
0.345 
(2.02) ** 
1.114 
(1.47) 
1.867 
(3.36) *** 
0.605 
(1.58)  
-0.217 
(-3.33) *** 
 
4.57% 
W-stat. 
 0.90 3.20* 0.00 0.58 2.27 0.04  0.00   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.082 
(-0.44) 
0.084 
(0.75) 
0.504 
(2.16) ** 
-0.607 
(-0.45) 
0.729 
(0.96) 
1.026 
(1.32)  
 0.031 
(0.29) 3.23% 
Electronic -0.470 
(-2.66) *** 
0.190 
(1.96) * 
0.232 
(1.40) 
1.935 
(2.69) *** 
1.669 
(2.98) *** 
0.654 
(1.62) *  
 0.069 
(1.23) 4.76% 
W-stat. 
 4.82** 1.19 2.69 12.53*** 2.82* 0.85   0.46  
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Table 3.9 
Statistics of individual coefficients of market liquidity risk factors estimated by 
conditional asset pricing model with time-varying alpha 
Among the other risk factors and control factors, this table reports the cross-sectional average of the time-series slope 
coefficients of market-wide liquidity risk factors with their associated t-statistics. These coefficients are estimated by 
running the first-pass time-series regression (Eq. (3.12)) for each firm during the floor trading period and the electronic 
trading period. Liquidity risk factors include PQSPR is proportional bid-ask spread, TOV is the liquidity turnover ratio 
and PIMPACT is the price impact (Amihud’s 2002 Illiquidity ratio). The construction of liquidity risk factors is explained 
in section 3.3.4. “Pos” reports the percentage of positive slope coefficients, while “Sig” gives the percentage of the 
coefficients that are significant at 10% of significance or higher. The last three columns present the difference in the mean 
between electronic and floor trading systems with the t-value and p-value of the null hypothesis that the difference in the 
mean is equal to zero. 
 
 Panel A: Unconditional asset pricing model. 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.005 (-3.20) 45 25 -0.025 (-11.81) 38 17 -0.020 (-7.21) 0.000 
TOV 
-3.83E-04 (-0.34) 47 12 0.006 (4.45) 50 15 0.007 (3.66) 0.000 
PIMPACT 
-0.002 (-0.56) 51 13 -0.004 (-4.37) 43 17 -0.002 (-0.70) 0.483 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.015 (-6.44) 32 17 -0.011 (-6.30) 31 16 0.004 (1.44) 0.151 
TOV 0.021 (7.62) 73 20 0.004 (0.90) 52 11 -0.018 (-3.76) 0.000 
PIMPACT 
-0.037 (-4.42) 35 25 -0.038 (-5.26) 34 22 -0.001 (-0.10) 0.921 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.011 (-4.53) 42 14 2.77E-06 (0.00) 50 12 0.011 (4.12) 0.000 
TOV 0.030 (10.03) 61 19 0.035 (7.73) 57 16 0.005 (0.92) 0.359 
PIMPACT 
-4.53E-04 (-2.12) 44 15 -2.63E-05 (-1.08) 46 11 4.27E-04 (1.88) 0.061 
 
 Panel B: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with Size and BM. 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.213 (-0.56) 48 16 -0.025 (-0.58) 46 16 0.188 (0.55) 0.584 
TOV 
-0.360 (-2.04) 48 14 0.023 (1.09) 52 16 0.383 (2.41) 0.016 
PIMPACT 
-0.064 (-0.15) 50 17 0.017 (0.83) 48 17 0.081 (0.21) 0.830 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.145 (-1.31) 41 16 -0.220 (-1.84) 45 15 -0.075 (-0.46) 0.646 
TOV 0.202 (2.95) 64 20 0.036 (0.46) 51 15 -0.167 (-1.61) 0.107 
PIMPACT 
-0.232 (-1.20) 47 16 -0.391 (-1.25) 45 18 -0.159 (-0.43) 0.667 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.144 (1.44) 48 15 -0.015 (-0.97) 50 14 -0.159 (-1.36) 0.174 
TOV 
-0.117 (-1.14) 52 17 0.149 (1.61) 53 18 0.266 (1.85) 0.064 
PIMPACT 0.006 (0.89) 48 19 -0.002 (-1.37) 47 16 -0.008 (-0.97) 0.332 
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  Panel C: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with default spread (Business cycle variable). 
Sock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.029 (-1.94) 44 17 -0.017 (-2.62) 47 12 0.013 (0.79) 0.427 
TOV 0.010 (1.48) 51 13 0.034 (6.80) 56 13 0.024 (2.95) 0.003 
PIMPACT 
-0.006 (-0.33) 48 17 -8.82E-05 (-0.02) 50 13 0.006 (0.33) 0.738 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.002 (-0.44) 48 10 -0.002 (-0.36) 45 13 0.000 (0.03) 0.978 
TOV 
-0.009 (-1.11) 49 18 0.023 (2.47) 65 18 0.032 (2.61) 0.009 
PIMPACT 0.058 (2.33) 61 12 -0.063 (-4.48) 23 22 -0.120 (-3.95) 0.000 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.012 (-2.03) 45 12 -0.001 (-0.57) 48 12 0.011 (1.67) 0.096 
TOV 0.052 (7.54) 58 16 0.091 (7.51) 62 17 0.039 (2.90) 0.004 
PIMPACT 
-0.002 (-1.57) 43 15 7.94E-05 (0.39) 44 15 0.002 (1.54) 0.125 
 
   Panel D: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with Size, BM and Default spread (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.156 (0.14) 50 15 0.325 (0.90) 50 14 0.169 (0.16) 0.871 
TOV 0.191 (0.51) 50 15 0.055 (0.25) 51 15 -0.136 (-0.33) 0.739 
PIMPACT 
-0.284 (-0.26) 50 15 0.083 (0.45) 50 14 0.367 (0.38) 0.704 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.599 (1.87) 55 14 -0.691 (-0.19) 53 18 -1.290 (-0.34) 0.733 
TOV 0.184 (0.31) 48 13 -5.950 (-0.78) 45 17 -6.134 (-0.78) 0.433 
PIMPACT 
-0.873 (-0.78) 53 17 -22.976 (-1.59) 51 16 -22.100 (-1.49) 0.137 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.254 (1.06) 50 16 -0.011 (-0.14) 49 18 -0.265 (-0.92) 0.356 
TOV 0.025 (0.10) 50 17 0.296 (0.86) 56 14 0.271 (0.67) 0.505 
PIMPACT 
-0.045 (-1.42) 44 14 0.003 (1.00) 50 17 0.048 (1.31) 0.191 
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Table 3.10 
Fama-MacBeth estimates with Fama-French factors and liquidity as risk factor and time-varying alpha 
This table represents time-series averages of individual stocks’ cross-sectional OLS regression coefficient estimates (Eq. (3.14)) for all securities in the UK, Switzerland and 
Germany. Panel A presents the estimates when the dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return using the unconditional Fama-French model augmented with liquidity factor. 
In panel B the dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return when factor loadings (i.e. betas) are allowed to vary with firm characteristics (i.e. size and book-to-market ratio). 
In panel C the dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return when factor loadings (i.e. betas) are allowed to vary with business cycle variables default spread. In panel D the 
dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return when factor loadings (i.e. betas) are allowed to vary with firm characteristics (i.e. size and book-to-market ratio) and with 
business cycle variable default spread. Liq. Risk Factor is the liquidity risk factor added to Fama-French three factor model, PQSPR is proportional bid-ask spread, TOV is the 
liquidity turnover ratio and PIMPACT is the price impact (Amihud’s 2002 Illiquidity ratio). The construction of liquidity risk factors is explained in section 3.3.4. Floor and 
electronic in the third column in each panel refers to the estimation done during the floor trading system and electronic trading system respectively.  Size represents the 
logarithm of market capitalization; BM is the logarithm of book-to-market ratio; RET2-3, RET4-6, RET7-12 are the past cumulative raw returns over the second through 
third, fourth through sixth, and seventh through twelfth months before the current month;  Prop. Bid-ask is the proportional bid-ask spread calculated as the quoted bid-ask 
spread divided by the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread; Turnover is the turnover ratio measures as the trading value divided by the market capitalization; Price impact is 
the ratio of absolute return divided by the trading value. BBBB
 
is the time-series average of the monthly adjusted R2. T-statistic (reported in parenthesis) are adjusted for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. W-stat. is the Wald test statistic. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, 1% level.  
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Panel A:  Risk adjusted return is unconditional.  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor 0.367 
(1.52) 
-0.394 
(-4.53) *** 
1.640 
(7.36) *** 
1.683 
(0.83) 
0.968 
(0.57) 
-0.015 
(-0.01) 
1.054 
(3.18) *** 
  
8.53% 
Electronic 2.739 
(12.5) *** 
-0.177 
(-0.74) 
1.418 
(4.39) *** 
1.000 
(0.21) 
0.798 
(0.18) 
0.168 
(0.04) 
0.259 
(0.52) 
  
9.02% 
W-stat. 
 117.26*** 0.84 0.47 0.02 0.00 0.00 2.50    
TOV 
Floor -0.396 
(-1.17) 
-0.469 
(-4.18) *** 
1.688 
(6.99) *** 
1.657 
(0.8) 
0.256 
(0.15) 
-0.834 
(-0.56)  
-0.351 
(-1.57) 
 
8.72% 
Electronic 0.939 
(3.82) *** 
-0.206 
(-0.85) 
1.281 
(3.96) *** 
0.613 
(0.13) 
0.463 
(0.11) 
-0.338 
(-0.08)  
0.241 
(0.98) 
 
9.31% 
W-stat. 
 29.46*** 1.17 1.59 0.05 0.00 0.01  5.84**   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.774 
(-2.31) ** 
-0.443 
(-1.74) * 
1.697 
(6.36) *** 
2.073 
(1.05) 
0.633 
(0.36) 
-0.823 
(-0.53)  
 -0.063 
(-0.31) 8.80% 
Electronic 1.643 
(5.93) *** 
-0.067 
(-0.20) 
2.167 
(5.62) *** 
1.119 
(0.22) 
0.990 
(0.22) 
0.310 
(0.07)  
 -0.151 
(-0.93) 9.10% 
W-stat. 
 152.24*** 1.23 1.49 0.04 0.01 0.07   0.29  
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor 5.578 
 (32.39) *** 
0.048 
(0.45) 
0.980 
 (5.21) *** 
4.996 
 (1.78) * 
3.019 
(1.04) 
3.329 
(1.66)* 
1.141 
 (4.26) *** 
  
8.77% 
Electronic 3.530 
 (14.81) *** 
-1.166 
 (-8.64) *** 
-2.128 
 (-6.12) *** 
-0.915 
(-0.25) 
-1.073 
(-0.30) 
4.855 
 (1.67) * 
-0.499 
 (-2.14) ** 
  
17.35% 
W-stat. 
 73.82*** 80.77*** 79.82*** 2.57 1.27 0.27 49.34***    
TOV 
Floor 4.391 
 (21.37) *** 
-0.397 
 (-2.89) *** 
1.050 
 (5.56) *** 
4.288 
 (1.68) * 
2.569 
(1.02) 
1.798 
(0.86)  
-1.116 
 (-7.85) *** 
 
9.33% 
Electronic 4.358 
 (16.48) *** 
-1.425 
 (-9.38) *** 
-2.353 
 (-6.25) *** 
0.412 
(0.11) 
-0.317 
(-0.09) 
6.073 
 (2.09) **  
-0.496 
 (-3.17) *** 
 
18.08% 
W-stat. 
 0.01 45.80*** 81.62*** 1.04 0.60 2.16  15.68***   
PIMPACT 
Floor 3.803 
 (15.78) *** 
0.745 
 (6.29) *** 
0.903 
 (4.99) *** 
5.026 
 (1.94) * 
3.833 
(1.53) 
1.820 
(0.91)  
 1.212 
 (10.34) *** 8.70% 
Electronic 3.377 
 (13.18) *** 
-0.956 
 (-5.56) *** 
-1.958 
 (-5.55) *** 
1.265 
(0.36) 
-0.554 
(-0.16) 
5.224 
 (1.86) *  
 0.302 
 (2.57) ** 17.21% 
W-stat. 
 2.76* 97.93*** 65.83*** 1.16 1.51 1.47   59.74***  
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Panel A (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -3.407 
(-11.23) *** 
0.732 
(5.20) *** 
0.444 
(2.65) *** 
2.094 
(0.91) 
2.780 
(1.29) 
3.607 
(1.98) ** 
2.983 
(8.75) *** 
  
7.02% 
Electronic -4.228 
(-6.05) *** 
2.640 
(6.35) *** 
3.124 
(7.44) *** 
1.901 
(0.96) 
1.404 
(0.83) 
2.602 
(1.60) 
5.715 
(14.51) *** 
  
10.02% 
W-stat. 
 1.38 21.07*** 40.68*** 0.01 0.66 0.38 48.14***    
TOV 
Floor -5.339 
(-9.67) *** 
-0.360 
(-1.99) ** 
1.804 
(2.07) ** 
0.039 
(0.01) 
4.858 
(1.36) 
8.046 
(3.04) ***  
-2.371 
(-8.62) *** 
 
8.81% 
Electronic -5.106 
(-13.8) *** 
1.332 
(10.12) *** 
3.520 
(8.33) *** 
1.323 
(0.64) 
1.559 
(0.84) 
3.169 
(1.91) *  
-2.749 
(-15.72) *** 
 
10.62% 
W-stat. 
 0.40 165.35*** 16.47*** 0.38 3.14* 8.65***  4.68**   
PIMPACT 
Floor -3.856 
(-9.79) *** 
1.676 
(8.45) *** 
1.944 
(2.18) ** 
-1.498 
(-0.38) 
4.151 
(1.21) 
8.349 
(3.00) ***  
 1.558 
(7.15) *** 8.42% 
Electronic -5.429 
(-16.06) *** 
4.158 
(23.15) *** 
3.462 
(8.07) *** 
2.055 
(0.97) 
2.014 
(1.07) 
3.664 
(2.14) **  
 2.305 
(15.82) *** 10.78% 
W-stat. 
 21.65*** 190.88*** 12.52*** 2.81* 1.29 7.48***   26.33***  
 
Panel B:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on size and BM.  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor 0.955 
(3.00) *** 
-0.229 
(-0.93) 
1.689 
(4.76) *** 
8.956 
(1.54) 
8.354 
(1.63)  
3.504 
(1.09) 
2.700 
(2.68) *** 
  
6.12% 
Electronic 1.662 
(3.83) *** 
0.095 
(0.38) 
2.728 
(6.07) *** 
2.142 
(0.43) 
1.080 
(0.22) 
2.562 
(0.60) 
0.237 
(0.36) 
  
5.10% 
W-stat. 
 2.65* 1.71 5.35** 1.85 2.23 0.05 13.75***    
TOV 
Floor 0.046 
(0.05) 
-1.020 
(-3.87) *** 
1.478 
(2.97) *** 
-0.354 
(-0.06) 
10.571 
(1.27) 
5.519 
(0.85)  
-0.238 
(-0.38) 
 
6.91% 
Electronic 1.298 
(2.93) *** 
-0.458 
(-1.59) 
0.930 
(2.11) ** 
-3.456 
(-0.66) 
-1.130 
(-0.23) 
0.908 
(0.21)  
0.641 
(2.34) ** 
 
5.89% 
W-stat. 
 8.00*** 3.82 1.54 0.35 5.60** 1.14  10.28***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.099 
(-0.10) 
-1.405 
(-2.84) *** 
1.164 
(4.51) *** 
0.091 
(0.03) 
-0.867 
(-0.39) 
-2.664 
(-1.37)  
 -0.681 
(-1.88) * 6.42% 
Electronic 1.814 
(4.59) *** 
-0.325 
(-1.15) 
2.820 
(8.73) *** 
-0.283 
(-0.06) 
1.044 
(0.22) 
2.002 
(0.48)  
 -0.408 
(-2.38) ** 5.31% 
W-stat. 
 23.39*** 14.68*** 26.25*** 0.01 0.16 1.26   2.55  
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Panel B (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor 5.977 
(32.69) *** 
-0.225 
(-1.72) * 
-0.137 
(-1.02) 
3.021 
(1.00) 
-1.062 
(-0.32) 
-0.388 
(-0.16) 
0.812 
(2.75) *** 
  
8.69% 
Electronic 1.695 
(6.25) *** 
0.437 
(1.35) 
-0.762 
(-2.41) ** 
-0.647 
(-0.17) 
-0.740 
(-0.20) 
4.357 
(1.76) * 
-0.568 
(-1.43) 
  
13.62% 
W-stat. 
 249.15*** 4.16** 3.91** 0.91 0.01 3.67* 12.14***    
TOV 
Floor 5.660 
(31.62) *** 
-0.614 
(-5.47) *** 
-0.082 
(-0.60) 
2.757 
(0.98) 
0.272 
(0.09) 
-0.166 
(-0.07)  
-0.639 
(-4.50) *** 
 
6.35% 
Electronic 1.706 
(6.22) *** 
-0.206 
(-0.64) 
-0.641 
(-2.26) ** 
1.359 
(0.31) 
1.411 
(0.33) 
7.287 
(2.80) ***  
-1.822 
(-8.32) *** 
 
14.97% 
W-stat. 
 207.81*** 1.61 3.90** 0.10 0.07 8.17***  29.21***   
PIMPACT 
Floor 4.753 
(20.06) *** 
0.678 
(5.01) *** 
-0.474 
(-3.75) *** 
2.127 
(0.77) 
-0.001 
(0.00) 
-2.335 
(-1.08)  
 0.926 
(7.23) *** 5.42% 
Electronic 0.982 
(3.10) *** 
1.126 
(3.04) *** 
0.131 
(0.46) 
0.709 
(0.18) 
-0.002 
(0.00) 
5.262 
(2.38) **  
 0.748 
(5.38) *** 12.50% 
W-stat. 
 141.55*** 1.46 4.48** 0.13 0.00 11.80***   1.64  
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -2.180 
(-11.50) *** 
0.713 
(5.96) *** 
1.284 
(5.32) *** 
2.739 
(1.22) 
3.915 
(1.81) * 
4.844 
(2.90) *** 
3.987 
(12.27) *** 
  
5.98% 
Electronic -2.080 
(-3.45) *** 
1.914 
(4.97) *** 
4.589 
(10.15) *** 
3.229 
(1.66) * 
3.343 
(1.96) * 
3.347 
(2.23) ** 
5.505 
(14.25) *** 
  
10.88% 
W-stat. 
 0.03 9.71*** 53.46*** 0.06 0.11 1.00 15.44***    
TOV 
Floor -4.772 
(-11.41) *** 
-0.629 
(-3.16) *** 
1.911 
(1.90) * 
1.598 
(0.45) 
6.508 
(1.91) * 
9.880 
(3.71) ***  
-2.486 
(-9.96) *** 
 
6.96% 
Electronic -2.298 
(-5.07) *** 
0.464 
(2.49) ** 
5.015 
(9.23) *** 
2.618 
(1.30) 
3.616 
(1.90) * 
3.789 
(2.54) **  
-2.424 
(-21.78) *** 
 
9.85% 
W-stat. 
 29.78*** 34.38*** 32.61*** 0.25 2.3 16.62***  0.31   
PIMPACT 
Floor -3.094 
(-12.44) *** 
1.549 
(7.85) *** 
2.067 
(2.25) ** 
-0.754 
(-0.20) 
4.564 
(1.47) 
8.367 
(3.48) ***  
 1.751 
(8.33) *** 6.30% 
Electronic -3.080 
(-7.64) *** 
3.110 
(14.56) *** 
3.314 
(6.84) *** 
4.005 
(1.92) * 
3.660 
(1.95) * 
3.304 
(2.19) **  
 2.017 
(18.12) *** 8.55% 
W-stat. 
 0.00 53.38*** 6.62*** 5.22** 0.23 11.22***   5.73**  
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Panel C:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on default spread (business cycle variable).  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor 0.991 
(3.96) *** 
-0.528 
(-6.61) *** 
1.512 
(7.00) *** 
1.093 
(0.54) 
0.666 
(0.38) 
-0.486 
(-0.33) 
1.439 
(4.64) *** 
  
9.26% 
Electronic 3.180 
(11.97) *** 
-0.155 
(-0.56) 
0.955 
(2.78) *** 
0.244 
(0.05) 
0.327 
(0.07) 
0.353 
(0.08) 
0.121 
(0.24) 
  
8.23% 
W-stat. 
 67.93*** 1.84 2.62 0.03 0.01 0.04 6.95***    
TOV 
Floor -0.343 
(-1.00) 
-0.474 
(-3.99) *** 
1.694 
(6.75) *** 
1.020 
(0.47) 
0.263 
(0.15) 
-1.394 
(-0.91)  
-0.403 
(-1.76) * 
 
9.19% 
Electronic 1.379 
(6.28) *** 
-0.085 
(-0.36) 
1.037 
(3.05) *** 
0.072 
(0.01) 
-0.100 
(-0.02) 
-0.253 
(-0.06)  
0.293 
(1.29) 
 
8.85% 
W-stat. 
 61.50*** 2.73* 3.74* 0.04 0.01 0.07  9.41***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.507 
(-1.86) * 
-0.415 
(-1.54) 
1.876 
(6.49) *** 
1.417 
(0.68) 
0.287 
(0.16) 
-1.412 
(-0.88)  
 0.051 
(0.25) 9.40% 
Electronic 2.361 
(8.69) *** 
-0.061 
(-0.20) 
1.570 
(3.83) *** 
0.372 
(0.07) 
0.391 
(0.08) 
0.230 
(0.05)  
 -0.096 
(-0.65) 8.76% 
W-stat. 
 202.54*** 1.32 0.55 0.04 0.00 0.13   0.98  
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor 5.754 
 (32.71) *** 
-0.177 
(-1.62) 
0.974 
 (5.90) *** 
4.956 
 (1.85) * 
2.505 
(0.83) 
2.834 
(1.31) 
0.965 
 (3.26) *** 
  
9.31% 
Electronic 4.097 
 (17.18) *** 
-1.371 
 (-9.74) *** 
-2.367 
 (-6.31) *** 
-0.954 
(-0.25) 
-1.334 
(-0.35) 
5.893 
 (2.01) ** 
-0.625 
 (-2.62) ** 
  
16.77% 
W-stat. 
 48.25*** 71.89*** 79.22*** 2.36 1.02 1.09 44.33***    
TOV 
Floor 5.343 
 (27.49) *** 
-0.505 
 (-3.75) *** 
1.048 
 (6.17) *** 
3.681 
(1.43) 
2.400 
(0.90) 
1.421 
(0.63)  
-0.957 
 (-6.85) *** 
 
9.55% 
Electronic 4.438 
 (16.03) *** 
-1.537 
 (-9.60) *** 
-2.515 
 (-6.04) *** 
0.214 
(0.05) 
-0.449 
(-0.11) 
6.378 
 (2.13) **  
-0.597 
 (-3.83) *** 
 
18.47% 
W-stat. 
 10.69*** 41.56*** 73.17** 0.75 0.51 2.73*  5.32**   
PIMPACT 
Floor 5.523 
 (22.92) *** 
0.368 
 (3.12) *** 
1.014 
 (6.29) *** 
5.054 
 (1.96) * 
3.697 
(1.35) 
1.529 
(0.68)   
0.880 
 (6.94) *** 9.00% 
Electronic 4.312 
 (13.14) *** 
-0.906 
 (-4.96) *** 
-2.434 
 (-5.30) *** 
0.803 
(0.21) 
-1.154 
(-0.30) 
6.591 
 (2.27) **   
0.628 
 (5.19) *** 17.28% 
W-stat. 
 13.64*** 48.58*** 56.49*** 1.19 1.63 3.03*   4.36**  
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Panel C (Continued)  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -2.980 
(-10.15) *** 
0.794 
(5.82) *** 
0.237 
(1.44) 
1.414 
(0.62) 
2.317 
(1.10) 
3.312 
(1.85) * 
3.066 
(8.83) *** 
  
6.68% 
Electronic -3.243 
(-3.53) *** 
1.846 
(2.78) *** 
2.369 
(5.74) *** 
2.148 
(1.04) 
1.500 
(0.83) 
2.134 
(1.32) 
5.077 
(14.40) *** 
  
8.76% 
W-stat. 
 0.08 2.51 26.65*** 0.13 0.21 0.53 32.54***    
TOV 
Floor -5.630 
(-12.14) *** 
-0.206 
(-1.14) 
1.513 
(1.77) * 
0.464 
(0.14) 
4.426 
(1.32) 
7.101 
(3.03) ***  
-2.345 
(-8.65) *** 
 
9.02% 
Electronic -5.792 
(-15.52) *** 
1.486 
(10.84) *** 
3.357 
(8.05) *** 
1.661 
(0.78) 
1.443 
(0.77) 
2.669 
(1.61)  
-2.468 
(-14.68) *** 
 
10.19% 
W-stat. 
 0.19 152.29*** 19.57*** 0.32 2.56 7.14***  0.53   
PIMPACT 
Floor -3.552 
(-8.45) *** 
1.571 
(8.04) *** 
1.589 
(1.69) * 
-1.851 
(-0.48) 
4.182 
(1.14) 
8.244 
(2.89) ***  
 1.431 
(6.50) *** 7.66% 
Electronic -4.091 
(-13.17) *** 
3.464 
(18.65) *** 
2.931 
(6.73) *** 
2.473 
(1.11) 
2.000 
(1.03) 
3.670 
(2.17) **  
 2.013 
(15.08) *** 9.36% 
W-stat. 
 3.01* 103.89*** 9.49*** 3.77* 1.25 7.31***   18.97***  
 
Panel D:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on size, BM and default spread (business cycle variable).  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.070 
(-0.24) 
0.295 
(1.02) 
1.840 
(3.34) *** 
-2.136 
(-0.62) 
-3.720 
(-1.12) 
-0.818 
(-0.30) 
2.216 
(2.86) *** 
  
4.31% 
Electronic 2.925 
(5.02) *** 
1.310 
(3.02) *** 
1.895 
(3.09) *** 
0.037 
(0.01) 
0.621 
(0.11) 
1.156 
(0.25) 
2.636 
(2.99) *** 
  
3.38% 
W-stat. 
 26.39*** 5.49** 0.01 0.13 0.62 0.18 0.23    
TOV 
Floor 0.510 
(1.04) 
-0.487 
(-3.19) *** 
2.020 
(3.72) *** 
0.445 
(0.11) 
-1.916 
(-0.51) 
-1.800 
(-0.61)  
-0.188 
(-0.47) 
 
6.57% 
Electronic 0.065 
(0.23) 
0.166 
(0.56) 
1.751 
(4.61) *** 
-1.314 
(-0.24) 
-0.049 
(-0.01) 
1.722 
(0.36)  
0.094 
(0.32) 
 
3.87% 
W-stat. 
 2.52 4.92** 0.50 0.10 0.12 0.56  0.95   
PIMPACT 
Floor -2.058 
(-1.72) * 
-0.028 
(-0.07) 
2.699 
(4.45) *** 
0.955 
(0.32) 
0.014 
(0.00) 
0.485 
(0.23)  
 0.429 
(1.36) 8.06% 
Electronic 1.212 
(3.91) *** 
-0.791 
(-1.33) 
2.532 
(6.68) *** 
2.598 
(0.43) 
4.532 
(0.75) 
5.404 
(1.02)  
 -0.940 
(-2.72) *** 3.24% 
W-stat. 
 111.00*** 1.65 0.19 0.07 0.56 0.86   15.75***  
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Panel D (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor 5.851 
 (38.13) *** 
0.011 
(0.09) 
0.061 
(0.28) 
4.274 
(1.29) 
1.472 
(0.46) 
1.265 
(0.54) 
1.504 
 (5.77) *** 
  
5.84% 
Electronic 2.741 
 (6.14) *** 
1.203 
(1.51) 
2.725 
 (2.11) ** 
24.027 
 (2.37) ** 
16.377 
 (2.00) ** 
22.938 
 (3.67) *** 
6.241 
 (3.66) *** 
  
8.51% 
W-stat. 
 48.47*** 2.25 4.25** 3.79* 3.30* 12.01*** 7.72***    
TOV 
Floor 4.558 
 (25.79) *** 
-0.304 
 (-2.43) ** 
0.808 
 (3.76) *** 
2.852 
(0.98) 
1.735 
(0.59) 
0.831 
(0.35)  
-0.438 
 (-3.34) *** 
 
4.48% 
Electronic 4.103 
 (11.54) *** 
-1.942 
 (-6.93) *** 
-0.977 
 (-2.16) ** 
7.365 
 (1.73) * 
0.387 
(0.09) 
6.802 
 (2.15) **  
0.407 
(0.99) 
 
7.50% 
W-stat. 
 1.64 34.20*** 15.57*** 1.13 0.10 3.56*  4.24**   
PIMPACT 
Floor 5.347 
 (24.7) *** 
0.711 
 (5.11) *** 
-0.060 
(-0.36) 
2.551 
(1.00) 
1.000 
(0.35) 
-1.335 
(-0.60)   
0.645 
 (5.03) *** 3.76% 
Electronic 2.983 
 (5.81) *** 
0.916 
(1.28) 
0.898 
(1.40) 
17.022 
 (2.37) ** 
3.071 
(0.50) 
14.219 
 (2.94) ***   
1.019 
 (1.89) * 8.45% 
W-stat. 
 21.24*** 0.08 2.22 4.05** 0.11 10.35***   0.48  
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -1.305 
(-4.76) *** 
0.732 
(3.61) *** 
0.457 
(1.55) 
1.425 
(0.63) 
2.554 
(1.19) 
3.742 
(2.32) *** 
4.077 
(8.97) *** 
  
3.97% 
Electronic 0.693 
(0.62) 
0.482 
(0.51) 
3.593 
(6.88) *** 
2.182 
(1.04) 
1.813 
(0.95) 
2.832 
(1.82) * 
4.867 
(10.5) *** 
  
8.11% 
W-stat. 
 3.17*** 0.07 36.01*** 0.13 0.15 0.34 2.90*    
TOV 
Floor -3.788 
(-10.37) *** 
-0.797 
(-4.74) *** 
0.913 
(1.05) 
1.022 
(0.34) 
4.625 
(1.64) * 
6.787 
(3.77) ***  
-2.836 
(-9.88) *** 
 
4.79% 
Electronic -1.272 
(-3.14) *** 
0.148 
(0.80) 
3.752 
(6.63) *** 
0.535 
(0.24) 
1.075 
(0.55) 
2.579 
(1.58)  
-2.012 
(-12.81) *** 
 
7.22% 
W-stat. 
 38.61*** 26.01*** 25.13*** 0.05 3.27* 6.67***  27.48***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.777 
(-1.27) 
1.150 
(3.97) *** 
0.613 
(1.05) 
-0.862 
(-0.28) 
1.348 
(0.51) 
5.703 
(2.79) ***  
 1.659 
(6.87) *** 0.01% 
Electronic -0.801 
(-2.00) ** 
2.965 
(10.97) *** 
2.870 
(5.45) *** 
2.686 
(1.05) 
1.700 
(0.78) 
3.229 
(1.97) *  
 2.089 
(11.68) *** 7.88% 
W-stat. 
 0.00 45.11*** 18.37*** 1.92 0.03 2.28   5.78**  
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Appendix  
Supplementary empirical information  
 
Appendix 3A 
The testable hypotheses, their acceptance or rejection, and the justification 
Hypothesis Status (accepted/ rejected) The reason 
H1: In asset pricing aggregate market liquidity is a priced risk 
factor (i.e. has a significant positive effect on current stock’s 
excess returns). 
Accepted 
Turnover ratio (proportional bid-ask spread and price impact) has a 
significant positive (negative) effect on current stock’s excess 
returns. 
H2: Firm specific liquidity has an additional premium (i.e. firm-
specific liquidity is negatively and significantly related to risk-
adjusted returns) after controlling for all risk factors including the 
market-wide liquidity risk factor.   
Accepted 
Firm-specific turnover ratio (proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact) has a significant negative (positive) effect on current 
stock’s excess returns. 
H3: Pricing of aggregate market liquidity (i.e. the relationship 
between market liquidity and stock excess returns) is not different 
before the introduction of an electronic trading system than after 
the introduction of an electronic trading system. 
Rejected 
 
The size of the coefficients of market liquidity measures is 
significantly different across trading systems / some of the 
coefficients become significant or insignificant after the 
automation. 
H4: The premium on firm-specific liquidity is not different before 
the introduction of an electronic trading system than that after the 
introduction of an electronic trading system. 
Rejected 
 
The size of the coefficients of firm-specific liquidity measures is 
significantly different across trading systems / some of the 
coefficients become significant or insignificant after the 
automation. 
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Appendix 3B 
Robust test: Statistics of individual coefficients of market liquidity risk factors 
estimated by conditional asset pricing model  
Among the other risk factors and control factors, this table reports the cross-sectional average of the time-series slope 
coefficients of market-wide liquidity risk factors with their associated t-statistics. These coefficients are estimated by 
running the first-pass time-series regression (Eq. (3.12)) for each firm during the floor trading period and the electronic 
trading period. Liquidity risk factors include PQSPR is proportional bid-ask spread, TOV is the liquidity turnover ratio and 
PIMPACT is the price impact (Amihud’s 2002 Illiquidity ratio). The construction of liquidity risk factors is explained in 
section 3.3.4. “Pos” reports the percentage of positive slope coefficients, while “Sig” gives the percentage of the 
coefficients that are significant at 10% of significance or higher. The last three columns present the difference in the mean 
between electronic and floor trading systems with the t-value and p-value of the null hypothesis that the difference in the 
mean is equal to zero. 
 
Panel C-1: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with term spread (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) PQSPR -0.026 (-6.25) 37 21 -0.022 (-6.63) 39 15 0.004 (0.83) 0.408 
TOV 
-0.001 (-0.39) 47 14 0.011 (4.83) 53 17 0.012 (3.57) 0.000 
PIMPACT 
-0.014 (-2.49) 48 15 -0.003 (-1.40) 46 16 0.011 (1.92) 0.055 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) PQSPR -0.011 (-3.83) 36 15 -0.026 (-4.02) 30 23 -0.015 (-2.26) 0.024 
TOV 0.020 (5.54) 69 23 -0.027 (-2.74) 40 13 -0.047 (-4.90) 0.000 
PIMPACT 
-0.032 (-3.25) 44 15 -0.086 (-2.50) 39 24 -0.055 (-1.67) 0.095 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.022 (-3.97) 40 15 0.005 (2.16) 50 12 0.027 (4.33) 0.000 
TOV 0.025 (4.85) 58 18 0.009 (1.43) 49 14 -0.016 (-1.92) 0.055 
PIMPACT 
-0.001 (-1.68) 46 13 3.10E-06 (0.06) 53 12 0.001 (1.58) 0.114 
 
     Panel C-2: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with yield (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) PQSPR -0.070 (-4.35) 39 20 0.009 (0.45) 47 13 0.079 (3.06) 0.002 
TOV 
-0.027 (-2.79) 48 14 0.029 (1.75) 55 16 0.056 (2.86) 0.004 
PIMPACT 
-0.037 (-1.81) 47 15 0.026 (2.70) 56 17 0.062 (2.84) 0.005 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) PQSPR 0.014 (1.57) 60 12 -0.004 (-0.73) 51 14 -0.018 (-1.62) 0.106 
TOV 
-0.020 (-2.08) 48 18 0.017 (1.60) 60 16 0.038 (2.58) 0.010 
PIMPACT 0.015 (0.53) 51 10 -0.047 (-3.17) 45 25 -0.062 (-1.80) 0.072 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.005 (0.62) 54 13 -0.001 (-0.29) 50 13 -0.007 (-0.65) 0.513 
TOV 0.026 (2.28) 55 17 0.074 (4.11) 57 13 0.049 (2.33) 0.020 
PIMPACT 1.86E-04 (0.20) 47 15 8.46E-05 (0.66) 48 12 0.000 (-0.10) 0.918 
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Panel C-3: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with dividends yield (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) PQSPR -0.131 (-4.82) 39 22 -0.089 (-2.68) 44 14 0.041 (0.95) 0.343 
TOV 
-0.004 (-0.23) 48 15 -0.015 (-0.66) 49 17 -0.011 (-0.38) 0.703 
PIMPACT 
-0.080 (-2.10) 52 16 -0.020 (-1.41) 41 22 0.060 (1.51) 0.130 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) PQSPR 0.013 (0.73) 56 22 0.018 (1.24) 58 12 0.005 (0.19) 0.849 
TOV 
-0.039 (-1.74) 47 14 0.075 (3.28) 64 19 0.114 (3.53) 0.000 
PIMPACT 
-0.246 (-3.94) 38 21 -0.057 (-0.91) 50 15 0.188 (2.09) 0.037 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.001 (0.06) 48 15 0.010 (2.37) 53 18 0.009 (0.59) 0.552 
TOV 0.008 (0.42) 50 19 0.046 (1.28) 50 10 0.038 (0.97) 0.333 
PIMPACT 
-0.003 (-2.40) 51 16 -1.26E-04 (-0.92) 50 18 0.003 (2.14) 0.032 
 
Panel D-1: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with size, BM and term spread (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) PQSPR -0.237 (-0.55) 48 16 -0.346 (-1.21) 48 14 -0.109 (-0.22) 0.828 
TOV 0.283 (1.75) 52 14 0.364 (1.57) 52 15 0.081 (0.27) 0.788 
PIMPACT 
-0.374 (-1.52) 50 17 -0.003 (-0.03) 49 16 0.371 (1.47) 0.142 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) PQSPR -0.129 (-0.78) 51 16 1.123 (0.94) 50 16 1.252 (1.03) 0.304 
TOV 0.154 (0.77) 57 15 -1.320 (-1.23) 45 19 -1.474 (-1.34) 0.182 
PIMPACT 
-0.986 (-1.24) 50 16 2.167 (0.63) 53 18 3.154 (0.88) 0.377 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.344 (0.81) 49 19 -0.023 (-0.43) 49 15 -0.367 (-0.74) 0.460 
TOV 
-0.740 (-1.18) 50 16 -0.098 (-0.26) 50 19 0.643 (0.80) 0.421 
PIMPACT 
-0.017 (-0.99) 48 15 0.001 (0.80) 48 19 0.018 (0.90) 0.368 
 
 Panel D-2: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with size, BM and yield (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) PQSPR -2.381 (-1.96) 50 15 -11.634 (-1.25) 50 15 -9.254 (-0.86) 0.390 
TOV 1.148 (1.15) 52 16 0.264 (0.29) 50 18 -0.884 (-0.65) 0.519 
PIMPACT 1.376 (0.45) 51 15 -1.352 (-1.10) 50 17 -2.729 (-0.91) 0.361 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) PQSPR 1.010 (1.47) 56 16 -0.307 (-0.38) 47 12 -1.317 (-1.23) 0.218 
TOV 1.703 (1.65) 49 15 2.952 (1.21) 47 19 1.249 (0.47) 0.640 
PIMPACT 1.336 (0.79) 52 19 0.059 (0.02) 52 15 -1.278 (-0.44) 0.663 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.333 (-0.39) 48 16 0.064 (0.45) 51 15 0.396 (0.4) 0.692 
TOV 
-1.982 (-0.87) 54 17 0.581 (0.55) 50 16 2.564 (0.91) 0.362 
PIMPACT 
-4.15E-04 (-0.01) 48 14 -9.70E-05 (-0.04) 49 16 0.000 (0.00) 0.997 
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Panel D-3: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with size, BM and dividends yield (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) PQSPR -1.468 (-0.52) 51 15 -0.087 (-0.07) 50 14 1.380 (0.49) 0.627 
TOV 0.783 (0.63) 51 17 0.126 (0.12) 52 15 -0.656 (-0.41) 0.685 
PIMPACT 
-1.532 (-0.74) 50 17 0.783 (0.77) 51 17 2.315 (1.08) 0.280 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) PQSPR -2.230 (-1.51) 49 20 -8.670 (-1.64) 44 13 -6.440 (-1.17) 0.244 
TOV 4.146 (1.84) 53 19 -11.583 (-1.87) 44 15 -15.730 (-2.37) 0.018 
PIMPACT 
-4.203 (-0.55) 51 20 -16.212 (-1.5) 54 18 -12.010 (-0.91) 0.364 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.088 (-0.06) 52 16 -0.381 (-1.34) 51 15 -0.293 (-0.18) 0.855 
TOV 2.155 (0.66) 49 15 0.275 (0.14) 51 21 -1.880 (-0.45) 0.656 
PIMPACT 0.051 (0.44) 50 14 0.012 (1.50) 51 17 -0.039 (-0.29) 0.773 
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Appendix 3C 
Robust Test: Fama-MacBeth estimates with Fama-French factors and liquidity as risk factor 
This table represents time-series averages of individual stocks’ cross-sectional OLS regression coefficient estimates (Eq. (3.14)) for all securities in the UK, Switzerland and 
Germany as a result of robust tests using different business cycle variables (such as term spread, short-term interest rate and dividends yield) as conditioning variables. Panel 
C-1, C-2, C-3 presents the estimates when the dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return when factor loadings (i.e. betas) are allowed to vary with business cycle variables 
term spread, short-term interest rate and dividends yield respectively. In panel D-1, D-2, D-3 the dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return when factor loadings (i.e. betas) 
are allowed to vary with firm characteristics (i.e. size and book-to-market ratio) and with business cycle variable term spread, short-term interest rate and dividends yield 
respectively. Liq. Risk Factor is the liquidity risk factor added to Fama-French three factor model, PQSPR is proportional bid-ask spread, TOV is the liquidity turnover ratio 
and PIMPACT is the price impact (Amihud’s 2002 Illiquidity ratio). The construction of liquidity risk factors is explained in section 3.3.4. Floor and electronic in the third 
column in each panel refers to the estimation done during the floor trading system and electronic trading system respectively.  Size represents the logarithm of market 
capitalization; BM is the logarithm of book-to-market ratio; RET2-3, RET4-6, RET7-12 are the past cumulative raw returns over the second through third, fourth through 
sixth, and seventh through twelfth months before the current month;  Prop. Bid-ask is the proportional bid-ask spread calculated as the quoted bid-ask spread divided by the 
midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread; Turnover is the turnover ratio measures as the trading value divided by the market capitalization; Price impact is the ratio of absolute 
return divided by the trading value.
 
BBBB is the time-series average of the monthly adjusted R2. T-statistic (reported in parenthesis) are adjusted for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. W-stat. is the Wald test statistic. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, 1% level.  
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     Panel C-1:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on term spread (business cycle variable).  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.355 
(-3.62) *** 
-0.148 
(-3.39) *** 
0.483 
(7.79) *** 
1.720 
(3.23) *** 
1.371 
(3.23) *** 
1.110 
(3.8) *** 
-0.598 
(-5.96) *** 
  
2.63% 
Electronic -0.764 
(-6.27) *** 
-0.005 
(-0.12) 
0.867 
(10.46) *** 
2.590 
(6.64) *** 
1.432 
(4.02) *** 
1.111 
(4.93) *** 
-0.341 
(-3.59) *** 
  
2.32% 
W-stat. 
 11.27*** 9.85*** 21.40*** 4.98** 0.03 0.00 7.29***    
TOV 
Floor -0.985 
(-5.45) *** 
0.116 
(2.52) ** 
0.565 
(6.42) *** 
2.508 
(3.82) *** 
2.074 
(3.08) *** 
1.925 
(4.18) ***  
0.055 
(0.62) 
 
4.31% 
Electronic -0.864 
(-6.13) *** 
0.171 
(3.52) *** 
0.864 
(10.66) *** 
2.765 
(5.83) *** 
1.400 
(4.18) *** 
1.075 
(4.71) ***  
-0.039 
(-0.72) 
 
2.49% 
W-stat. 
 0.74 1.28 13.60*** 0.29 4.03** 13.85***  3.00*   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.051 
(-3.26) *** 
0.078 
(0.83) 
0.523 
(5.93) *** 
2.274 
(3.37) *** 
1.997 
(2.94) *** 
1.795 
(3.89) ***  
 -0.027 
(-0.35) 3.96% 
Electronic -0.891 
(-6.00) *** 
0.114 
(1.64) * 
0.857 
(9.85) *** 
2.256 
(4.66) *** 
1.553 
(4.66) *** 
1.190 
(4.86) ***  
 -0.052 
(-1.28) 2.57% 
W-stat. 
 1.15 0.27 14.78*** 0.00 1.78 6.11**   0.38  
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor -0.811 
 (-4.17) *** 
0.048 
(0.57) 
0.349 
 (2.83) *** 
2.857 
 (2.67) *** 
1.809 
 (1.82) * 
1.888 
 (2.38) ** 
0.174 
(1.13) 
  
5.19% 
Electronic -0.243 
(-1.18) 
0.111 
(1.14) 
0.509 
 (3.62) *** 
2.799 
 (2.08) ** 
1.466 
(1.25) 
1.429 
 (1.94) * 
0.145 
(1.05) 
  
8.54% 
W-stat. 
 7.64*** 0.43 1.31 0.00 0.09 0.39 0.04    
TOV 
Floor -0.859 
 (-4.15) *** 
-0.044 
(-0.62) 
0.305 
 (2.90) *** 
2.509 
 (2.41) ** 
1.218 
(1.38) 
1.585 
 (2.01) **  
-0.160 
 (-2.24) ** 
 
4.35% 
Electronic -0.262 
(-1.18) 
0.091 
(0.97) 
0.532 
 (3.65) *** 
3.409 
 (3.05) *** 
2.235 
 (2.01) ** 
1.619 
 (2.16) **  
-0.128 
 (-1.76) * 
 
8.55% 
W-stat. 
 7.20*** 2.09 2.43 0.65 0.83 0.00  0.19   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.902 
 (-4.00) *** 
0.100 
(1.16) 
0.359 
 (3.17) *** 
2.458 
 (2.32) ** 
1.574 
 (1.77) * 
1.808 
 (2.34) **   
0.099 
(1.32) 4.32% 
Electronic -0.266 
(-1.26) 
0.162 
(1.66)* 
0.517 
 (3.56) *** 
3.905 
 (3.49) *** 
1.791 
 (1.68) * 
1.608 
 (2.38) **   
0.019 
(0.25) 8.43% 
W-stat. 
 9.09*** 0.40 1.18 1.67 0.04 0.09   1.11  
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     Panel C -1(Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.243 
(-1.47) 
0.093 
(1.56) 
0.377 
(3.04) *** 
0.946 
(1.70) * 
1.638 
(3.77) *** 
0.800 
(2.38) ** 
0.029 
(0.23) 
  
3.86% 
Electronic -0.514 
(-1.40) 
0.533 
(1.37) 
0.599 
(2.87) *** 
1.321 
(1.87) * 
1.391 
(2.22) ** 
0.355 
(0.75) 
-0.067 
(-0.41) 
  
4.78% 
W-stat. 
 0.55 1.28 1.13 0.28 0.15 0.88 0.34    
TOV 
Floor -0.252 
(-1.39) 
-0.077 
(-1.18) 
0.566 
(1.97) * 
-0.576 
(-0.44) 
0.730 
(0.80) 
1.370 
(1.15)  
-0.238 
(-1.86) * 
 
3.56% 
Electronic -0.525 
(-2.28) ** 
0.112 
(1.68) * 
0.615 
(2.92) *** 
1.151 
(1.45) 
1.376 
(2.26) ** 
0.689 
(1.51)  
-0.221 
(-2.92) *** 
 
5.12% 
W-stat. 
 1.41 8.08*** 0.05 4.7** 1.13 2.23  0.05   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.077 
(-0.37) 
0.080 
(0.52) 
0.593 
(2.01) ** 
-0.957 
(-0.65) 
1.004 
(1.39) 
1.555 
(1.41)  
 0.072 
(0.58) 3.75% 
Electronic -0.542 
(-2.28) ** 
0.243 
(1.96) * 
0.517 
(2.37) ** 
1.111 
(1.34) 
1.656 
(2.60) ** 
0.540 
(1.14)  
 0.113 
(1.68) * 5.25% 
W-stat. 
 3.82** 1.73 0.12 6.26** 1.05 4.62   0.37  
 
     Panel C-2:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on Yield (business cycle variable).  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.383 
(-4.01) *** 
-0.143 
(-3.31) *** 
0.488 
(7.86) *** 
1.796 
(3.48) *** 
1.337 
(3.18) *** 
1.110 
(3.76) *** 
-0.596 
(-6.01) *** 
  
2.62% 
Electronic -0.773 
(-6.36) *** 
-0.005 
(-0.11) 
0.905 
(10.75) *** 
2.724 
(6.75) *** 
1.550 
(4.41) *** 
1.122 
(4.97) *** 
-0.353 
(-3.81) *** 
  
2.42% 
W-stat. 
 10.32*** 8.96*** 24.50*** 5.29** 0.37 0.00 6.87***    
TOV 
Floor -1.003 
(-5.45) *** 
0.121 
(2.59) ** 
0.576 
(6.52) *** 
2.621 
(3.96) *** 
2.071 
(3.11) *** 
1.931 
(4.25) ***  
0.055 
(0.61) 
 
4.28% 
Electronic -0.892 
(-6.37) *** 
0.186 
(3.78) *** 
0.903 
(10.97) *** 
2.865 
(5.83) *** 
1.487 
(4.58) *** 
1.095 
(4.71) ***  
-0.051 
(-0.96) 
 
2.58% 
W-stat. 
 0.63 1.73 15.73*** 0.25 3.24* 12.93***  3.95**   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.072 
(-3.26) *** 
0.086 
(0.91) 
0.536 
(6.02) *** 
2.320 
(3.41) *** 
1.984 
(2.94) *** 
1.790 
(3.84) ***  
 -0.026 
(-0.34) 3.98% 
Electronic -0.920 
(-6.22) *** 
0.121 
(1.76) * 
0.900 
(10.07) *** 
2.414 
(4.96) *** 
1.657 
(5.05) *** 
1.257 
(5.22) ***  
 -0.055 
(-1.41) 2.65% 
W-stat. 
 1.05 0.26 16.59*** 0.04 0.99 4.90**   0.56  
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     Panel C-2 (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.799 
 (-4.34) *** 
0.022 
(0.25) 
0.324 
 (2.64) *** 
2.936 
 (2.74) *** 
1.954 
 (2.00) ** 
1.729 
 (2.18) ** 
0.166 
(1.08) 
  
5.38% 
Electronic -0.285 
(-1.36) 
0.096 
(0.99) 
0.623 
 (4.19) *** 
2.458 
 (1.99) ** 
1.153 
(1.03) 
1.691 
 (2.46) ** 
0.177 
(1.28) 
  
8.15% 
W-stat. 
 6.05** 0.59 4.03** 0.15 0.51 0.00 0.01    
TOV 
Floor -0.817 
 (-4.09) *** 
-0.071 
(-0.97) 
0.262 
 (2.50) ** 
2.627 
 (2.51) ** 
1.406 
(1.59) 
1.488 
 (1.89) *  
-0.157 
 (-2.30) ** 
 
4.49% 
Electronic -0.397 
 (-1.82) * 
0.081 
(0.88) 
0.670 
 (4.45) *** 
3.156 
 (2.82) *** 
2.206 
 (2.05) ** 
1.611 
 (2.17) **  
-0.141 
 (-1.97) * 
 
8.07% 
W-stat. 
 3.74* 2.69* 7.37*** 0.22 0.55 0.03  0.05   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.824 
 (-3.81) *** 
0.051 
(0.59) 
0.340 
 (3.13) *** 
2.464 
 (2.29) ** 
1.749 
 (1.95) * 
1.826 
 (2.37) **   
0.092 
(1.27) 4.48% 
Electronic -0.363 
 (-1.79) * 
0.121 
(1.35) 
0.588 
 (3.96) *** 
3.946 
 (3.76) *** 
1.715 
 (1.67) * 
1.900 
 (2.96) ***   
-0.004 
(-0.06) 7.97% 
W-stat. 
 5.16** 0.60 2.79* 2.00 0.00 0.01   1.77  
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.237 
(-1.47) 
0.096 
(1.78) * 
0.395 
(3.27) *** 
1.137 
(2.03) ** 
1.754 
(3.94) *** 
0.954 
(3.04) *** 
0.049 
(0.41) 
  
3.78% 
Electronic -0.460 
(-1.37) 
0.541 
(1.42) 
0.620 
(3.13) *** 
1.569 
(2.34) ** 
1.494 
(2.47) ** 
0.569 
(1.24) 
-0.031 
(-0.19) 
  
4.60% 
W-stat. 
 0.44 1.36 1.29 0.41 0.18 0.71 0.25    
TOV 
Floor -0.130 
(-0.69) 
-0.086 
(-1.33) 
0.548 
(1.91) * 
-0.617 
(-0.49) 
0.895 
(1.04) 
1.378 
(1.24)  
-0.239 
(-1.78) * 
 
3.44% 
Electronic -0.440 
(-1.96) * 
0.089 
(1.41) 
0.656 
(3.21) *** 
1.537 
(1.91) * 
1.506 
(2.57) ** 
0.663 
(1.47)  
-0.236 
(-3.17) *** 
 
4.93% 
W-stat. 
 1.9 7.68*** 0.28 7.19*** 1.09 2.52  0.00   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.088 
(-0.39) 
0.115 
(0.71) 
0.632 
(2.00) ** 
-0.727 
(-0.49) 
1.100 
(1.54) 
1.699 
(1.45)  
 0.098 
(0.74) 3.87% 
Electronic -0.451 
(-1.92) * 
0.243 
(1.98) ** 
0.594 
(2.84) *** 
1.307 
(1.59) 
1.757 
(2.86) *** 
0.684 
(1.46)  
 0.131 
(1.86) * 5.19% 
W-stat. 
 2.38 1.08 0.03 6.15** 1.15 4.70**   0.22  
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     Panel C-3:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on Dividends yield (business cycle variable).  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.423 
(-4.71) *** 
-0.138 
(-3.43) *** 
0.467 
(7.41) *** 
1.865 
(3.63) *** 
1.395 
(3.26) *** 
1.266 
(4.79) *** 
-0.572 
(-6) *** 
  
2.43% 
Electronic -0.808 
(-6.79) *** 
0.005 
(0.12) 
0.895 
(10.92) *** 
2.547 
(6.53) *** 
1.678 
(4.98) *** 
1.073 
(4.85) *** 
-0.361 
(-3.89) *** 
  
2.33% 
W-stat. 
 10.48*** 9.71*** 27.30*** 3.06* 0.70 0.76 5.18**    
TOV 
Floor -1.005 
(-5.02) *** 
0.114 
(2.42) ** 
0.547 
(6.05) *** 
2.817 
(4.22) *** 
2.241 
(3.30) *** 
2.139 
(4.30) ***  
0.058 
(0.66) 
 
4.40% 
Electronic -0.900 
(-6.49) *** 
0.180 
(3.85) *** 
0.913 
(11.19) *** 
2.687 
(5.45) *** 
1.682 
(5.31) *** 
1.023 
(4.26) ***  
-0.036 
(-0.66) 
 
2.51% 
W-stat. 
 0.58 1.98 20.13*** 0.07 3.12* 21.62***  3.06*   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.016 
(-3.09) *** 
0.048 
(0.51) 
0.513 
(5.55) *** 
2.929 
(4.20) *** 
2.206 
(3.36) *** 
2.106 
(4.55) ***  
 -0.060 
(-0.83) 4.03% 
Electronic -0.954 
(-6.50) *** 
0.107 
(1.55) 
0.907 
(10.18) *** 
2.373 
(4.74) *** 
1.866 
(6.02) *** 
1.128 
(4.80) ***  
 -0.067 
(-1.65) * 2.56% 
W-stat. 
 0.18 0.73 19.56*** 1.23 1.21 17.33***   0.03  
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor -0.874 
 (-4.62) *** 
0.071 
(0.72) 
0.376 
 (2.93) *** 
3.759 
 (3.66) *** 
2.246 
 (2.22) ** 
1.880 
 (2.33) ** 
0.301 
 (1.79) * 
  
6.01% 
Electronic -0.364 
(-1.63) 
0.065 
(0.62) 
0.686 
 (4.72) *** 
3.103 
 (2.88) *** 
1.393 
(1.27) 
1.655 
 (2.69) *** 
0.083 
(0.59) 
  
7.76% 
W-stat. 
 5.24** 0.00 4.55** 0.37 0.60 0.13 2.42    
TOV 
Floor -0.813 
 (-4.2) *** 
-0.078 
(-1.11) 
0.296 
 (2.77) *** 
3.286 
(3.19) *** 
2.029 
 (2.21) ** 
1.687 
 (2.12) **  
-0.197 
 (-2.81) *** 
 
4.83% 
Electronic -0.364 
(-1.65)* 
0.051 
(0.52) 
0.711 
 (4.69) *** 
3.906 
 (3.95) *** 
1.919 
 (1.78) * 
1.655 
 (2.49) **  
-0.118 
 (-1.69) * 
 
7.81% 
W-stat. 
 4.17** 1.74 7.47*** 0.39 0.01 0.00  1.29   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.910 
 (-4.23) *** 
0.101 
(1.11) 
0.371 
 (3.38) *** 
3.228 
 (3.07) *** 
2.393 
 (2.39) ** 
1.998 
 (2.60) **   
0.154 
 (2.14) ** 4.75% 
Electronic -0.421 
 (-1.92) * 
0.063 
(0.69) 
0.701 
 (4.63) *** 
4.494 
 (4.51) *** 
1.720 
(1.61) 
1.687 
 (2.81) ***   
-0.061 
(-0.87) 7.91% 
W-stat. 
 4.96** 0.18 4.76** 1.61 0.40 0.27   9.38***  
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    Panel C-3 (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.297 
(-1.90) * 
0.133 
(2.59) ** 
0.403 
(3.39) *** 
1.513 
(2.85) *** 
1.784 
(4.07) *** 
0.579 
(1.82) * 
0.048 
(0.40) 
  
3.62% 
Electronic -0.507 
(-1.50) 
0.524 
(1.53) 
0.615 
(3.36) *** 
2.278 
(3.23) *** 
1.328 
(2.04) ** 
0.172 
(0.40) 
-0.018 
(-0.12) 
  
4.68% 
W-stat. 
 0.38 1.31 1.35 1.18 0.49 0.91 0.19    
TOV 
Floor -0.251 
(-1.26) 
-0.062 
(-1.00) 
0.564 
(1.96) * 
0.317 
(0.27) 
0.327 
(0.34) 
1.002 
(1.02)  
-0.201 
(-1.46) 
 
3.36% 
Electronic -0.623 
(-2.78) *** 
0.154 
(2.65) *** 
0.588 
(3.00) *** 
1.893 
(2.29) ** 
1.250 
(1.92) * 
0.299 
(0.66)  
-0.232 
(-3.05) *** 
 
5.20% 
W-stat. 
 2.75* 13.87*** 0.01 3.64* 2 2.43  0.17   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.088 
(-0.39) 
0.083 
(0.50) 
0.613 
(1.96) * 
-0.026 
(-0.02) 
0.397 
(0.44) 
1.240 
(1.11)  
 0.054 
(0.41) 3.72% 
Electronic -0.566 
(-2.41) ** 
0.2116 
(1.76) * 
0.5326 
(2.67) *** 
1.9696 
(2.39) ** 
1.6073 
(2.49) ** 
0.3824 
(0.80)  
 0.0867 
(1.24) 5.33% 
W-stat. 
 4.13** 1.15 0.16 5.86** 3.52* 3.24*   0.21  
 
    Panel D-1:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on size, BM and Term spread (business cycle variable). 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.373 
(-5.11) *** 
-0.141 
(-3.94) *** 
0.235 
(5.12) *** 
1.636 
(3.08) *** 
1.556 
(3.90) *** 
1.245 
(5.27) *** 
-0.548 
(-6.69) *** 
  
2.61% 
Electronic -0.818 
(-9.39) *** 
0.012 
(0.30) 
0.557 
(8.07) *** 
2.701 
(7.52) *** 
1.464 
(4.88) *** 
1.241 
(6.66) *** 
-0.410 
(-5.45) *** 
  
2.46% 
W-stat. 
 26.15*** 14.99*** 21.83*** 8.79*** 0.09 0.00 3.36*    
TOV 
Floor -0.896 
(-5.89) *** 
0.115 
(2.68) *** 
0.311 
(3.99) *** 
2.137 
(3.79) *** 
2.526 
(4.15) *** 
1.459 
(3.92) ***  
-0.023 
(-0.31) 
 
4.17% 
Electronic -1.029 
(-9.77) *** 
0.249 
(7.06) *** 
0.597 
(8.85) *** 
2.666 
(6.51) *** 
1.328 
(4.52) *** 
1.227 
(6.41) ***  
-0.108 
(-2.19) ** 
 
2.55% 
W-stat. 
 1.59 14.50*** 17.99*** 1.67 16.61*** 1.48  2.97*   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.191 
(-4.98) *** 
0.147 
(2.02) ** 
0.331 
(4.10) *** 
2.073 
(3.47) *** 
2.323 
(4.18) *** 
1.387 
(3.71) ***  
 0.018 
(0.27) 4.00% 
Electronic -1.091 
(-9.01) *** 
0.231 
(3.91) *** 
0.518 
(7.53) *** 
2.360 
(5.25) *** 
1.385 
(5.15) *** 
1.173 
(5.91) ***  
 0.009 
(0.22) 2.69% 
W-stat. 
 0.69 2.02 7.40*** 0.41 12.18*** 1.15   0.05  
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     Panel D-1 (Continued)  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor -0.639 
 (-4.10) *** 
0.013 
(0.19) 
0.155 
 (2.00) ** 
2.781 
 (3.72) *** 
1.191 
(1.60) 
2.096 
 (3.03) *** 
0.033 
(0.33) 
  
3.56% 
Electronic -0.202 
(-1.44) 
0.200 
 (2.30) ** 
0.261 
 (2.35) ** 
2.709 
 (3.18) *** 
0.949 
(1.21) 
1.321 
 (2.78) *** 
0.009 
(0.08) 
  
7.52% 
W-stat. 
 9.65*** 4.65** 0.91 0.01 0.10 2.67 0.05    
TOV 
Floor -0.666 
 (-4.34) *** 
0.031 
(0.52) 
0.172 
 (2.71) *** 
2.768 
 (3.35) *** 
1.398 
 (1.86) * 
2.222 
 (3.32) ***  
-0.152 
 (-3.2) *** 
 
3.32% 
Electronic -0.210 
(-1.39) 
0.248 
 (3.65) *** 
0.202 
 (1.90) * 
2.932 
 (3.24) *** 
1.187 
 (1.76) * 
1.590 
 (3.35) ***  
-0.033 
(-0.57) 
 
7.47% 
W-stat. 
 9.10*** 10.22*** 0.08 0.03 0.10 1.77  4.18**   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.885 
 (-4.91) *** 
0.108 
(1.53) 
0.226 
 (2.90) *** 
2.141 
 (2.64) *** 
1.579 
 (2.20) ** 
2.068 
 (3.41) ***   
0.107 
 (1.79) * 3.65% 
Electronic -0.207 
(-1.46) 
0.137 
(1.63) 
0.214 
 (1.88) * 
4.322 
 (5.23) *** 
0.762 
(1.08) 
2.014 
 (4.09) ***   
-0.107 
(-1.63) 7.15% 
W-stat. 
 22.88*** 0.11 0.01 6.96*** 1.35 0.01   10.70***  
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.343 
(-3.14) *** 
0.111 
(2.60) ** 
0.225 
(2.28) ** 
0.942 
(1.85) * 
1.821 
(4.50) *** 
0.795 
(3.08) *** 
-0.084 
(-0.76) 
  
3.57% 
Electronic -0.252 
(-0.68) 
0.147 
(0.78) 
0.278 
(1.78) * 
1.027 
(1.80) * 
1.786 
(3.24) *** 
0.225 
(0.63) 
0.005 
(0.03) 
  
4.17% 
W-stat. 
 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.00 2.55 0.36    
TOV 
Floor -0.416 
(-2.72) *** 
0.013 
(0.23) 
-0.077 
(-0.39) 
-0.216 
(-0.18) 
0.483 
(0.6) 
0.256 
(0.42)  
-0.131 
(-1.16) 
 
3.96% 
Electronic -0.653 
(-3.96) *** 
0.122 
(2.46) ** 
0.219 
(1.34) 
1.104 
(1.41) 
1.911 
(3.71) *** 
0.515 
(1.34)  
-0.246 
(-3.52) *** 
 
4.93% 
W-stat. 
 2.07 4.81 3.27 2.86 7.70 0.46  2.70   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.205 
(-1.30) 
0.106 
(0.91) 
0.137 
(0.63) 
-1.342 
(-0.81) 
1.150 
(1.84) * 
0.914 
(1.15)  
 0.048 
(0.47) 2.83% 
Electronic -0.551 
(-3.18) *** 
0.319 
(3.03) *** 
0.268 
(1.53) 
1.203 
(1.53) 
2.049 
(3.56) *** 
0.475 
(1.16)  
 0.160 
(2.60) ** 4.94% 
W-stat. 
 3.99** 4.11** 0.57 10.42*** 2.43 1.15   3.32*  
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     Panel D-2:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on size, BM and Yield (business cycle variable). 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.397 
(-5.35) *** 
-0.134 
(-3.87) *** 
0.232 
(5.14) *** 
1.666 
(3.08) *** 
1.577 
(3.84) *** 
1.177 
(4.93) *** 
-0.543 
(-6.71) *** 
  
2.64% 
Electronic -1.026 
(-11.22) *** 
0.067 
(1.44) 
0.657 
(9.61) *** 
3.155 
(7.39) *** 
1.740 
(5.26) *** 
1.528 
(7.04) *** 
-0.438 
(-5.35) *** 
  
2.69% 
W-stat. 
 47.33*** 18.59*** 38.56*** 12.17*** 0.24 2.63* 1.66    
TOV 
Floor -0.908 
(-6.20) *** 
0.123 
(2.87) *** 
0.346 
(4.63) *** 
2.036 
(3.45) *** 
2.551 
(4.19) *** 
1.678 
(4.43) ***  
-0.025 
(-0.34) 
 
4.14% 
Electronic -1.127 
(-10.64) *** 
0.288 
(8.22) *** 
0.604 
(9.19) *** 
2.597 
(5.83) *** 
1.335 
(4.73) *** 
1.255 
(6.13) ***  
-0.160 
(-3.42) *** 
 
2.76% 
W-stat. 
 4.28** 22.16*** 15.35*** 1.59 18.55*** 4.28**  8.34***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.186 
(-4.87) *** 
0.152 
(2.09) ** 
0.327 
(4.12) *** 
2.063 
(3.42) *** 
2.421 
(4.30) *** 
1.462 
(3.79) ***  
 0.016 
(0.25) 4.08% 
Electronic -1.182 
(-9.90) *** 
0.268 
(4.67) *** 
0.558 
(8.44) *** 
2.453 
(5.10) *** 
1.545 
(5.10) *** 
1.265 
(6.14) ***  
 0.021 
(0.56) 2.81% 
W-stat. 
 0.00 4.09** 12.21*** 0.66 8.33*** 0.92   0.02  
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor -0.687 
 (-4.35) *** 
-0.066 
(-0.94) 
0.086 
(1.05) 
2.843 
 (3.42) *** 
1.259 
(1.49) 
2.026 
 (2.78) *** 
-0.054 
(-0.54) 
  
4.23% 
Electronic -0.124 
(-0.88) 
0.112 
(1.55) 
0.128 
(1.15) 
2.717 
 (3.22) *** 
0.917 
(1.17) 
1.278 
 (2.59) ** 
0.160 
(1.46) 
  
7.78% 
W-stat. 
 15.93*** 6.05** 0.15 0.02 0.19 2.30 3.81*     
TOV 
Floor -0.685 
 (-4.32) *** 
-0.011 
(-0.19) 
0.104 
 (1.68) * 
2.550 
 (2.92) *** 
1.346 
 (1.80) * 
2.374 
 (3.57) ***  
-0.166 
 (-3.40)*** 
 
3.73% 
Electronic -0.187 
(-1.20) 
0.224 
 (3.44) *** 
0.158 
(1.41) 
2.967 
 (3.35) *** 
1.442 
 (2.03) ** 
1.163 
 (2.49) **  
-0.112 
 (-1.91) * 
 
7.24% 
W-stat. 
 10.20*** 13.02*** 0.22 0.22 0.02 6.72***  0.86    
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.882 
 (-5.01) *** 
0.040 
(0.61) 
0.153 
 (2.12) ** 
2.271 
 (2.73) *** 
1.574 
 (1.96) * 
2.146 
 (3.61) ***   
0.064 
(1.18) 3.68% 
Electronic -0.161 
(-1.09) 
0.120 
(1.60) 
0.144 
(1.26) 
4.377 
 (5.18) *** 
0.859 
(1.14) 
1.675 
 (3.84) ***   
-0.033 
(-0.52) 7.18% 
W-stat. 
 23.49*** 1.14 0.01 6.20** 0.90 1.17   2.35  
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    Panel D-2 (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.345 
(-3.24) *** 
0.113 
(2.84) *** 
0.204 
(2.09) ** 
1.291 
(2.52) ** 
1.673 
(4.32) *** 
0.757 
(2.89) *** 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
  
3.60% 
Electronic -0.325 
(-1.12) 
0.335 
(1.32) 
0.272 
(1.73) * 
1.630 
(2.75) *** 
1.980 
(3.38) *** 
0.366 
(0.93) 
0.061 
(0.40) 
  
4.48% 
W-stat. 
 0.00 0.76 0.18 0.33 0.27 0.99 0.17    
TOV 
Floor -0.472 
(-3.02) *** 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.068 
(-0.33) 
0.053 
(0.04) 
1.075 
(1.87) * 
0.039 
(0.08)  
-0.164 
(-1.27) 
 
3.88% 
Electronic -0.543 
(-3.45) *** 
0.103 
(2.16) ** 
0.221 
(1.29) 
1.554 
(2.11) ** 
2.211 
(4.01) *** 
0.778 
(1.94) *  
-0.286 
(-4.41) *** 
 
5.00% 
W-stat. 
 0.21 4.58** 2.84** 4.14** 4.24** 3.39*  3.53*   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.170 
(-1.00) 
0.061 
(0.47) 
0.256 
(0.96) 
-1.005 
(-0.60) 
1.139 
(1.93) * 
1.056 
(1.14)  
 0.010 
(0.08) 3.65% 
Electronic -0.429 
(-2.77) *** 
0.279 
(2.77) *** 
0.344 
(1.95) * 
1.653 
(2.22) ** 
2.275 
(3.81) *** 
0.535 
(1.22)  
 0.167 
(2.74) *** 5.00% 
W-stat. 
 2.80* 4.69** 0.25 12.74*** 3.62* 1.41   6.66***  
 
    Panel D-3:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on size, BM and Dividends Yield (business cycle variable). 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.487 
(-7.23) *** 
-0.098 
(-2.79) *** 
0.239 
(5.03) *** 
1.715 
(3.68) *** 
1.373 
(3.87) *** 
1.136 
(4.20) *** 
-0.507 
(-6.36) *** 
  
2.47% 
Electronic -0.865 
(-9.57) *** 
0.033 
(0.73) 
0.606 
(9.75) *** 
2.737 
(7.52) *** 
1.912 
(6.22) *** 
1.157 
(5.64) *** 
-0.392 
(-4.91) *** 
  
2.60% 
W-stat. 
 17.49*** 8.24*** 34.92*** 7.89*** 3.08* 0.01 2.08    
TOV 
Floor -1.006 
(-7.31) *** 
0.147 
(3.88) *** 
0.342 
(4.32) *** 
2.222 
(3.86) *** 
2.398 
(4.01) *** 
1.722 
(4.41) ***  
-0.019 
(-0.27) 
 
3.93% 
Electronic -1.032 
(-10.12) *** 
0.232 
(6.90) *** 
0.607 
(9.09) *** 
2.600 
(6.25) *** 
1.836 
(5.88) *** 
1.233 
(5.65) ***  
-0.123 
(-2.81) *** 
 
2.71% 
W-stat. 
 0.06 6.32** 15.76*** 0.82 3.24* 5.02**  5.64***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.230 
(-4.35) *** 
0.161 
(1.95) * 
0.349 
(4.11) *** 
2.498 
(4.20) *** 
2.311 
(4.22) *** 
1.786 
(4.52) ***  
 0.010 
(0.16) 4.17% 
Electronic -1.095 
(-9.69) *** 
0.208 
(3.71) *** 
0.596 
(8.72) *** 
2.700 
(6.14) *** 
1.961 
(6.90) *** 
1.249 
(6.07) ***  
 0.011 
(0.29) 2.66% 
W-stat. 
 1.44 0.71 13.05*** 0.21 1.52 6.81***   0.00  
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   Panel D-3 (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor -0.736 
 (-4.59) *** 
0.037 
(0.46) 
0.177 
 (2.39) ** 
3.439 
 (4.33) *** 
0.889 
(1.13) 
1.873 
 (2.69) *** 
0.135 
(1.30) 
  
4.32% 
Electronic -0.214 
(-1.46) 
0.099 
(1.27) 
0.166 
(1.39) 
3.423 
 (4.31) *** 
0.941 
(1.39) 
1.320 
 (2.27) ** 
0.046 
(0.45) 
  
7.19% 
W-stat. 
 12.59*** 0.65 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.91 0.76    
TOV 
Floor -0.672 
 (-4.24) *** 
-0.066 
(-1.09) 
0.060 
(0.93) 
2.683 
 (3.43) *** 
1.139 
(1.58) 
2.221 
 (3.56) ***  
-0.182 
 (-4.15) *** 
 
3.81% 
Electronic -0.311 
 (-2.08) ** 
0.086 
(1.29) 
0.232 
 (1.86) * 
3.967 
 (5.24) *** 
1.343 
 (2.03) ** 
1.473 
 (2.90) ***  
-0.102 
 (-1.85) * 
 
6.38% 
W-stat. 
 5.86** 5.22** 1.89 2.88* 0.10 2.17  2.09   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.848 
 (-4.79) *** 
0.067 
(0.84) 
0.183 
 (2.29) ** 
2.640 
 (3.48) *** 
1.288 
(1.66)* 
1.683 
 (2.73) ***   
0.079 
(1.36) 3.52% 
Electronic -0.316 
 (-2.06) ** 
0.100 
(1.26) 
0.363 
 (2.93) *** 
4.393 
 (5.65) *** 
0.611 
(0.93) 
1.570 
 (3.38) ***   
-0.034 
(-0.54) 6.41% 
W-stat. 
 12.06*** 0.17 2.11 5.09** 1.06 0.06   3.23*  
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.256 
(-2.33) ** 
0.142 
(3.73) *** 
0.102 
(1.12) 
1.502 
(3.12) *** 
1.629 
(4.13) *** 
0.462 
(1.75) * 
0.057 
(0.53) 
  
3.47% 
Electronic -0.610 
(-2.70) *** 
0.329 
(1.64) * 
0.360 
(2.25) ** 
1.695 
(2.79) *** 
1.638 
(2.92) *** 
0.369 
(0.88) 
0.033 
(0.27) 
  
4.12% 
W-stat. 
 2.46 0.87 2.61 0.1 0 0.05 0.04    
TOV 
Floor -0.389 
(-2.61) *** 
-0.042 
(-0.65) 
-0.049 
(-0.19) 
-0.465 
(-0.31) 
0.467 
(0.55) 
0.585 
(0.70)  
-0.161 
(-1.40) 
 
3.91% 
Electronic -0.566 
(-3.48) *** 
0.041 
(0.90) 
0.130 
(0.82) 
1.877 
(2.50) ** 
2.006 
(3.53) *** 
0.658 
(1.59)  
-0.197 
(-3.60) *** 
 
4.85% 
W-stat. 
 1.18 3.34* 1.27 9.71*** 7.32*** 0.03  0.44   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.223 
(-1.23) 
0.051 
(0.38) 
-0.027 
(-0.12) 
-0.861 
(-0.51) 
0.909 
(1.46) 
0.750 
(1.08)  
 0.023 
(0.21) 4.05% 
Electronic -0.457 
(-2.64) *** 
0.113 
(1.31) 
0.279 
(1.65) * 
2.020 
(2.88) *** 
1.540 
(2.71) *** 
0.475 
(1.05)  
 0.088 
(1.61) * 4.97% 
W-stat. 
 1.83 0.51 3.27* 16.89*** 1.23 0.37   1.43  
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Appendix 3D 
Robust Test: Statistics of individual coefficients of market liquidity risk factors 
estimated by conditional asset pricing model with time-varying alpha  
Among the other risk factors and control factors, this table reports the cross-sectional average of the time-series slope 
coefficients of market-wide liquidity risk factors with their associated t-statistics. These coefficients are estimated by 
running the first-pass time-series regression (Eq. (3.12)) for each firm during the floor trading period and the electronic 
trading period.  Liquidity risk factors include PQSPR is proportional bid-ask spread, TOV is the liquidity turnover ratio 
and PIMPACT is the price impact (Amihud’s 2002 Illiquidity ratio). The construction of liquidity risk factors is 
explained in section 3.3.4. “Pos” reports the percentage of positive slope coefficients, while “Sig” gives the percentage 
of the coefficients that are significant at 10% of significance or higher. The last three columns present the difference in 
the mean between electronic and floor trading systems with the t-value and p-value of the null hypothesis that the 
difference in the mean is equal to zero. 
 
Panel C-1: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with term spread (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.023 (-5.01) 38 19 -0.026 (-7.76) 39 14 -0.003 (-0.53) 0.597 
TOV 
-0.002 (-0.59) 47 13 0.013 (5.31) 53 17 0.015 (3.79) 0.000 
PIMPACT 
-0.011 (-1.92) 49 14 -0.005 (-2.33) 43 16 0.006 (0.99) 0.320 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.012 (-3.99) 34 16 -0.026 (-3.39) 31 26 -0.013 (-1.79) 0.074 
TOV 0.021 (5.53) 72 21 -0.026 (-2.24) 42 13 -0.048 (-4.22) 0.000 
PIMPACT 
-0.031 (-2.79) 43 17 -0.089 (-2.45) 39 25 -0.059 (-1.68) 0.093 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.022 (-3.91) 40 16 0.008 (3.20) 52 12 0.030 (4.73) 0.000 
TOV 0.025 (4.41) 57 19 0.013 (1.95) 50 13 -0.012 (-1.41) 0.158 
PIMPACT 
-0.001 (-1.80) 45 13 2.69E-05 (0.49) 52 12 0.001 (1.74) 0.082 
 
Panel C-2: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with yield (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.060 (-3.20) 39 20 -0.018 (-0.87) 48 13 0.042 (1.49) 0.137 
TOV 
-0.034 (-3.06) 47 12 0.041 (2.45) 56 16 0.075 (3.67) 0.000 
PIMPACT 
-0.046 (-2.17) 48 15 0.021 (2.13) 56 17 0.068 (2.94) 0.003 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.007 (0.71) 54 10 -0.007 (-1.15) 49 16 -0.014 (-1.11) 0.268 
TOV 
-0.024 (-2.31) 47 17 0.024 (2.23) 60 15 0.048 (3.18) 0.002 
PIMPACT 
-0.004 (-0.13) 50 9 -0.060 (-3.73) 41 24 -0.055 (-1.42) 0.155 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.008 (0.92) 55 12 -0.004 (-0.69) 51 14 -0.012 (-1.11) 0.268 
TOV 0.011 (0.78) 54 16 0.081 (3.51) 57 14 0.069 (2.60) 0.009 
PIMPACT 0.001 (1.20) 48 13 -0.001 (-1.36) 50 12 -0.002 (-1.52) 0.129 
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Panel C-3: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with dividend yield (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.095 (-3.23) 40 22 -0.047 (-1.29) 45 14 0.048 (1.00) 0.316 
TOV 
-0.027 (-1.28) 47 13 -0.033 (-1.41) 49 16 -0.006 (-0.19) 0.853 
PIMPACT 
-0.044 (-1.14) 52 16 -0.024 (-1.48) 42 21 0.020 (0.49) 0.621 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.016 (-0.81) 49 21 0.025 (1.64) 57 12 0.041 (1.57) 0.117 
TOV 
-0.023 (-0.94) 48 13 0.075 (2.89) 65 20 0.098 (2.73) 0.007 
PIMPACT 
-0.201 (-3.18) 40 18 -0.071 (-1.14) 51 15 0.130 (1.45) 0.147 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.010 (-0.74) 47 15 -0.311 (-3.70) 54 21 0.021 (1.33) 0.182 
TOV 
-0.001 (-0.07) 50 18 0.101 (2.07) 53 12 0.103 (2.03) 0.043 
PIMPACT 
-0.003 (-2.57) 49 16 -0.001 (-1.32) 49 20 0.002 (1.44) 0.150 
 
Panel D-1: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with size, BM and term spread (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.265 (0.57) 47 15 -0.018 (-0.11) 48 13 -0.283 (-0.63) 0.530 
TOV 0.663 (2.09) 52 13 0.092 (0.81) 51 14 -0.572 (-1.87) 0.061 
PIMPACT 
-0.701 (-1.73) 50 16 -0.097 (-0.83) 48 14 0.604 (1.60) 0.109 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.130 (1.07) 52 13 1.244 (0.90) 45 12 1.114 (0.79) 0.430 
TOV 0.062 (0.44) 55 13 -5.563 (-1.46) 48 16 -5.625 (-1.45) 0.148 
PIMPACT 
-0.079 (-0.24) 51 12 0.298 (0.06) 52 18 0.377 (0.08) 0.940 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.121 (-0.73) 50 20 -0.060 (-1.13) 49 14 0.061 (0.31) 0.760 
TOV 0.130 (0.85) 50 16 0.002 (0.01) 51 18 -0.128 (-0.37) 0.714 
PIMPACT 
-0.004 (-0.31) 47 15 0.004 (1.67) 49 20 0.008 (0.54) 0.589 
 
Panel D-2: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with size, BM and yield (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-5.256 (-2.25) 49 15 -0.850 (-0.87) 50 14 4.406 (1.90) 0.058 
TOV 2.054 (1.12) 52 16 0.193 (0.25) 50 16 -1.862 (-1.01) 0.311 
PIMPACT 5.707 (1.98) 51 15 -0.089 (-0.12) 50 16 -5.796 (-2.19) 0.029 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.652 (1.13) 52 18 -0.921 (-1.30) 47 13 -1.573 (-1.72) 0.087 
TOV 0.789 (1.04) 51 14 6.363 (1.32) 49 19 5.574 (1.12) 0.264 
PIMPACT 1.958 (1.22) 52 18 -3.580 (-1.09) 51 13 -5.537 (-1.50) 0.135 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 0.179 (0.31) 48 15 0.169 (1.18) 50 15 -0.010 (-0.01) 0.988 
TOV 0.536 (1.60) 52 14 0.024 (0.02) 51 16 -0.512 (-0.51) 0.608 
PIMPACT 
-0.047 (-0.99) 50 13 0.002 (0.74) 49 17 0.049 (0.88) 0.378 
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Panel D-3: Conditional asset pricing model, Beta varies with size, BM and dividend yield (Business cycle variable). 
Stock 
Exchange 
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Floor Trading System Electronic  Trading System Electronic minus Floor 
Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value Pos Sig Mean t-value p-value 
Lo
n
do
n
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(L
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-2.904 (-0.44) 49 16 0.105 (0.06) 49 15 3.009 (0.50) 0.620 
TOV 
-0.935 (-0.45) 50 16 0.470 (0.46) 52 14 1.405 (0.65) 0.517 
PIMPACT 
-0.911 (-0.36) 51 16 -0.018 (-0.02) 50 16 0.894 (0.37) 0.712 
Sw
iss
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
 
(S
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.431 (-0.55) 51 18 -8.562 (-1.58) 47 11 -8.131 (-1.45) 0.147 
TOV 1.806 (1.62) 53 18 -1.179 (-0.09) 43 13 -2.984 (-0.23) 0.821 
PIMPACT 1.922 (0.60) 52 17 9.391 (0.58) 56 18 7.469 (0.45) 0.655 
Fr
a
n
kf
u
rt
 
 
St
o
ck
 
Ex
ch
a
n
ge
 
(F
SE
) 
PQSPR 
-0.331 (-0.49) 51 17 -0.136 (-0.55) 51 15 0.195 (0.24) 0.811 
TOV 
-0.636 (-1.09) 48 16 0.772 (0.32) 49 19 1.408 (0.65) 0.513 
PIMPACT 
-0.069 (-1.43) 50 16 0.004 (0.67) 51 16 0.072 (1.29) 0.198 
6 Chapter Three: Liquidity and Assets Pricing 
219 
 
Appendix 3E 
Robust Test: Fama-MacBeth estimates with Fama-French factors and liquidity as risk factor and time-varying alpha 
This table represents time-series averages of individual stocks’ cross-sectional OLS regression coefficient estimates (Eq. (3.14)) for all securities in the UK, Switzerland and 
Germany. Panel C-1, C-2, C-3 presents the estimates when the dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return when factor loadings (i.e. betas) are allowed to vary with business 
cycle variables term spread, short-term interest rate and dividends yield respectively. In panel D-1, D-2, D-3 the dependent variable is the risk-adjusted return when factor 
loadings (i.e. betas) are allowed to vary with firm characteristics (i.e. size and book-to-market ratio) and with business cycle variable term spread, short-term interest rate and 
dividends yield respectively. Liq. Risk Factor is the liquidity risk factor added to Fama-French three factor model, PQSPR is proportional bid-ask spread, TOV is the liquidity 
turnover ratio and PIMPACT is the price impact (Amihud’s 2002 Illiquidity ratio). The construction of liquidity risk factors is explained in section 3.3.4. Floor and electronic 
in the third column in each panel refers to the estimation done during the floor trading system and electronic trading system respectively.  Size represents the logarithm of 
market capitalization; BM is the logarithm of book-to-market ratio; RET2-3, RET4-6, RET7-12 are the past cumulative raw returns over the second through third, fourth 
through sixth, and seventh through twelfth months before the current month;  Prop. Bid-ask is the proportional bid-ask spread calculated as the quoted bid-ask spread divided 
by the midpoint of the quoted bid-ask spread; Turnover is the turnover ratio measures as the trading value divided by the market capitalization; Price impact is the ratio of 
absolute return divided by the trading value.   BBBB
 
is the time-series average of the monthly adjusted R2. T-statistic (reported in parenthesis) are adjusted for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. W-stat. is the Wald test statistic. All coefficients are multiplied by 100. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10, 5, 1% level. 
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 Panel C-1:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on Term spread (business cycle variable).  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor 1.148 
(4.87) *** 
-0.660 
(-8.22) *** 
1.633 
(6.87) *** 
1.268 
(0.61) 
0.789 
(0.45) 
-0.314 
(-0.21) 
1.208 
(3.85) *** 
  
9.42% 
Electronic 3.343 
(15.54) *** 
-0.274 
(-1.07) 
0.941 
(2.74) *** 
1.070 
(0.21) 
0.204 
(0.04) 
-0.038 
(-0.01) 
0.607 
(1.17) 
  
9.02% 
W-stat. 
 104.09*** 2.25 4.07*** 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.35    
TOV 
Floor -0.370 
(-1.00) 
-0.530 
(-4.33) *** 
1.655 
(6.68) *** 
0.907 
(0.42) 
-0.078 
(-0.05) 
-1.439 
(-0.93)  
-0.495 
(-2.00) ** 
 
9.04% 
Electronic 1.541 
(6.55) *** 
-0.598 
(-2.36) ** 
0.476 
(1.31) 
0.994 
(0.20) 
0.259 
(0.06) 
-0.260 
(-0.06)  
0.543 
(2.40) ** 
 
9.17% 
W-stat. 
 66.03*** 0.07 10.62*** 0.00 0.01 0.07  21.06***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.785 
(-2.08) ** 
-0.496 
(-1.74) * 
1.740 
(6.40) *** 
0.844 
(0.40) 
-0.155 
(-0.09) 
-1.576 
(-0.98)  
 0.016 
(0.08) 9.22% 
Electronic 2.651 
(10.91) *** 
-0.710 
(-2.22) ** 
1.142 
(2.66) *** 
1.268 
(0.24) 
0.902 
(0.19) 
0.089 
(0.02)  
 -0.248 
(-1.66) * 8.82% 
W-stat. 
 333.18*** 0.45 1.93 0.01 0.05 0.13   3.14*  
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor 6.044 
 (34.43) *** 
-0.308 
 (-2.73) *** 
0.825 
 (3.93) *** 
3.302 
(1.11) 
1.261 
(0.40) 
2.254 
(1.00) 
0.511 
 (1.79) * 
  
9.63% 
Electronic 3.829 
 (17.29) *** 
-1.136 
 (-7.74) *** 
-2.761 
 (-7.02) *** 
0.012 
(0.00) 
-0.672 
(-0.18) 
5.788 
 (1.93) * 
-0.656 
 (-2.57) ** 
  
18.33% 
W-stat. 
 100.03*** 31.80*** 83.14*** 0.79 0.26 1.39 20.95***    
TOV 
Floor 5.648 
 (27.72) *** 
-0.489 
 (-4.03) *** 
0.864 
 (4.28) *** 
3.194 
(1.17) 
1.676 
(0.61) 
1.169 
(0.49)  
-0.740 
 (-5.42) *** 
 
9.57% 
Electronic 4.435 
 (15.63) *** 
-1.360 
 (-9.50) *** 
-2.389 
 (-6.21) *** 
1.674 
(0.45) 
1.203 
(0.32) 
7.803 
 (2.64) ***  
-0.216 
(-1.51) 
 
18.28% 
W-stat. 
 18.29*** 37.02*** 71.58*** 0.17 0.02 5.02**  13.47***   
PIMPACT 
Floor 4.402 
 (18.2) *** 
0.326 
 (2.79) *** 
0.746 
 (4.02) *** 
3.727 
(1.37) 
2.345 
(0.88) 
0.999 
(0.45)   
0.911 
 (7.47) *** 9.18% 
Electronic 3.715 
 (14.02) *** 
-0.961 
 (-5.10) *** 
-2.425 
 (-6.09) *** 
1.744 
(0.50) 
0.001 
(0.00) 
5.992 
 (2.09) **   
0.301 
 (2.30) ** 17.99% 
W-stat. 
 6.74*** 46.70*** 63.42*** 0.33 0.42 3.03*   21.68***  
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 Panel C-1 (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -2.808 
(-9.57) *** 
0.629 
(4.42) *** 
0.561 
(3.49) *** 
2.080 
(0.91) 
2.892 
(1.35) 
3.430 
(1.89) * 
2.826 
(8.25) *** 
  
6.83% 
Electronic -3.574 
(-4.91) *** 
2.578 
(6.60) *** 
3.301 
(8.03) *** 
1.543 
(0.77) 
1.506 
(0.88) 
2.275 
(1.41) 
5.811 
(13.93) *** 
  
9.77% 
W-stat. 
 1.11 24.94*** 44.46*** 0.07 0.65 0.51 51.21***    
TOV 
Floor -4.840 
(-8.09) *** 
-0.297 
(-1.73) * 
1.832 
(2.28) ** 
-0.581 
(-0.15) 
4.957 
(1.39) 
7.813 
(2.96) ***  
-2.106 
(-7.18) *** 
 
8.50% 
Electronic -5.015 
(-13.85) *** 
1.354 
(10.06) *** 
3.735 
(8.93) *** 
1.359 
(0.67) 
1.863 
(1.00) 
3.436 
(2.02) **  
-2.677 
(-15.73) *** 
 
10.61% 
W-stat. 
 0.23 150.47*** 20.73*** 0.91 2.74* 6.59***  11.24***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -2.963 
(-5.55) *** 
1.301 
(6.49) *** 
1.714 
(2.27) ** 
-1.818 
(-0.46) 
3.724 
(1.13) 
7.736 
(2.94) ***  
 1.334 
(5.63) *** 7.24% 
Electronic -4.590 
(-15.05) *** 
3.812 
(21.14) *** 
3.182 
(7.24) *** 
2.289 
(1.08) 
2.450 
(1.25) 
3.893 
(2.23) **  
 2.195 
(16.03) *** 9.89% 
W-stat. 
 28.47*** 193.95*** 11.16*** 3.76* 0.42 4.83**   39.60***  
 
 Panel C-2:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on Yield (business cycle variable).  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor 1.072 
(4.67) *** 
-0.578 
(-7.03) *** 
1.600 
(7.20) *** 
1.320 
(0.65) 
0.792 
(0.46) 
-0.262 
(-0.18) 
1.267 
(3.98) *** 
  
9.29% 
Electronic 2.517 
(12.90) *** 
-0.150 
(-0.58) 
1.396 
(4.17) *** 
1.430 
(0.29) 
0.749 
(0.16) 
0.373 
(0.09) 
0.303 
(0.56) 
  
8.63% 
W-stat. 
 54.82*** 2.76* 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.02 3.14*    
TOV 
Floor -0.234 
(-0.66) 
-0.501 
(-4.23) *** 
1.589 
(6.66) *** 
0.954 
(0.45) 
-0.073 
(-0.04) 
-1.356 
(-0.92)  
-0.398 
(-1.63) 
 
8.78% 
Electronic 0.788 
(3.89) *** 
-0.343 
(-1.44) 
0.655 
(1.84) * 
0.943 
(0.19) 
0.332 
(0.07) 
-0.174 
(-0.04)  
0.301 
(1.38) 
 
9.02% 
W-stat. 
 25.40*** 0.44 6.91*** 0.00 0.01 0.08  10.33***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.766 
(-2.12) ** 
-0.456 
(-1.66) * 
1.764 
(6.50) *** 
1.090 
(0.53) 
0.071 
(0.04) 
-1.390 
(-0.90)  
 0.008 
(0.04) 9.15% 
Electronic 1.962 
(8.64) *** 
-0.420 
(-1.33) 
1.444 
(3.30) *** 
1.706 
(0.33) 
1.296 
(0.28) 
0.518 
(0.12)  
 -0.219 
(-1.43) 8.53% 
W-stat. 
 269.31*** 0.01 0.54 0.01 0.07 0.18   2.21  
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 Panel C-2 (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor 5.225 
 (30.07) *** 
-0.254 
 (-2.27) ** 
0.757 
 (3.82) *** 
3.699 
(1.33) 
1.534 
(0.51) 
1.914 
(0.89) 
0.766 
 (2.65) *** 
  
9.28% 
Electronic 3.781 
 (17.32) *** 
-0.832 
 (-6.16) *** 
-2.536 
 (-7.28) *** 
0.209 
(0.06) 
-1.000 
(-0.27) 
5.765 
 (2.01) ** 
-0.720 
 (-3.21) *** 
  
16.95% 
W-stat. 
 43.78*** 18.32*** 89.44*** 0.94 0.48 1.80 43.92***    
TOV 
Floor 5.566 
 (28.11) *** 
-0.608 
 (-4.61) *** 
0.915 
 (5.22) *** 
4.178 
(1.58) 
2.724 
(1.01) 
1.600 
(0.69)  
-0.819 
 (-5.92) *** 
 
9.56% 
Electronic 4.637 
 (19.70) *** 
-1.036 
 (-7.85) *** 
-2.378 
 (-7.08) *** 
1.119 
(0.32) 
0.792 
(0.22) 
6.866 
 (2.41) **  
-0.271 
 (-1.91) * 
 
17.39% 
W-stat. 
 15.58*** 10.54*** 96.06*** 0.75 0.28 3.41*  14.90***   
PIMPACT 
Floor 4.005 
 (17.05) *** 
0.258 
 (2.23) ** 
0.753 
 (4.92) *** 
4.698 
 (1.78) * 
3.361 
(1.29) 
1.340 
(0.63)   
0.975 
 (7.68) *** 8.85% 
Electronic 3.762 
 (16.47) *** 
-0.604 
 (-3.80) *** 
-2.665 
 (-7.76) *** 
1.848 
(0.54) 
-0.511 
(-0.15) 
5.630 
 (2.01) **   
0.290 
 (2.61) ** 16.58% 
W-stat. 
 1.13 29.31*** 98.98*** 0.70 1.22 2.36   37.99***  
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -2.639 
(-10.30) *** 
0.510 
(4.19) *** 
0.449 
(2.74) *** 
1.938 
(0.84) 
2.728 
(1.27) 
3.643 
(2.00) ** 
2.818 
(8.59) *** 
  
6.76% 
Electronic -3.280 
(-5.39) *** 
2.379 
(7.24) *** 
3.094 
(7.32) *** 
1.573 
(0.81) 
1.453 
(0.88) 
2.548 
(1.61) 
5.480 
(14.12) *** 
  
9.47% 
W-stat. 
 1.11 32.34*** 39.21*** 0.04 0.59 0.48 47.05***    
TOV 
Floor -4.309 
(-8.81) *** 
-0.375 
(-1.94) * 
1.713 
(1.98) ** 
-1.150 
(-0.31) 
4.702 
(1.30) 
7.910 
(3.02) ***  
-2.050 
(-7.70) *** 
 
8.40% 
Electronic -4.765 
(-13.14) *** 
1.239 
(8.70) *** 
4.168 
(10.19) *** 
1.229 
(0.60) 
1.783 
(0.94) 
3.233 
(1.90) ***  
-2.629 
(-16.81) *** 
 
10.74% 
W-stat. 
 1.58 128.59*** 36.02*** 1.37 2.35 7.56***  13.71***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -2.816 
(-6.22) *** 
1.351 
(8.10) *** 
1.934 
(2.20) ** 
-1.412 
(-0.36) 
4.342 
(1.25) 
8.209 
(2.97) ***  
 1.459 
(6.82) *** 7.29% 
Electronic -4.461 
(-14.80) *** 
3.524 
(20.23) *** 
2.940 
(6.52) *** 
2.079 
(1.00) 
2.160 
(1.13) 
3.759 
(2.19) **  
 2.064 
(16.02) *** 9.60% 
W-stat. 
 29.78*** 155.71*** 4.97** 2.84* 1.30 6.70***   22.05***  
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Panel C-3:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on Dividend yield (business cycle variable).  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor 1.069 
(5.30) *** 
-0.382 
(-4.29) *** 
1.801 
(7.50) *** 
1.526 
(0.73) 
1.053 
(0.61) 
0.130 
(0.09) 
1.190 
(3.46) *** 
  
8.45% 
Electronic 4.229 
(15.91) *** 
-0.138 
(-0.59) 
0.437 
(1.13) 
0.690 
(0.14) 
0.492 
(0.10) 
0.035 
(0.01) 
1.232 
(2.16) ** 
  
8.47% 
W-stat. 
 141.46*** 1.10 12.40*** 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01    
TOV 
Floor 0.218 
(0.68) 
-0.467 
(-4.29) *** 
1.604 
(6.03) *** 
1.514 
(0.72) 
0.226 
(0.13) 
-0.896 
(-0.59)  
-0.152 
(-0.66) 
 
8.37% 
Electronic 2.137 
(8.18) *** 
-0.494 
(-2.00) ** 
0.795 
(1.94) * 
0.107 
(0.02) 
-0.144 
(-0.03) 
-0.476 
(-0.11)  
0.547 
(2.36) ** 
 
9.00% 
W-stat. 
 53.90*** 0.01 3.89** 0.08 0.01 0.01  9.05***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.257 
(-1.55) 
-0.434 
(-1.58) 
1.895 
(6.44) *** 
2.051 
(1.00) 
0.441 
(0.25) 
-0.720 
(-0.46)  
 -0.013 
(-0.06) 8.99% 
Electronic 4.422 
(14.36) *** 
-0.960 
(-2.92) *** 
0.701 
(1.52) 
0.016 
(0.00) 
-0.098 
(-0.02) 
-0.476 
(-0.10)  
 -0.445 
(-3.07) *** 8.56% 
W-stat. 
 339.87*** 2.57 6.72*** 0.15 0.01 0.00   8.87***  
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor 5.759 
 (33.60) *** 
-0.078 
(-0.65) 
0.263 
(1.31) 
4.012 
(1.40) 
0.605 
(0.20) 
-0.032 
(-0.01) 
1.246 
 (4.26) *** 
  
8.96% 
Electronic 2.911 
 (12.09) *** 
-1.150 
 (-8.27) *** 
-2.178 
 (-6.16) *** 
-0.173 
(-0.05) 
-1.060 
(-0.30) 
5.093 
 (1.84) * 
-0.759 
 (-3.26) *** 
  
16.04% 
W-stat. 
 139.85*** 59.38*** 47.62*** 1.43 0.22 3.45* 74.17***    
TOV 
Floor 4.902 
 (27.01) *** 
-0.466 
 (-3.69) *** 
0.656 
 (3.78) *** 
4.368 
 (1.68) * 
1.610 
(0.60) 
0.221 
(0.10)  
-1.214 
 (-8.92) *** 
 
7.93% 
Electronic 4.596 
 (19.35) *** 
-1.427 
 (-9.37) *** 
-2.716 
 (-6.80) *** 
1.718 
(0.47) 
0.185 
(0.05) 
6.312 
 (2.11) **  
-0.613 
 (-3.73) *** 
 
17.58% 
W-stat. 
 1.66 39.79*** 71.35*** 0.53 0.15 4.16**  13.36***   
PIMPACT 
Floor 3.729 
 (16.19) *** 
0.755 
 (6.39) *** 
0.678 
 (4.61) *** 
4.760 
 (1.72) * 
2.168 
(0.79) 
-0.123 
(-0.06)   
1.023 
 (8.62) *** 6.86% 
Electronic 3.150 
 (12.65) *** 
-1.053 
 (-5.83) *** 
-2.050 
 (-5.96) *** 
1.538 
(0.45) 
-0.882 
(-0.25) 
4.941 
 (1.78) *   
0.187 
(1.52) 16.31% 
W-stat. 
 5.41** 100.20*** 62.94*** 0.88 0.75 3.34*   45.98***  
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 Panel C-3 (Continued)  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -3.714 
(-13.31) *** 
0.824 
(6.43) *** 
0.163 
(0.86) 
2.369 
(1.03) 
2.863 
(1.33) 
3.393 
(1.89) * 
3.121 
(9.23) *** 
  
6.57% 
Electronic -4.343 
(-5.15) *** 
2.409 
(4.64) *** 
2.124 
(4.38) *** 
2.640 
(1.26) 
1.403 
(0.83) 
2.014 
(1.25) 
5.674 
(14.61) *** 
  
9.10% 
W-stat. 
 0.56 9.31*** 16.34*** 0.02 0.75 0.73 43.24***    
TOV 
Floor -6.060 
(-11.87) *** 
-0.153 
(-0.80) 
0.990 
(1.24) 
-0.090 
(-0.03) 
3.442 
(1.12) 
6.549 
(2.88) ***  
-2.249 
(-9.01) *** 
 
8.60% 
Electronic -5.191 
(-13.72) *** 
1.250 
(8.97) *** 
3.072 
(6.69) *** 
1.629 
(0.77) 
1.136 
(0.63) 
2.813 
(1.80) *  
-2.788 
(-15.86) *** 
 
9.84% 
W-stat. 
 5.27** 101.36*** 20.57*** 0.66 1.65 5.73**  9.39***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -4.620 
(-10.65) *** 
1.789 
(9.22) *** 
1.392 
(1.51) 
-1.384 
(-0.35) 
3.341 
(1.02) 
7.613 
(2.83) ***  
 1.424 
(6.74) *** 8.17% 
Electronic -5.047 
(-15.12) *** 
3.850 
(21.90) *** 
2.863 
(5.88) *** 
2.489 
(1.11) 
1.555 
(0.85) 
3.403 
(2.07) **  
 2.222 
(16.31) *** 9.64% 
W-stat. 
 1.64 137.48*** 9.14*** 3.00* 0.95 6.58***   34.31***  
 
 Panel D-1:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on size, BM and Term spread (business cycle variable).  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor 0.525 
(2.11) ** 
-0.316 
(-2.03) ** 
0.682 
(2.81) *** 
0.887 
(0.39) 
2.311 
(1.10) 
2.573 
(1.50) 
2.514 
(4.05) *** 
  
5.21% 
Electronic 1.616 
(3.91) *** 
1.248 
(2.66) *** 
1.204 
(2.15) ** 
-1.101 
(-0.21) 
-0.912 
(-0.18) 
2.326 
(0.51) 
2.246 
(2.00) ** 
  
2.99% 
W-stat. 
 6.96*** 11.14*** 0.87 0.14 0.41 0.00 0.06    
TOV 
Floor 1.444 
(2.97) *** 
-0.965 
(-6.20) *** 
1.576 
(3.89) *** 
-0.182 
(-0.06) 
1.132 
(0.47) 
-1.408 
(-0.72)  
0.195 
(0.57) 
 
7.33% 
Electronic -0.351 
(-0.64) 
-0.294 
(-1.04) 
1.685 
(3.46) *** 
2.712 
(0.49) 
2.493 
(0.48) 
3.867 
(0.85)  
0.928 
(3.19) *** 
 
3.15% 
W-stat. 
 10.71*** 5.62** 0.05 0.27 0.07 1.35  6.34**   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.914 
(-2.03) ** 
-0.501 
(-1.66) * 
1.811 
(4.46) *** 
0.653 
(0.22) 
0.842 
(0.36) 
-2.089 
(-1.13)  
 0.152 
(0.70) 7.13% 
Electronic 3.149 
(5.12) *** 
-0.578 
(-1.76) * 
1.306 
(2.72) *** 
-0.728 
(-0.12) 
-1.259 
(-0.23) 
1.590 
(0.38)  
 -0.358 
(-1.59) 2.82% 
W-stat. 
 67.76*** 0.05 1.11 0.06 0.15 0.76   5.10**  
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 Panel D-1 (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor 6.728 
 (38.56) ***  
-0.335 
 (-2.29) ** 
-0.050 
(-0.29) 
2.542 
(0.82) 
-1.627 
(-0.49) 
-1.173 
(-0.45) 
0.921 
 (3.79) *** 
  
6.13% 
Electronic 3.745 
 (8.21) *** 
-3.512 
 (-5.97) *** 
2.077 
 (5.67) *** 
12.197 
 (2.23) ** 
9.673 
 (1.69) * 
9.225 
 (2.69) *** 
1.563 
 (2.97) *** 
  
12.92% 
W-stat. 
 42.81*** 29.19*** 33.68*** 3.12* 3.89** 9.17*** 1.49    
TOV 
Floor 5.564 
 (30.94) *** 
-1.469 
 (-13.90) *** 
-0.311 
 (-2.15) ** 
2.677 
(0.96) 
-0.091 
(-0.03) 
-0.368 
(-0.14)  
-0.947 
 (-8.15) *** 
 
6.70% 
Electronic 1.972 
 (4.49) *** 
0.477 
(1.23) 
-2.855 
 (-3.93) *** 
-3.959 
(-0.50) 
-2.386 
(-0.29) 
9.468 
 (2.74) ***  
-0.660 
 (-2.08) ** 
 
10.95% 
W-stat. 
 66.70*** 25.39*** 12.27*** 0.69 0.08 8.13***  0.82   
PIMPACT 
Floor 5.845 
 (26.34) *** 
0.029 
(0.21) 
0.110 
(0.72) 
1.702 
(0.67) 
-0.461 
(-0.17) 
-1.186 
(-0.53)   
1.048 
 (7.34) *** 5.02% 
Electronic 2.227 
 (6.24) *** 
-0.792 
(-1.66)* 
1.069 
 (1.93) * 
6.547 
 (1.77) * 
3.430 
(0.93) 
5.544 
 (2.59) **   
1.604 
 (4.55) *** 11.42% 
W-stat. 
 102.67*** 2.97* 3.00* 1.71 1.11 9.90***   2.49  
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -1.456 
(-4.77) *** 
0.526 
(4.19) *** 
1.805 
(8.45) *** 
3.802 
(1.70) * 
5.354 
(2.45) ** 
4.943 
(2.65) *** 
3.574 
(10.61) *** 
  
5.39% 
Electronic -0.076 
(-0.09) 
1.222 
(1.89) * 
6.434 
(14.22) *** 
2.116 
(1.02) 
4.127 
(2.29) ** 
3.626 
(2.26) ** 
5.439 
(13.27) *** 
  
10.63% 
W-stat. 
 2.75* 1.16 104.64*** 0.66 0.46 0.67 20.7***    
TOV 
Floor -5.390 
(-15.42) *** 
-0.398 
(-1.77) * 
1.958 
(3.54) *** 
1.001 
(0.28) 
5.150 
(1.83) * 
7.578 
(3.40) ***  
-2.171 
(-8.71) *** 
 
5.57% 
Electronic -2.040 
(-4.34) *** 
0.232 
(1.61) 
7.296 
(15.10) *** 
3.174 
(1.41) 
5.032 
(2.48) ** 
4.504 
(2.46) **  
-2.128 
(-18.44) *** 
 
11.45% 
W-stat. 
 50.91*** 19.1*** 121.98*** 0.94 0.00 2.82*  0.14   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.667 
(-3.66) *** 
0.883 
(4.06) *** 
1.846 
(4.02) *** 
0.427 
(0.13) 
3.145 
(1.17) 
8.303 
(3.89) ***  
 1.469 
(6.45) *** 2.38% 
Electronic -2.352 
(-6.47) *** 
2.845 
(13.81) *** 
3.708 
(7.73) *** 
4.352 
(1.88) * 
4.666 
(2.30) ** 
4.069 
(2.36) **  
 2.008 
(15.54) *** 7.84% 
W-stat. 
 3.55* 90.74*** 15.08*** 2.88* 0.56 6.02**   17.46***  
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 Panel D-2:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on size, BM and Yield (business cycle variable).  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.276 
(-0.84) 
0.207 
(0.78) 
1.489 
(5.27) *** 
5.156 
(1.62) 
6.055 
(2.20) ** 
4.675 
(2.43) ** 
2.865 
(3.55) *** 
  
4.74% 
Electronic 0.913 
(1.55) 
0.998 
(2.40) ** 
2.322 
(6.21) *** 
4.486 
(0.77) 
2.562 
(0.47) 
3.336 
(0.69) 
2.666 
(2.04) ** 
  
2.67% 
W-stat. 
 4.08** 3.63* 4.97** 0.01 0.42 0.08 0.02    
TOV 
Floor 0.869 
(1.89) * 
-0.761 
(-4.3) *** 
1.242 
(2.43) ** 
2.459 
(0.68) 
1.342 
(0.45) 
0.110 
(0.04)  
0.228 
(0.66) 
 
6.01% 
Electronic -1.198 
(-2.66) *** 
-0.293 
(-0.88) 
1.849 
(3.64) *** 
4.923 
(0.84) 
4.174 
(0.74) 
5.631 
(1.14)  
1.637 
(2.87) *** 
 
3.31% 
W-stat. 
 20.99*** 1.99 1.43 0.18 0.25 1.26  6.12**   
PIMPACT 
Floor 1.201 
(0.84) 
-1.340 
(-2.75) *** 
-2.572 
(-1.97) ** 
-19.724 
(-2.16) ** 
-14.982 
(-2.59) ** 
-8.784 
(-1.42)  
 0.398 
(1.27) 7.02% 
Electronic 1.808 
(3.61) *** 
-1.546 
(-3.06) *** 
3.729 
(9.14) *** 
5.596 
(0.99) 
5.536 
(1.09) 
7.419 
(1.73) *  
 -1.568 
(-3.67) *** 2.56% 
W-stat. 
 1.47 0.17 238.31*** 20.18*** 16.21*** 14.33***   21.15***  
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor 5.980 
 (31.42) *** 
-0.115 
(-0.64) 
-0.976 
 (-5.23) *** 
2.386 
(0.72) 
-1.120 
(-0.32) 
-1.357 
(-0.49) 
0.826 
 (3.15) *** 
  
7.84% 
Electronic 4.756 
 (11.00) *** 
-2.685 
 (-5.68) *** 
-1.775 
 (-2.22) ** 
5.469 
(1.09) 
4.231 
(0.92) 
14.480 
 (4.06) *** 
0.138 
(0.35) 
  
12.87% 
W-stat. 
 8.02*** 29.59*** 0.99 0.38 1.35 19.73*** 3.02*    
TOV 
Floor 5.253 
 (22.03) *** 
-0.883 
 (-6.20) *** 
-1.069 
 (-6.80) *** 
1.501 
(0.45) 
-0.251 
(-0.07) 
-1.186 
(-0.39)  
-0.889 
 (-7.48) *** 
 
6.58% 
Electronic 3.129 
 (5.54) *** 
1.266 
 (3.27) *** 
-1.932 
 (-1.98) * 
1.492 
(0.16) 
0.746 
(0.08) 
12.662 
 (2.95) ***  
0.379 
(0.85) 
 
8.63% 
W-stat. 
 14.13*** 30.80*** 0.78 0.00 0.01 10.38***  8.04***   
PIMPACT 
Floor 5.368 
 (23.72) *** 
0.092 
(0.54) 
-0.753 
 (-5.03) *** 
-0.036 
(-0.01) 
-1.797 
(-0.63) 
-2.698 
(-1.17)   
0.670 
 (5.13) *** 4.65% 
Electronic 4.515 
 (14.44) *** 
-2.155 
 (-6.67) *** 
1.993 
 (3.38) *** 
2.076 
(0.49) 
2.351 
(0.60) 
9.705 
 (3.80) ***   
-0.164 
(-0.67) 8.28% 
W-stat. 
 7.45*** 48.28*** 21.63*** 0.25 1.10 23.64***   11.44***  
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 Panel D-2 (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -2.434 
(-10.20) *** 
0.356 
(2.26) ** 
1.133 
(4.97) *** 
3.761 
(1.64) * 
4.472 
(2.13) ** 
4.707 
(2.95) *** 
3.163 
(8.61) *** 
  
4.26% 
Electronic -1.375 
(-1.39) 
1.506 
(2.53) ** 
6.014 
(11.84) *** 
3.573 
(1.77) * 
4.257 
(2.37) ** 
3.648 
(2.49) ** 
5.497 
(13.33) *** 
  
11.19% 
W-stat. 
 1.15 3.72* 92.35*** 0.01 0.01 0.52 32.04***    
TOV 
Floor -5.634 
(-14.08) *** 
-0.101 
(-0.49) 
1.265 
(3.07) *** 
2.042 
(0.62) 
3.767 
(1.48) 
4.702 
(2.35) **  
-2.382 
(-8.19) *** 
 
3.59% 
Electronic -2.544 
(-4.72) *** 
0.160 
(0.82) 
6.863 
(11.06) *** 
3.918 
(1.75) * 
5.258 
(2.57) ** 
5.134 
(2.92) ***  
-1.984 
(-17.21) *** 
 
11.11% 
W-stat. 
 32.84*** 1.81 81.44*** 0.7 0.53 0.06  11.89***   
PIMPACT 
Floor -1.310 
(-1.42) 
0.371 
(1.00) 
1.311 
(2.57) ** 
2.524 
(0.74) 
4.825 
(1.70) * 
7.621 
(3.36) ***  
 1.408 
(5.46) *** -0.19% 
Electronic -3.864 
(-12.99) *** 
2.576 
(11.91) *** 
3.200 
(6.13) *** 
5.315 
(2.14) ** 
4.629 
(2.18) 
4.282 
(2.60) **  
 1.775 
(11.61) *** 7.47% 
W-stat. 
 73.74*** 104.03*** 13.1*** 1.26 0.01 4.1**   5.76**  
 
 Panel D-3:  Risk adjusted return is conditional on size, BM and Dividends Yield (business cycle variable).  
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
L
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -0.141 
(-0.41) 
-0.350 
(-2.62) *** 
0.674 
(1.85) * 
-1.935 
(-0.93) 
-1.308 
(-0.68) 
-0.934 
(-0.55) 
1.284 
(2.24) ** 
  
4.24% 
Electronic 3.782 
(8.33) *** 
0.008 
(0.03) 
2.105 
(5.48) *** 
4.086 
(0.71) 
4.038 
(0.77) 
3.337 
(0.68) 
1.002 
(1.05) 
  
3.00% 
W-stat. 
 74.73*** 1.42 13.86*** 1.08 1.03 0.77 0.09    
TOV 
Floor 0.511 
(0.72) 
-0.524 
(-2.36) ** 
0.178 
(0.46) 
-4.748 
(-1.87) * 
-0.702 
(-0.27) 
-0.984 
(-0.46)  
0.561 
(1.70) * 
 
5.27% 
Electronic 5.727 
(7.46) *** 
-0.724 
(-1.98) ** 
-0.541 
(-0.74) 
-5.526 
(-0.91) 
-5.651 
(-0.94) 
-1.078 
(-0.20)  
0.859 
(2.52) ** 
 
2.90% 
W-stat. 
 46.13*** 0.30 0.96 0.02 0.68 0.00  0.76   
PIMPACT 
Floor -0.888 
(-0.91) 
-0.428 
(-1.33) 
0.189 
(0.47) 
-4.974 
(-1.85) * 
-4.117 
(-1.82) * 
-3.615 
(-2.09) **  
 0.114 
(0.50) 6.04% 
Electronic 3.100 
(3.69) *** 
0.586 
(1.04) 
2.888 
(3.17) *** 
0.257 
(0.04) 
0.307 
(0.05) 
4.175 
(0.73)  
 -0.274 
(-0.67) 2.73% 
W-stat. 
 22.57*** 3.24* 8.80*** 0.56 0.43 1.85   0.91  
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 Panel D-3 (Continued) 
Stock 
exchange  
Liq. Risk 
Factor 
Sample 
period 
Intercept  Size BM RET2-3 RET4-6 RET7-12 Prop. 
Bid-ask 
Turnover  Price 
impact 
BBBB
 
S
w
i
s
s
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
S
S
E
)
 PQSPR 
Floor 8.473 
 (47.94) *** 
0.915 
 (6.08) *** 
-0.897 
 (-6.20) *** 
1.801 
(0.45) 
-2.606 
(-0.70) 
-3.739 
(-1.22) 
1.918 
 (6.32) *** 
  
7.38% 
Electronic 0.615 
 (2.95) *** 
0.726 
 (4.26) *** 
0.561 
 (2.02) ** 
3.404 
(0.78) 
1.901 
(0.50) 
6.585 
 (2.54) ** 
-0.567 
(-1.18) 
  
7.31% 
W-stat. 
 1420.00*** 1.24 27.51*** 0.14 1.40 15.82*** 26.50***    
TOV 
Floor 6.551 
 (31.91) *** 
0.292 
 (1.94) * 
-0.458 
 (-1.98) ** 
-0.636 
(-0.15) 
-4.378 
(-1.06) 
-4.131 
(-1.20)  
-1.370 
 (-8.79) *** 
 
5.26% 
Electronic 2.214 
 (7.84) *** 
-0.306 
(-1.28) 
-3.954 
 (-6.28) *** 
4.985 
(0.91) 
-0.136 
(-0.02) 
6.226 
 (1.96) *  
-0.956 
 (-3.68) *** 
 
8.10% 
W-stat. 
 236.05*** 6.25** 30.82*** 1.06 0.60 10.68***  2.54   
PIMPACT 
Floor 6.820 
 (31.65) *** 
1.606 
 (8.15) *** 
-1.752 
 (-12.56) *** 
1.836 
(0.56) 
-2.223 
(-0.73) 
-4.285 
 (-1.85) *   
1.278 
 (7.64) *** 5.05% 
Electronic 4.723 
 (9.66) *** 
-2.228 
 (-5.25) *** 
-2.117 
 (-3.54) *** 
-1.685 
(-0.22) 
-2.373 
(-0.32) 
9.616 
 (2.41) **   
-1.067 
 (-3.70) *** 8.25% 
W-stat. 
 18.38*** 81.76*** 0.37 0.21 0.00 12.14***   66.08***  
F
r
a
n
k
f
u
r
t
 
S
t
o
c
k
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
 
(
F
S
E
)
 
PQSPR 
Floor -2.302 
(-7.03) *** 
0.472 
(2.63) *** 
2.195 
(7.67) *** 
5.397 
(1.35) 
7.446 
(1.93) * 
7.530 
(2.39) ** 
1.927 
(3.31) *** 
  
4.25% 
Electronic -3.463 
(-4.96) *** 
1.828 
(3.02) *** 
4.805 
(11.43) *** 
4.369 
(1.88) * 
2.682 
(1.46) 
2.410 
(1.60) 
4.758 
(11.74) *** 
  
6.19% 
W-stat. 
 2.76* 5.00** 38.57*** 0.20 6.72*** 11.5*** 48.76***    
TOV 
Floor -5.841 
(-14.53) *** 
0.043 
(0.25) 
2.017 
(3.06) *** 
1.243 
(0.34) 
6.606 
(2.11) ** 
9.448 
(4.06) ***  
-2.798 
(-11.87) *** 
 
6.28% 
Electronic -3.404 
(-10.23) *** 
1.252 
(9.27) *** 
5.829 
(11.61) *** 
1.858 
(0.75) 
1.440 
(0.68) 
2.693 
(1.64)  
-2.669 
(-18.21) *** 
 
6.85% 
W-stat. 
 53.65*** 80.08*** 57.7*** 0.06 5.91** 16.88***  0.78   
PIMPACT 
Floor -2.650 
(-5.04) *** 
2.196 
(9.51) *** 
0.652 
(1.91) * 
0.659 
(0.19) 
4.680 
(1.64) 
7.619 
(3.85) ***  
 2.094 
(10.54) *** 1.65% 
Electronic -4.360 
(-12.95) *** 
3.620 
(18.92) *** 
4.915 
(11.5) *** 
5.575 
(2.52) ** 
3.393 
(1.74) * 
3.905 
(2.44) **  
 2.256 
(19.91) *** 8.15% 
W-stat. 
 25.82*** 55.38*** 99.45*** 4.95** 0.44 5.37**   2.04  
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4 Chapter Four 
Information Asymmetry, Divergence of Opinion and Firm-
specific Liquidity  
4.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter it was shown that illiquidity is positively related to expected return, 
that is to say, illiquid stocks offer higher returns to investors than liquid stocks. It was also 
shown that liquidity is priced differently before and after the automation of a trading 
system, which means that level of liquidity is different across trading systems. This chapter 
investigates what it is that affects firm-specific liquidity: in particular, whether information 
asymmetry and divergence of opinion affect firm-specific liquidity and thus cause a 
difference in the levels of liquidity across stocks on floor and electronic trading systems.  
 
The literature in the area of market microstructure shows that liquidity is primarily a 
function of asymmetric information to the extent that a high level of information 
asymmetry results in lower liquidity. Information asymmetry may exist among various 
groups such as informed traders and market makers (i.e. dealers/specialists), managers and 
outside investors. This chapter takes as its focus the information asymmetry between 
company managers and outside investors, where company managers are expected to have 
more specific information about their firms’ assets value and future prospects than the 
outside investors65,66. In such a situation, investors face a higher degree of uncertainty about 
a firm’s value, which exposes them to a higher level of risk. This, in turn, is expected to 
increase the perceived inventory risk and lower stocks’ liquidity. The opposite is true when
                                                 
65
 Previous studies in market microstructure have extensively examined the effect of information asymmetry 
between informed traders and market makers on liquidity. Such studies include, for example, Bagehot (1971), 
Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Kyle (1985), Easley and O'Hara (1987), Admati 
and Pfleiderer (1988),Glosten and Harris (1988), Madhavan and Smidt (1991), Hasbrouck (1991) among 
others. These studies point out that liquidity will decline in markets with informed traders as a result of wide 
bid-ask spreads that are set up by market makers to recover their loss to well-informed traders from uniformed 
traders.    
66
 When mentioned in this chapter, information asymmetry is between the company managers and the market 
(i.e. outside investors) unless otherwise indicated. 
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 both company managers and investors are equally informed about the firm (i.e. there is a 
lower level of information asymmetry)67.   
 
Outside investors often share common information about firms, but disagree as to its 
meaning and interpretation, which results in divergence of opinion (Harris and Raviv, 
1993; Dische, 2002; Doukas et al., 2004 among others). Divergence of opinion can be 
recognized as a potential determinant of stock liquidity. It may reflect uncertainty among 
investors about firms’ future prospects and represent a potential source of risk (Doukas et 
al., 2004; Doukas and McKnight, 2005 and references cited in). Therefore, it is anticipated 
that investors will avoid trading in stocks where divergence of opinion is higher, which 
may result in lower stock liquidity. On the other hand, when there is a disagreement in 
opinion among investors about a firm’s value, the market may be dominated by the beliefs 
of optimistic investors (see Miller, 1977) 68. In this case, the optimistic investors will hold 
and trade in stocks with a higher dispersion among investors, because they believe that 
these stocks have higher valuations (see Diether et al., 2002; Boehme et al., 2006 among 
others). Not only may stock prices be pushed up by this, but trading activity and market 
depth of these stocks may be increased, thereby improving stocks’ liquidity. So divergence 
of opinion can result in either less or more liquidity69.  
 
Furthermore, with many stock exchanges having moved from floor to electronic trading 
systems, it is expected that the dissemination of information about firms and their 
informational environment will be affected, and thus affect firm-specific liquidity70. More 
specifically, the different characteristics of floor and electronic trading systems such as the 
sharing of information and the speed and efficiency in executing orders, are anticipated to 
affect the level of information asymmetry between managers and investors and the degree 
of divergence in investors’ opinion. For example, in contrast to an electronic trading 
                                                 
67
 For more detail on the effect of information asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity, see section 4.3.3.1. 
68
 In Miller’s (1977) model, pessimistic investors are not allowed to trade when they actually wish to sell 
short the stocks with dispersion in investors’ opinion, therefore, optimistic investors will dominate the market.  
69
 For more details on the relationship between divergence of opinion and firm-specific liquidity, see section 
4.3.3.2. 
70
 Theissen, 2002b, Handa et al. (2004) and Maghyereh (2005) argue that the introduction of electronic 
trading systems will improve the transmission of information to market participants compared with floor 
trading systems. However, this issue is controversial. See section 4.3.3.3 for more details.    
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system, sharing information about orders and firms’ fundamental value on a floor trading 
system will improve the dissemination of information and thus reduce the level of 
information asymmetry. This will also enhance investors’ informational level to the extent 
that they can update their beliefs adequately and adjust the interpretation of information, 
which will then reduce the disagreement in their opinions.  This in turn is expected to affect 
the extent to which an information asymmetry and divergence of opinion have an impact on 
firm-specific liquidity, i.e. different trading systems will have different implications 
concerning the relationship of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion with firm-
specific liquidity71.  Therefore, this chapter aims to examine the impact of automation of 
trading systems on the implications of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion 
on firm-specific liquidity. The investigation of this issue in this chapter will yield insights 
concerning the extent to which variations in the level of information asymmetry and 
differences in investors’ opinions may affect firm-specific liquidity within different 
contexts of market structure. 
 
The importance of information asymmetry between managers and investors has been 
extensively examined in the literature, mainly focusing on its role in valuing firms’ assets 
around corporate events. For example, Dierkens (1991) shows that, at an equity issue 
announcement, the drop in stock prices is positively related to information asymmetry. 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) provide evidence of the positive relation between 
information asymmetry and abnormal returns for the diversified companies that engaged in 
a spin-off. Officer et al. (2006) find that with a higher level of information asymmetry 
about the target, the acquirer achieves a higher gain. Draper and Paudyal (2008) examine 
the role of information asymmetry in bidders’ gains and show that firms with higher 
information asymmetry achieve a higher gain from early bidders. These studies generally 
conclude that firms with a higher level of information asymmetry have engaged in 
informational releasing events such as equity issuance, spin-off, and takeover to alleviate 
information asymmetries through attracting the attention of investors.   
 
                                                 
71
 For further details on the impact of floor and electronic trading systems on the relationship of information 
asymmetry and divergence of opinion with firm-specific liquidity, see section 4.3.3.3. 
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Additionally, some studies with more particular relevance to our study are those that focus 
on the relationship between the number of financial analysts and liquidity, such as Chung et 
al. (1995), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Easley et al. (1998). The first two 
studies examine the relationship between financial analysts and liquidity assuming that 
financial analysts are informed traders, to the extent that larger adverse selection cost (i.e. 
lower liquidity) is expected for stocks with substantial analysts’ coverage. Chung et al. 
(1995) find that stocks’ liquidity decreases as the number of analysts following the stock 
increases. In contrast, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) provide evidence that firms with 
many analysts have smaller adverse selection costs (i.e. higher liquidity), which is against 
the notion that financial analysts are informed traders. Consistent with the analysis of 
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995), Easley et al. (1998) find that the probability of 
informed-based trade is lower for stocks with many financial analysts. This provides 
evidence that the number of financial analysts is not an appropriate proxy for information-
based trading, and any study using it as such would not capture the true relationship.  
 
Furthermore, although the literature on divergence of opinion is extensive, it is mainly 
directed towards examining the relationship between divergence of opinion and stock 
returns. For example, Miller (1977) theorizes the relationship between stock returns and 
disagreement among investors. Ackert and Athanassakos (1997), Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000), Diether et al. (2002), Boehme et al. (2006) among others provide empirical 
evidence in support of Miller’s (1977) theory that stock returns are negatively related to 
divergence of opinion. In contrast, Doukas et al. (2004) and Doukas and McKnight (2005), 
among others, report a positive relationship between dispersion in forecasts and future 
returns.  
 
Despite this plethora of studies on information asymmetry, financial analysts, and 
divergence of opinions, studies that explicitly examine the implications of information 
asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity, and those that examine the relationship between 
divergent opinion and firm-specific liquidity are virtually nonexistent. In particular, no 
study, to the best of our knowledge, has examined the impact of a different context of 
market structure (i.e. floor and electronic trading systems) on the implications of 
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information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity72. By 
investigating this issue, this chapter extends the empirical literature in the following ways: 
 
First, although the recent developments in information technology have led to dramatic 
changes in the structure of the trading systems of financial markets, our knowledge is 
limited on how the move from floor to electronic trading systems can impact the level of 
information asymmetries and the disagreement among investors and how this, in turn, 
could result in a different impact on firm-specific liquidity. This chapter, therefore, 
contributes to our knowledge on this issue and extends the literature on market structure 
and design by examining whether and to what extent the cross-sectional variation in 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion could explain the cross-sectional 
variation in firm-specific liquidity before and after the automation of trading systems. 
 
Second, prior studies restricted themselves either to investigating the role of information 
asymmetry between managers and outside investors in valuing risky assets, or in examining 
different empirical issues related to financial analysts. Further, the literature has extensively 
examined the importance of divergence of opinion in asset pricing; but has not examined, 
as we do in this chapter, the relationship between information asymmetry and firm-specific 
liquidity, and also the relationship between divergence of opinion and individual stock 
liquidity. So this chapter extends the existing literature by providing more useful and deep 
insights about the nature of these relationships. 
 
Finally, this chapter provides new evidence, for the first time, on the implications of 
information asymmetry between company managers and outside investors and on the 
implication of divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity in European markets. Three 
main European markets are used to test this issue, namely the UK (London Stock 
Exchange; LSE), Swiss (Swiss Stock Exchange; SSE), and German (Frankfurt Stock 
Exchange; FSE). These markets have different attributes and major differences in their 
                                                 
72
 Also, none of the studies on market structure and design, especially that on floor and electronic trading 
systems, which have been reviewed in section 2.2.2, have examined the relationship between information 
asymmetry and divergence of opinions and firm-specific liquidity before and after the automation of trading 
systems.  
8 Chapter Four: Information Asymmetry, Divergence of Opinion and Firm-specific Liquidity 
234 
 
structure and are considered smaller than US markets, which were the main focus of 
previous studies. For example, unlike US markets where stocks are traded under one 
trading system (i.e. floor trading system), stocks in the UK and Swiss markets are shifted 
from floor to electronic trading systems. In the German market stocks may be traded either 
electronically through the electronic trading system XETRA or by the floor trading system. 
Thus, these different trading systems across markets, as discussed before, may affect the 
process of disseminating information produced by financial analysts which, in turn, may 
affect the implications of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-
specific liquidity. Furthermore, institutional investors in NYSE hold approximately 82% of 
market shares compared with nearly 87.2%, 86.7% and 84.2% in the UK, German and 
Swiss markets respectively73. This difference in institutional investors’ holdings may affect 
the number of financial analysts supplying information to the markets and, thus affect the 
level of information asymmetry and the degree of the divergence of opinion. Brennan and 
Tamarowski (2000) argue that institutional investors are likely to be significant users of 
analysts information, pointing out that “institutional investors, by contrast, often require 
documented analyses by analysts and other third parties to justify their portfolio decisions” 
(p. 29). Hence, investigating the relationship between information asymmetry and 
divergence of opinion with individual stock liquidity, before and after the automation for 
these major European markets will provide us with new insights that could not be obtained 
by looking at other markets.  
 
To this end, the following questions will be addressed: 
 
• Does the variation in the information asymmetry between the managers of the 
company and outside investors explain the cross-sectional variation in firm-specific 
liquidity?  
 
                                                 
73
 The source for the percentage of institutional ownership for US is Ho et al. (2004), while for LSE, FSE and 
SSE it  is the Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE) 
http://www.fese.be/_lib/files/Share_Ownership_Survey 
_2007_Final.pdf.  
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• Does the variation in opinion among investors explain the cross-sectional variation 
in firm-specific liquidity? 
 
• Does the impact of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-
specific liquidity differ before and after the automation of trading systems?   
 
The findings of this chapter should be of particular interest to many parties such as 
investors, companies, regulators and academics. An investigation of the relationship 
between information asymmetry, divergence of opinion and firm-specific liquidity will be 
important for investors because it sheds light on their trading behaviour and illuminates 
their trading decisions. Intuitively, investors prefer trading where there are low transaction 
costs and holding stocks that are less uncertain as to future prospects. For instance, if firms 
with high level of information asymmetry have lower liquidity, this indicates that trading in 
these firms’ stocks will result in higher transaction costs (i.e. higher bid-ask spread). Easley 
et al. (1998) argue that stocks with low analysts’ coverage will have a larger bid-ask spread. 
Furthermore, if the findings of this chapter show that stocks with a high level of analysts’ 
disagreement because of high uncertainty about firms’ future growth (Doukas et al., 2004) 
will be less liquid, this means that holding these stocks will expose investors to a higher 
level of risk. Therefore, investors will prefer to trade in stocks with a low level of 
information asymmetry (i.e. firms that are more transparent to the market) and with a low 
level of disagreement among investors.  
 
Examining the implications of both information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on 
firm-specific liquidity could highlight the importance of companies’ information disclosure 
policies and provide them with useful references for their decision making. For instance, it 
may help firms’ executives make decisions on whether their information disclosure policy 
needs to improve. Thomas (2002) points out that firms with a high level of information 
asymmetry between managers and outside investors face problems in raising capital, have 
lower liquidity and, hence, a higher cost of capital.  Therefore, if a low level of information 
asymmetry results in higher firm-specific liquidity, managers will decide to invest more in 
investor relations activities to improve the disclosure of information. This, in addition to 
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improving a firm’s liquidity, will reduce the cost of equity and increase the amount of 
capital raised by gaining easier access to capital markets. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam 
(1999) find that due to a low level of information asymmetry there was an improvement in 
the share price and an increase in the amount of capital raised by companies engaged in 
spin-off. Further, Dische (2002), Doukas et al. (2004) and Moeller et al. (2006) argue that 
the amount of information about a firm and its quality can affect the divergence in opinion 
among investors. Therefore, if the findings show that there is a significant relationship 
between divergence of opinion and individual stock liquidity, then firms could control the 
dispersion of earnings forecasts among investors in a such way that could benefit firms 
(Johnson, 2004) via improving their liquidity and, thus, reducing cost of equity.   
 
In addition, the findings of this chapter should have some implications for exchange 
regulators and shed light on some regulatory concerns regarding the performance of trading 
systems. That is, exchanges’ designers and regulators are responsible for ensuring that a 
trading system facilitates the process of information dissemination. Therefore, if, after the 
automation of trading systems, information asymmetry and the divergence of opinion have 
greater impact on firm-specific liquidity, then more regulations are required to improve the 
information diffusion of electronic trading systems. Otherwise, no further regulations are 
required.    
 
Finally, the findings of this chapter are of central importance to academics and financial 
communities (i.e. investors and companies). They shed light on the nature of the role of 
financial analysts and emphasize the importance of the earnings forecast by financial 
analysts. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) argue that financial analysts’ activities are 
costly ones whose social benefits remain unexplored and Easley et al. (1998) argue that the 
role played by financial analysts in the market remains a puzzle not yet solved. Therefore, 
if firm-specific liquidity improved with low level of information asymmetry between firms 
and market (i.e. with substantial analysts coverage) and it is significantly affected by 
analysts’ divergence of opinion, this will provide confirmation that the crucial role of 
financial analysts is to uncover and disseminate information about firms and highlight the 
importance and the creditability of their consensus about provided information. To this end, 
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the discussion above emphasizes the need for more research to highlight the importance of 
the relationship of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion with individual stock 
liquidity.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The next section provides a review of the 
literature related to information asymmetry and divergence of opinion. Section 4.3 presents 
the proxies for liquidity, information asymmetry, and divergence of opinion, describes the 
data and the sample that is utilized in the empirical analysis, develops the hypothesis and 
discusses the methodology employed to undertake the analysis. The empirical results are 
then discussed in section 4.4. Finally, section 4.5 concludes the chapter.   
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
The literature that directly examines the association of liquidity with information 
asymmetry between managers and the market, and the association of liquidity with 
divergence of opinion is virtually nonexistent. Therefore, this section briefly reviews the 
empirical research undertaken to examine the relationship between information asymmetry 
and other issues such as corporate actions; the research on the role of financial analysts that 
is related to our study; and the research conducted to examine the effect of divergence of 
opinion on assets returns. This review of literature can be considered relevant to 
understanding the key issues of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion and their 
implications for liquidity74.  
 
4.2.1 Information asymmetry between managers and market 
 
Company managers and outside investors are both assumed to have the same level of 
market-wide information; however, managers usually have the advantage and know more 
value-relevant, firm-specific information than outside investors which creates the 
information asymmetry problem between the two (see for example Dierkens, 1991). In this 
                                                 
74
 See section 2.2.2 for the review of the studies on market structure and design, especially with regard to 
floor and electronic trading systems.  
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case, managers with private and positive information about the firm will be motivated to 
attract the attention of the market towards it, to mitigate information asymmetry (Brennan 
and Hughes, 1991; Draper and Paudyal; 2008, among others). Managers normally do so by 
pushing their companies towards engaging in corporate actions such as equity issue, stock 
split, and takeover. 
 
There is extensive empirical literature that examines the association between corporate 
actions requiring changes in organizational form and information asymmetry, and how the 
latter affects the value of the firm’s assets. For instance, Dierkens (1991) examines the 
interaction between information asymmetry and the issuing of new equity. He uses a 
sample of 197 firms that issued equity between 1980 and 1983. He shows that when there is 
an equity announcement, information asymmetry is significantly decreased. The results 
also show a negative relation between stock price and information asymmetry, and firms, 
therefore, time their equity issue announcement when the level of information asymmetry is 
low.   
 
Furthermore, some diversified companies with liquidity constraints whose assets’ values 
are buried by a high level of information asymmetry, choose corporate spin-off to alleviate 
the asymmetric information about a firm’s value. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), 
for example, examine the information hypothesis which states that spin-off improves the 
value of a firm through mitigating the information asymmetry between managers and 
market regarding operating efficiency and profitability of the different divisions of the firm. 
They analyze a sample of 118 corporate spin-offs which were completed between 1979 and 
1993, along with a control sample to control for firm-specific characteristics (e.g. size and 
industry classification) in their empirical tests. By using event study methodology in 
addition to univariate and multivariate analysis, they find that firms engaged in spin-off are 
those with higher information asymmetry. They report a significant decrease in the measure 
of information asymmetry after spin-off. In contrast to the control sample, they find that the 
abnormal return is larger for firms with a higher level of information asymmetry about their 
values. This is consistent with the theory that the mitigation of information asymmetry is an 
important factor in explaining spin-off gains. Finally, the results show that firms with 
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liquidity constraints were able to raise more external capital after spin-off compared with 
the control sample.  
 
In contrast, Thomas (2002) provides evidence which is at odds with the above research. He 
argues that corporate diversification is not necessarily related to a high level of information 
asymmetry, and information asymmetry that is related to one segment can be diversified 
away across other segments. In other words, the valuation errors that outsiders make are 
imperfectly correlated across multiple segments and may therefore be smaller for 
diversified firms. The sample that Thomas uses includes firms which have forecast data 
from I/B/E/S available for the end of fiscal years between July 1985 and June 1996. He 
finds that diversified firms, compared with focus firms, do not show a high level of 
information asymmetry between managers and the market. This implies that diversification 
provides a potential information benefit rather than exacerbates information asymmetries75.  
 
Further, Draper and Paudyal (2008) examine the proposition that managers where firms are 
undervalued and have an asymmetric information problem with the market, wish to reduce 
the information asymmetry and increase the value of their company’s asset through 
attracting the attention of market participants by announcing takeover bids. They analyze 
9,620 bids made by 1,630 UK companies between 1985 and 2003. The findings of both 
univariate and multivariate analyses are consistent with their prediction. More specifically, 
they find that bidders with high information asymmetry, compared with those with low 
information asymmetry, have higher announcement returns and larger gains. These findings 
are robust to alternative proxies for information asymmetry. The results also show that 
bidders with greater information asymmetry gain the most under all market conditions and 
for all relative deal size groups.  
 
In summary, the review thus far suggests that firms that are missvalued (i.e. mainly 
undervalued) and have a higher cost of capital due to information asymmetry, undertake 
information-releasing events such as an equity issue, earning announcement, takeover, or 
                                                 
75
  Other studies such as Nanda and Narayanan (1999) and Gilson et al. (2001) among others provide evidence 
that is consistent with Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999). Clarke et al. (2004) provide evidence that is 
consistent with Thomas (2002). 
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company spin-off. Such events release valuable firm-specific information to the market 
through attracting the attention of financial analysts, who follow, analyze and disseminate 
information about the firm. This implies that firms with substantial financial analysts’ 
coverage are those with low information asymmetry between company managers and 
outside investors.  
 
4.2.2 Financial analysts and firm-specific liquidity 
 
The role played by financial analysts has recently inspired a large amount of research76. 
However, a brief review of the key studies that examine the relationship between financial 
analysts and individual stock liquidity follows. Chung et al. (1995), for example, examine 
the relationship between financial analysts and bid-ask spread. They propose that market 
makers set up the bid-ask spread based on a belief that adverse selection risk is associated 
with the number of analysts following a stock. In other words, they expect a positive 
relation between financial analysts and a stock’s bid-ask spread. They use intraday data for 
NYSE and AMEX on bid and ask prices for the period 1984-1988 and obtained data on 
financial analysts from I/B/E/S dataset. They find that stocks with greater analysts’ 
coverage are those with a wider bid-ask spread, which is consistent with the view that the 
number of financial analysts is positively related to adverse selection costs, which makes 
market makers post higher bid and ask prices.  Their result contradicts the notion that 
financial analysts are uninformed traders who only collect and disseminate information 
rather than creating private information.   
 
Along the same lines, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) estimate the effect of 
information-based trading on stock liquidity by examining the empirical link between 
financial analysts and adverse selection cost of transaction. They employ the number of 
analysts following a company as a proxy for informed trading and predict greater adverse 
                                                 
76
 Other studies have examined various empirical issues related to financial analysts. Hayes (1998) and 
Jackson (2005) examined the incentives for analysts to generate trade, Kim et al. (1997) and Branson et al. 
(1998) examined the response of stock price to the analysts’ initial buy recommendation, and Irvine (2003) 
compared abnormal returns and liquidity around a recommendation of an analyst who is initiating coverage, 
to abnormal returns and liquidity around a recommendation by an analyst who already covers the stock. 
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selection costs for the firms with many analysts. For 1,508 stocks in NYSE, they use 
intraday and daily data of the year 1988, and data on the number of analysts for the year 
end 1987. The adverse selection cost, measured by Kyle (1985) lambda, is estimated by 
using both Glosten and Harris (1988) and Madhavan and Smidt (1991) procedures. 
However, the authors argue that neither measure of adverse selection costs is entirely 
appropriate because in NYSE both market and limit orders are allowed77. Inconsistent with 
their prediction, Brennan and Subrahmanyam find the firms being followed by a large 
number of analysts have more liquidity than those followed by few analysts. In other 
words, the adverse selection costs tend to decrease with the increase in analysts’ coverage, 
which is at odds with the findings of Chung et al. (1995). Brennan and Subrahmanyam 
(1995) explain their results as due to enhanced competition among informed agents, 
resulting in information being quickly reflected in stock prices and thus deepening the 
market.  
 
Employing financial analysts as a proxy for informed traders is inappropriate because their 
role focuses mainly on collecting, analyzing and disseminating information about firms. 
Therefore, the results of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995), in contrast with Chung et al. 
(1995), confirm this notion. However, Easley et al. (1998) argue that the puzzle about the 
role that the analysts play in financial markets remains unsolved. Therefore, Easley et al. 
develop a new approach to examining the informational role of analysts. That is, they 
investigate whether financial analysts provide private information to the market. They use 
intraday data during the sample period 1 October 1991 to 22 December 1991 and estimate 
the probability of informed trade for a sample of NYSE that varies in analysts’ coverage. 
The results show, consistent with Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) but in contrast with 
Chung et al. (1995), that stocks with substantial analysts coverage have a low probability of 
informed trades. That is, even though stocks that are followed by more analysts have more 
information-based trade, the rate of uninformed trade in these stocks is greater. The 
findings also show that analysts do not provide or create any private information: private 
information events have the same probability across stocks with different analysts’ 
                                                 
77
 Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) argue that the model of Glosten and Harris (1988) assumes that 
investors can place only unconditional market orders, while the model of Madhavan and Smidt (1991) 
explicitly assumes that informed traders condition their order flow on the price.  
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coverage. Finally, Easley et al. find that there is a relation between analysts and the 
reduction in the level of informed trading; therefore, the number of analysts following a 
firm cannot be used as a proxy for informed traders. Thus, the authors argue that any study 
(such as Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995 and Chung et al., 1995) which uses analysts’ 
coverage as a proxy for informed trading cannot capture the true relationship.  
 
Even though Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995), Chung et al. (1995) and Easley et al. 
(1998) examine the relation between financial analysts and liquidity, none of them 
explicitly examine the implications of information asymmetry between company managers 
and outsider investors on firm-specific liquidity, which is the gap that this chapter aims to 
examine and fill.  
 
4.2.3 Divergence of opinions 
 
Turning our attention to the issue of divergence of opinion among investors, Harris and 
Raviv (1993) refer to divergence of opinion among investors as the situation where 
investors share common information about firms’ future prospects and their growth 
opportunities, but they differ in the way they interpret this information.  The issue of 
divergence among investors’ opinions has attracted much attention from academics, and 
numerous studies have been devoted to examining its role in explaining the cross-section of 
stock returns. The literature has looked at the dispersion in investors’ opinion and how it 
affects stock returns from two different points of view.  
 
The first point of view, first developed by the seminal work of Miller (1977), states that 
under short sale constraint pessimistic investors are not allowed to trade (i.e. short the 
stocks): only optimistic investors will hold the stocks, so the prices will reflect a more 
optimistic valuation78. Whenever disagreement among investors about stocks’ value is 
high, optimistic investors will place a heavy demand on stocks which, in turn, will increase 
stock prices and result in lower returns. In other words, divergence of opinion among 
investors is negatively related to stock returns. The work of Miller (1977) paves the way for 
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 We refer to this point of view throughout the thesis as the optimistic view. 
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further empirical work to test the valuation effect of divergence of opinions among 
investors. Diether et al. (2002), for example, examine the role of dispersion in analysts’ 
forecasts (as proxy for divergence in opinion among investors) in explaining stocks cross-
sectional returns for sample of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from 1976 to 2000.  
They find evidence that stocks with low disagreement in opinion among investors earn 
higher returns than otherwise similar stocks, thereby providing support to Miller’s 
hypothesis. In particular, they find that a portfolio of stocks with the lowest dispersion in 
investors’ opinions outperform a portfolio of stocks with the higher dispersion in investors’ 
opinions by 9.48% per year. These results are more pronounced for small stocks and stocks 
that have high book-to-market ratio and low momentum.  
 
Consistent with Diether et al. (2002), Boehme et al. (2006) also provide evidence in support 
of the Miller effect. But in contrast to Diether et al. (2002), they test the overvaluation 
effect by using the two dimensions in Miller’s hypothesis, which are short-sale constraint 
and divergence of investor opinion. By using a sample of NYSE and NASDAQ stocks from 
1988-2002, they find that stocks subject to high divergence of investors’ opinion and high 
short-sale constraints are overpriced. For these stocks, they report an annualized return of 
21% which is greater than the return reported by Diether et al. (2002). Their findings also 
show that neither of these conditions, high divergence of investors’ opinion and high short-
sale constraints, is sufficient to produce overpricing.  
 
The negative relationship between divergence of opinion and stock returns, reported by 
Diether et al. (2002) and Boehme et al. (2006) among others, shows that firms with high 
uncertainty about earnings do worse, which implies that instead of discounting uncertainty, 
investors pay a premium for it (see Johnson, 2004). This is inconsistent with the other point 
of view, the risk view, which posits that divergence of opinion among investors could be 
viewed as a potential source of risk. That is, since divergence of opinion presents highly 
uncertain, more volatile future prospects for a firm, investors should demand a higher 
expected rate of return on stocks with higher divergence of opinion among investors (see 
for example, Diether et al., 2002; Doukas and McKnight, 2005). Consequently, a positive 
relationship between divergence of opinion and stock returns is expected.   
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Doukas et al. (2004), for example, provide evidence that support the risk view. They 
examine whether divergence in opinion can explain the difference in the cross-sectional 
returns between value and growth stocks. They argue that investors will ask for higher 
expected returns when the disagreement among investors about stocks future price is high. 
By using a sample of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from 1983 to 2001, they find 
that dispersion in analysts’ forecast decreases as firm size increases and increases with 
book-to-market ratio. Their results show that divergence of opinion plays an important role 
in asset pricing since value stocks earn a higher return, which is considered a reward for 
greater dispersion in investors’ opinion about a firm’s future prospects. These results hold 
for alternative asset-pricing specifications.  
 
Also, as part of their study, Doukas and McKnight (2005) provide evidence consistent with 
the notion that divergence of opinion among investors can be viewed as a proxy for risk. 
They used a sample of 13 European stock markets from 1988 to 2001, and find that stocks 
with high (low) dispersion in opinion earn higher (lower) expected returns. This result is 
consistent with the result of Doukas et al. (2004) but contradicts the result of Diether et al. 
(2002) and Boehme et al. (2006) among others, who report a negative relationship between 
stock returns and divergence in opinion among investors.  
 
Overall, while there is much literature that examines the role of divergence of opinion, it 
mainly focuses on investigating the importance of divergence of opinion among investors 
in explaining the cross-sectional stock returns. None of the previous studies examine the 
implications of divergence of opinion among investors on firm-specific liquidity. To date 
the impact of divergence in investors’ opinion on individual stock liquidity, and its role in 
explaining the cross-sectional variation in liquidity has been neglected in the microstructure 
literature.  
 
To this end, this chapter sheds new light on not only the implications of information 
asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firms-specific liquidity, but also examines the 
impact of different market structures (i.e. floor versus electronic trading systems) on the 
relation between information asymmetry and divergence of opinion with firm-specific 
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liquidity, for the biggest three European stock markets; specifically, the UK, the Swiss and 
the German markets. In other words, this research examines and compares whether the 
cross-sectional variation on firm-specific liquidity can be explained by the cross-sectional 
variation of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion before and after the 
automation of trading systems. Studies that attempt to highlight and examine this empirical 
issue, to the best of our knowledge, are virtually nonexistent. 
 
4.3 Research Design 
 
This section provides a discussion of the proxies for liquidity, information asymmetry and 
divergence of opinion that are employed in the empirical analysis. It also presents the 
sample and data, identifies the hypotheses to be tested and develops the methodology 
utilized to test the hypotheses. 
 
4.3.1 Proxies for liquidity, information asymmetry and divergence of opinion 
4.3.1.1 Proxies for liquidity 
 
There are many measures of liquidity that have been used in the market microstructure 
literature. However, in our analysis in this chapter we focus on the most commonly used 
measures of liquidity, which are the same measures that are discussed in detail in previous 
chapter (section 3.3.4). These measures are: proportional bid-ask spread, turnover ratio, and 
price impact (Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio). For each one of these measures, we 
calculate it first on a daily basis using daily data, and then the monthly average is calculated 
by taking the average of daily observations for each company in a given month, as in 
equations (3.15) and (3.16), (3.18) and (3.19), (3.21) and (3.22) for proportional bid-ask 
spread, turnover ratio, and price impact respectively.
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4.3.1.2 Proxies for information asymmetry  
 
Information asymmetry can exist between different groups. However, this section presents 
the proxies for information asymmetry that mainly measure its level between company 
managers and outside participants (i.e. market). In our empirical analysis, we use two 
alternative measures: analysts’ coverage (i.e. number of the analysts following a firm) and 
mean forecast error.  
 
4.3.1.2.1 Analysts’ coverage 
 
Financial analysts play an important role in collecting, analyzing and disseminating 
information to the market about firms’ future prospects. Firms that are followed by a large 
number of financial analysts have a lower level of information asymmetry between 
managers and the market: the market holds up-to-date information about firms’ value and 
their future prospects.  In contrast, firms that are followed by a small number of financial 
analysts face an information asymmetry problem between managers and the market, 
because less firm-specific information is available to the public (Draper and Paudyal 2008).  
We therefore use the number of analysts following a firm as a proxy for information 
asymmetry between the company managers and outside investors. For each stock, we set 
the analysts’ coverage as equal to the number of analysts providing the Institutional 
Brokerage Estimate System (I/B/E/S) with their earnings estimate for one fiscal year. 
Wherever the number of analysts is not available, we set the analysts’ coverage for that 
company equal to zero.   
 
Previous studies such as Freeman (1987) and Bhushan (1989) provide evidence that the 
number of analysts following a firm is an increasing function of the firm’s size. That is, 
both analysts’ coverage and size are positively correlated, i.e. financial analysts have the 
incentive to focus on large firms. They find that generating information about large firms 
more profitable and large firms represent the interest of more investors (see for example, 
Freeman 1987; Bhushan, 1989; and Chung et al., 1995). Therefore, to control for the size 
effect on analysts’ coverage, we made analysts’ coverage orthogonal to firm size. More 
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specifically, following Draper and Paudyal (2008) we regress analysts’ coverage against 
firm size and use the residuals (εi) of the regression to measure the incremental analyst’ 
coverage as follows: 
 
                               CD1  ,,E  F   CD1 
G,E  .,                                   (4.1) 
 
where ACi,t is the number of analysts following a firm i at month t and MVi,t is the firm’s 
market value and the error term ( εi,t ) represents the incremental analysts’ coverage (IAC). 
 
4.3.1.2.2 Mean forecast error 
 
As a second measure for information asymmetry between company managers and outside 
investors, we use mean forecast error, calculated as the absolute ratio of the difference 
between the forecasted earnings per share and the actual earnings per share divided by the 
mean value of the forecasted earning per share. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) 
argue that the error in analysts’ forecast will be larger when there is a high level of 
information asymmetry between managers and outside investors about a firm’s value and 
cash flows. They also point out that Elton et al. (1984) find that approximately 84% of 
analysts’ forecast error relate to inaccurate prediction of firm-specific factors. This suggests 
that using mean forecast error as a measure for information asymmetry will be appropriate. 
However, this measure may have some shortcomings: it may be correlated with a firm’s 
earnings risk and, thus, a higher forecast error may result from volatile earnings rather than 
from a higher level of information asymmetry. Also, forecast error may include an 
optimistic component: analysts are overly optimistic with their forecasts at the beginning of 
the fiscal year, but tend to adjust their forecasts downward as the year approaches its end 
(see, Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999 and references cited in).   
 
4.3.1.3   Proxies for divergence of opinions  
 
Financial analysts’ level of consensus about a firm’s future earnings is reflected by 
dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts. Stocks with high dispersion in analysts’ forecasts 
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are those with a low level of consensus among financial analysts (i.e. those with a high 
level of divergence of opinion among investors) and vice versa. Therefore we use the 
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts for one fiscal year as a proxy for the divergence of opinion 
among investors. Following Diether et al. (2002), Dische (2002), Boehme et al. (2006) 
among others, we measure dispersion in analysts’ forecasts by the coefficient of variation, 
which is estimated by the standard deviation of the earnings forecasts divided by the 
absolute value of the mean of earnings forecasts as reported in I/B/E/S summary file. At 
least two analysts are required to obtain the coefficient of variation. This measure is 
intuitively appealing, and it has been extensively used in the literature that examines the 
relationship between divergence of opinion among investors and asset returns, such as 
Diether et al. (2002), Boehme et al. (2006) among others.      
 
4.3.2 The sample 
 
We utilize the same sample used in chapter two which includes all the stocks listed and 
subsequently delisted in the UK (London Stock Exchange; LSE), Swiss (Swiss Stock 
Exchange; SSE) and German (Frankfurt Stock Exchange; FSE) stock markets.  
 
The primary data is taken from Datastream which consists of both daily and monthly data 
for all stocks (dead and live). The daily data includes bid prices, ask prices, trading volume, 
market value and closing prices. As discussed in the previous section, this daily data is used 
to calculate monthly-liquidity proxies: proportional bid-ask spread, turnover ratio, and 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio (price impact). Monthly data includes the stock return 
index (which includes capital gains as well as dividend payments), market return indices, 
industry return indices, size (market value) and stock prices. Also from Datastream, we 
have obtained data on 10 industrial economic sectors (based on Datastream level 2 
classifications ICBIN). 
 
Further, the data on analysts’ earnings estimates is drawn from the Institutional Brokerage 
Estimate System (I/B/E/S) summary history file. The summary history file is derived from 
the detail file and it contains the number of estimates (i.e. number of forecasts) provided by 
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financial analysts and the summary statistics for analysts’ forecasts that include mean, 
median and standard deviation. I/B/E/S calculates these statistics on the third Thursday of 
each month using all the outstanding forecasts provided by financial analysts that month. 
For the countries included in the sample, I/B/E/S provides data on analysts’ earnings 
forecasts since 1987.  Data on stocks from both databases (i.e. Datastream and I/B/E/S) 
have been merged using the IBES ticker which is the common identifier between the two 
databases. The IBES ticker remains the same and does not change even when the company 
has changed its name or sedol. For stocks in I/B/E/S which do not have their match in 
Datastream by IBES ticker, because it is missing, have been matched using the information 
on companies’ name and their sedol provided by the I/B/E/S company identification file79. 
That is, the match has been done based on the sedol and company name. Stocks which are 
in Datastream but not covered by I/B/E/S will have no data on analysts’ earnings forecasts, 
however they are included in the analysis. For these stocks, we consider the number of 
analysts following a stock (i.e. analysts’ coverage) equal to zero.   
 
The sample period in this chapter has the same start date for all markets included in the 
analysis as in Chapter Two, which is guided by the availability of data, but it has been 
extended for all markets to the end of December 2008. However, the chapter utilized a data 
set for different sample periods based on the date of the introduction of the automated 
trading system (as shown in table 3.1 Chapter Two). That is, the sample period for UK 
data, which covers the floor and electronic trading periods, extends from October 1987 to 
December 2008. The sample period for the German markets only spans eleven years from 
January 1998 to December 2008 for each of the trading systems, which operate parallel to 
each other. Finally, the sample period for the Swiss market extends from April 1990 to 
December 2008.  
 
Table 4.1 reports the time-series averages of the cross-sectional means, medians, and 
standard deviations of stocks characteristics. The variables display considerable skewness. 
                                                 
79
 The company identification file provides additional data for informational purposes. It is an event-driven 
file that records the changes in company’s identification information such as official ticker, CUSIP/SEDOL, 
and company name (see the web site of WRDS http://wrds-
web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/ibes/idsum/contents.shtml). 
8 Chapter Four: Information Asymmetry, Divergence of Opinion and Firm-specific Liquidity 
250 
 
Therefore, we employ logarithmic transforms of all the variables except the squared stock 
returns (proxy for stock return volatility measured as squared stock returns following 
Chordia et al. (2000)) because they may be equal to zero. In the case of analysts’ coverage, 
we employ the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following the firm, in 
order to include in the regression firms with zero analysts’ coverage.  
 
The descriptive statistics results show that the number of analysts following a firm in both 
the UK and Switzerland declines after moving to an electronic trading system, while in the 
German market, where both trading systems work parallel to each other, the number of 
analysts stays constant. More specifically, the mean of analysts’ coverage in the UK and 
Switzerland on the floor trading system was nearly 6 and 9 analysts following a firm, and 
declined to nearly 4 and 7 analysts respectively, after moving to an electronic trading 
system. Further, in contrast to the UK market, both the mean of the error in analysts 
forecast (MFE) and the dispersion in analysts forecast (CV) declined in the Swiss market 
after moving to the electronic trading system. But in the German market, both MFE and CV 
are nearly equal under both trading systems. The results also show that after moving to an 
electronic trading system, the liquidity in the UK market declined as indicated by the 
increase in both the proportional bid-ask spread and the price impact, and as indicated by 
the decline in the turnover ratio. That is, proportional bid-ask spread and price impact 
increased to 8.4% and 0.016 during the electronic trading period compared with 4.9% and 
0.001 respectively before, and turnover ratio decreased to almost 4 after the automation of 
the trading system compared with 20 during the floor trading period. Similarly to the UK, 
the results also show that liquidity for the electronic trading system in the German market is 
lower than that for the floor trading system. That is, both proportional bid-ask spread and 
price impact on floor trading systems are lower than proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact on electronic trading systems: they are respectively 5.2% and 0.107 on floor trading 
compared with  8.7% and 3.616 on electronic trading systems. In contrast, the results in the 
Swiss market show the opposite: the firm-specific liquidity has increased after moving to 
the electronic trading system. The proportional bid-ask spread (turnover ratio) has 
decreased (increased) to 4.2% (13) after the move to the electronic trading system 
compared with 4.7% (4) before automation.   
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4.3.3 Hypotheses development  
 
This chapter aims to examine whether the variation in firm-specific liquidity can be 
explained by both the variation in information asymmetry and the variation in divergence in 
opinions pre- and post-automation in the underlying markets.  Therefore, in this section, we 
provide a theoretical explanation for the rationale and motivation behind these relationships 
and develop several testable hypotheses. 
 
4.3.3.1 Information asymmetry and firm-specific liquidity 
 
The level of information asymmetry between company managers and outside investors 
depends on the extent to which the information regarding the value and future prospects of 
a firm is made available to the public through an independent third party (i.e. financial 
analysts). Firms with few analysts’ coverage have an information asymmetry problem 
between managers and outside investors, because the firm-specific information about the 
assets’ value and future growth opportunities will only be available to the firm’s managers. 
In this case, outside investors are expected to face greater firm-specific uncertainty (i.e. 
higher risk) (Dierkens, 1991; Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999) by holding the firms’ 
shares. The increased uncertainty (i.e. risk) due to less information available to outside 
investors could increase the perceived risk of holding inventory and thus reduce liquidity. 
Therefore, investors and market makers will be reluctant to hold the stocks of firms with a 
high level of information asymmetry through reducing their trading or posting wider bid-
ask spread. This will result in lower market depth and thus reduce the liquidity.  
 
 On the other hand, if many analysts are following and covering a firm, then the 
information asymmetry gap between the company managers and outside investors will be 
reduced and both managers and outside investors will be equally informed about the 
intrinsic value of the firm’s assets and future prospects. That is, substantial analysts’ 
coverage will result in a large amount of firm-specific information being available in the 
market. In this case, the degree of uncertainty about the firm’s future prospects and growth 
opportunities will be lower and, thus, the investors and market makers will not be reluctant 
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to trade or hold the firms’ shares because they will be less risky. In sum, this implies that 
the amount of risk faced by outside investors and market makers, which could be perceived 
as inventory holding risk, will be high for stocks with a high level of information 
asymmetry and thereby decrease firm-specific liquidity. Therefore, the level of information 
asymmetry between company managers and outside investors is expected to be negatively 
related to firm-specific liquidity. Expressed differently, it is expected that a higher level of 
information asymmetry will be associated with higher bid-ask spread and price impact and 
with lower turnover ratio. This leads to our first testable hypothesis:   
 
H1: information asymmetry between company managers and outsider investors has a 
significant negative effect on firm-specific liquidity.  
 
4.3.3.2 Divergence of opinion and firm-specific liquidity 
 
The empirical relation between divergence of opinion and firm-specific liquidity is 
particularly relevant in the light of the relation between firm-specific liquidity and the 
required rate of return (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986 among others), and also in the light 
of the relation between divergence of opinion and stock returns (Diether et al., 2002; 
Dische, 2002 among others). However, it is expected that divergence of opinion will have 
either a negative or positive effect on firm-specific liquidity, depending on whether 
divergence of opinion, manifested in the disagreement among financial analysts, can be 
viewed as a source of risk (see for example, Williams, 1977; Diether et al., 2002; Doukas et 
al., 2004; Doukas and McKnight, 2005 among others) or as a source of optimistic trading 
(see for example, Miller, 1977; Diether et al., 2002; Boehme et al., 2006 among others). 
More specifically, in the first view, disagreement among investors may reflect uncertainty 
about the firm’s future prospects and its growth opportunities.  That is, the higher the 
divergence of opinion among investors, the higher the uncertainty and vice versa. In this 
case, investors are expected to avoid trading in stocks with a higher level of divergence of 
opinion which may result in a lower trading volume and thus lower market depth. Also, 
market makers will post a higher bid-ask spread to avoid any additional inventory risk that 
they might face as a result of trading in stocks with a higher level of divergence of opinion. 
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Therefore, it is expected that divergence of opinion among investors will inversely affect 
firm-specific liquidity.  
 
In the second view, when investors disagree in their opinions, the market will be dominated 
by the beliefs of optimistic investors: only optimistic investors are allowed to trade and 
pessimistic investors are not allowed to sell the stocks. Therefore, optimistic investors will 
place a large demand and push stock prices upwards because they believe that these stocks 
have a higher valuation (Diether et al., 2002). As a result the trading volume and market 
depth will increase for stocks with a high divergence of opinion. Further, market makers 
will post a lower bid-ask spread to attract trade and increase their holding of such stocks. 
Consequently, the increase in divergence of opinion among investors could increase firm-
specific liquidity and, thus, it is expected that divergence of opinion will positively affect 
firm-specific liquidity. Since the discussion above predicts an ambiguous effect of 
divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity, the effect needs to be tested by empirical 
analysis. This will lead us to our second testable hypothesis:  
 
H2: Divergence of opinion among investors has an insignificant effect on firm-specific 
liquidity.  
 
4.3.3.3 Information asymmetry, divergence of opinion and firm-specific liquidity 
under different contexts of trading systems 
 
One of the major themes in this chapter is to compare the implications of information 
asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity in the context of different 
trading systems. It is expected that the latter may affect information dissemination process 
and thus affect firms’ informational environment. Different characteristics of floor and 
electronic trading systems, such as information sharing and speed and efficiency in 
executing orders, may have impact on the level of information asymmetry between 
company managers and outside investors and on the divergence of opinion among 
investors. For example, on a floor trading system all investors can share information about 
order inflow and intrinsic value, through the professional relationships that emerge by 
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frequent trading (Venkataraman, 2001). This may result in a faster diffusion of information 
about firms for a floor trading system and reduce the level of information asymmetry 
between managers and investors. This applies especially to firms followed by a small 
number of analysts (i.e. firms with high level of information asymmetry), as information 
about these firms is assumed to filter slowly to stock markets (Doukas and McKnight, 
2005). In addition, this advantage is expected to alleviate the divergence of opinion among 
investors. That is, by sharing information about firms’ intrinsic value, investors’ knowledge 
and beliefs are updated adequately and thus their interpretation of information, which 
reduces the dispersion in their opinions. It is, therefore, expected that the impact of 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity will be lower 
for a floor trading system than for an electronic trading one. This, in turn, will result in 
different levels of liquidity between floor and electronic trading systems for firms with the 
same level of information asymmetry and for firms with the same level of divergence in 
investors’ opinion.   
 
In contrast, the opposite could be true in the case of the electronic trading system. More 
specifically, the efficiency and high speed of the electronic trading system in placing and 
executing orders, compared with the floor trading system, (see for example, Freund and 
Pagano, 2000; Venkataraman, 2001; Theissen, 2002b) will attract more orders. Because 
more orders are placed and executed in the automated trading system, the prices become 
more informative (Huson and MacKinnon, 2003) through reflecting all the available 
information about firms. This will improve the informational environment of the firms 
through reducing the information asymmetry between company managers and outside 
investors. This will also help investors to adequately update their knowledge based on 
information already reflected in stock prices and, thus, reduce the divergence in their 
opinions. Hence, it is expected that the impact of information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion on firm-specific liquidity will be lower for the electronic trading system. In sum, 
the level of information asymmetry between the company and outside investors and the 
degree of divergence in investors’ opinions are both expected to be affected by different 
market structures (i.e. floor and electronic trading system) and this will affect their impact 
on firm-specific liquidity. However, the impact of information asymmetry and divergence 
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of opinion on firm-specific liquidity is expected to be lower either on floor or electronic 
trading system. Therefore, the extent to which information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion have an impact on firm-specific liquidity is an empirical issue. This will lead us to 
our third and fourth testable propositions: 
 
H3: There is no significant difference in the impact of information asymmetry on firm-
specific liquidity before and after the introduction of an electronic trading system. 
 
H4: There is no significant difference in the impact of divergence of opinion among 
investors on firm-specific liquidity before and after the introduction of an electronic 
trading system.   
 
4.3.4 Empirical methodology 
 
In the light of the above discussion, this section seeks to empirically test the developed 
hypotheses, explaining the methodologies employed. It also discusses the comparative 
analysis that compares the average portfolio’s liquidity as well as the estimated regressions’ 
parameters between floor and electronic trading systems, to find out whether there is a 
difference in the impact of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-
specific liquidity as a result of automation.  
 
4.3.4.1 Univariate analysis  
 
In order to draw conclusions about firm-specific liquidity for different classes of stocks, 
similar to the standard approach in asset pricing, we assign stocks to portfolios based on 
their characteristics, such as the level of information asymmetry (measured by analysts’ 
coverage, mean forecast error, and incremental analysts’ coverage) and divergence of 
opinion (measured by coefficient of variation). More specifically, in each month we sort 
stocks independently by their analysts’ coverage, mean forecast error, incremental analysts’ 
coverage and coefficient of variation. Then stocks are assigned into three equally-weighted 
portfolios, high, medium, and low, according to the level both of information asymmetry 
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and of the divergence of opinion. Portfolios with a high level of information asymmetry 
between company managers and outside investors are those with stocks with low analysts’ 
coverage and incremental analysts’ coverage and with high mean forecast error. Portfolios 
with a high divergence of opinion among investors are those with stock with high 
coefficient of variation. After being assigned into portfolios, stocks are held for one month 
(i.e. portfolios are rebalanced monthly). For each portfolio, we calculate the monthly 
portfolio liquidity as the equally-weighted average of the liquidity of all stocks in the 
portfolio.  
 
Furthermore, to draw a conclusion on how liquidity of portfolios with the same level of 
information asymmetry and portfolios with the same level of divergence of opinion will be 
different between floor and electronic trading systems, we conduct a comparison for 
average portfolios’ liquidity across trading systems. In other words, the difference in 
average portfolio liquidity between portfolios with the same level of information 
asymmetry and between portfolios with same level of divergence of opinion across trading 
systems is tested for. The t-test to examine the difference in average portfolios’ liquidity 
between trading systems is used.  
 
4.3.4.2 Multivariate analysis  
 
The estimation based on the univariate analysis, discussed in the previous section, will 
provide evidence concerning the implication of information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion on firm-specific liquidity without allowing for interaction between these 
determinants and between other determinants of firm-specific liquidity. Therefore, to allow 
for this interaction, we use the multivariate analysis to provide further evidence concerning 
the implications of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific 
liquidity.  
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4.3.4.2.1 Cross-sectional framework 
 
To examine the relationship between firm-specific liquidity and both information 
asymmetry and divergence of opinion, we run a series of cross-sectional regressions on a 
monthly basis.  It could be simple to calculate the average for all variables in the sample 
period and then to estimate one single cross-sectional regression using the average values. 
But we apply the methodology of Fama and MacBeth (1973), which is widely used in 
cross-sectional analysis, by estimating monthly cross-sectional regressions, and then we 
calculate the time-series average of the estimated cross-sectional coefficients over time. 
Chordia et al. (2000) argue that this approach should improve the statistical precision. The 
cross-sectional regressions are estimated without, and with, controlling for the well known 
determinants of firm-specific liquidity such as firm size, price and return volatility.   
 
More specifically, we estimate first an empirical model in the following form: 
 
                             ,  F   	,,  
8,  ,G,  .,                                (4.2) 
 
where Li,t is the firm-specific liquidity measured by proportional bid-ask spread, turnover 
ratio and price impact, ACit is analysts’ coverage (i.e. the number of analysts following a 
firm) and, as mentioned previously,  it is defined as the logarithm of one plus the number of 
analysts in order to include the firms for which there is no analysts’ coverage in the 
regression model. MFEi,t is the mean forecast error in the analysts’ earnings forecasts, CVi,t 
is the coefficient of variation and εi,t  is the error term. Then the model in equation (4.2) is 
estimated again while controlling for other factors that affect individual stock liquidity such 
as size, price and return volatility. That is, we estimate the empirical model of the form: 
 
  ,  F   	-,,  
8,  ,G,  H324,   ,  GIJ.  .,     (4.3) 
 
where IACi,t is the incremental analysts’ coverage derived from equation (4.1) to control for 
the size effect, sizei,t is the market capitalization (i.e. market value) of the firm i at month t, 
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Pi,t is stock price of the firm i at month t and Voli,t is the return volatility measured as 
squared stock return following Chordia et al. (2000).      
 
Then, the coefficients β1 – β3 in equation (4.2) and the coefficients β1 – β6 in equation (4.3) 
are estimated by using the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimator. That is, we first 
estimate the vector of explanatory variables coefficients ct each month from Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression as follows: 
 
                                                   K̂  $MN M&	MN O,                                                      (4.4) 
 
where K̂  represents the coefficients β1 – β3 and the coefficients β1 – β6 in equations (4.2) 
and (4.3) respectively, and Xt is the vector of explanatory variables in both equation (4.2) 
and equation (4.3) in month t and O, is the vector of firm-specific liquidity. Then, the 
standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimators are the time-series averages of these 
coefficients K̂. 
 
4.3.4.2.2 The two-pass framework 
 
The cross-sectional variation in firm-specific liquidity is expected to be affected by the 
different level of information that is available for both company managers and outside 
investors. In other words, information available to managers and outside investors could be 
divided into three levels of information, namely; market-wide, industry-wide, and firm-
specific information. Dierkens (1991) argues that both managers and outside investors are 
equally informed about information at the wide level (i.e. market-wide and industry-wide 
information), but are not equally informed about firm-specific information. Thus, managers 
have more firm-specific information than outside investors which creates the problem of 
information asymmetry. Also, insufficient diffusion of information about a firm could 
result in disagreement among investors about a firm’s future prospects. Therefore, investors 
will bear some of the uncertainty (i.e. risk) related to firm until the firm-specific 
information is disseminated to the market (see for example, Dierkens, 1991; Krishnaswami 
and Subramaniam, 1999). Until the firm-specific information becomes available to the 
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market, and the level of information asymmetry is reduced and the investors update their 
beliefs and have a more informative consensus among themselves, the variation in firm-
specific liquidity is expected to be affected by both market-wide and industry-wide 
information. Therefore, to examine the incremental impact of information asymmetry 
between the company managers and outside investors and the impact of divergence of 
opinion among investors on firm-specific liquidity, we have to control for the impact of 
other information (i.e. market-wide and industry-wide information) on firm-specific 
liquidity. This approach aims to discover whether firm-specific information has any 
incremental explanatory power after controlling the variation in firm-specific liquidity for 
market- and industry-wide information.  
 
In order to examine the incremental explanatory power of information asymmetry and 
divergence of opinion among investors in the cross-sectional variation of firm-specific 
liquidity, we apply the idea of Brennan et al. (1998) and Avramov and Chordia (2006a): the 
two-pass regressions framework80. Their framework, which has been applied in asset 
pricing literature, is based on controlling the cross-sectional variation in stock returns for 
all risk factors in the first-pass regression (i.e. time-series regression), and then using the 
unexplained returns, which is the constant plus the residuals of first-pass regression, as a 
dependent variable in the second-pass regression (i.e. cross-sectional regression). We apply 
the same idea; however, for the purpose of the empirical analysis in this chapter, we 
employ the model of Chordia et al. (2000) as our first-pass time-series regression to control 
the variation in firm-specific liquidity for market-wide and industry-wide information. In 
the Chordia et al. (2000) model, individual stock liquidity is regressed on aggregate market 
and industry factors. Specifically, we run time-series regressions of firm-specific liquidity 
for each individual stock on market liquidity, industry liquidity, market return and industry 
return. By using aggregate measures (i.e. market factors and industry factors) we will 
control for the common component of liquidity that is not related to firm-specific 
information events (see Sadka and Scherbina, 2007 and references cited in). Then, we run 
cross-sectional regressions of the unexplained part of liquidity (i.e. constant plus residuals 
                                                 
80
 Both studies used the same regression framework (i.e. the two-pass regression): however, in contrast to 
Brennan et al. (1998), Avramov and Chordia (2006a) used a conditional framework.  
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from the first-pass regressions) as dependent variable on a set of explanatory variables that 
includes information asymmetry proxies and a divergence of opinion proxy.  
 
The empirical methodology of the two-pass framework is explained as follows: first, the 
first-pass time-series regression will be as follows: 
 
               3, F   	
  -)  
  -)  .,                  (4.5) 
 
where MKTLt and INDLt are market liquidity and industry liquidity at the month t 
respectively. For each measure of liquidity, proportional bid-ask spread, turnover ratio and 
price impact, we construct the market liquidity (industry liquidity) by calculating the cross-
sectional average of individual stocks’ liquidity for all stocks in the sample (in the same 
industry). MKTt and INDt are, respectively, the market return and industry return at the 
month t. Market return and industry return are defined as the first difference of the natural 
logarithm of the monthly market return and industry return index respectively.  The 
following specifications have been estimated for the first-pass regression (equation (4.5)): 
(i) β2= β3 = β4= 0, (ii) β3= β4 = 0, (iii) β4 = 0, (iv) all coefficients depart from zero.  
 
Next, from equation (4.5), the unexplained part of firm-specific liquidity (which is the sum 
of constant and residuals) represents the raw material for our estimation in the following 
cross-sectional regression:  
 
                                     ",  ,,  ∑ ,P,MP,,QP9	  .,                                       (4.6) 
 
where MP,, is the vector of explanatory variables that includes the proxy for information 
asymmetry and the proxy for divergence of opinion, and M is the total number of the 
explanatory variables. Equation (4.6) has been estimated without, and with, controlling for 
the determinants of firm-specific liquidity which are the firm size, price and return 
volatility. Once again, the coefficients Cm,t in equation (4.6) are estimated by using the 
standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) estimator. That is, we first estimate the vector of 
characteristics rewards ct each month from Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression: 
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                                                  K̂  $MN M&	MN "R ,                                                    (4.7) 
 
where Xt is the vector of explanatory variables in equation (4.6) in month t and "R , is the 
vector of the unexplained part of firm-specific liquidity. Then, the standard Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) estimators are the time-series averages of these coefficients tcˆ . 
 
For the purpose of testing the stated hypotheses, we estimated the empirical model as 
described in equations (4.2), (4.3), and (4.6) for both the pre-automation period and post-
automation periods. Then we test whether the coefficients of information asymmetry 
measures and divergence of opinion measures are equal to zero. Specifically, we test the 
null hypotheses that the information asymmetry and divergence of opinion coefficients are 
insignificant in the cross-sectional regressions. In the case of the two-pass regressions 
framework, if the market-wide and industry-wide factors are sufficient to explain the 
variation in firm-specific liquidity, then, the explanatory power of information asymmetry 
measures and divergence of opinions measures in the cross-sectional regression should be 
insignificant. This means that market-wide and industry-wide factors, which control for 
market-wide and industry-wide information, are able to capture the impact of both 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion. On the other hand, if the cross-sectional 
unexplained liquidity is still affected by the information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion measures in the cross-sectional regression, after controlling for market-wide and 
industry-wide information, then the coefficient of information asymmetry and divergence 
of opinion should be significant. This means that firm-specific information is valuable and, 
thus, information asymmetry and divergence of opinion have incremental explanatory 
power even after taking into consideration the market-wide and industry-wide information. 
 
4.3.4.2.3 Comparing estimated regressions’ parameters before and after the 
automation of a trading system 
 
To investigate the effect of the automation of the trading system on the impact of both 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity, we conducted 
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a comparative analysis of the estimated coefficients of information asymmetry and 
divergence of opinion pre- and post-automation of the trading system. More specifically, to 
examine the influence of the automation of a trading system on the relationship of 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion with firm-specific liquidity, we used the 
Wald-test to test the coefficients equality restriction for the cross-sectional regressions 
(equations (4.2), (4.3), (4.6)) estimated on a floor trading system and on an electronic 
trading system. In other words, we tested whether the coefficient of the measures of 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion in the cross-sectional regression model 
estimated on a floor trading system is expected to be equal to the same coefficient of the 
regression model estimated on an electronic trading system (i.e. β1F = β1E).  
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
 
This section presents and discusses the results of both univariate and multivariate analyses. 
The results are outlined first for univariate analysis, which is based on constructing 
portfolios based on information asymmetry and divergence of opinion. Following that, it 
reports the results of the cross-sectional regressions (i.e. multivariate analysis) that examine 
the variation in firm-specific liquidity, which is measured by proportional bid-ask spread, 
turnover ratio and price impact (Amihud’s 2002 illiquidity ratio). Both analyses have been 
conducted for the two sub-sample periods before- and after- the automation of a trading 
system, and a comparative analysis has then been applied to compare the effect of 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity in different 
contexts of trading systems81.  
 
4.4.1 Univariate analysis 
 
This sections starts with the portfolio analysis to examine the predictions, which state that 
stocks with a high level of information asymmetry have a lower liquidity, and those with a 
high level of divergence in opinion among investors are expected to have either lower or 
                                                 
81
 See appendix 4A, which provides a summary of the testable hypotheses and whether they are supported or 
rejected, along with the reasons based on the empirical results of this section. 
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higher liquidity. Table 4.2, panels A-D, reports the estimated equally-weighted average 
liquidity for the portfolios constructed on the basis of information asymmetry and on the 
basis of divergence of opinion. Stocks in the sample are ranked in ascending order based on 
analysts’ coverage, incremental analysts’ coverage and mean forecasting error (i.e. 
measures of information asymmetry), and based on the coefficient of variation (i.e. measure 
of divergence of opinion). Then, stocks are sorted into three equally-weighted portfolios: 
low, medium and high according to the ranking variables.   
 
The results in table 4.2 panel A show that, in most cases, average portfolio liquidity, as 
measured by proportional bid-ask spread, price impact and turnover ratio, increase 
monotonically with the number of analysts following a firm under both trading systems. 
More specifically, both average proportional bid-ask spread and price impact decrease with 
the analysts’ coverage. Thus, the results confirm the notion that stocks with low analysts’ 
coverage (with a high level of information asymmetry) have statistically significant higher 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact than stocks with high analysts’ coverage (with 
a low level of information asymmetry). For example, in the UK market the proportional 
bid-ask spread (price impact) on the floor trading and electronic trading systems, 
respectively, is 5.4% and 7.3% (0.2 % and 0.6%) for stocks with low analysts’ coverage, 
which is significantly higher than that for stocks with high analysts’ coverage, 1.7% and 
1.4% (0.005% and 0.010%). This is consistent with the results in the Swiss market and the 
German market.  Furthermore, the turnover ratio shows a monotonic increase with analysts’ 
coverage in all cases except on the floor trading system for both the UK and German 
markets. For example, in the Swiss market, stocks with large analysts’ coverage, on both 
floor and electronic trading system, have significantly higher turnover ratio, 2.68 and 28.95 
respectively, than stocks with a low analysts’ coverage, 1.61 and 1.31. There is also a 
significant difference in the average liquidity among these portfolios: the F-statistics of the 
analysis of variance, that test the equality in the averages of two or more different groups, 
is statistically significant in the majority of cases at 1% and 5% significant level. These 
results imply that stocks with higher information asymmetry between managers and 
outsiders impose a higher level of uncertainty on investors. Consequently, the investors try 
to reduce their trading in these stocks and market makers post a wider bid-ask spread to 
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avoid any additional inventory risk. Overall, the results provide support to the first 
prediction that information asymmetry is negatively associated with firm-specific liquidity 
on both trading systems.  
 
Firm-specific liquidity is also examined by incremental analysts’ coverage (IAC) which is 
estimated using equation (4.1). The purpose of employing IAC is to control for the effect of 
firm size on the number of analysts following a firm, and to evaluate the incremental value 
of analysts’ coverage in reducing information asymmetry between manager and market 
(Draper and Paudyal, 2008). The results in table 4.2 panel B provide evidence which is 
consistent with that reported in panel A with regard to the pattern and the significance of 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact measures. That is, the results also confirm that 
stocks with low IAC (with higher information asymmetry) have statistically significant 
higher proportional bid-ask spread and price impact than stocks with high IAC (with low 
information asymmetry). This provides additional support to the first hypothesis that firms 
with low information asymmetry have higher liquidity. In contrast, the results of turnover 
ratio provide weak support to this hypothesis. Only on the electronic trading systems for 
both the UK market and the German market, does turnover ratio show a monotonic increase 
with analysts’ coverage. Otherwise turnover ratio decreases with an increase in analysts’ 
coverage, which means that turnover ratio is higher for stocks with high information 
asymmetry. This may imply that, before the arrival of the firm-specific information to the 
market by financial analysts, informed traders try to take advantage of their information and 
trade profitably, which may increase the trading volume of stocks with higher information 
asymmetry.  
 
The last measure for information asymmetry is based on the error in financial analysts’ 
forecasts; the mean forecast error. Stocks with a high mean forecasting error are those with 
high information asymmetry between company managers and outside investors. The results 
based on this measure (table 4.2 panel C) in general show that firm-specific liquidity 
declines monotonically with the increase in mean forecast error on both trading systems. 
That is, consistent with evidence reported in previous panels (A and B), both proportional 
bid-ask spread and price impact increase as mean forecast error increases. For instance, for 
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the UK market on the floor and electronic trading systems, proportional bid-ask spread 
(price impact) for stocks with low mean forecast error (low information asymmetry) is 
2.3% and 2.8% (0.01% and 0.10%) respectively, while it is 4.4% and 6.5% (0.05% and 
0.40%) for stocks with high mean forecast error (high information asymmetry). The results 
of proportional bid-ask spread and price impact for both the Swiss market and the German 
market are consistently similar. In contrast, the majority of turnover ratio results are 
inconsistent with our prediction. The average portfolio turnover ratio increases with mean 
forecast error. That is, firms with higher information asymmetry (high mean forecast error) 
have a higher turnover ratio (i.e. higher liquidity), which is against our prediction.  
 
In summary, although the majority of turnover ratio results do not support our prediction, 
the evidence of a positive association of information asymmetry with both proportional bid-
ask spread and price impact is strong and statistically significant and, thus provides strong 
support to the first hypothesis that firm-specific liquidity is negatively related to 
information asymmetry for both trading systems. The results are robust for alternative 
measures of information asymmetry.   
 
Finally, to examine the relationship between firm-specific liquidity and divergence of 
opinion among investors, stocks are assigned to three portfolios based on the coefficient of 
variation (i.e. the measure of divergence of opinion). The results reported in table 4.2 panel 
D provide mixed evidence regarding this relationship. On the one hand, on both trading 
systems and for all markets, the average proportional bid-ask spread and average price 
impact increase with divergence of opinion. That is, firm-specific liquidity decreases with 
divergence of opinion. For instance, in the UK market, the proportional bid-ask spread 
(price impact) is 2.1% and 2.2% (0.01% and 0.04%) for stocks with a low divergence of 
opinion on floor and electronic trading systems respectively, which is significantly lower 
than stocks with a high divergence in opinion, 3.6% and 3.3% (0.04% and 0.10%). The 
results confirm the notion that divergence of opinion among investors is a source of risk 
and, therefore, investors and market makers are reluctant to trade and hold stocks with high 
dispersion in investors’ opinion in order to avoid any additional risk which results in lower 
stock’s liquidity. This contradicts the second hypothesis that firm-specific liquidity is not 
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related to divergence in opinion among investors. Further, the analysis of variance confirms 
the existence of the difference in stocks’ liquidity with different levels of divergence of 
opinion, the results of the F-statistic that test the equivalence in the average between two or 
more groups, in most cases, is statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels of significance.   
 
On the other hand, the average portfolio turnover ratio in panel D increases with the 
divergence of opinion on both trading systems for the UK and the German markets, and 
only on the electronic trading system for the Swiss market. This means that firm-specific 
liquidity increases with divergence in investors’ opinions. For example, the turnover ratio 
for stocks with a low divergence of opinion in the UK market on the floor and electronic 
trading systems, respectively, 2.6 and 3.7, is significantly lower than for stocks with a high 
divergence of opinion 3.5 and 4.7. This is also consistent with the results of the turnover 
ratio in the German market on both trading systems, and on the electronic trading system 
for the Swiss market. These results support the optimistic view of divergence of opinion: 
whenever there is disagreement in opinion among investors regarding the value of the firm, 
the market will be dominated by optimistic investors (see Miller, 1977 among others). 
However, the positive relationship between the turnover ratio and divergence of opinion 
could suggest that the turnover ratio is a better proxy for divergence of opinion.  Doukas 
and McKnight (2005) point out that previous studies find a strong positive relationship 
between turnover ratio and dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. However, our results do not 
support the second hypothesis that firm-specific liquidity is insignificantly related to 
divergence in investors’ opinion. Overall, the results for the relationship between 
divergence of opinion and firm-specific liquidity are mixed. That is, the results of the 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact provide strong and statistically significant 
evidence for a negative association between firm-specific liquidity and divergence of 
opinion, while the results of turnover ratio provide contradictory evidence.  
 
The results of the univariate analysis thus far show that information asymmetry and 
divergence of opinion are significantly related to firm-specific liquidity on both trading 
systems. This leads us to investigate to what extent the relationship between firm-specific 
liquidity and both information asymmetry and divergence of opinion could be affected by 
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the move towards an automated trading system. Therefore, we conduct a test to compare 
the average portfolio’s liquidity between a floor and electronic trading system. For 
instance, the average liquidity of a portfolio of stocks with low analysts’ coverage (high 
information asymmetry) on a floor trading system is compared with the average liquidity 
for the same portfolio on an electronic trading system. A statistically significant difference 
in the average portfolio liquidity implies that different trading systems have affected the 
level of information asymmetry and the level of divergence of opinion and thus their 
impact on firm-specific liquidity. A significantly negative (positive) difference in the 
average portfolio proportional bid-ask spread and price impact (turnover ratio) indicates 
that firm-specific liquidity is higher on an electronic trading system and vice versa.  
 
The results of comparison tests are reported in table 4.3 panels A-D. In general, the great 
majority of the results show that the difference in the average liquidity of portfolios 
between electronic and floor trading systems is statistically significant at all levels of 
significance. The results of the portfolios constructed on the basis of analysts’ coverage 
(panel A) show that the liquidity of stocks with high information asymmetry (low analysts’ 
coverage) is lower (higher) on electronic trading system for the UK and the German 
markets (Swiss market). The difference in the average proportional bid-ask spread and 
price impact in the UK and the German markets (the Swiss market) is positive (negative) 
and only insignificant for price impact in the Swiss market. This implies that the floor 
trading system in the UK and Germany alleviates the information asymmetry problem for 
stocks with a high level of information asymmetry, which results in a higher stock liquidity 
compared with the electronic trading system. The difference in the turnover ratio for stocks 
with low analysts’ coverage confirms this finding in the UK market, but not in the Swiss 
and German markets. In relation to the stocks with high analysts’ coverage (low 
information asymmetry), the results in the UK and German markets are mixed. That is, the 
significant negative (positive) difference in the proportional bid-ask spread (turnover ratio) 
in the UK and German markets show higher liquidity on the electronic trading system for 
stocks with high analysts’ coverage, while the positive difference in price impact shows the 
opposite.  Further, stocks with high analysts’ coverage in the Swiss market have higher 
liquidity on the electronic than on the floor trading system. The difference in proportional 
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bid-ask spread and price impact is negatively significant at 1% and 10% level of 
significance respectively. Hence, the results do not support the third hypothesis that there is 
no difference in the impact of information asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity before and 
after the automation of a trading system.  
 
Furthermore, the results based on incremental analysts’ coverage (IAC), table 4.3 panel B, 
confirm the notion that the impact of information asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity is 
different under different trading systems. The results show that, in the UK and German 
markets, the difference in proportional bid-ask spread and price impact is significantly 
positive in most cases for stocks both with low IAC (high information asymmetry) and with 
high IAC (low information asymmetry). This indicates that the liquidity of stocks either 
with low IAC or high IAC is low on an electronic trading system. Once again, this implies 
that the level of information asymmetry between company managers and outsider investors 
on an electronic trading system is higher than on a floor trading system, which might be 
due to the sharing information advantage of the floor trading system. In contrast, the 
significantly negative differences in proportional bid-ask spread and price impact in most 
cases for the Swiss market indicate the opposite. That is, the results show that firm-specific 
liquidity is higher on an electronic trading system for stocks with either low or high IAC. 
Turnover ratio results provide further support for the results of proportional bid-ask spread 
and price impact in the German market, but they are inconsistent with other results in the 
case of the UK and Swiss markets. Regardless of the mixed evidence, the results reject the 
third hypothesis that the impact of information asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity is not 
different across trading systems.  
 
The results of the final measure of information asymmetry, the mean forecasting error, are 
reported in table 4.3 panel C. The results provide further support to our findings in previous 
panels A and B. Under different trading systems, the impact of information asymmetry on 
firm-specific liquidity is different. More specifically, in contrast to the Swiss market, the 
significant positive difference in proportional bid-ask spread and price impact, in most 
cases, for the UK and German markets show that liquidity for stocks with low mean 
forecast error (low information asymmetry) and for stocks with high mean forecast error 
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(high information asymmetry) is low on an electronic trading system. Once again, the 
results of turnover ratio contradict with the results of proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact.  
 
Finally, the results of comparing the average liquidity of portfolios with different levels of 
divergence of opinion between electronic and floor trading systems are reported in table 4.3 
panel D. In general, the results show that the impact of divergence of opinion on firm-
specific liquidity is different between floor and electronic trading systems. Stocks with low 
and high divergence of opinion are more liquid on the floor trading system than in the 
electronic trading system in the UK and German markets. The difference in the average 
portfolio price impact is significantly positive in both markets. In contrast, the liquidity of 
stocks with low and high divergence of opinion is higher on the electronic trading system in 
the Swiss market as shown by the significantly negative difference in the average portfolio 
proportional bid-ask spread. This implies that the floor trading system in both the UK and 
German markets is more effective in reducing the disagreement between investors, through 
their sharing of information and interaction advantage. However, the electronic trading 
system in the Swiss market seems to perform better for all stocks traded in the market. In 
contrast, the results of turnover ratio provide odd evidence in all markets and show that 
liquidity for stocks with the same level of divergence of opinion is low (high) on the 
electronic trading system for the Swiss (UK and German) market. Regardless of this, our 
findings do not provide support for the fourth hypothesis that the impact of divergence of 
opinion on firm-specific liquidity is indifferent across trading systems.    
 
In sum, the results discussed above provide strong and statistically significant evidence, 
which shows that floor and electronic trading systems affect the level of information 
asymmetry between company managers and outside investors as well as affect the level of 
dispersion in opinion among investors, which then affects their relation with firm-specific 
liquidity. Further, the results, in general, show that in the UK and German markets the 
liquidity of stocks with different levels of information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion will be higher on the floor trading system, while the Swiss market provides higher 
liquidity on the electronic trading system. This implies that the electronic trading system in 
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the Swiss market is suitable and performs better for all stock compared with the electronic 
trading system in the UK and German markets.  
 
4.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
 
This section provides further investigation of the implications of information asymmetry 
and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity using multivariate frameworks: the 
cross-sectional framework and the two-pass regressions framework. Both frameworks have 
been estimated during the two sub-sample periods before- and after the automation of the 
trading system, with and without controlling for the determinant of firm-specific liquidity 
(i.e. size, price and return volatility). Then a comparison of the estimated coefficients has 
been conducted to compare the impact of information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion on firm-specific liquidity before and after the automation of a trading system.  
 
4.4.2.1.1 Cross-sectional regression analysis 
 
Table 4.4 shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) coefficient estimates of the cross-sectional 
regression (equation (4.2)) in the pre- and post-automation periods along with the Wald test 
results. Panels A, B, and C report the results for the UK, Swiss and German markets 
respectively. Since firm-specific liquidity is measured by proportional bid-ask spread, price 
impact  and turnover ratio, the higher (lower) the proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact (turnover ratio), the lower the liquidity. Therefore, if information asymmetry and 
divergence of opinion are expected to negatively affect firm-specific liquidity, then the sign 
of the information asymmetry and divergence of opinion coefficients should be positive 
(negative) when firm-specific liquidity is measured by proportional bid-ask spread and 
price impact (turnover ratio). In all panels the results show that the coefficients on analysts’ 
coverage, in proportional bid-ask spread and price impact regressions, are significantly 
negative at 1% level of significance during the two sub-sample periods in all markets. 
These results are inconsistent with the results of Chung et al. (1995), but they are consistent 
with the findings of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) who find that the number of 
analysts following a firm is negatively related to price impact (i.e. estimated adverse 
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selection cost component), and with Easley et al. (1998) who find that individual stock 
liquidity (measured by probability of information-based trading) is high for stocks where 
there are many analysts following a firm82. In addition, the results of turnover ratio 
regression provide consistent evidence, since the coefficient of analysts’ coverage is 
significantly positive at 1% level of significance, except for Germany on the floor trading 
system which is negatively significant.  
 
The overall results imply that the more analysts there are following a firm, the more firm-
specific information will be available to the market, which will make investors better 
informed and certain about the future prospects of the firm. This will increase the trading 
activity of investors and market makers and thereby increase firm-specific liquidity. 
Further, the results on analysts’ coverage provide confirmation that the main role of 
analysts’ is to collect, analyze and disseminate information about firms, and not as 
proposed by Chung et al. (1995) and Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) that analysts are 
informed traders with informational advantage. That is, the greater the analysts’ coverage, 
the lower the information asymmetry between company managers and the market. Our 
results of negative (positive) relations between analysts’ coverage and both proportional 
bid-ask spread and price impact (turnover ratio) are consistent with the findings of 
univariate analysis and provide support for the first postulated hypothesis, that firm-specific 
liquidity is negatively related to information asymmetry between company managers and 
outsider investors on both trading systems.  
 
Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of the mean forecast error (i.e. the other measure of 
information asymmetry) in both proportional bid-ask spread and price impact regressions 
provide further support for the first hypothesis. On both trading systems, the mean forecast 
error has a strong and positive impact, in most cases, on proportional bid-ask spread and 
price impact for the UK and Swiss markets. This confirms the intuition that firms with a 
high mean forecasting error (high information asymmetry) have lower liquidity. In contrast, 
                                                 
82
 Both studies, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Easley et al. (1998), examine the relationship 
between liquidity and numbers of analysts, assuming that financial analysts are informed traders who may 
have informational advantage that could affect the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
traders.  
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on both trading systems for all markets, the positive and significant coefficient of mean 
forecasting error in turnover ratio regression indicates that firm-specific liquidity is higher 
for firms with a high mean forecasting error. This finding, once again, implies that when 
firms have high information asymmetry between managers and outsider investors, informed 
traders armed with superior information try to seize the advantage and trade quickly before 
more information gets released to the market.  This will result in high trading levels and 
thus higher liquidity for firms with higher information asymmetry (i.e. high mean 
forecasting error). These findings are consistent with the findings of univariate analysis. 
Although the positive relationship between turnover ratio and the mean forecast error is 
against our prediction, the significant positive relationship between the mean forecast error 
and both proportional bid-ask spread and price impact provides further support for our first 
postulated hypothesis.  
 
The results so far show that the cross-sectional variation in information asymmetry explains 
the cross-sectional variation in firm-specific liquidity for all markets and on both trading 
systems. This highlights the importance of examining how the introduction of the 
automated trading system could affect the impact of information asymmetry on firm-
specific liquidity. The results of the Wald test that compares the estimated coefficients 
between pre- and post automation periods are reported in the last three columns in all 
panels. Whenever the coefficients of information asymmetry, while having the same sign, 
in all regressions are significant both before and after the automation of the trading system, 
the coefficients have an impact that is significantly different in the two sub-periods, as 
indicated by the significant Wald test statistic. The overwhelming results for all markets 
provide evidence that the impact of information asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity is 
different in the two sub-periods. More specifically, although the coefficients of analysts’ 
coverage are significantly negative (positive) in proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact (turnover ratio) regressions for all markets, the Wald test shows that in most cases 
the size of the coefficients significantly increased after the introduction of the electronic 
trading system. This indicates that information asymmetry between company managers and 
the outside market is more important on an electronic trading system, and represents a 
greater source of concern to investors than on a floor trading system. This, further, implies 
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that analysts’ coverage and the information provided by analysts to the market, become 
highly important in the absence of investors’ ability to share information about firms.   
 
In relation to the mean forecasting errors, the coefficient becomes insignificant after 
automation for the trading system in price impact (proportional bid-ask spread) regression 
for the UK (Swiss) market, while for the German market it is insignificant in both 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact regression during the two sub-sample periods. 
The insignificance of the coefficient of mean forecasting error, in addition to the reduction 
in its size in price impact regression for the Swiss market after automation, indicates a 
decrease in its effect on firm-specific liquidity. These results are consistent with the 
findings of univariate analysis and confirm the notion that the impact of information 
asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity is different for floor and electronic trading systems, 
which rejects our third testable hypothesis.   
 
In sum, the results so far show that the automation of a trading system appears to have an 
impact on the effect of information asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity. The results also 
show that the impact of information asymmetry is greater on an electronic trading system 
when measured by analysts’ coverage; while the impact of information asymmetry is 
greater on a floor trading system when it is measured by mean forecasting error.  
 
Turning our attention to the relationship between divergence of opinion and firm-specific 
liquidity, the results in all panels for all markets provide mixed evidence. More specifically, 
the coefficient of divergence of opinion, measured by coefficient of variation, is positively 
significant at 1% level of significance in proportional bid-ask spread and price impact for 
all markets during the two sub-sample periods. The results confirm the notion that firm-
specific liquidity decreases with divergence of opinion. This implies that divergence of 
opinion among investors (manifested in disagreement among analysts) represents a source 
of risk and, thus, the greater the disagreement among investors the more uncertainty there is 
about a firm’s future prospects and the more risk there is associated with the firm. In such a 
situation, investors are reluctant to trade and hold risky stock in order to avoid any 
additional inventory risk by posting higher bid-ask spread. This will result in low trading 
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activity and, thus, lower market depth (i.e. higher price impact). These results are consistent 
with those of univariate analysis, and do not support our prediction that divergence of 
opinion has an insignificant impact on firm-specific liquidity.  
 
In contrast, in all turnover ratio regressions for all markets during the two sub-sample 
periods, except for the Swiss market on the floor trading system, the coefficient of 
divergence of opinion is positive and significant at 1% level of significance. The results 
indicate that firm-specific liquidity increases as divergence of opinion increases. This is 
consistent with the optimistic view (i.e. non-risk view) about divergence of opinion: 
whenever investors disagree about a firm’s future prospects the market will be dominated 
by optimistic investors who trade and hold the firm’s stocks. The trading activity of 
optimistic traders will improve the liquidity of the firm. This evidence confirms the 
findings of univariate analysis and also rejects the second hypothesis that divergence of 
opinion has an insignificant impact on firm-specific liquidity. 
  
In addition, the impact of divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity appears to have 
changed with the automation of the trading system, which rejects the fourth hypothesis that 
the impact of divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity is not different between 
trading systems. The results of the Wald test, which compare the estimated coefficients in 
the two sub-periods, are statistically significant in the majority of regressions. Even though 
the coefficient of divergence of opinion is significant for both the floor and the electronic 
trading systems, the Wald test shows that the size of the coefficient decreases significantly 
after the automation of the trading system. This indicates that the importance of divergence 
of opinion with regard to its effect on firm-specific liquidity has decreased during the 
electronic trading compared with floor trading system, because investors on floor-based 
trading can easily notice the disagreement among investors, which may result in high 
impact on firm-specific liquidity.  
 
Overall, the results for the relationship between divergence of opinion and firm-specific 
liquidity are inconclusive. That is, the divergence of opinion among investors has either a 
negative or positive impact on firm-specific liquidity. Also its impact on firm-specific 
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liquidity decreased during the electronic trading period compared with the floor trading 
one.  
 
Table 4.5 shows the Fama-MacBeth (1973) coefficient estimates of the cross-sectional 
regression (equation (4.3)) after controlling for the other determinants of firm-specific 
liquidity such as size, price and return volatility. In this equation we use, instead of 
analysts’ coverage, the incremental analysts’ coverage as a proxy for information 
asymmetry between company managers and the outside market, because both the firm’s 
size and analysts’ coverage are positively correlated. We calculate the incremental analysts’ 
coverage as the residuals of the equation (4.1).  
 
The estimated coefficients, during the floor trading period, show that incremental analysts’ 
coverage in most regressions has the expected sign and is statistically significant at 1% 
level of significance for the UK and Swiss markets, and it is only significant in proportional 
bid-ask spread regression in the German market.  These results indicate that analysts’ 
coverage still has a marginal contribution in reducing the information asymmetry between 
managers and outside investors, even after controlling for the effect of the firm’s size. This 
means that the higher the incremental analysts’ coverage the higher the firm-specific 
liquidity due to the low level of information asymmetry. In contrast, on an electronic 
trading system for all markets, none of the incremental analysts’ coverage coefficients are 
statistically significant. This implies that, on the electronic trading system, firm size is a 
good proxy of analysts’ coverage and that it does capture its effect. The implication of these 
findings is that, even though information about firms, especially large ones, could be 
available for all investors, the investors on a floor trading system also depend on the 
information collected, analyzed and disseminated by analysts in making their trading 
decisions. But, on an electronic trading system, because of the absence of investors’ 
interaction and sharing of information, investors depend heavily on market capitalization 
(i.e. firm size) as an indication of the amount of information available to the market. This is 
consistent with the argument that firm’s size is a good proxy for information asymmetry 
between company managers and outside investors. This may indicate that while the role of 
financial analysts, as well as the size of the firm, is important in the floor trading system in 
8 Chapter Four: Information Asymmetry, Divergence of Opinion and Firm-specific Liquidity 
276 
 
reducing information asymmetry, the role of market capitalization in presenting the level of 
information asymmetry is more important on an electronic trading system. However, these 
findings provide support for the first hypothesis: information asymmetry has significant 
negative impact on firm-specific liquidity.  
 
In addition, after controlling for other determinates of firm-specific liquidity, the coefficient 
of mean forecasting errors remains significant in proportional bid-ask spread and turnover 
ratio (proportional bid-ask spread and price impact) regressions on a floor (electronic) 
trading system for the UK, and in proportional bid-ask spread regression on a floor trading 
system in the Swiss market. However, the significant and positive coefficient of mean 
forecasting error in proportional bid-ask spread and price impact regressions is consistent 
with the notion that firms with a high level of information asymmetry have lower liquidity 
and, thus, it is consistent with the first predictions. The insignificant impact of mean 
forecast error on the measures of firm-specific liquidity (i.e. proportional bid-ask spread, 
price impact, turnover ratio) may be captured by firm size, which implies again that the 
latter could be a better proxy for information asymmetry.  The results show that in all 
panels, the impact of size on firm-specific liquidity is highly significant (at 1% level of 
significance) and has the expected sign in most of regressions on both trading systems. This 
means that large firms have a lower level of information asymmetry and, thus, higher 
liquidity, compared with small firms.  
 
Finally, the results on the relationship between divergence of opinion and firm-specific 
liquidity in the UK market are consistent with those reported in panel A table 4.4. The 
results provide support for the risk view with the coefficients of divergence of opinion 
being positive in proportional bid-ask spread regressions on both trading systems, and for 
the optimistic view through the positive (negative) coefficient in turnover ratio (price 
impact) regression on both trading systems (floor). In other words, the evidence for the 
impact of divergence of opinion on liquidity in the UK market is inconclusive. However, it 
rejects the second hypothesis. In the Swiss market the evidence provides further support for 
the risk view as divergence of opinion is positively related to both proportional bid-ask 
spread and price impact on the floor trading system.  However, the impact of divergence of 
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opinion on the electronic trading system for the Swiss market is insignificant, which might 
also be due to the size effect. In contrast to the results reported in panel C table 4.4 for the 
German market, the estimated coefficients of divergence of opinion provide only further 
support to the non-risk view. The coefficient is negative and significant in price impact 
(proportional bid-ask spread and price impact) regression(s) in the pre- (post-) automated 
period and it is positive and significant in turnover ratio regression on both sub-periods. 
This implies that the German market is dominated by optimistic investors and that 
whenever investors disagree about the future prospects of a firm, its liquidity will improve. 
This shows that divergence of opinion is positively related to liquidity and thus rejects the 
second proposition.  
 
Furthermore, the results also show that the impact of information asymmetry on firm-
specific liquidity is different between the two trading systems, which reject the third 
hypothesis. For instance, the statistically significant Wald test statistics at 5% level of 
significance or better show that the impact of firm size (as a proxy of information 
asymmetry) is more important on the electronic (floor) trading system for the UK and 
German (Swiss) markets, and the impact of mean forecasting error is greater on the 
electronic trading system for the UK. Moreover, the coefficients of incremental analysts’ 
coverage become insignificant after automation for all markets. This implies that investors 
on a floor trading system depend on the information provided by the analysts to improve 
their informational level about firms, while on an electronic trading system they depend on 
firm size.  The results also show that the impact of divergence of opinion on firm-specific 
liquidity is different on both trading systems for all markets, which rejects the fourth 
hypothesis. The Wald test statistic reveals that the coefficient of divergence of opinion in 
proportional bid-ask spread and turnover ratio regressions on a floor trading system in the 
UK market is statistically different from that on an electronic trading system. The 
coefficient decreases in size during the electronic trading period in the UK market, which 
indicates that the effect of divergence of opinion is large on a floor trading system.  
Furthermore, the impact of divergence of opinion becomes insignificant (significant) after 
automation in proportional bid-ask spread and price impact (proportional bid-ask spread) 
regression in the Swiss (German) market. 
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To summarise, the results of both univarite and multivariate analysis (with and without 
controlling for the determinate of firm-specific liquidity) show that the cross-sectional 
variation in firm-specific liquidity is explained by the cross-sectional variation in 
information asymmetry. The evidence for the impact of divergence of opinion is 
inconclusive. The results also show that different market structures (i.e. different trading 
systems) appear to have affected the relationship between the variables that represent the 
focus of this chapter (information asymmetry, divergence of opinion and firm-specific 
liquidity) through affecting the process of disseminating information about firms.    
 
4.4.2.1.2 Two-pass regression analysis 
 
The results discussed in the previous section, based on the cross-sectional framework, 
overwhelmingly support the implication of information asymmetry on firm-specific 
liquidity: firms with a high level of information asymmetry between company managers 
and outside investors have lower liquidity. The results also provide mixed evidence for the 
impact of divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity: the divergence in opinion 
among investors could either positively or negative affect firm-specific liquidity. The 
results show that information asymmetry and divergence of opinion do not fully explain the 
variation in firm-specific liquidity. The adjusted R2 for all regressions, without and with 
controlling for other determinants of firm-specific liquidity, ranges from 4.16% to 84.83% 
which is considered low. This may raise the possibility of other factors that could explain 
the variation in firm-specific liquidity. Therefore, this section aims to further examine the 
implications of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity 
after controlling for the impact of market-wide and industry-wide information using two-
pass regressions framework. Although both company managers and outside investors have 
the same level of information about the market and industry, they have different level of 
firm-specific information. Therefore, we control for the impact of market-wide and 
industry-wide factors on the variation of firm-specific liquidity in the first-pass time-series 
regression and then, in the second-pass cross-sectional regression, we examine whether 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion have any marginal explanatory power in 
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explaining the cross-sectional variation in firms-specific liquidity, that is not captured by 
market-wide and industry-wide factors.  
 
The coefficients of the second-pass cross-sectional regression model (equation (4.6)) 
without and with controlling for the other determinants of firm-specific liquidity, along 
with the Wald test results, are reported in table 4.6 panel A and panel B respectively. The 
regression model is estimated during the two sub-sample periods (before- and after the 
automation of the trading system). In the first-pass time-series regression, individual stock 
liquidity is regressed on market-wide and industry-wide factors under different 
specifications. In the first, individual stock liquidity is regressed on market liquidity. In the 
second, it regressed on market and industry liquidity, then on market liquidity, industry 
liquidity, and market return. Finally, it is regressed on market liquidity, industry liquidity, 
market return and industry return. If the factors in the first-pass time-series regression are 
insufficient in explaining the variation in firm-specific liquidity, the explanatory power of 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion measures in the cross-sectional 
regression should be significant. This implies that information asymmetry and divergence 
of opinion play an important role in explaining the variation in firm-specific liquidity and 
that the firm-specific information provided to the market is valuable.  
 
In the last three specifications of the first-pass regressions, we check for collinearity 
between market factors and industry factors, by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF) 
and correlation matrix. Whenever the value of VIF is equal to or above 10, this is an 
indication of high collinearity (see Gujarati, 2003 and the references cited in). The results 
show that for the majority of industries, there is collinearity between market liquidity and 
industry liquidity, and for all industries there is collinearity between market returns and 
industry returns83. Therefore, we made industry factors orthogonal to market factors. In 
other words, we regress industry factors against market factors and calculate the residuals 
of regression model.  
 
                                                 
83
 VIF is calculated as the inverse of one minus R-squared of the regression of one explanatory variable over 
all the other explanatory variables. Due to the lack of space, the tables for VIF and correlation coefficients are 
not reported as they are already voluminous. 
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Regardless of the different specifications of the first-pass time-series regression, the results 
are qualitatively and quantitatively similar. Therefore, we focus our discussion on the 
empirical results of the cross-sectional regression models estimated under the first 
specification (i.e. using market liquidity as an explanatory variable in the first-pass time-
series regression) 84. The results in panel A table 4.6, in general, show weak evidence for 
the impact of information asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity. More specifically, when 
market-wide information has been controlled for, firm-specific liquidity is not related to 
analysts’ coverage for the UK and Swiss markets on both trading systems and for the 
German market on the electronic trading system only. This suggests that the explanatory 
power of analysts’ coverage is captured by the factors in the first-pass time-series 
regression, and the cross-sectional variation in firm-specific liquidity is explained by 
market liquidity. These results are inconsistent with the results reported in table 4.4 in the 
previous section and do not support our first hypothesis. However, these findings confirm 
the Easley et al. (1998) view that financial analysts do not produce new information and 
that they rely on public, rather than private, information in making their recommendations.  
In contrast, mean forecast error has a significant impact on the cross-section of individual 
stock liquidity unexplained by wide-factors. The coefficient of mean forecast error is 
positively significant in proportional bid-ask spread and turnover ratio regressions for the 
UK (German) market on the floor and electronic trading systems respectively (only on an 
electronic trading system). This means that firm-specific liquidity measured by proportional 
bid-ask spread (turnover ratio) is low (high) for firms with a high mean forecasting error 
(i.e. high information asymmetry). Only the positive relationship between mean forecasting 
error and proportional bid-ask spread provides support for the first hypothesis that 
information asymmetry is negatively related to firm-specific liquidity. 
 
The empirical results also show a weak negative effect of divergence of opinion among 
investors on firm-specific liquidity. In other words, the coefficient of divergence of opinion 
measure (coefficient of variation) is negatively significant at a 5% and weakly significant at 
a 10% level of significance in the turnover ratio regression on the electronic trading system, 
                                                 
84
 The results of the cross-sectional regressions estimated under other specifications of the first-pass time-
series regression is reported in the Appendix 4B-4D.  
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for the UK and the German markets respectively. For the Swiss market, the coefficient of 
variation has a significant positive impact on price impact on both floor and electronic 
trading systems. These results imply that the factors in the first-pass (i.e. market liquidity) 
could not capture the impact of divergence of opinion among investors. In other words, 
investors may disagree on the meaning and in the interpretation of the information at both 
the wide-level and firm-level, however, only their disagreement about the firms’ future 
prospects has an incremental explanatory power on the cross-sectional variation of firm-
specific liquidity. Although the evidence is weak, it is consistent with the risk view; 
divergence of opinion among investors is a source of uncertainty about firms’ future 
prospects and it is negatively related to liquidity, and thus does not support the second 
hypothesis.  
 
Furthermore, the introduction of electronic trading systems appears to affect the impact of 
information asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity. For instance, in the UK market, the 
impact of mean forecasting error in proportional bid-ask spread (turnover ratio) regression 
is significant (insignificant) before automation, but it became insignificant (significant) 
after automation. On the floor trading system, the impact of mean forecast error in 
proportional bid-ask spread and turnover ratio regressions was insignificant for the German 
market, but it is significant on the electronic trading system. These results reject our third 
prediction and show that the impact of information asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity is 
different across trading systems. Also, the impact of divergence of opinion on firm-specific 
liquidity, as appears in turnover ratio regression in the UK and German markets, is greater 
on the electronic trading system compared with the floor trading system where the 
coefficient is insignificant. Although the evidence is weak, it rejects the fourth hypothesis 
and indicates that the impact of divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity is different 
between floor and electronic trading systems.  
 
Furthermore, the empirical estimates reported in panel B, while controlling for other 
determinants of firm-specific liquidity such as size, price, and return volatility, show that 
the impact of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity 
has been captured by market liquidity. The majority of the coefficients of information 
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asymmetry measures and of divergence of opinion measures are insignificant especially for 
the Swiss and the German markets. Apart from that, the estimates for the UK market 
provide little evidence of the impact of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion 
on firm-specific liquidity. That is, the incremental analysts’ coverage has a significant 
negative impact on proportional bid-ask spread during the two sub-periods (i.e. floor and 
electronic trading system), which is not expected given the existence of the size in the same 
equation. This significant effect of incremental analysts coverage might be due to the 
insignificant impact of a firm’s size that captured by the factors in the first-pass regression. 
Also, the coefficient of mean forecast error has the expected sign in the proportional bid-
ask spread regression; it is positively significant at 1% level of significance. These results 
suggest that a firm with a high level of information asymmetry is illiquid and, thus, provide 
further but weak support to the first hypothesis. 
 
Once again, the evidence concerning the impact of divergence of opinion is inconclusive. 
More specifically, the significant negative relation between turnover ratio and coefficient of 
variation in the UK (German) market on both trading systems (on electronic trading 
system) is consistent with the risk view. That is, the higher the divergence of opinion the 
more the uncertainty faced by investors. This is also consistent with the significant positive 
relation between price impact and coefficient of variation on the floor trading system in the 
Swiss market. However, the significant negative relation between proportional bid-ask 
spread and coefficient of variation in the UK market on the floor trading system is 
consistent with the optimistic view, where the market will be dominated by optimistic 
traders who trade and increase their holding of stock with a high level of divergence of 
opinion.  These results contradict the results reported in table 4.5 panel A, and reject the 
second hypothesis. Finally, the results provide mixed evidence on the impact of automation 
on the influence of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific 
liquidity. That is, some of the information asymmetry and divergence of opinion 
coefficients became insignificant after automation, which indicates that the impact of 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on liquidity is different. However, the 
insignificant Wald test in the case of significant coefficients for both sub-sample periods 
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indicates that information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on both trading systems 
has the same impact on firm-specific liquidity.  
 
Overall, the results of two-pass regression provide weak evidence concerning the impact of 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity before and 
after automation. This may imply that market-wide information and industry-wide 
information play an important role in explaining the cross-sectional variation in firm-
specific liquidity, and both information asymmetry between company managers and outside 
investors and the divergence of opinion have little incremental explanatory power in 
relation to the variations in cross-sectional liquidity. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter represents the first empirical study that explicitly examines the implications of 
information asymmetry between company managers and outside investors, and the 
implications of divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity, before and after the 
automation of trading systems for the UK, Swiss and German markets.  
 
We argued that firms with a high level of information asymmetry between company 
managers and outside investors should have lower liquidity, and that firms with a high level 
of divergence of opinion among investors could have either high liquidity or low liquidity, 
depending on whether divergence of opinion represents the dominant optimistic view in the 
market or whether it represents a source of uncertainty. We also argue that the impact of 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity can be 
different before and after automation of trading systems. The overwhelming results of both 
univariate and multivariate analysis show that, in all markets in our sample under both floor 
and electronic trading systems, firm-specific liquidity is negatively related to information 
asymmetry. Specifically, liquidity of firms with greater information asymmetry between 
company managers and outside investors is significantly lower than liquidity of firms with 
low information asymmetry. Analysts’ coverage is significant and negatively (positively) 
related to proportional bid-ask spread and price impact (turnover ratio) and mean forecast 
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error is positively related to proportional bid-ask spread and price impact. This indicates 
that firms with substantial analysts’ coverage and low forecast error (i.e. low information 
asymmetry) have higher liquidity than other firms. This is consistent with the notion that 
financial analysts increase the supply of information about a firm to the market, which 
reduces the uncertainty regarding the firm’s future prospects and, consequently, investors 
and market makers will not be reluctant to trade or hold stocks that have low information 
asymmetry. These findings are robust after controlling for the impact of firm size. In 
contrast to the above findings, we find that the results of turnover ratio in portfolio analysis 
and in regression analysis show the opposite. That is, firms with a high level of information 
asymmetry have higher liquidity (i.e. high turnover ratio). This result supports the notion 
that informed traders try to take advantage of their private information regarding firms with 
high information asymmetry and trade profitability before information is disseminated to 
the market.  
 
Further, our results provide inconclusive evidence concerning the relationship between 
divergence of opinion and firm-specific liquidity for all markets during both sub-sample 
periods, pre- and post-automation of the trading systems. The majority of the results clearly 
support the notion that divergence in investors’ opinion can be viewed as a proxy for risk. 
In the univariate analysis, liquidity measured by proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact declines monotonically with the divergence of opinion. Also, in the multivariate 
analysis, divergence of opinion is positively related to proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact (i.e. negatively related to firm-specific liquidity). In contrast, the results of turnover 
ratio reflect the optimistic view of the divergence of opinion. That is, the average portfolio 
turnover ratio increases monotonically with divergence of opinion, and in the multivariate 
analysis the divergence of opinion is positively related to turnover ratio (i.e. positively 
related to firm-specific liquidity). The inconclusive evidence about this relationship stresses 
the need for future empirical research to confirm whether liquidity is positively or 
negatively related to divergence of opinion.  
 
The results of the comparative analysis support the prediction that the impact of 
information asymmetry as well as the divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity is 
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different across trading systems. For the portfolios that include stocks with the same level 
of information asymmetry, and stocks with the same level of divergence of opinion, the 
average portfolio liquidity across trading systems is different. In most cases, the univariate 
results of proportional bid-ask spread and price impact show that, in contrast to the Swiss 
market, the average portfolio liquidity for stocks with the same level of information 
asymmetry and with the same level of divergence of opinion, is higher on the floor trading 
system than that on the electronic trading system for the UK and German markets. 
However, the results of turnover ratio show the opposite. Further, the results of the Wald 
test, which compares the estimated parameters before and after the automation of a trading 
system, are also consistent with our prediction. Our findings imply that the informational 
environment is affected by whether the trading system is floor-based or electronically-
based. It appears that the floor trading system is more efficient than the electronic one in 
disseminating information among investors, to the extent that information asymmetry 
between company managers and outside investors with regard to the same stock will be 
lower on a floor trading system than an electronic one, especially in the case of the UK and 
German markets. This also implies that investors on the floor trading system are quickly 
able to update their beliefs, and thus decrease disagreement among themselves with regard 
to companies’ future prospects. 
 
Furthermore, the explanatory power of the cross-sectional regressions ranges from 4.16% 
to 84.83%, which means that information asymmetry and divergence of opinion, along with 
other determinates of firm-specific liquidity, could not fully explain the cross-sectional 
variation of firm-specific liquidity. Therefore, further work as to the implications of 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity has been 
conducted, after controlling, however, for the impact of other information (i.e. market-wide 
and industry-wide information) on the cross-sectional variation of firm-specific liquidity. 
We applied the idea of Brennan et al. (1998) and Avramov and Chordia (2006a) which is 
based on the two-pass regression framework. The findings of this analysis provide useful 
insights and question the importance of the information provided by financial analysts. The 
results provide overwhelming evidence that information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion are not related to firm-specific liquidity. This suggests that the factors in the first-
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pass time-series regression were able to capture the impact of information asymmetry and 
divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity. These results question the type of 
information supplied to the market by financial analysts. Is this information considered 
public information? If so, what causes the variation in firm-specific liquidity when analysts 
disseminate information to the market or when the number of analysts following a firm 
increase? Do the behaviour and reactions of investors cause this variation? Such issues 
could be usefully researched.   
 
Finally, it has been argued that a high level of information asymmetry between company 
managers and outside investors as well as the divergence of opinion could represent a 
source of risk due to the uncertainty about firms’ future prospects. This could affect the 
inventory holding costs for investors and market makers. Therefore, another interesting 
extension of our analysis would be to examine the impact of information asymmetry and 
divergence of opinion on the cost components of bid-ask spread.   
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Table 4.1 
Descriptive statistics 
This table presents the time-series average of cross-sectional means, medians, and standard deviations 
during the two sub-sample periods, during the floor trading period and the electronic trading period, for 
UK, Switzerland and Germany.  Measures of information asymmetry include: analyst’s coverage (AC) is 
measured as the number of financial analysts reported earnings forecast to I/B/E/S. Mean forecasting error 
(MFE) is measured as the absolute ratio of the difference between the forecasted earnings per share and the 
actual earnings per share divided by the mean value of the forecasted earning per share. Incremental 
analysts’ coverage (IAC) is estimated as the residuals of the equation (4.1). The measure of Divergence of 
opinion includes the coefficient of variation (CV) which is estimated by the standard deviation of the 
earnings forecasts divided by the absolute value of the mean of earnings forecasts as reported in I/B/E/S 
summary file. Measures of liquidity include: proportional bid-ask spread (PQSPR) is calculated by dividing 
the quoted bid-ask spread over the midpoint of quoted bid-ask spread, turnover ratio (TOV) is the trading 
value divided by market capitalization, and price impact (PIMPACT) is the ratio of absolute returns divided 
by trading value. Size represents the market capitalization expressed in millions. Price is the stock price at 
the end of month. Return volatility (VOL) is measured as the squared stock return. 
Panel A: UK (London Stock Exchange) 
Floor trading system Electronic trading system 
Variables N Mean Median StdDev. N Mean Median StdDev. 
AC 129 5.973 3.674 5.517 134 4.434 2.332 4.813 
MFE 129 1.154 0.091 19.922 134 1.380 0.164 13.053 
IAC 129 0.229 0.143 0.546 134 0.060 0.038 0.422 
CV 129 0.203 0.053 1.383 134 0.274 0.070 1.899 
PQSPR 129 0.049 0.031 0.057 134 0.084 0.049 0.111 
TOV 129 19.516 2.124 399.109 134 3.812 1.686 32.208 
PIMPACT 129 0.001 5.680E-05 0.006 134 0.016 3.912E-04 0.305 
Size 129 0.428 0.047 1.588 134 0.840 0.034 5.653 
Price 129 4.255 1.365 45.962 134 3.591 0.975 32.513 
VOL 129 0.017 0.004 0.073 134 0.032 0.005 0.131 
Panel B: Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
Floor trading system Electronic trading system 
Variables N Mean Median StdDev. N Mean Median StdDev. 
AC 79 9.057 6.576 7.904 149 6.749 4.886 6.725 
MFE 79 1.012 0.161 5.356 149 0.811 0.183 3.048 
IAC 79 0.155 0.004 0.448 149 0.014 -0.007 0.410 
CV 79 0.504 0.140 2.512 149 0.242 0.105 0.714 
PQSPR 78 0.047 0.022 0.096 149 0.042 0.018 0.094 
TOV 79 3.882 1.430 19.615 149 13.040 0.860 175.111 
PIMPACT 79 0.007 1.076E-04 0.082 149 0.007 1.028E-04 0.080 
Size 79 0.650 0.120 2.340 149 1.077 0.257 3.892 
Price 79 680.116 268.177 1790.790 149 579.842 186.001 1685.000 
VOL 79 0.013 0.002 0.074 149 0.017 0.002 0.105 
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 Table 4.1 (continued) 
Panel C: Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
Floor trading system Electronic trading system 
Variables N Mean Median StdDev. N Mean Median StdDev. 
AC 132 7.629 3.170 9.145 132 7.658 3.223 9.138 
MFE 132 1.756 0.342 6.921 132 1.789 0.345 7.247 
IAC 132 0.042 0.027 0.440 132 0.089 0.078 0.491 
CV 132 0.472 0.162 1.601 132 0.479 0.163 1.643 
PQSPR 132 0.052 0.029 0.073 130 0.087 0.025 0.194 
TOV 132 3.368 0.643 37.151 132 39.668 0.640 933.571 
PIMPACT 132 0.107 0.003 1.145 132 3.616 0.002 59.689 
Size 132 1.330 0.078 6.239 132 2.131 0.267 7.607 
Price 132 44.570 11.031 164.888 132 31.288 11.280 112.558 
VOL 132 0.041 0.006 0.202 132 0.065 0.008 0.391 
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Table 4.2 
Information asymmetry, divergence of opinion and liquidity 
This table reports the time-series means of monthly cross-sectional averages of liquidity measures for the portfolios formed on the basis of the level of 
information asymmetry and on the basis of the level of the divergence of opinions among investors. All measures are as defined in table 4.1. Liquidity 
is measured by the proportional bid-ask spread (PQSPR), the turnover ratio (TOV), and the price impact (illiquidity ratio) (PIMPACT). Measures of 
information asymmetry include: analysts coverage (AC), incremental analysts’ coverage (IAC) estimated using equation (4.1) and mean forecasting 
errors (MFE). Divergence of opinion is measured by coefficient of variation (CV). Under all measures of information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion, stocks are sorted into three portfolios. High (low) analysts’ coverage and incremental analysts’ coverage (mean forecasting errors) refer to low 
information asymmetry between company managers and outsider investors. Low CV refers to low divergence in opinion among investors. Floor and 
Electronic refer to the estimation made during the floor trading system and electronic trading system respectively. Portfolios are equally weighted and 
rebalanced monthly. T-test is applied to test the null hypothesis that the time-series average of liquidity is equal to zero. F-Statistic, one-way analysis of 
variance is applied to examine the equivalence in the means of two or more portfolios. *, **, *** denotes the significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level 
respectively.   
Panel A: Liquidity by Analysts’ Coverage   
 
UK (London Stock Exchange) Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
                           Liquidity Measures 
Analysts’ Coverage   PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
F
l
o
o
r
 
Low 0.054*** 3.183*** 0.002*** 0.049*** 1.609*** 0.003 0.038*** 1.256*** 0.023*** 
Medium 0.033*** 3.164*** 0.001*** 0.027*** 2.108*** 2.385E-04*** 0.028*** 1.076*** 0.006*** 
High 0.017*** 3.017*** 4.790E-05*** 0.013*** 2.676*** 8.825E-05*** 0.012*** 1.158*** 0.001*** 
F-Statistic 444.06*** 0.25 58.09*** 262.58*** 24.41*** 1.94 122.03*** 0.61 17.81*** 
E
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
 Low 0.073*** 2.392*** 0.006*** 0.028*** 1.310*** 0.001*** 0.054*** 1.432*** 0.718*** 
Medium 0.037*** 3.051*** 0.001*** 0.016*** 1.862*** 2.131E-04*** 0.028*** 1.665*** 0.429* 
High 0.014*** 5.247*** 9.554E-05*** 0.010*** 28.954*** 6.006E-05*** 0.010*** 3.401*** 0.010* 
F-Statistic 811.01*** 252.78*** 31.53*** 126.82*** 1.09 51.63*** 66.61*** 68.59*** 3.06** 
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      Table 4.2 (continued) 
Panel B: Liquidity by Incremental Analysts’ Coverage   
 
UK (London Stock Exchange) Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
                           Liquidity Measures 
Incremental Analysts’ 
Coverage   PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
F
l
o
o
r
 
Low 0.056*** 3.129*** 9.154E-04*** 0.086*** 2.868*** 0.014*** 0.043*** 2.690*** 0.070*** 
Medium 0.086*** 260.384 0.003*** 0.050*** 6.365*** 0.002*** 0.077*** 6.686*** 0.236*** 
High 0.038*** 3.127*** 5.313E-04*** 0.033*** 2.192*** 0.010 0.039*** 1.969*** 0.050*** 
F-Statistic 111.54*** 2.09 21.89*** 53.32  *** 24.93*** 2.15     47.32*** 10.94*** 12.97*** 
E
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
 Low 0.076*** 3.007*** 0.016** 0.036*** 28.727 0.005*** 0.078*** 1.706*** 1.924*** 
Medium 0.154*** 9.474 0.042*** 0.075*** 10.218*** 0.010 0.145*** 198.006* 7.704 
High 0.073*** 3.432*** 0.007*** 0.023*** 1.979*** 0.006*** 0.059*** 2.213*** 3.800*** 
F-Statistic 301.54*** 0.98 3.54** 192.81*** 1.54 0.35     56.23*** 2.70* 0.80 
 
Panel C: Liquidity by Mean Forecasting Error 
 
UK (London Stock Exchange) Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
                           Liquidity Measures 
Mean Forecasting Error PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
F
l
o
o
r
 
Low 0.023*** 2.649*** 1.255E-04*** 0.024*** 1.998*** 2.283E-04*** 0.019*** 1.097*** 0.002*** 
Medium 0.027*** 2.692*** 1.991E-04*** 0.024*** 2.202*** 2.357E-04*** 0.023*** 1.151*** 0.004*** 
High 0.044*** 3.275*** 4.814E-04*** 0.035*** 2.192*** 4.822E-04*** 0.030*** 1.102*** 0.007*** 
F-Statistic 146.310*** 14.260*** 69.890*** 49.76 *** 1.21 37.07 *** 38.20*** 0.07 10.65*** 
E
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
 Low 0.028** 3.624*** 0.001** 0.015*** 1.582*** 2.458E-04*** 0.018*** 2.173*** 0.005*** 
Medium 0.037*** 3.447*** 0.004 0.017*** 30.242 2.842E-04*** 0.024*** 2.224*** 0.010*** 
High 0.065*** 3.342*** 0.004*** 0.022*** 1.955*** 4.965E-04*** 0.030*** 2.153*** 0.390 
F-Statistic 112.240*** 3.540** 1.27 25.62*** 1.02 10.46*** 20.49*** 0.12 1.59 
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      Table 4.2 (continued) 
Panel D: Liquidity by Divergence of Opinions (CV) 
 
UK (London Stock Exchange) Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
                           Liquidity Measures 
Coefficient of Variation  PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
F
l
o
o
r
 
Low 0.021*** 2.595*** 1.188E-04*** 0.019*** 2.422*** 1.624E-04*** 0.017*** 1.209*** 0.003*** 
Medium 0.022*** 2.868*** 1.135E-04*** 0.024*** 2.232*** 2.179E-04*** 0.019*** 1.105*** 0.003*** 
High 0.036*** 3.480*** 3.796E-04*** 0.031*** 2.090*** 3.482E-04*** 0.026*** 1.400*** 0.006*** 
F-Statistic 153.99*** 22.45*** 25.20*** 49.13*** 1.92 26.89*** 28.73*** 0.96 6.12*** 
E
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
 Low 0.022*** 3.653*** 3.750E-04*** 0.014*** 1.866*** 1.725E-04*** 0.016*** 2.196*** 0.050** 
Medium 0.020*** 4.489*** 2.958E-04*** 0.013*** 34.361 1.513E-04*** 0.018*** 2.659*** 0.586 
High 0.033*** 4.717*** 0.001*** 0.018*** 2.089*** 3.126E-04*** 0.025*** 2.625*** 0.097*** 
F-Statistic 115.71*** 28.00*** 9.28*** 11.75*** 1.01 10.14*** 13.13*** 4.55** 1.75 
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Table 4.3 
Test of difference in portfolios’ liquidity means across trading systems 
This table presents the differences in the liquidity means of the portfolios constructed on the basis of the level of information asymmetry and on the 
basis of the level of the divergence of opinion among investors. The differences represent the average portfolio liquidity for the electronic trading 
system minus the average portfolio liquidity for the floor trading system. Measures of liquidity, level of information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion are as described in table 4.1. T-test is applied to test the null hypothesis that the difference in the mean is equal to zero. *, **, *** denote the 
significance at 10%, 5%, 1% level respectively.  
Panel A: Difference in Portfolios’ Liquidity by Analysts’ Coverage   
 
UK (London Stock Exchange) Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
                           Liquidity Measures 
Analysts’ Coverage   PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Low 0.018*** -0.791*** 0.004*** -0.021*** -0.299*** -0.002 0.016*** 0.176** 0.695*** 
Medium 0.005*** -0.112 0.001*** -0.011*** -0.245 -2.500E-05 4.000E-04 0.590*** 0.422* 
High 
-0.003*** 2.230*** 4.760E-05*** -0.003*** 26.278 -2.800E-05* -0.002** 2.243*** 0.010* 
 
Panel B: Difference in Portfolios’ Liquidity by Incremental Analysts’ Coverage   
 
UK (London Stock Exchange) Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
                           Liquidity Measures 
Incremental 
Analysts’ Coverage   PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Low 0.020*** -0.122 0.020* -0.050*** 25.859 -0.009*** 0.035*** -0.984** 1.855*** 
Medium 0.068*** -250.910 0.040*** 0.025*** 3.853 0.008 0.068*** 191.320 7.469 
High 0.035*** 0.306* 0.010*** -0.011*** -0.213* -0.004 0.020*** 0.244 3.750** 
 
Panel C: Difference in Portfolios’ Liquidity by Mean Forecasting Error 
 
UK (London Stock Exchange) Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
                           Liquidity Measures 
Mean Forecasting Error PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Low 0.005*** 0.975*** 0.001** -0.009*** -0.415*** 1.750E-05 -0.001 1.076*** 0.003* 
Medium 0.011*** 0.756*** 0.004 -0.007*** 28.040 4.840E-05 0.001 1.073*** 0.006** 
High 0.021*** 0.066 0.004*** -0.013*** -0.236* 1.440E-05 3.000E-04 1.051*** 0.383 
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       Table 4.3 (continued) 
Panel D: Difference in Portfolios’ Liquidity by Divergence of Opinions (CV) 
 
UK (London Stock Exchange) Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
                           Liquidity Measures 
Coefficient of Variation PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Low 0.001 1.058*** 2.560E-04*** -0.005*** -0.555** 1.000E-05 -0.001 0.987*** 0.048** 
Medium 
-0.002** 1.622*** 1.820E-04*** -0.011*** 32.128 -6.700E-05*** -0.001 1.554*** 0.583 
High 
-0.003** 1.237*** 6.800E-04*** -0.014*** -0.001 -3.600E-05 -3.000E-04 1.225*** 0.091*** 
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Table 4.4 
Cross-sectional regression of individual stock liquidity to information asymmetry and divergence of opinion  
This table represents time-series averages of individual stocks’ cross-sectional OLS regression coefficients of equation (4.2) estimated for all securities in the UK, 
Switzerland and Germany during the two sub-sample periods, during the floor trading period and the electronic trading period, using the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) procedure. All measures are as defined in table 4.1. Liquidity is measured by the proportional bid-ask spread (PQSPR), the turnover ratio (TOV), and the 
price impact (illiquidity ratio) (PIMPACT). Measures of information asymmetry include: analysts’ coverage (AC), incremental analysts’ coverage (IAC) 
estimated using equation (4.1) and mean forecasting errors (MFE). Divergence of opinion is measured by coefficient of variation (CV).  Adj. R2 is the time-series 
average of the monthly adjusted R2. Wald Stat. is the Wald test statistic applied to examine the equality between the coefficients estimated for floor and electronic 
trading systems. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% level respectively.  
Panel A: UK (London Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-2.093 
(-30.76)*** 
4.819 
(45.05) *** 
-9.171 
(-51.04) *** 
-1.904 
(-31.93)*** 
4.562 
(58.76) *** 
-9.401 
(-49.15) *** 10.03*** 10.97*** 1.45 
AC 
-0.665 
(-38.53) *** 
0.344 
(11.86) *** 
-2.483 
(-74.33) *** 
-1.148 
(-23.61) *** 
0.706 
(21.54) *** 
-3.111 
(-55.84) *** 98.70*** 122.21*** 127.00*** 
MFE 
0.035 
(12.16) *** 
0.023 
(6.29) *** 
0.039 
(6.70) *** 
0.029 
(5.30) *** 
0.030 
(8.02) *** 
0.016 
(1.30) 1.17 3.81* 3.47* 
CV 
0.143 
(21.93) *** 
0.074 
(7.76) *** 
0.168 
(6.90) *** 
0.078 
(11.20) *** 
0.057 
(11.97) *** 
0.079 
(4.17) *** 87.61*** 11.44*** 22.53*** 
Adj. R2 (%) 47.01 8.36 51.02 51.13 21.30 56.07    
 
Panel B: Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-2.099 
(-46.16)*** 
-0.890 
(-11.17) *** 
-5.519 
(-32.58) *** 
-3.056 
(-13.59)*** 
-0.777 
(-9.52) *** 
-6.030 
(-22.62) *** 18.12*** 1.92 3.67* 
AC 
-0.799 
(-72.86) *** 
0.453 
(24.70) *** 
-1.694 
(-71.1) *** 
-0.606 
(-14.35) *** 
0.657 
(15.87) *** 
-2.169 
(-14.32) *** 20.77*** 24.30*** 9.85*** 
MFE 
0.033 
(3.75) *** 
0.059 
(4.64) *** 
0.075 
(3.16) *** 
0.026 
(0.91) 
0.038 
(1.77) * 
-0.075 
(-2.30) ** 0.06 0.96 21.09*** 
CV 
0.130 
(13.81) *** 
-0.110 
(-5.80) *** 
0.206 
(5.26) *** 
0.128 
(2.40) ** 
0.135 
(4.61) *** 
0.183 
(7.11) *** 0.00 69.66*** 0.81 
Adj. R2 (%) 42.53 6.70 43.35 24.38 9.84 37.45    
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
Panel C: Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-2.621 
(-57.50) *** 
-0.309 
(-2.34) ** 
-4.113 
(-20.97) *** 
-2.451 
(-21.67)*** 
-1.613 
(-7.06) *** 
-2.230 
(-6.69) *** 2.26 32.54*** 31.87*** 
AC 
-0.736 
(-31.19) *** 
-0.226 
(-2.95) *** 
-1.922 
(-41.1) *** 
-0.940 
(-22.24) *** 
0.827 
(12.43) *** 
-3.195 
(-34.76) *** 23.25*** 250.55*** 191.69*** 
MFE 
-0.004 
(-0.44) 
0.037 
(2.15) ** 
0.040 
(0.95) 
-0.007 
(-0.81) 
0.052 
(4.02) *** 
-0.015 
(-0.60) 0.11 1.24 4.70** 
CV 
0.077 
(9.88)*** 
0.150 
(5.97) *** 
0.139 
(4.61) *** 
0.064 
(6.85) *** 
0.088 
(3.94) *** 
0.194 
(6.42) *** 1.89 7.51*** 3.35* 
Adj. R2 (%) 57.26 14.72 54.21 57.71 21.76 64.05    
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Table 4.5 
Cross-sectional regression of individual stock liquidity to information asymmetry and divergence of opinion after controlling for other 
determinants of liquidity  
This table represents time-series averages of individual stocks’ cross-sectional OLS regression coefficients of equation (4.3) estimated for all securities in the UK, 
Switzerland and Germany during the two sub-sample periods, during the floor trading period and the electronic trading period, using the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) procedure. All measures are as defined in table 4.1. Liquidity is measured by the proportional bid-ask spread (PQSPR), the turnover ratio (TOV), and the 
price impact (illiquidity ratio) (PIMPACT). Measures of information asymmetry include: analysts’ coverage (AC), incremental analysts’ coverage (IAC) 
estimated using equation (4.1) and mean forecasting errors (MFE). Divergence of opinion is measured by coefficient of variation (CV). Size is the market 
capitalization. Price is the price of stock at the end of the month. Volatility is the stock’s return volatility measured as squared stock return.  Adj. R2 is the      
time-series average of the monthly adjusted R2. Wald Stat. is the Wald test statistic applied to examine the equality between the coefficients estimated during 
floor and electronic trading systems. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The coefficients of both 
PQSPR and PIMPACT regressions are multiplied by 100. *, **, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Panel A: UK (London Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-1.559 
(-24.57)*** 
5.198 
(32.03) *** 
-8.629 
(-87.14) *** 
-0.983 
(-15.30)*** 
4.417 
(54.24) *** 
-7.587 
(-50.65) *** 80.52*** 91.85*** 48.41*** 
IAC 
0.026 
(7.05) *** 
0.055 
(6.30) *** 
-0.030 
(-3.46) *** 
-0.033 
(-1.60) 
0.019 
(0.83) 
-0.052 
(-1.24) 8.34*** 2.28 0.29 
MFE 
0.017 
(8.74) *** 
0.008 
(2.25) ** 
0.004 
(1.17) 
0.027 
(7.00) *** 
0.002 
(0.35) 
0.016 
(1.90) * 7.45*** 1.26 1.95 
CV 
0.066 
(17.5) *** 
0.079 
(9.87) *** 
-0.029 
(-2.83) *** 
0.033 
(3.55) *** 
0.057 
(8.13) *** 
-0.007 
(-0.30) 12.82*** 9.75*** 0.90 
Size 
-0.289 
(-55.79) *** 
0.066 
(3.69) *** 
-1.123 
(-126.21) *** 
-0.443 
(-24.65) *** 
0.252 
(23.00) *** 
-1.298 
(-62.43) *** 73.60*** 288.28*** 71.05*** 
Price 
-0.129 
(-18.86) *** 
-0.003 
(-0.56) 
-0.015 
(-2.02) ** 
-0.092 
(-14.29) *** 
-0.042 
(-5.27) *** 
0.011 
(1.43) 33.65*** 23.49*** 11.69*** 
Volatility 
1.232 
(10.67) *** 
6.287 
(11.15) *** 
0.312 
(0.65) 
0.585 
(4.88) *** 
4.763 
(15.48) *** 
-0.262 
(-1.42) 29.18*** 24.57*** 9.70*** 
Adj. R2 (%) 68.92 11.07 77.05 75.70 25.58 84.83    
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Table 4.5 (continued) 
Panel B: Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-1.391 
(-25.51)*** 
0.468 
(1.45) 
-3.317 
(-17.81) *** 
-2.466 
(-11.06)*** 
1.406 
(2.89) *** 
-3.797 
(-8.21) *** 23.23*** 3.71* 1.07 
IAC 
-0.073 
(-6.57) *** 
0.244 
(3.27) *** 
-0.161 
(-3.47) *** 
0.306 
(0.95) 
-0.540 
(-1.14) 
0.755 
(1.14) 1.39 2.72* 1.91 
MFE 
0.017 
(2.42) ** 
-0.024 
(-0.65) 
0.019 
(0.73) 
0.025 
(0.54) 
0.040 
(0.59) 
-0.041 
(-0.51) 0.03 0.89 0.55 
CV 
0.074 
(10.37) *** 
-0.051 
(-0.53) 
0.107 
(1.81) * 
0.428 
(1.08) 
-0.450 
(-0.76) 
0.750 
(0.97) 0.81 0.46 0.70 
Size 
-0.465 
(-67.21) *** 
-0.121 
(-2.75) *** 
-0.949 
(-39.54) *** 
-0.339 
(-20.34) *** 
-0.020 
(-0.43) 
-1.082 
(-23.84) *** 56.69*** 4.60** 8.49*** 
Price 
-0.002 
(-0.53) 
0.044 
(1.00) 
-0.171 
(-6.48) *** 
0.209 
(1.11) 
-0.420 
(-1.24) 
0.374 
(0.90) 1.25 1.88 1.73 
Volatility  
0.963 
(1.88) * 
13.699 
(9.33) *** 
0.381 
(0.38) 
0.376 
(0.85) 
17.640 
(11.14) *** 
-5.763 
(-6.03) *** 1.74 6.20** 41.36*** 
Adj. R2 (%) 60.57 4.16 61.40 39.30 10.76 55.93    
 
Panel C: Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-2.266 
(-46.5)*** 
0.485 
(3.83) *** 
-3.279 
(-23.41) *** 
-2.124 
(-29.40)*** 
-1.254 
(-8.32) *** 
-1.054 
(-6.76) *** 3.84** 133.01*** 203.96*** 
IAC 
-0.050 
(-2.41) ** 
-0.181 
(-1.65) * 
0.180 
(1.58) 
0.002 
(0.06) 
-0.101 
(-1.49) 
0.087 
(1.27) 2.81* 1.36 1.86 
MFE 
0.005 
(1.34) 
-0.030 
(-1.40) 
0.028 
(1.32) 
0.007 
(1.10) 
-0.021 
(-1.04) 
0.024 
(1.26) 0.11 0.21 0.03 
CV 
0.000 
(0.03) 
0.081 
(2.25) ** 
-0.083 
(-2.43) ** 
-0.025 
(-1.72) * 
0.121 
(3.19) *** 
-0.089 
(-2.75) *** 3.02* 1.15 0.04 
Size 
-0.332 
(-36.1) *** 
-0.216 
(-6.66) *** 
-0.914 
(-28.41) *** 
-0.413 
(-26.58) *** 
0.259 
(10.38) *** 
-1.425 
(-60.41) *** 27.50*** 361.66*** 468.09*** 
Price 
-0.014 
(-1.51) 
-0.080 
(-1.55) 
0.038 
(0.68) 
0.003 
(0.31) 
-0.090 
(-3.68) *** 
0.027 
(1.07) 3.30* 0.18 0.16 
Volatility  
-0.319 
(-2.02) ** 
10.741 
(4.66) *** 
-4.995 
(-1.89) * 
-0.396 
(-1.92) * 
7.373 
(9.15) *** 
-3.054 
(-4.66) *** 0.14 17.48*** 8.75*** 
Adj. R2 (%) 68.57 33.12 70.28 70.90 18.39 80.12    
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Table 4.6 
Fama-MacBeth estimates of the cross-sectional regression with market liquidity as explanatory variable in the first-pass time-series 
regression 
This table represents time-series averages of individual stocks’ cross-sectional OLS regression coefficients for all securities in the UK, Switzerland and Germany 
during the two sub-sample periods, during the floor trading period and the electronic trading period, using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Panel A 
presents the estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) without controlling for the determinants of firm-specific liquidity, Panel B represents the 
estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) after controlling for other determinants of firm-specific liquidity. All measures are as defined in table 
4.1. Liquidity is measured by the proportional bid-ask spread (PQSPR), the turnover ratio (TOV), and the price impact (illiquidity ratio) (PIMPACT). Measures 
of information asymmetry include: analysts’ converge (AC), incremental analysts’ coverage (IAC) estimated using equation (4.1) and mean forecasting errors 
(MFE). Divergence of opinions is measured by coefficient of variation (CV). Size is the market capitalization. Price is the price of stock at the end of the month. 
Volatility is the stock’s return volatility measured as squared stock return. Adj. R2 is the time-series average of the monthly adjusted R2. Wald Stat. is the Wald 
test statistic applied to examine the equality between the coefficients estimated during floor and electronic trading system. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) 
are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The coefficients of both PQSPR and PIMPACT regressions are multiplied by 100. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Panel A: Estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) without controlling variables. 
UK (London Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.033 
(0.93) 
0.141 
(0.21) 
0.003 
(0.61) 
0.050 
(1.09) 
-0.077 
(-1.09) 
0.170 
(1.24) 0.14 9.42*** 1.48 
AC 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.062 
(-0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.66) 
0.029 
(1.09) 
0.019 
(0.39) 
0.022 
(0.52) 1.27 2.80* 0.31 
MFE 
0.018 
(5.33) *** 
-0.006 
(-0.43) 
1.771E-04 
(0.62) 
0.006 
(0.82) 
0.023 
(2.54) ** 
0.030 
(1.19) 2.87* 10.63*** 1.39 
CV 
-0.006 
(-1.09) 
-0.005 
(-0.15) 
-3.470E-04 
(-0.57) 
0.032 
(1.03) 
-0.031 
(-2.52) ** 
0.034 
(0.79) 1.50 4.37** 0.63 
Adj. R2 (%) 1.38 1.90 2.63 0.38 1.15 0.47    
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Table 4.6 Panel A (continued) 
Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.024 
(0.26) 
-0.128 
(-0.97) 
0.002 
(0.61) 
0.471 
(0.88) 
-0.09 
(-0.70) 
0.006 
(1.09) 0.69 0.12 0.44 
AC 
0.006 
(0.20) 
0.045 
(0.99) 
6.768E-05 
(0.06) 
0.046 
(1.29) 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
-0.001 
(-0.36) 1.27 0.92 0.16 
MFE 
-0.003 
(-0.18) 
0.036 
(1.25) 
-4.190E-04 
(-0.75) 
0.121 
(1.15) 
-0.02 
(-1.03) 
-1.490E-04 
(-0.28) 1.39 8.70 0.26 
CV 
0.027 
(1.33) 
-0.042 
(-0.94) 
0.002 
(1.97)* 
0.099 
(0.74) 
-0.01 
(-0.37) 
0.002 
(1.76)* 0.29 2.25 0.00 
Adj. R2 (%) 0.90 -0.48 4.31 0.38 -0.22 -0.75    
Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-0.037 
(-1.73)* 
-0.071 
(-0.67) 
0.073 
(1.18) 
0.013 
(0.17) 
-11.769 
(-1.82)* 
-2.136 
(-0.07) 0.42 0.52 0.01 
AC 
-0.012 
(-2.00)** 
0.025 
(0.48) 
-0.021 
(-1.10) 
-0.004 
(-0.16) 
0.685 
(0.16) 
1.868 
(0.21) 0.42 0.17 0.05 
MFE 
0.005 
(0.95) 
3.240E-04 
(0.01) 
-0.015 
(-0.97) 
0.026 
(1.80)* 
6.002 
(1.74)* 
-0.829 
(-0.07) 3.03* 2.98* 0.01 
CV 
0.001 
(0.14) 
0.024 
(0.28) 
0.022 
(1.38) 
-0.012 
(-0.65) 
-10.750 
(-1.80)* 
0.516 
(0.06) 0.48 4.88** 0.00 
Adj. R2 (%) 0.71 3.59 4.05 1.21 2.66 1.14    
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Table 4.6 (continued) 
Panel B: Estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) with controlling variables. 
UK (London Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.063 
(1.41) 
-0.514 
(-1.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
0.031 
(0.60) 
-0.781 
(-7.15)*** 
0.190 
(1.36) 0.40 5.98** 1.86 
IAC 
-0.015 
(-3.78)*** 
0.020 
(0.44) 
-3.530E-04 
(-0.72) 
-0.047 
(-1.81)* 
-0.013 
(-0.3) 
0.037 
(0.92) 1.54 0.56 0.86 
MFE 
0.011 
(3.88)*** 
-0.018 
(-1.57) 
2.063E-05 
(0.08) 
-0.007 
(-0.53) 
-0.008 
(-0.85) 
0.018 
(1.17) 1.91 1.04 1.36 
CV 
-0.009 
(-2.13)** 
-0.068 
(-1.69)* 
-4.590E-04 
(-0.74) 
0.025 
(1.04) 
-0.055 
(-3.23) *** 
0.021 
(0.67) 1.98 0.57 0.47 
Size 
-0.004 
(-1.17) 
-0.024 
(-0.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.79) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
0.038 
(2.80) *** 
-0.002 
(-0.81) 0.66 21.06*** 0.32 
Price 
-0.012 
(-2.00)** 
0.048 
(1.64) 
0.001 
(1.03) 
-0.002 
(-0.23) 
0.031 
(1.66) * 
-0.014 
(-1.18) 1.74 0.79 1.51 
Volatility  
1.269 
(3.15)*** 
23.420 
(6.47)*** 
0.120 
(2.32)** 
0.716 
(1.89)* 
16.786 
(8.60) *** 
0.260 
(1.01) 2.13 11.56*** 0.29 
Adj. R2 (%) 5.63 7.49 5.63 2.83 7.57 1.70    
Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.025 
(0.22) 
1.115 
(0.82) 
-0.003 
(-0.62) 
0.209 
(0.42) 
-0.309 
(-0.82) 
-0.005 
(-0.39) 0.14 14.35*** 0.02 
IAC 
-0.021 
(-0.66) 
0.296 
(1.11) 
-0.001 
(-1.11) 
1.256 
(1.45) 
-0.203 
(-0.73) 
0.015 
(1.35) 2.16 3.20* 2.06 
MFE 
-0.008 
(-0.54) 
-0.138 
(-1.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.88) 
-0.080 
(-0.82) 
0.024 
(0.51) 
-0.002 
(-1.59) 0.55 11.67*** 1.51 
CV 
0.025 
(1.16) 
0.337 
(1.01) 
0.002 
(1.79)* 
0.942 
(1.15) 
-0.370 
(-1.02) 
0.015 
(1.13) 1.25 3.81* 1.03 
Size 
-0.006 
(-0.41) 
-0.174 
(-0.95) 
4.897E-06 
(0.01) 
-0.014 
(-0.76) 
0.055 
(1.16) 
-0.001 
(-0.44) 0.19 23.46*** 0.20 
Price 
0.005 
(0.42) 
0.140 
(1.04) 
0.001 
(1.65) 
0.342 
(0.98) 
-0.192 
(-0.88) 
0.007 
(1.01) 0.93 2.34 0.86 
Volatility  
2.574 
(1.43) 
17.285 
(2.68)*** 
0.304 
(3.63)*** 
-0.931 
(-1.45) 
30.348 
(8.65)*** 
0.082 
(1.09) 29.71*** 13.87*** 8.66*** 
Adj. R2 (%) 2.83 4.90 2.55 3.61 13.58 7.17    
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Table 4.6, Panel B (continued) 
Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-0.027 
(-1.14) 
-0.322 
(-2.14)** 
0.079 
(1.22) 
0.079 
(1.04) 
-0.598 
(-6.38)*** 
5.092 
(0.63) 1.93 8.67*** 0.38 
IAC 
0.008 
(0.39) 
0.110 
(0.83) 
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
0.035 
(1.03) 
0.107 
(1.38) 
-4.991 
(-1.14) 0.62 0.00 1.30 
MFE 
0.002 
(0.39) 
0.018 
(0.29) 
-0.017 
(-1.22) 
0.017 
(1.16) 
0.045 
(1.13) 
-0.964 
(-1.01) 1.02 0.46 0.99 
CV 
-0.004 
(-0.46) 
-0.071 
(-0.77) 
0.022 
(1.31) 
0.011 
(0.46) 
-0.126 
(-2.04)** 
2.315 
(1.25) 0.40 0.80 1.52 
Size 
0.004 
(1.33) 
0.032 
(1.17) 
-0.006 
(-1.01) 
-0.008 
(-0.75) 
0.037 
(2.26)** 
0.379 
(0.92) 1.23 0.12 0.88 
Price 
-0.011 
(-1.02) 
-0.059 
(-0.88) 
-0.008 
(-0.42) 
0.011 
(0.42) 
-0.014 
(2.26) 
-1.396 
(-0.7) 0.70 4.49** 0.48 
Volatility  
-0.034 
(-0.14) 
8.810 
(2.19)** 
-0.752 
(-1.13) 
-0.317 
(-0.77) 
14.717 
(6.56)*** 
-60.361 
(-0.28) 0.47 6.93*** 0.08 
Adj. R2 (%) 1.76 10.82 4.83 1.84 13.17 3.57    
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Appendices  
Supplementary empirical information 
 
Appendix 4A 
The testable hypotheses, their acceptance or rejection, and the justification 
Hypothesis Status (accepted/ rejected) The reason 
H1: information asymmetry between company managers and 
outsider investors has a significant negative effect on firm-specific 
liquidity. 
Accepted 
Information asymmetry is significantly and negatively (positively) 
related to turnover ratio (proportional bid-ask spread and price 
impact).  
H2: Divergence of opinion among investors has an insignificant 
effect on firm-specific liquidity. Rejected 
Divergence of opinion has a significant effect on turnover ratio, 
proportional bid-ask spread and price impact. 
H3: There is no significant difference in the impact of information 
asymmetry on firm-specific liquidity before and after the 
introduction of an electronic trading system. 
Rejected 
The size of the coefficients of information asymmetry measures is 
significantly different across trading systems / some of the 
coefficients become significant or insignificant after automation. 
H4: There is no significant difference in the impact of divergence of 
opinion among investors on firm-specific liquidity before and after 
the introduction of an electronic trading system. 
Rejected 
The size of the coefficients of divergence of opinion measures is 
significantly different across trading systems / some of the 
coefficients become significant or insignificant after automation. 
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Appendix 4B 
Fama-MacBeth estimates of the cross-sectional regression with market liquidity and industry liquidity as explanatory variables in the 
first-pass time-series regression 
This table represents time-series averages of individual stocks’ cross-sectional OLS regression coefficients for all securities in the UK, Switzerland and Germany 
during the two sub-sample periods, during the floor trading period and the electronic trading period, using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Panel A 
presents the estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) without controlling for the determinants of firm-specific liquidity. Panel B represents the 
estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) after controlling for other determinants of firm-specific liquidity. All measures are as defined in table 
4.1. Liquidity is measured by the proportional bid-ask spread (PQSPR), the turnover ratio (TOV), and the price impact (illiquidity ratio) (PIMPACT). Measures 
of information asymmetry include: analysts’ converge (AC), incremental analysts’ coverage (IAC) estimated using equation (4.1), and mean forecasting errors 
(MFE). Divergence of opinion is measured by coefficient of variation (CV). Size is the market capitalization. Price is the price of stock at the end of the month. 
Volatility is the stock’s return volatility measured as squared stock return. Adj. R2 is the time-series average of the monthly adjusted R2. Wald Stat. is the Wald 
test statistic applied to examine the equality between the coefficients estimated during floor and electronic trading systems. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) 
are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The coefficients of both PQSPR and PIMPACT regressions are multiplied by 100. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Panel A: Estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) without controlling variables. 
UK (London Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.027 
(0.84) 
-0.372 
(-1.06) 
0.003 
(0.81) 
0.046 
(1.07) 
-0.085 
(-1.35) 
0.110 
(1.07) 0.20 20.43*** 1.08 
AC 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
0.131 
(1.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.46) 
0.031 
(1.14) 
0.026 
(0.64) 
0.013 
(0.43) 1.38 6.57** 0.20 
MFE 
0.018 
(5.35)*** 
0.001 
(0.08) 
2.817E-04 
(0.98) 
0.006 
(0.87) 
0.022 
(2.65)*** 
0.017 
(1.05) 3.26* 6.28** 1.06 
CV 
-0.008 
(-1.68)* 
-0.005 
(-0.15) 
2.273E-04 
(0.46) 
0.032 
(1.05) 
-0.028 
(-2.19)** 
0.021 
(0.68) 1.74 3.10* 0.46 
Adj. R2 (%) 1.13 1.71 2.57 0.33 0.90 0.34    
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Appendix 4B, Panel A (continued) 
Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.030 
(0.38) 
-0.017 
(-0.16) 
-0.024 
(-1.26) 
0.472 
(0.91) 
-0.127 
(-1.27) 
0.005 
(1.12) 0.72 1.20 37.07*** 
AC 
0.002 
(0.06) 
0.008 
(0.20) 
0.006 
(1.43) 
0.034 
(0.94) 
0.044 
(1.41) 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 0.79 1.29 17.52*** 
MFE 
-0.004 
(-0.27) 
0.035 
(1.30) 
-0.001 
(-1.22) 
0.114 
(1.11) 
-0.020 
(-0.96) 
-1.170E-04 
(-0.23) 1.32 6.93*** 3.11* 
CV 
0.026 
(1.18) 
-0.040 
(-0.95) 
-0.004 
(-0.72) 
0.098 
(0.75) 
0.007 
(0.25) 
0.002 
(1.66)* 0.31 2.64 33.03*** 
Adj. R2 (%) 0.73 0.87 3.83 0.14 0.16 -0.76    
Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-0.038 
(-1.80)* 
0.017 
(0.17) 
0.011 
(0.15) 
0.024 
(0.29) 
-0.094 
(-1.57) 
-1.357 
(-0.04) 0.57 3.44* 0.00 
AC 
-0.013 
(2.23)** 
0.017 
(0.38) 
-0.004 
(-0.17) 
-0.014 
(-0.61) 
0.004 
(0.10) 
1.845 
(0.20) 1.36 0.11 0.04 
MFE 
0.007 
(1.40) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
-0.002 
(-0.08) 
0.016 
(1.08) 
0.049 
(1.64) 
-0.669 
(-0.06) 0.40 2.84* 0.00 
CV 
0.001 
(0.15) 
0.058 
(1.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
-0.013 
(-0.53) 
-0.091 
(-1.90) 
0.537 
(0.06) 0.33 9.70*** 0.00 
Adj. R2 (%) 1.09 2.20 5.00 0.59 1.70 1.24    
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Appendix 4B (continued) 
Panel B: Estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) with controlling variables. 
UK (London Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.058 
(1.37) 
-0.630 
(-1.75) * 
0.003 
(0.60) 
0.022 
(0.44) 
-0.772 
(-7.52) 
0.140 
(1.16) 0.50 1.93 1.29 
IAC 
-0.014 
(3.50) *** 
0.016 
(0.38) 
2.720E-04 
(0.47) 
-0.047 
(1.80)* 
-0.006 
(-0.15) 
0.014 
(0.50) 1.60 0.30 0.24 
MFE 
0.011 
(3.81) *** 
-0.011 
(-0.93) 
7.442E-05 
(0.26) 
-0.006 
(-0.52) 
-0.008 
(-0.98) 
0.008 
(0.95) 2.05 0.16 0.88 
CV 
-0.011 
(-2.65) *** 
-0.066 
(-1.69) * 
1.392E-05 
(0.03) 
0.026 
(1.09) 
-0.052 
(-3.04)*** 
0.013 
(0.54) 2.40 0.62 0.30 
Size 
-4.000E-03 
(-1.26) 
0.014 
(0.58) 
-3.540E-04 
(-0.75) 
-8.120E-04 
(-0.21) 
0.039 
(3.07)*** 
0.003 
(1.06) 0.70 3.97** 1.43 
Price 
-0.011 
(-1.95) * 
0.026 
(1.04) 
-9.890E-05 
(-0.15) 
1.533E-04 
(0.02) 
0.031 
(1.64)* 
-0.017 
(-1.09) 2.18 0.05 1.17 
Volatility  
1.255 
(3.29)*** 
21.366 
(6.51)*** 
0.085 
(1.70)* 
0.748 
(2.08)** 
16.329 
(8.54)*** 
0.140 
(0.38) 1.98 6.94*** 0.02 
Adj. R2 (%) 4.89 6.16 5.69 2.53 7.03 1.53    
Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.048 
(0.53) 
1.067 
(0.88) 
-0.028 
(-1.08) 
0.220 
(0.45) 
-0.172 
(-0.46) 
-0.004 
(-0.34) 0.12 10.91*** 4.70** 
IAC 
-0.028 
(-0.86) 
0.203 
(0.89) 
0.002 
(0.56) 
1.196 
(1.45) 
-0.252 
(-0.82) 
0.014 
(1.33) 2.19 2.19 1.39 
MFE 
-0.011 
(-0.77) 
-0.126 
(-1.10) 
-0.001 
(-1.22) 
-0.077 
(-0.82) 
0.024 
(0.47) 
-0.002 
(-1.48) 0.50 8.60*** 0.59 
CV 
0.027 
(1.17) 
0.307 
(1.05) 
-0.003 
(-0.63) 
0.876 
(1.17) 
-0.396 
(-0.99) 
0.014 
(1.15) 1.28 3.06* 1.93 
Size 
-0.008 
(-0.62) 
-0.162 
(-1.00) 
0.003 
(1.02) 
-0.013 
(-0.74) 
0.035 
(0.97) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 0.08 29.51*** 7.63*** 
Price 
0.002 
(0.21) 
0.128 
(1.09) 
3.5E-05 
(0.06) 
0.312 
(0.98) 
-0.201 
(-0.86) 
0.006 
(1.00) 0.95 1.99 1.00 
Volatility  
2.227 
(1.40) 
16.215 
(2.59) 
-0.042 
(-0.08) 
-1.579 
(-2.05)** 
30.644 
(8.39)*** 
0.041 
(0.67) 24.36*** 15.61*** 1.81 
Adj. R2 (%) 2.02 4.56 4.25 3.05 11.90 6.50    
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 Appendix 4B, Panel B (continued)  
Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-0.027 
(-1.20) 
-0.148 
(-1.25) 
0.030 
(0.39) 
0.050 
(0.65) 
-0.527 
(-5.71)*** 
6.159 
(0.88) 0.99 16.87*** 0.77 
IAC 
0.015 
(0.77) 
-0.004 
(-0.05) 
0.025 
(0.70) 
0.017 
(0.44) 
0.056 
(0.79) 
-6.309 
(-1.18) 0.00 0.71 1.41 
MFE 
0.004 
(0.67) 
0.013 
(0.27) 
-0.004 
(-0.21) 
0.014 
(1.00) 
0.034 
(1.00) 
-1.929 
(-1.11) 0.54 0.39 1.24 
CV 
-0.002 
(-0.16) 
-0.018 
(-0.34) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.028 
(-1.19) 
-0.103 
(-2.10)** 
4.422 
(1.20) 1.22 3.02* 1.43 
Size 
0.005 
(1.49) 
0.027 
(1.06) 
-0.010 
(-0.90) 
0.005 
(0.44) 
0.024 
(1.52) 
0.142 
(0.27) 0.00 0.04 0.08 
Price 
-0.011 
(-0.95) 
-0.069 
(-1.08) 
0.011 
(0.36) 
-0.047 
(-1.3) 
0.005 
(0.23) 
1.071 
(0.29) 0.99 10.92*** 0.08 
Volatility  
-0.095 
(-0.43) 
8.700 
(2.47)** 
-0.576 
(-0.72) 
-0.380 
(-0.63) 
14.421 
(7.25)*** 
-261.921 
(-0.75) 0.22 8.27*** 0.56 
Adj. R2 (%) 1.98 7.73 5.23 1.42 9.20 3.62    
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Appendix 4C 
Fama-MacBeth estimates of the cross-sectional regression with market liquidity, industry liquidity and market return as explanatory 
variables in the first-pass time-series regression 
This table represents time-series averages of individual stocks’ cross-sectional OLS regression coefficients for all securities in the UK, Switzerland and Germany 
during the two sub-sample periods, during the floor trading period and the electronic trading period, using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Panel A 
presents the estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) without controlling for the determinants of firm-specific liquidity. Panel B represents the 
estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) after controlling for other determinants of firm-specific liquidity. All measures are as defined in table 
4.1. Liquidity is measured by the proportional bid-ask spread (PQSPR), the turnover ratio (TOV), and the price impact (illiquidity ratio) (PIMPACT). Measures 
of information asymmetry include: analysts’ coverage (AC), incremental analysts’ coverage (IAC) estimated using equation (4.1) and mean forecasting errors 
(MFE). Divergence of opinions is measured by coefficient of variation (CV). Size is the market capitalization. Price is the price of stock at the end of the month. 
Volatility is the stock’s return volatility measured as squared stock return. Adj. R2 is the time-series average of the monthly adjusted R2. Wald Stat. is the Wald 
test statistic applied to examine the equality between the coefficients estimated during floor and electronic trading systems. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) 
are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The coefficients of both PQSPR and PIMPACT regressions are multiplied by 100. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Panel A: Estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) without controlling variables. 
UK (London Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.032 
(1.05) 
-0.484 
(-1.35) 
0.005 
(1.25) 
0.051 
(1.09) 
-0.101 
(-1.63) 
0.120 
(1.24) 0.17 37.78*** 1.40 
AC 
0.003 
(0.39) 
0.141 
(1.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.86) 
0.030 
(1.17) 
0.033 
(0.77) 
0.005 
(0.18) 1.13 6.55* 0.05 
MFE 
0.018 
(5.43)*** 
0.005 
(0.38) 
2.996E-04 
(1.02) 
0.011 
(2.44)** 
0.021 
(2.09)** 
0.015 
(0.97) 2.82* 2.51 0.90 
CV 
-0.007 
(-1.50) 
-0.029 
(-0.88) 
2.937E-04 
(0.60) 
0.028 
(1.01) 
-0.025 
(-1.90)* 
0.021 
(0.72) 1.59 0.09 0.50 
Adj. R2 (%) 1.10 1.69 2.48 0.33 0.75 0.30    
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 Appendix 4C, Panel A (continued) 
Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.074 
(0.88) 
-0.006 
(-0.06) 
-0.017 
(-0.52) 
0.477 
(0.96) 
-0.069 
(-0.67) 
0.009 
(1.90)* 0.65 0.37 31.18*** 
AC 
-0.005 
(-0.18) 
-0.023 
(-0.61) 
0.007 
(0.65) 
0.047 
(1.26) 
0.009 
(0.27) 
-0.001 
(-0.63) 1.93 0.92 24.83*** 
MFE 
-0.003 
(-0.23) 
0.027 
(1.04) 
-0.005 
(-0.87) 
0.117 
(1.16) 
-0.024 
(-1.12) 
2.585E-04 
(0.52) 1.41 5.49** 113.23*** 
CV 
0.026 
(1.14) 
-0.037 
(-0.95) 
0.004 
(0.94) 
0.101 
(0.81) 
0.008 
(0.27) 
0.002 
(2.29)** 0.36 2.45 5.38** 
Adj. R2 (%) 0.66 0.38 4.17 1.23 0.50 0.79    
Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-0.038 
(-1.81)* 
0.014 
(-0.12) 
-0.022 
(-0.10) 
0.048 
(0.23) 
-0.107 
(-1.83)* 
15.800 
(0.48) 1.20 4.26** 0.23 
AC 
-0.013 
(2.34)** 
0.013 
(0.30) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
-0.017 
(-0.70) 
0.012 
(0.31) 
-3.181 
(-0.31) 1.57 0.00 0.10 
MFE 
0.008 
(1.74)* 
0.013 
(0.59) 
-0.045 
(-1.15) 
0.002 
(0.15) 
0.045 
(1.55) 
-1.618 
(-0.14) 0.14 1.23 0.02 
CV 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
0.041 
(0.99) 
0.008 
(0.23) 
0.004 
(0.14) 
-0.084 
(-1.87)* 
0.257 
(0.03) 0.03 7.70*** 0.00 
Adj. R2 (%) 1.11 1.67 6.06 0.56 1.70 0.38    
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Appendix 4C (continue) 
Panel B: Estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) with controlling variables. 
UK (London Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.072 
(1.82)* 
-0.735 
(-2.11)** 
0.003 
(0.48) 
0.017 
(0.31) 
-0.802 
(-8.17)*** 
0.150 
(1.28) 1.03 0.47 1.59 
IAC 
-0.014 
(3.53)*** 
0.011 
(0.27) 
1.864E-04 
(0.32) 
-0.049 
(1.98)** 
-0.009 
(-0.23) 
0.016 
(0.60) 2.04 0.26 0.35 
MFE 
0.011 
(3.82)*** 
-0.008 
(-0.73) 
1.785E-04 
(0.59) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
-0.010 
(-1.26) 
0.007 
(0.84) 1.98 0.06 0.68 
CV 
-0.009 
(-2.39)** 
-0.079 
(-1.95)* 
1.723E-04 
(0.35) 
0.023 
(1.04) 
-0.049 
(-2.85)*** 
0.014 
(0.61) 2.13 3.08* 0.36 
Size 
-0.002 
(-0.75) 
0.017 
(0.74) 
-0.001 
(-2.14)** 
-4.870E-04 
(-0.13) 
0.037 
(2.50)** 
-5.690E-05 
(-0.02) 0.16 1.88 0.05 
Price 
-0.013 
(-2.36)** 
0.032 
(1.36) 
0.001 
(1.11) 
0.002 
(0.27) 
0.038 
(2.00)** 
-0.016 
(-0.95) 3.68* 0.08 1.00 
Volatility  
1.251 
(3.30)*** 
22.647 
(6.26)*** 
0.087 
(1.92)* 
0.744 
(2.09) 
16.213 
(8.45)*** 
0.190 
(0.46) 2.04 11.24*** 0.06 
Adj. R2 (%) 4.71 6.20 5.21 2.53 6.64 1.76    
Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.073 
(0.76) 
1.014 
(0.82) 
-0.019 
(-0.65) 
0.158 
(0.36) 
-0.202 
(-0.51) 
-3.890E-04 
(-0.04) 0.04 9.58*** 2.99* 
IAC 
-0.032 
(-1.01) 
0.206 
(0.87) 
-0.005 
(-0.50) 
1.141 
(1.44) 
-0.272 
(-0.84) 
0.013 
(1.23) 2.18 2.17 2.94* 
MFE 
-0.010 
(-0.67) 
-0.131 
(-1.10) 
-0.005 
(-0.78) 
-0.080 
(-0.86) 
0.029 
(0.54) 
-0.002 
(-1.32) 0.56 8.79*** 5.03** 
CV 
0.028 
(1.18) 
0.312 
(1.02) 
0.004 
(0.90) 
0.800 
(1.18) 
-0.416 
(-0.98) 
0.015 
(1.19) 1.29 2.95* 0.70 
Size 
-0.011 
(-0.83) 
-0.169 
(-1.01) 
2.712E-05 
(0.01) 
-0.017 
(-0.93) 
0.053 
(1.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.79) 0.10 42.59*** 0.66 
Price 
0.006 
(0.64) 
0.141 
(1.15) 
0.004 
(0.77) 
0.292 
(0.98) 
-0.222 
(-0.91) 
0.007 
(1.04) 0.92 2.21 0.22 
Volatility  
2.298 
(1.45) 
16.155 
(2.59)** 
-0.436 
(-0.95) 
-1.104 
(-1.61) 
31.184 
(8.27)*** 
0.025 
(0.34) 24.59*** 15.90*** 39.53*** 
Adj. R2 (%) 1.91 4.60 3.61 2.80 11.57 7.44    
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 Appendix 4C, Panel B (continued) 
Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-0.018 
(-0.79) 
-0.142 
(-1.20) 
-0.091 
(-0.42) 
0.054 
(0.66) 
-0.525 
(-6.39) 
19.273 
(1.48) 0.77 21.78 2.21 
IAC 
0.013 
(0.65) 
0.005 
(0.07) 
0.129 
(1.23) 
0.031 
(0.79) 
0.041 
(0.64) 
-7.527 
(-1.33) 0.22 0.31 1.84 
MFE 
0.004 
(0.81) 
0.031 
(0.76) 
-0.063 
(-1.54) 
0.002 
(0.10) 
0.031 
(0.95) 
-2.162 
(-0.80) 0.04 0.00 0.61 
CV 
-0.003 
(-0.30) 
-0.039 
(-0.91) 
-0.006 
(-0.15) 
-0.012 
(-0.51) 
-0.104 
(-2.15)** 
4.298 
(1.11) 0.15 1.78 1.24 
Size 
0.004 
(1.42) 
0.028 
(1.10) 
1.592E-04 
(0.01) 
0.007 
(0.47) 
0.027 
(1.74)* 
-1.222 
(-0.93) 0.03 0.01 0.87 
Price 
-0.013 
(-1.14) 
-0.077 
(-1.19) 
-0.033 
(-0.81) 
-0.045 
(-1.25) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
1.834 
(0.48) 0.80 10.39*** 0.24 
Volatility  
-0.133 
(-0.60) 
8.671 
(2.45)** 
0.881 
(0.62) 
-0.241 
(-0.42) 
14.271 
(7.18)*** 
-219.083 
(-0.64) 0.03 7.93*** 0.41 
Adj. R2 (%) 2.29 7.04 6.16 1.41 9.04 4.93    
 
8 Chapter Four: Information Asymmetry, Divergence of Opinion and Firm-specific Liquidity 
311 
 
Appendix 4D 
Fama-MacBeth estimates of the cross-sectional regression with market liquidity, industry liquidity, market return and industry return 
as explanatory variables in the first-pass time-series regression 
This table represents time-series averages of individual stocks’ cross-sectional OLS regression coefficients for all securities in the UK, Switzerland and Germany 
during the two sub-sample periods, during the floor trading period and the electronic trading period, using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Panel A 
presents the estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) without controlling for the determinants of firm-specific liquidity, Panel B represents the 
estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) after controlling for other determinants of firm-specific liquidity. All measures are as defined in table 
4.1. Liquidity is measured by the proportional bid-ask spread (PQSPR), the turnover ratio (TOV), and the price impact (illiquidity ratio) (PIMPACT). Measures 
of information asymmetry include: analysts’ coverage (AC), incremental analysts’ coverage (IAC) estimated using equation (4.1) and mean forecasting errors 
(MFE). Divergence of opinion is measured by coefficient of variation (CV). Size is the market capitalization. Price is the price of stock at the end of the month. 
Volatility is the stock’s return volatility measured as squared stock return. Adj. R2 is the time-series average of the monthly adjusted R2. Wald Stat. is the Wald 
test statistic applied to examine the equality between the coefficients estimated during floor and electronic trading systems. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) 
are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The coefficients of both PQSPR and PIMPACT regressions are multiplied by 100. *, **, *** denotes 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.  
Panel A: Estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) without controlling variables. 
UK (London Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.034 
(1.12) 
-0.633 
(-1.40) 
0.002 
(0.53) 
0.054 
(1.21) 
-0.101 
(-1.6) 
0.110 
(1.17) 0.21 70.43*** 1.32 
AC 
0.002 
(0.24) 
0.161 
(1.19) 
-1.530E-04 
(-0.12) 
0.029 
(1.09) 
0.031 
(0.69) 
0.003 
(0.09) 1.04 8.35*** 0.01 
MFE 
0.020 
(5.63)*** 
0.010 
(0.85) 
1.219E-05 
(0.04) 
0.011 
(2.55)** 
0.020 
(1.90)* 
0.012 
(0.80) 3.50* 0.99 0.64 
CV 
-0.008 
(-1.76)* 
-0.062 
(-1.68)* 
0.001 
(1.06) 
0.027 
(1.00) 
-0.026 
(-2.11)** 
0.020 
(0.68) 1.69 8.51*** 0.44 
Adj. R2 (%) 1.08 1.82 2.67 0.33 0.77 0.24    
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 Appendix 4D, Panel A (continued) 
Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.055 
(0.65) 
0.102 
(0.68) 
0.087 
(1.18) 
0.435 
(0.95) 
-0.030 
(-0.3) 
0.007 
(1.35) 0.68 1.76 275.55*** 
AC 
-0.005 
(-0.18) 
-0.051 
(-1.03) 
-0.021 
(-1.08) 
0.049 
(1.25) 
0.007 
(0.23) 
5.885E-05 
(0.04) 1.89 3.50* 180.74*** 
MFE 
-0.009 
(-0.63) 
0.012 
(0.49) 
-0.002 
(-0.49) 
0.112 
(1.17) 
-0.020 
(-0.96) 
4.315E-04 
(0.87) 1.60 2.45 23.77*** 
CV 
0.024 
(0.99) 
-0.014 
(-0.38) 
0.021 
(1.7)* 
0.091 
(0.78) 
0.016 
(0.58) 
0.002 
(2.05)** 0.33 1.14 428.48*** 
Adj. R2 (%) 0.62 1.45 1.76 1.17 0.67 0.95    
Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-0.028 
(-1.35) 
0.041 
(0.43) 
-0.302 
(-1.19) 
0.074 
(0.90) 
-0.081 
(-1.38) 
17.042 
(0.49) 1.53 4.33 0.24 
AC 
0.009 
(1.58) 
0.016 
(0.35) 
0.051 
(0.69) 
-0.019 
(-0.74) 
0.007 
(0.18) 
-4.016 
(-0.37) 1.22 0.04 0.14 
MFE 
0.007 
(1.60) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
-0.032 
(-0.48) 
0.013 
(0.83) 
0.037 
(1.43) 
-3.683 
(-0.30) 0.13 2.21 0.09 
CV 
-0.002 
(-0.29) 
0.067 
(1.39) 
-0.077 
(-0.83) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
-0.073 
(-1.79)* 
1.125 
(0.12) 0.00 11.82*** 0.02 
Adj. R2 (%) 0.65 1.91 6.22 0.65 1.70 0.79    
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Appendix 4D (continued) 
Panel B: Estimates of the second-pass cross-sectional equation (4.6) with controlling variables. 
UK (London Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.070 
(1.82)* 
-0.852 
(-2.06)** 
-1.690E-04 
(-0.03) 
0.017 
(0.33) 
-0.790 
(-8.01)*** 
0.130 
(1.13) 1.08 0.39 0.42 
IAC 
-0.012 
(3.27)*** 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
-2.180E-04 
(-0.37) 
-0.051 
(2.03)** 
-0.005 
(-0.12) 
0.017 
(0.64) 2.36 0.00 0.30 
MFE 
0.012 
(4.18)*** 
-0.007 
(-0.60) 
-7.170E-05 
(-0.24) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.010 
(-1.18) 
0.005 
(0.54) 2.43 0.12 0.34 
CV 
-0.011 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.105 
(-2.15)** 
4.217E-04 
(0.86) 
0.021 
(1.03) 
-0.049 
(-3.02)*** 
0.013 
(0.60) 2.45 12.03*** 0.31 
Size 
-0.002 
(-0.8) 
0.022 
(0.86) 
-0.001 
(-1.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
0.037 
(2.58)** 
-0.003 
(-0.68) 0.04 1.13 0.51 
Price 
-0.012 
(-2.3)** 
0.031 
(1.21) 
0.001 
(1.32) 
0.003 
(0.32) 
0.037 
(1.92)* 
-0.011 
(-0.65) 3.52* 0.08 0.27 
Volatility  
1.309 
(3.63)*** 
21.665 
(6.29)*** 
0.079 
(1.83)* 
0.764 
(2.14)** 
15.998 
(8.37)*** 
0.300 
(0.70) 2.34 8.78***  
Adj. R2 (%) 4.61 5.82 4.67 2.49 6.55 1.65    
Switzerland (Swiss Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
0.047 
(0.48) 
0.994 
(0.81) 
0.084 
(1.09) 
0.121 
(0.3) 
-0.157 
(-0.4) 
-0.002 
(-0.19) 0.03 8.50*** 60.27*** 
IAC 
-0.029 
(-0.87) 
0.193 
(0.90) 
-0.012 
(-1.4) 
1.130 
(1.44) 
-0.273 
(-0.87) 
0.014 
(1.34) 2.20 2.18 6.29** 
MFE 
-0.016 
(-1.07) 
-0.124 
(-1.09) 
-0.002 
(-0.41) 
-0.085 
(-0.91) 
0.029 
(0.55) 
-0.002 
(-1.16) 0.55 8.31*** 0.07 
CV 
0.025 
(1.01) 
0.292 
(1.01) 
0.020 
(1.62) 
0.778 
(1.17) 
-0.394 
(-0.96) 
0.014 
(1.17) 1.27 2.80* 0.18 
Size 
-0.011 
(-0.83) 
-0.156 
(-0.98) 
-0.009 
(-1.38) 
-0.019 
(-1.11) 
0.042 
(1.30) 
-4.640E-04 
(-0.41) 0.23 37.44*** 55.96*** 
Price 
0.007 
(0.75) 
0.120 
(1.09) 
0.002 
(0.60) 
0.290 
(0.98) 
-0.208 
(-0.88) 
0.006 
(1.01) 0.92 1.92 0.41 
Volatility  
2.213 
(1.38) 
15.846 
(2.54)** 
-0.039 
(-0.03) 
-0.808 
(-1.42) 
31.150 
(8.25)*** 
-0.025 
(-0.51) 28.40*** 16.41*** 0.07 
Adj. R2 (%) 1.63 4.51 4.42 2.72 11.30 7.04    
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 Appendix 4D, Panel B (continued) 
Germany (Frankfurt Stock Exchange) 
 Floor Trading system Electronic Trading system Wald Stat. 
Explanatory\Dependent PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT PQSPR TOV PIMPACT 
Constant 
-0.016 
(-0.69) 
-0.137 
(-1.16) 
-0.278 
(-0.95) 
0.021 
(0.24) 
-0.502 
(-7.17) 
0.109 
(0.76) 0.18 27.16 0.61 
IAC 
0.013 
(0.72) 
-0.017 
(-0.22) 
-0.268 
(2.25)** 
-0.011 
(-0.27) 
0.026 
(0.44) 
-0.096 
(-2.04)** 0.34 0.55 4.43** 
MFE 
0.004 
(0.75) 
0.018 
(0.4) 
-0.048 
(-0.69) 
0.014 
(1.04) 
0.024 
(0.82) 
-0.026 
(-0.81) 0.56 0.04 0.64 
CV 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
-0.007 
(-0.14) 
-0.099 
(-0.99) 
-0.030 
(-1.07) 
-0.089 
(-2.01)** 
0.044 
(1.11) 1.08 3.41* 1.28 
Size 
0.002 
(0.66) 
0.027 
(1.06) 
0.003 
(0.10) 
0.006 
(0.41) 
0.023 
(1.52) 
-0.006 
(-0.53) 0.07 0.08 0.28 
Price 
-0.006 
(-0.65) 
-0.061 
(-0.93) 
-0.035 
(-0.69) 
-0.042 
(-0.97) 
0.008 
(0.39) 
0.029 
(0.75) 0.69 10.59*** 0.58 
Volatility  
-0.049 
(-0.23) 
8.926 
(2.36)** 
-1.310 
(-0.60) 
0.574 
(0.84) 
14.650 
(7.42)*** 
-1.865 
(-0.59) 0.82 8.40*** 0.34 
Adj. R2 (%) 2.08 6.09 5.90 1.54 8.95 5.37    
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5 Chapter Five 
Summary and Conclusions  
 
5.1   Overview   
 
This thesis investigates empirically the effects of the introduction of automated trading 
systems on liquidity related issues. As indicated in the introduction, the movement towards 
automating trading systems in many stock exchanges, and the continuous debate on the 
benefits or otherwise of floor versus electronic trading systems, emphasizes the necessity 
for further empirical research. Therefore, this thesis has examined, both before and after 
automation, three empirical issues related to liquidity: identifying the determinants of time-
series variation in market-wide liquidity and its time-series behaviour; the pricing of 
market-wide and firm-specific liquidity in asset returns; and finally, the relation of firm-
specific liquidity with information asymmetry between company managers and outsider 
investors and with the divergence of opinion among investors.  
 
Through exploring these issues, this thesis contributes to our knowledge in market 
microstructure, and in particular to the literature on market structure and design, through 
examining how changes in the structure of trading systems may affect the impact of 
underlying factors and economic forces on liquidity, and the implications of liquidity in 
asset pricing, for a sample of European stock exchanges. Furthermore, this thesis also 
contributes to our knowledge of the determinants of market-wide liquidity by providing 
out-of-sample evidence from four European stock exchanges, by examining the factors that 
are responsible for the time-series variation in market-wide liquidity and analyzing its time-
series behaviour, in other markets such as the Swiss Stock Exchange, the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange, the Vienna Stock Exchange and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. It also 
contributes to the literature on liquidity and asset pricing, by providing out-of-sample 
evidence in relation to US studies by shedding light on the importance of liquidity in asset 
pricing for the UK, Swiss, and German markets. A further contribution of this thesis to the 
literature on liquidity and asset pricing is reflected in the methodology which investigates 
the pricing of both market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity in asset returns using a
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 conditional asset pricing model (i.e. the framework of Avramov and Chordia, 2006a). 
Finally, this thesis contributes to the literature on market microstructure and specifically to 
the literature on liquidity by providing, for the first time, new evidence concerning the 
implications of information asymmetry between a firm’s managers and outsider investors 
and on the implications of divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity for the three 
major European stock markets: the UK, Swiss and German markets.    
 
5.2   Summary of the Findings  
 
As stated earlier, the objective of this thesis is to examine various empirical issues related 
to liquidity before and after the automation of trading systems. Chapter two identifies the 
factors and the underlying forces that are responsible for the time-series variation in 
market-wide liquidity, and investigates the time-series behaviour of market-wide liquidity 
(i.e. the regularities in market-wide liquidity during the week, around holidays and around 
the announcement of major macroeconomic indicators such as GDP, CPI and 
unemployment rates). This is explored for the Swiss Stock Exchange, the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange, the Vienna Stock Exchange and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The 
determinants and their expected relationships to market-wide liquidity have been specified 
based upon theoretical paradigms in market microstructures (i.e. inventory and information 
asymmetry models). The results overwhelmingly confirm most of the predicted 
relationships. More specifically, the results show that, on either one or both trading 
systems, market variables are significantly related to market-wide liquidity: up market 
(down market) is positively (negatively) related to trading activity and down market is 
negatively related to bid-ask spreads and price impact measures, recently rising market and 
recently falling market (i.e. recent market trends) are respectively negatively and positively 
related to trading activity measures, and recent market volatility, in most cases, has a 
significantly negative effect on market liquidity. The findings also show that interest rate 
measures (i.e. short-term interest rate, the term spread, and the quality spread) significantly 
influence market liquidity. The short-term rate and the quality spread are negatively related 
to market liquidity. However, while the term spread has a significantly negative effect on 
market liquidity in the Swiss Stock Exchange, it has a significantly positive effect on 
10 Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusions 
317 
 
market liquidity in the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. 
With respect to the main objective, the evidence shows that the impact of these factors on 
market-wide liquidity is different before and after automation. That is, in most cases the 
impact of market-wide liquidity determinants such as concurrent market returns, recent 
market trends, volatility, term spread and quality spread, decreases after the automation of 
the trading system in all markets except the Frankfurt stock exchange, where the impact of 
these factors became more pronounced following its changeover. 
 
Moreover, consistent with the results from US studies, the results show that there is a 
distinct day-of-the-week effect in market-wide liquidity in all markets. We find that while 
liquidity increases on Fridays only in the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the Vienna Stock 
Exchange, it declines on Mondays in all markets. In addition, liquidity shows a distinct 
pattern around holidays. It declines (increases) around holidays in the Swiss Stock 
Exchange and the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (the Frankfurt Stock Exchange). 
Furthermore, the patterns of market-wide liquidity during the week and around holidays 
exist on either one or both trading systems. However, these patterns are different before and 
after automation. For example, on Mondays market liquidity on the floor trading system for 
all markets is lower than that on the electronic trading system. In addition, around holidays 
market liquidity is lower (higher) on the electronic trading system of the Amsterdam Stock 
Exchange (the Frankfurt Stock Exchange). Finally, with regards to the effect of the 
announcement of macroeconomic indicators, which has only been examined for the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange where the data on the announcement of macroeconomic 
indicators is only available for that market, the results show that market-wide liquidity is 
influenced by the announcement of GDP, CPI and unemployment rates before and after 
automation, and their impact on market liquidity is different under both types of trading 
systems. For instance, market-wide liquidity decreases (increases) on a floor trading system 
on the day of the announcement of GDP (unemployment rate). 
 
In relation to the second issue - the pricing of liquidity in asset returns - chapter three 
examines the importance of market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity in asset 
pricing before and after automation. More specifically, this chapter examines whether 
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market-wide liquidity is a priced risk factor, and whether firm-specific liquidity has any 
additional premium after controlling for all risk factors including market liquidity risk. 
Then, this analysis is extended to investigate how the changeover might affect the impact of 
liquidity on asset returns. To examine this issue, the model of Avramov and Chordia 
(2006a) has been estimated for the two sub-samples periods, pre- and post- automation. The 
findings provide evidence which suggests that, on either one or both trading systems, both 
market-wide and firm-specific liquidity have a significant impact on stocks’ returns (i.e. are 
priced on asset returns). This implies that investors will ask for a premium for bearing 
market liquidity risk as well as for a premium for carrying less liquid stocks. Our results 
show that the impact of liquidity, market-wide and firm-specific, on stock returns during 
the floor trading period is different than that during the electronic trading period. For 
example, the results show that the impact of market liquidity on excess return is strong in 
the post-automation period for the UK market compared to the Swiss and German markets, 
where the impact of liquidity is strong in the pre-automation period. Furthermore, generally 
the premium on firm-specific liquidity in the Swiss market during floor trading is higher 
than that during electronic trading, while in the German market firm-specific liquidity has a 
higher premium on electronic trading systems. Finally, the results provide strong evidence 
that market liquidity is priced when beta is fixed (i.e. unconditional asset pricing model) 
and when beta is allowed to vary with default spread. However, the evidence is weak when 
beta is allowed to vary with firm-characteristics. This implies that investors become more 
concerned about liquidity if economic conditions have changed, because market liquidity is 
expected to be low and the probability for liquidation is expected to be higher when 
economic conditions turn sour.  
 
Finally, chapter four examines the impact of information asymmetry between company 
managers and outside investors, and the implications of divergence of opinion on firm-
specific liquidity pre- and post- automation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
time that these implications are addressed and examined explicitly. We expect that stocks 
with a high level of information asymmetries and divergence of opinion could represent a 
high level of uncertainty about a firm’s future prospects, and thus result in a high level of 
risk. This could affect both the inventory holding costs and information asymmetry costs 
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for investors and market makers, which will then negatively affect firm-specific liquidity. 
The majority of the results for both univariate and multivariate analyses confirm our 
prediction regarding the relation between information asymmetry and firm-specific 
liquidity. The results show that, before and after automation, there is a significant negative 
relationship between the level of information asymmetry and firm-specific liquidity, i.e. 
there is no effect of automation on the relationship between information asymmetry and 
firm-specific liquidity. This implies that firms with a low level of information asymmetry 
between company managers and investors are those with high liquidity. In contrast, the 
results provide mixed evidence regarding the relationship between liquidity and divergence 
of opinion. We find that divergence of opinion is positively related to all measures of 
liquidity during the two sub-samples periods, before and after automation. That is, while 
the positive relation between divergence of opinion and both proportional bid-ask spread 
and price impact support the risk view of divergence of opinion, the positive relation 
between divergence of opinion and turnover ratio supports the optimistic view. Even 
though there is a significant relation between firm-specific liquidity and both information 
asymmetry and divergence of opinion under both trading systems, the results show that the 
impact of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity on 
floor trading systems is different from that on electronic trading systems. That is, the results 
show that in most cases for all markets, the impact of information asymmetry (divergence 
of opinion) on firm-specific liquidity on floor (electronic) trading systems is lesser than that 
on electronic (floor) trading systems. This implies that different trading systems could 
affect differently the informational environment of firms, and thus affect the impact of 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion on liquidity.   
 
We also examined whether information asymmetry and divergence of opinion that results 
from firm-specific information have any incremental effect on firm-specific liquidity, after 
allowing for the impact of both market-wide and industry-wide information. To examine 
this issue, the ideas of Brennan et al. (1998) and Avramov and Chordia (2006a) model have 
been used. In this model, stock excess returns are adjusted to risk factors through running 
time-series regression of stock excess returns on asset pricing risk factors. Then the 
unexplained variation in stock returns (i.e. risk adjusted returns), which is represented by 
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the sum of the constant and the residual of first-pass time-series regressions, is used as a 
dependent variable in cross-sectional regressions. Through applying this approach, 
however, we control the variation in firm-specific liquidity for market-wide and industry-
wide information by running time-series regression of firm-specific liquidity on market-
wide and industry-wide factors. Then, the unexplained part of firm-specific liquidity is 
regressed in cross-sectional regression using a set of explanatory variables including 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion proxies. The great majority of the results 
show that the impact of information asymmetry and divergence of opinion is statistically 
insignificant before and after automation of trading systems. This implies that market 
factors and industry factors were able to explain the variation in firm-specific liquidity, and 
thus capture the cross-sectional impact of information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion proxies on firm-specific liquidity. This finding puts into question the role and the 
type of information provided by financial analysts: do they depend on firm-specific 
information or public information to provide recommendations to the market? Such a 
question deserves further investigation. 
 
5.3   Implications  
 
The findings of this thesis should be of particular interest to market participants such as 
investors, company managers and market designers and regulators. The results of our 
research should provide these parties with new insights into the implications of floor and 
electronic trading systems on liquidity and on its relation with its determinants and asset 
returns. In particular, the evidence in chapter two shows that market-wide liquidity is 
influenced by several factors, and that there is day-of-the-week regularities in market-wide 
liquidity. It also shows that the impact of factors on market-wide liquidity and the daily 
regularities in liquidity in floor trading systems is different than that in electronic trading 
systems. This finding will be useful for investor and portfolio managers and help to guide 
their trading strategies, to coincide their trading with the time and the place (i.e. either floor 
or electronic trading) in which market liquidity is expected to be high.  This will help them 
to achieve higher profits through avoiding high transaction costs, which may result when 
the market becomes illiquid during adverse market and macroeconomic conditions.  
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This evidence, in addition to the evidence in chapter three on liquidity and asset pricing 
will help both investors and managers to manage their portfolios even more efficiently. The 
findings in chapter three indicate that market-wide liquidity and firm-specific liquidity are 
priced differently on floor trading systems compared to electronic trading systems. 
Therefore, portfolio managers and investors can know the amount of the premium required 
on market liquidity risk and firm-specific liquidity and thus guide their investment 
decisions, through balancing the expected trading costs against expected returns. 
Additionally, the work in chapter four on information asymmetry and divergence of 
opinion may also be a useful factor in the decision-making process of investors and 
portfolio managers who try to select the right stocks to trade in and hold in their portfolios. 
They will direct their attention towards selecting stocks that expose them to low levels of 
risk and uncertainty, which are the stocks with low levels of information asymmetry and 
divergence of opinion. In brief, the evidence provided in this thesis is expected to be of 
great importance and interest in the investment spectrum. 
 
Company managers (i.e. financial managers) and policymakers are also expected to benefit 
from the findings of this thesis. For companies that are considering raising more external 
capital or going public, the access into financial markets and raising cash will be easier, and 
liquidity risk on the aftermarket for initial public offering will be lower during the time 
when the market is highly liquid. The findings of chapter two suggest that financial 
managers should base such decisions on some input variables such as market factors and 
macroeconomic variables, to decide the right time to gain access into the market. Also, the 
findings concerning the relationship between liquidity and asset returns could provide 
financial managers with new insights into the question of their financial management 
policies: if a firm’s stocks are less liquid, financial managers are required to implement new 
liquidity-increasing financial policies to improve the liquidity of their stocks and thus 
reduce the firm’s opportunity cost of capital.  
 
A further policy implication of this thesis is related to corporate information disclosure 
policy. One of the corporate policies and decisions that financial managers could pay more 
attention to is the improvement of the information disclosure policy. A poor disclosure 
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policy might be the reason for deteriorating stocks’ liquidity, especially when investors are 
reluctant to hold or trade in stocks having low levels and poor quality firm-specific 
information being available to the market. Therefore, a firm’s executives will make 
decisions to invest more in investors’ relations activities in order to improve the quality of 
disclosure policy. This will result in a lower level of information asymmetry between 
company managers and outside investors and thus reduce the level of divergence of opinion 
among investors. Consequently, as shown by the evidence in the last chapter, this will 
improve a firm’s liquidity, which ultimately leads to a lower cost of capital and then an 
increase in the amount of capital raised by gaining easy access to financial markets.  
 
Finally, the empirical research carried out throughout this thesis shows that different 
trading systems have important implications on the market microstructure characteristic - 
liquidity, on its economic relation with the factors that are responsible for its time-series 
variation, on its relation with asset returns, and on its relation with information asymmetry 
and divergence of opinion. This provides useful references to exchange regulators and 
designers in other markets, which have already introduced or are considering introducing 
an electronic trading system, on the possible success of such a changeover, and whether 
further regulations and policy procedures are required to maintain the efficient functioning 
of the market within the new trading system.  For example, if after the introduction of 
electronic trading systems, market-wide liquidity exhibits a strong response to other market 
factors and macroeconomic variables, or if market liquidity is highly priced and a higher 
premium is required by investors on stocks traded on the automated trading system, then 
more regulations are required to improve the mechanism of supplying liquidity in the new 
trading system, especially during the periods of a negative market and macroeconomic 
shocks. Furthermore, the difference in the impact of information asymmetry and divergence 
of opinion on firm-specific liquidity before and after the automation of trading systems, as 
shown in the last chapter, will help regulators to take the necessary actions to improve the 
informational efficiency of the trading system, where liquidity is highly influenced by 
information asymmetry and divergence of opinion.  
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5.4 Future Research  
 
Although this thesis has investigated significant issues in relation to market structure and 
design and its implications for various market microstructure-related issues, there are some 
obvious issues awaiting future research that have not been addressed in this thesis due to 
space, time constraints and data availability restrictions. This section aims to provide some 
suggestions that could be helpful in enhancing the knowledge of both academics and 
practitioners concerning various issues related to market microstructure. For instance, in 
relation to the determinants of market-wide liquidity and its time-series behaviour, an 
examination of this issue for other financial markets, especially the emerging markets, 
could be an important extension of the research undertaken here. These markets are 
characterized by higher illiquidity (i.e. lower liquidity) and volatility. They have also 
undergone structural changes that may affect liquidity such as equity market liberalization, 
which may drive up liquidity (see Lesmond, 2005; Bekaert et al., 2007). This may affect 
the degree of response of market-wide liquidity to various factors and macroeconomic 
forces. This would enhance our understanding and provide additional verification of the 
underlying factors and economic forces that are responsible for the time-series variation in 
market-wide liquidity and its time-series behaviour, and in particular, could be of great 
importance for market participants and regulators.   
 
The empirical analysis of chapter three (i.e. the second empirical chapter) could be 
extended to markets other than equity markets, such as bond markets. Studies that examine 
the role of liquidity in asset pricing for bond markets are rare, so our knowledge about the 
pricing for liquidity and its implications on expected returns in debt securities markets is 
limited. The availability of sufficient and reliable data that spans a long time period for 
other European markets or Asian markets could for example, provide new insights into the 
role of liquidity in asset pricing using the methodologies adopted here.  The inclusion of a 
larger variety of markets would provide us with wider evidence of how liquidity will be 
priced in different markets with different institutional features that could possibly affect the 
mechanism of providing liquidity and thus its pricing process.  
 
10 Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusions 
324 
 
The research undertaken in this thesis concerning the impact of information asymmetry and 
divergence of opinion on firm-specific liquidity certainly has further scope for future 
research. It has been argued that the level of information asymmetry between company 
managers and outside investors (measured by the number of analysts following the firm) 
represents a source of risk (i.e. uncertainty about a firm’s future prospects), which is 
perceived by investors in the form of high inventory risk. Thus, further research could 
analyze the impact of analysts following on the costs components of bid-ask spread, 
especially the inventory cost component and the information asymmetry component. This 
could provide further confirmation as to whether financial analysts are informed traders or 
only represent a channel for disseminating information about firms.  
 
Finally, since this thesis analyses different issues relating to liquidity under different 
trading systems, similar research could be undertaken for alternative market structures such 
as quote-driven versus order-driven markets and call-auction versus continuous-auction 
mechanisms. In these alternative market structures, the provision and supply mechanism of 
liquidity is different and this could affect the relation of liquidity with its determinants and 
perhaps affect its impact on asset returns. Furthermore, due to the data availability, the 
analysis undertaken in this thesis has relied on using daily data. Thus, an obvious extension 
of the research undertaken in this thesis is that similar research could be conducted using 
high frequency data (i.e. transaction data). 
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